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Abstract 
Social practice theories help challenge the often hidden paradigms, worldviews and values at 
the basis of many unsustainable practices. However, practice theoretical research can 
struggle to provide effective results for policymaking. Connected to social practices, 
discourses and their boundaries define what is seen as possible, what the range of issues 
and their solutions are. By exploring the connections between practices and discourses - 
where paradigms, worldviews and values are represented through cognitive frames – this 
thesis develops, firstly, a conceptual approach to help enable purposive change in 
unsustainable social practices. This is done in an interdisciplinary manner integrating 
different literatures. Secondly, the thesis takes meat and the current meat system as a 
central theme. Radical transformation towards new meatways is arguably necessary, as 
explored in this thesis in detail, yet complex psychological, ideological and power related 
mechanisms currently slow down and inhibit change. 
Notable for the practice-discourse framework is that it allows a focus, on the one hand, on 
existing strategic ignorance of conflicting values, emotions and knowledges, and on the 
other hand, on the potential for discursive consciousness of practices, and their related 
(conflicting) values, emotions and knowledges. The wider, the more varied and in-depth 
discourses there are, the more difficult strategic ignorance is to maintain. Discursive 
consciousness can create discursively open practices which may be well established and 
discursively dominant in a society, but nonetheless, increasingly questioned, creating 
tensions and potential openings to different ways of going about the practices. Especially 
significant in such discursively open practices can be different and new meanings replacing, 
or co-occurring alongside old meanings. Discourses disseminate new meanings and potential 
new ways of doing things to a wider social group or society. Discursive consciousness can be 
seen as a key concept for purposive change. Further, it may better enable change in the 
context of distributed agentive power residing within the practice-discourse arrangement. A 
positive feedback loop may emerge between collective individual action creating political 
change, and political change changing both individual and societal values.   
Taking the widened, and interdisciplinary version of a social practice theory approach to 
meat eating related practices, the thesis examines discourses related to the new meatways, 
firstly flexitarianism, and secondly, eating cell-based or plant-based meats, or insects. 
Cognitive frames can work as a focus of practice theoretical analysis especially due to their 
connections to values, emotions and knowledge on the side of practices. Discourse data can 
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be used to investigate some of the underlying issues to do with controversial practices, or 
practices that are established, but being questioned. Discourses can reveal much about the 
values, emotions, knowledge, paradigms, and worldviews linked to social practices, as well 
as potential coping mechanisms, such as strategic ignorance of related conflicts.  The second 
research goal for the thesis is to answer a more specific question related to the new 
meatways and discourses around them potentially enabling a purposive transformation. This 
is done by analysing recent online discourses from the UK-based Guardian newspaper. 
The analyzed data suggests that meat eating related practices can be seen as discursively 
open, especially due to the new meatways offering new solutions, as compared to 
vegetarianism and veganism. Discourses regarding cell-based or plant-based meat or insects 
push the boundaries of what meat is, and seeing strong flexitarianism as a realistic meatway 
helps imagine a solution to finding sufficient future protein for the world. Further, discourses 
around the new meatways can reveal somewhat hidden frames that have supported existing 
practices in the last decades. Two conceptual metaphors present in the data nail down well 
two issues regarding transforming the meat system towards radically less, or no intensive 
production, with the goal of radically lower negative impacts. The first metaphor, the hungry 
beast, addresses the still very present meat demand paradigm or frame in need of critical 
reassessment. The new meats (cell- based, plant-based meat and insects) are partially 
functioning in this frame with the underlining assumption that they are necessary to satisfy 
the starkly increasing demand for meat. The second metaphor of a journey illustrates how 
sustainable ways of eating protein, including some more conventional meat, can be realized. 
When framing meat eating and its transformation using this metaphor, different meatways 
are seen as points on a continuum, where many possible journeys along that continuum can 
be made. In this way even more radical changes can be facilitated. Finally, compared to the 
old meatways, the new meatways can better align values related to sustainability with 
values often being prioritized in daily food related practices, such as providing for family, 
convenience, tradition, freedom, politeness, and pleasure. The new meatways therefore 
offer a way to expand the discourse, away from the conventional animal-based meat vs. no 
meat dichotomy. 
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1. Introduction 
This thesis is concerned with the issue of change as regards unsustainable social practices, 
taking meat and the current meat system as central examples and a theme. In this chapter, I 
will first introduce my focus and my motivation for doing this research. Subsequently, I will 
explain my research approach and goals for this work, and finally, briefly present the overall 
structure of the thesis. 
1.1. Framing and objectives for the work 
The enormous global system created to produce human food from non-human animals is 
argued to be the number one single cause of climate change and biodiversity loss, the two 
most urgent interlinked crises humanity is facing in the 21st century. Additionally, it causes 
many other serious problems. Whether such a fundamental practice to humans as eating 
other animals (Zaraska, 2016a) can be ended remains to be seen, but it is certainly possible 
to radically change this practice. Even if extremely challenging, it is arguably necessary to 
radically alter current system of meat production and consumption - in short, the meat 
system - and go back to eating meat only occasionally on more or less a global basis, 
supplementing, or replacing conventional animal-based meat with either meat-like or non-
meat-like plant proteins. Without such changes, the dual crises cannot be sufficiently 
tackled, as is increasingly argued (Davis et al., 2016; Garnett, 2011; GRAIN-IATP, 2018; Johns 
Hopkins Center for a Livable Future, 2018; Springmann et al., 2018). The next chapter will 
discuss the many reasons to transform the meat system, but one of the most compelling 
ones is that the amount of greenhouse gases (GHGs) produced by the meat and dairy system 
in a business-as-usual growth scenario - regarding global population, per capita meat and 
dairy consumption, and the related emissions - would comprise four fifths (81%) of the 
global carbon budget for the 1.5 degree scenario for 2050 (GRAIN-IATP, 2018).1 
The question of meat is related to the more general question of especially environmental 
sustainability.2 Taking a social practice approach, whereby practices are the focus of inquiry, 
                                                          
1
 This proportion takes the current contribution to global GHG emissions of the meat system to be 14.5% (FAO, 
2013). The next chapter will discuss this contribution issue some more. 
2
 The concept of sustainability is usually considered to include economic, social and environmental 
components. This thesis focuses on the environmental component. It can be considered a prerequisite for the 
other two components. 
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rather than consumers and their supposedly malleable behaviour, Shove and Spurling (2013) 
argue that achieving sustainability requires a radical redefinition of what counts as normal 
within social practices, involving not just the consumers, but all other parts of the societal 
system as well. In their view, changing social practices forms the foundation for a 
transformation towards sustainability. Therefore, understanding contemporary social 
practices - how they have changed, are currently changing, and how they might, especially 
purposively, change in the future - is essential. O’Brien (2012:588) sees indeed that in order 
to bring about sustainability, more focus has to be placed on change itself, "how humans 
individually and collectively approach change, why change is so often resisted or impeded, 
and, most important, how systems-scale changes towards sustainability come about".  
Traditionally, social practice theories have not focused on purposive change. However, such 
a focus is critical, if social practice theories are to be employed to make effective public 
policy for more sustainable societies (Lorek & Vergragt, 2015).  
Following from the above, a more thorough understanding of certain aspects of social 
practices can help enable transformative change, both for social practices more generally, 
and for meat eating related practices in particular. Social practice theories are my point of 
departure in the conceptual framework in this thesis. However, I explore conceptually the 
better incorporation of especially four aspects relevant for change. Firstly, in the so called 
second wave of social practice theory literature (Postill, 2010) from the last two decades, 
lately often focusing on (more sustainable) consumption, there has been little exploration of 
how social practices and discourses combine.3, 4 Seeing discourses as particularly relevant for 
change towards sustainability, I explore the conceptual connections between discourses and 
social practices within the framework in Chapter 3.5 Secondly, the role of values and 
                                                          
3
 With Daniel Welch as one recent exception. 
4
 Social practices will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, but as regards the concept of discourse, there are 
many, rather different definitions for it. The one that perhaps most closely relates to my understanding and use 
of the word in this thesis is from Keller (2013:2), whereby discourses are “more or less successful attempts to 
stabilize, at least temporarily, attributions of meaning and orders of interpretation, and thereby to 
institutionalize a collectively binding order of knowledge in a social ensemble” around particular themes or 
issues. 
5
 I am aware that especially the works of Michel Foucault, and his broad view of discourses, are relevant for the 
study of both discourses and practices (see e.g. Jäger, 2001, for a discussion). However, his work is conceptually 
different from the contemporary social practice theory literature that focuses on a more specific definition of 
social practices, and especially on (un)sustainable social practices. In this literature, practices and discourses 
are largely considered to be separate entities, and I take this view as well, even though I explore the important 
connections between them. 
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emotions is rarely discussed in social practice theory literature, even if their existence may 
be acknowledged. However, I see values and emotions, and conflicts between them, as 
having an essential intertwined role in both practices and discourses, in various ways often 
hindering change. This is therefore another aspect I explore in the conceptual framework. A 
third aspect linked to the practice-discourse connection is the role of discursive 
consciousness, of practices, and their related values, emotions and knowledges, as well as 
any related conflicts. Although seen as a rare state of mind in social practices (Warde, 2014), 
discursive consciousness can also be seen as a key concept for purposive change, as 
discussed later. Finally, discursive consciousness of social practices can better enable change 
at both individual and societal levels in the context of distributed agentive power residing 
within different components related to social practices, including discourses, and including 
collective, and sometimes even individual, human agency.6  
Taking the somewhat widened and interdisciplinary version of a social practice theory 
approach from the conceptual chapter to meat eating related practices in the empirical 
chapter, I examine discourses related to what I call the new meatways. The new meatways 
comprise eating alternative meat-like foods, such as cell-based meat, plant-based meat, or 
insects (called together the new meats), and flexitarianism, i.e. eating meat only 
occasionally.  
Due to the under exploration of the connections between discourses and social practices 
mentioned above, using discourse data to study social practices is rare (but see Fairclough, 
2001a). However, I find it a useful way to investigate some of the underlying issues to do 
with especially controversial practices, such as those related to meat eating. Discourses are 
useful for examining cognitive frames, essential for the values, emotions and knowledge also 
linked to social practices. In particular, discourses may touch upon issues such as coping 
strategies, related to the value or emotion conflicts often hidden in meat eating, and the 
ideologies or values embedded, and often taken for granted, in such practices. 
                                                          
6
 The more general issue of (dominative) power is of course relevant too. In social practice theories, the issue 
of power is often an underlying assumption, whereby the “hidden” part of individual practices containing 
cultural values, ideologies, materialities, infrastructures, etc. on the one hand, and the interconnectedness of 
many if not all social practices, on the other hand, are hindering change. This thesis will include discussion of 
such power as well. 
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My overall goal with this work has been to explore ways in which societies can transform 
towards more sustainable practices in general, and towards more sustainable meatways in 
particular. In Chapter 6, I will return to the issue of potential relevance of this research. 
1.2. Research approach 
My research approach in this thesis is two-fold. Somewhat unconventionally for a thesis, I 
include specific research related goals for both building the conceptual framework and doing 
the empirical analysis. This approach came about from my desire to work on the issue of 
meat, but in the contexts of both social practice theories and discourses, as I consider 
discourses essential for purposive change. As mentioned above, the more recent social 
practice theory literature in general, and the social practice theory literature focusing on 
sustainability transformation in particular, has not (yet) engaged much in the connections 
between social practices and discourses, and therefore, I decided to explore this issue in this 
thesis, in addition to focusing on the case of meat. The conceptual framework will therefore 
not only accompany and support the empirical part, but also extend beyond it, and 
independent of it. 
I call the first of my research related goals a research task, and it is the following: 
 Exploring social practice theories and the connections between discourses and social 
practices, in order to create a framework that could help enable purposive change in 
unsustainable social practices both at individual and at societal levels. 
In the conceptual chapter, I will approach this task by looking into not just social practice 
theory literature, but also other literatures, such as social psychology, cognitive linguistics, 
philosophy, critical discourse analysis and sustainability science itself. Spotswood and Marsh 
(2016) believe that the future of behaviour change is transdisciplinary. In such a manner, I 
will combine aspects of these literatures in the conceptual work.  
The second research related goal is to answer a more specific research question, namely the 
following: 
 How could the new meatways and discourses around them enable a purposive 
transformation in meat eating related practices? 
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In the empirical chapter, I will attempt to answer my research question by examining the 
collected discourse data from various different angles, engaging in detailed analysis with a 
critical approach. The data itself is collected from the online Guardian, a broadsheet 
newspaper based in the United Kingdom, from four separate articles and their reader 
comments7 from between 2015 and 2017. The articles all discuss one or more of the new 
meatways. 
As conclusions, I will include several suggestions on how specific elements of meat eating 
related discourses can connect to change in practices, as answers to the research question, 
while also reflecting on the research task, i.e. the more theoretical connections between 
discourses and social practices. 
1.3. Outline of the thesis 
Following this first chapter, Chapter 2 is a detailed overview of the topic of meat. It will first 
discuss the issues involved in the meat system, discuss the history of meat eating, and 
review trends in the past half a century in a number of countries, as well as discuss what 
might have been influencing the trends.8 Subsequently, the chapter will review discourses 
around meat from the past and present, before moving on to real and potential future 
action to reduce meat eating. The new meatways and the new meats will also be discussed 
in the second chapter.  
In Chapter 3, I will move into building the conceptual framework for social practices in 
connection with a sustainability transformation, and this is done in an interdisciplinary 
manner. The methodology of critical discourse analysis for the empirical analysis is also 
introduced in Chapter 3, as it relates to the conceptual framework as well. 
Further, Chapter 4 will give an overview of the actual methods of the data analysis, as well as 
discuss other issues related to the empirical analysis, such as data choice and quality criteria 
for the analysis. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will contain the actual empirical analysis of the 
chosen discourse data. I consider the results of this analysis to be an exploration of some of 
                                                          
7
 The total number of included reader comments is 607. 
8
 In general for this thesis, references to trends, influences and discourses in both the Global North and the 
Global South are included when available and appropriate. The empirical data, however, reflects discourses 
more in the Global North. 
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the elements in the conceptual framework, and indicative of the potential dynamics of 
transformative change. 
Finally, in Chapter 6, I will first present conclusions from the conceptual work, as well as 
from the empirical analysis, and also include some suggestions on how to potentially further 
the transformation of meat eating related practices from the point of view of the 
conclusions from this thesis. Finally, I will reflect on the work as a whole, including the 
potential contribution of this research. 
To note, the theme of discourses – the red line of discourse, so to speak – carries through 
the whole rest of the thesis.  
1.4. General note on style 
There are a couple of issues to note as regards the style of writing in this thesis. 
First of all, I tend to use somewhat less complex language, and fewer disciplinary-specific 
terms as might be the case for some comparable work. This is partly so because English is 
not my native language, but other than that, it is a deliberate choice. My personal 
preference is to avoid potentially fuzzy concepts or complex ways of presenting ideas that 
may not always be completely clear to readers, or sometimes not even to writers. As Billig 
(2009) argues, simple language is often better than technical language, as technical terms 
can actually be used more imprecisely, and their use may appear to solve a problem, when 
in fact, the writer is only avoiding solving the problem by using them. 
Secondly, interdisciplinarity requires one to be as clear as possible, and use less jargon as 
well. Readers may not be familiar with the vocabulary of all the related disciplines, and 
therefore using too many specialist terms can make interdisciplinary texts unclear. Further, 
sometimes several specialist words could be applied from different disciplinary viewpoints to 
a principally similar idea, or, on the other hand, certain concepts may be viewed quite 
differently in different disciplines. Avoiding specialist words when possible often takes care 
of the first kind of ambiguity, and defining concepts specifically enough - but sometimes 
necessarily broadly - hopefully takes care of the second form of ambiguity.  
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Thirdly, my writing style in this thesis is less neutral in tone than language in most doctoral 
theses might be. This is a style that is more common in sustainability research. Peattie (2011) 
notes that sustainability researchers are often criticized for doing research that is based on 
values and driven by a desire to do something good, as real research should be value-free, 
objective and dispassionate. However, all research is in fact laden with certain values, beliefs 
and worldviews. When these are consistent with the dominant social paradigm (whatever 
that may be in the particular research context), they are largely invisible, and so researchers, 
together with people in general, may not often be fully aware of the paradigm, and even 
when aware, they may not see the related values and beliefs as potentially or necessarily 
challengeable.9  Sustainability, on the other hand, is ideally also a paradigmatic lens through 
which to view the world (Peattie, 2011). In the context of my thesis, this lens occasionally 
leads to - perhaps more visible - ideological arguments.10 An example of such arguments for 
me personally, is that, without a sense and frame of co-responsibility, current societies may 
not be able to find a way out of the urgent ecological crises, to be tackled for our survival as 
organised societies. In terms of both the research lens, and the research results, it is of 
course important to try to remain critical and self-reflective.   
Finally, on the term “meat eating”, as also discussed in Chapter 3 in connection with 
discussing meat eating related practices, I generally prefer using the term “meat eating” to 
“meat consumption”, as a more concrete term that is also less associated with general 
consumption related arguments. In specific contexts in this thesis, I do still use “meat 
consumption”, while also occasionally referring to “eating animals”. 
  
                                                          
9
 See Chapter 3 for more discussion on ideologies and paradigms. 
10
 Ideologies can be seen here as general, socially shared beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). 
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2. Old and new meatways11 
In this chapter, I will give background to the issues within the meat crisis, explore how 
humans have been eating non-human animals over time, including in the last half a century, 
and consider potential reasons for changes in these practices. Subsequently, I will explore 
the different discourses related to eating animals - with the underlining notion, related to 
both my research task and research question, that discourses are deeply tied in with 
practices. Finally, I will look at some future visions for a transformation of the meat system. 
2.1. Background 
From scientific literature, it is evident by now that the impacts of the production and 
consumption of animals for human food on the natural world, and therefore also to humans, 
are catastrophic, especially in terms of climate change and biodiversity loss. The meat 
system is said to be broken, something acknowledged by many members of the research 
community, and also echoed by some media outlets. The topic is very gradually starting to 
appear in some policy domains. At the same time, most people in the world appear either 
unaware of the scale and extent of the damage done by the global meat complex,12 or even 
if aware at some level, unwilling, or seemingly unable to change or critically assess their own 
food related practices (see e.g. Hartmann & Siegrist, 2017).  
In addition to being the most important single contributor to both climate change and 
biodiversity loss, the global meat complex also contributes to several other crucial issues. All 
this will be covered in Section 2.1.1, after which I will explore the history and present of 
eating animals in Section 2.1.2. In Section 2.1.3, I will reflect on some of the issues often 
considered to influence the practices of humans eating animals. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 The old meatways refer here to traditional (mostly industrial) and abundant meat eating by the current vast 
majority, and vegetarianism or veganism by a current small minority. 
12
 The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) defines the global meat complex as a highly horizontally 
and vertically integrated “web of transnational corporations […] that controls the inputs, production and 
processing of mass quantities of food animals”, see e.g. https://www.iatp.org/blog/leaders-global-meat-
complex. I use occasionally the term Big Meat for this complex. The meat system, on the other hand, refers in 
my thesis to the general systems of production and consumption of meat.  
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2.1.1.  The issue with meat 
Figure 2.1 shows the growth of total global meat consumption in the last half a century 
(measured as “supply”, see Box 2.2). While the world has doubled its human population in 
this time, it has quadrupled its meat consumption, thereby the per capita consumption has 
also doubled (for per capita growth, see Figure 2.5). This much increased consumption of 
meat has largely been facilitated by industrial meat production methods developed since 
World War II, constituting one of the biggest changes in the entire food and agriculture 
industry (van Otterloo, 2012). Increasingly, the meat produced in the Global South is, 
however, also industrial, and so for example, at least three quarters of the world's chickens 
and more than half of pigs were produced industrially in the 2000s (FAO, 2009), and now, 
ten years later, these proportions are likely to have risen further.13 A recent investigation 
concluded that for the United Kingdom, the so called megafarms (large CAFOs, confined 
animal feeding operations) are already widespread (with 800 of them in total in the country) 
and most of the rest of the UK meat production is also intensive.14 
Figure 2.1. Total global meat supply from 1961 (in millions of tonnes) 
 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
Notes: Bovine meat consists of cows and buffalos, but overwhelmingly cows; Poultry meat covers chickens, turkeys, 
ducks, geese and guinea fowl, although mostly chickens; for the difference between supply and consumption, see Box 2.2. 
All food and agriculture related data from FAOSTAT is available from 1961. 
                                                          
13
 A 2012 report on India concluded that around 90% of meat chickens in India were factory farmed at that 
point (MacDonald & Iyer, 2012). 
14
 A study by the Guardian newspaper and the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, see 
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/jul/17/uk-has-nearly-800-livestock-mega-farms-
investigation-reveals. The definition for an intensive UK farm is that there are more than 40,000 chickens, 2,000 
pigs or 750 beef cows. The US definition for a large CAFO (also so called megafarm in the UK) is that there are 
at least 125,000 chickens, 2,500 pigs, or 1,000 beef cows. 
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The impacts of the global meat complex have been covered in literature in quite some detail, 
especially in the last decade. A recent comprehensive report on the issue is the Meat Atlas 
produced by the Heinrich Böll Foundation (2014), and a recent peer reviewed overview is 
provided, for example, by Godfray et al. (2018). Below is a review of some of the most 
pressing issues, related mainly to intensive non-organic animal agriculture, rather than 
organic, or extensive animal farming.15 Figure 2.2 divides the impacts to four main 
categories: issues linked to a range of environmental impacts, issues linked more directly to 
human and animal welfare, and lastly, ethical impacts. 
Figure 2.2. Impacts from systems of intensive meat production and consumption 
 
Source: Figure by author. 
Firstly, direct impacts to human welfare include those generated from the production 
methods, affecting either food safety or the risk of new illnesses, or both. The domestication 
                                                          
15
 Organic or extensively produced meat shares many problems with intensively produced meat, especially with 
its climate impact (see e.g. Steinfeld et al., 2006; Foodwatch, 2009), and cannot offer an all-encompassing 
alternative to intensively produced meat, also in terms of scale. However, since it is often discussed as a real 
alternative, some discussion of organic/extensively produced meat will be included (e.g. in Section 2.2.1). 
Further, switching from conventional to organic meat can have positive or negative spillover effects (discussed 
in Section 2.3.1). 
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of farm animals has most likely brought about most of the common human viral diseases 
over the last 10,000 years with viruses jumping from animals to humans in close contact. 
However, the ever increasing expansion and intensification of meat production - especially 
in poorer and less regulated conditions in the Global South, but also in the Global North - has 
led to the dramatic increase in the emergence and spread of infectious diseases originating 
in animals, such as the avian influenza (e.g. Greger, 2017). The contamination of meat 
intended for consumption by therapeutic or growth-promoting antibiotics, growth 
hormones, pesticides animal faeces containing bacteria, such as E. coli, or toxins, such as 
dioxin, is a related and serious risk to human welfare. Similarly, bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy (BSE) is a disease caused by prion contaminated meat. The current global 
crisis with antibiotic resistant bacteria has also to a large extent resulted from the same 
antibiotics being given to farm animals, often as a growth promotion agent (e.g. WHO, 
2015). 
Direct human welfare impacts are also generated from poor working conditions in the meat 
packing industry, most importantly from: high rates of injury, often extremely low pay, lack 
of benefits, and enormous stress due to the rapid pace of work, foul working environment 
and the generally expected ruthless handling of live animals. According to Foer (2009), the 
annual personnel turnover rates in the United States typically exceed 100%, and are possibly 
up to around 150%. Often farm level workers, for example, in American intensive animal 
farming, are immigrants paid under minimum wage levels (e.g. Donaldson, 2016a). 
Further, there is conclusive evidence by now that the excessive consumption of meat, and 
especially red meat and processed meats, contributes significantly to obesity and most 
serious human illnesses, such as cancer, cardiovascular disease, or diabetes (e.g. Deckers, 
2013; Kmietowicz, 2017; Rouhani et al., 2014; Sinha et al., 2009; Wellesley et al., 2015; 
Willett & Stampfer, 2013). That societies could be consuming too much meat as regards 
human health has, however, been a controversial issue for decades, at least partly due to 
pressure from the global meat complex (Nestle, 2018; The Pew Commission, 2008), and has 
resulted, for example, in governments being reluctant to include limits on meat in official 
nutritional guidelines. Even when such limits are included, these involve only very modest 
recommended reductions (Gonzalez Fischer & Garnett, 2016), as discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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Finally for human welfare impacts, and importantly from a global perspective, intensive 
meat production has an impact on poverty and malnutrition. Tudge (2017), among others, 
argues that poverty in the Global South is being amplified by the gradual but steady 
industrialization of meat production there. The human labour input that has helped employ 
large masses of people on subsistence farms in the South is being cut in the name of 
efficiency, simultaneously, however, increasing unemployment and decreasing access to 
food production (Fiddes, 1991; Tudge, 2017). Further, the expansion of CAFOs and 
supermarkets in the Global South - often favoured by governments (e.g. Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, 2017) - is cutting down the beneficial smallholder production, and increasing 
grain prices, as a larger proportion of the grain goes to the CAFOs, with the higher prices 
being particularly a problem for the poor animal farmers (MacLachlan, 2015). Growing feed 
for meat producing animals worsens food shortages also through deforestation and the 
displacement of local populations from their traditional lands, and violence towards forest 
and wildlife defenders.16 
Although most people would likely prefer not to think about it, producing billions of 
individual animals globally only to be killed for human food17 may be considered by some to 
be one of the worst consequences of industrialized animal agriculture. It can be argued that 
the question is less about animal welfare within the production systems as such, and more 
about sentient animals’ right to be respected, a discussion philosopher Peter Singer set off 
over 40 years ago, and their right to not necessarily be our food, let alone in such excessive 
amounts. Animal welfare issues are most closely linked to the treatment of animals in 
intensive agricultural production systems (see e.g. McLeod-Kilmurray, 2012). The problems 
are rooted in lack of both physical and mental wellbeing of farmed animals, which also lead 
to serious human welfare risks, on the one hand, through the use of large amounts of 
therapeutic antibiotics to contain disease, and on the other hand, through stressed animals 
being exposed to diseases that end up infecting humans, as mentioned above. Foer (2009) 
                                                          
16
 This phenomenon is increasingly reported in the news. See e.g. Deaths by the dozen in defence of nature, in 
the Guardian Weekly, 9 February 2018. 
17
 Around 65 billion farm animals were slaughtered globally in 2011 (Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014), around 
120 thousand farm animals per minute. 
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argues, however, that the meat industry discovered early on that an overall good health of 
farm animals is not a required condition for making a profit.18 
The lack of wellbeing of the production animals is also an issue for the third category of 
impacts from intensive meat production and consumption, relating to the ethics of meat 
production, i.e. questions of morality. Firstly, it can be said that cruelty towards animals is 
morally wrong. Rawles (2017), among others, has argued that animal welfare should be 
included in the concept of sustainable development, alongside economy, environment and 
society, since sustainable development in itself is “ethically aspirational”. Further, she 
believes that regarding animal welfare as a luxury that societies cannot afford, because of 
more dire economic or environmental pressures, reflects the instrumental thinking 
(regarding nature) that is at the root of the problems societies are currently facing.  
There has been a strong, but ultimately failed effort to include animal welfare in the 2015 
Sustainable Development Goals for 2030.19 However, in October 2016, the FAO20 Committee 
on World Food Security significantly included in their final recommendation, (in line with 
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development) considerations for animal welfare to be aligned 
with World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) standards and principles. It remains to be 
seen whether governments take note of these recommendations, and what that might mean 
in practice for the industry.21  
Further on the ethical aspects of industrial meat production, as discussed above, the 
increasing industrialization of meat production in the Global South can be exptected to 
significantly increase unemployment and poverty there (e.g. Tudge, 2017). This creates an 
ethical problem whereby the technology transfer (i.e. industrialization of meat production) 
transferred from the Global North to the South increases the welfare divide between the 
North and the South. 
Last, but probably most importantly from the point of view of the survival of humanity, the 
enormous environmental impacts of industrial meat production stem from the scale of 
                                                          
18
 The lack of mental wellbeing of the production animals was discussed as an issue for the quality of meat 
already in the late 1970s (see e.g. Lawrie, 1977, discussing the effect of animal stress). 
19
 See e.g. https://www.worldanimalprotection.org/news/un-incorporate-animal-protection-2030-agenda-
sustainable-development. 
20
 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
21
 The FAO committee also made recommendations regarding several other negative impacts from the meat 
system. 
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production and lack of consideration for the secondary effects of using the inputs (e.g. land, 
oil, energy, fertilizers, water, feed, uniform agricultural animal species) and the effects of 
secondary outputs (e.g. manure, wastewater), which cause air, water and ground pollution, 
in addition to increasing greenhouse gases, detrimental land use change (through 
deforestation, soil degradation, erosion and desertification), and the associated depletion of 
natural resources and threats to biodiversity.  
For example, the water footprint of industrial animal farming is considerable. Hoekstra 
(2017) gives one estimate of the water footprint of average diets in the Global North. An 
average meat-eater’s diet for one single day in the Global North costs 3600 litres of water, 
while an average vegetarian diet there consumes 2300 litres, still a considerable amount, but 
much less.22 The pollution of waterways by fertilizers and manure is a problem not 
accounted for in these figures. In fact, more than 80% of the nitrogen inputs into animal 
agriculture are lost (Westhoek et al., 2011), impacting on terrestrial biodiversity in addition 
to increasing water pollution and disrupting the natural nitrogen cycle. Leach et al. (2012) 
conclude from their study on the effect of different diets on nitrogen losses to the 
environment that only a complete change to plant-based protein would result in a significant 
reduction of the nitrogen footprint. 
Agriculture's contribution to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is often estimated to be up to 
a third of all emissions when fossil fuel inputs are included (e.g. Garnett, 2017). Importantly, 
this figure, however, does not include emissions related to the processing, transport, retail, 
and consumption of food, or the resulting waste. Industrial meat (and dairy) production has 
been estimated to contribute at least half of the total food impact on GHG emissions (e.g. 
Eder & Delgado, 2006), with the largest impact made at the farm stage. In 2006, the FAO 
(Steinfeld et al.) estimated livestock’s contribution to all GHGs from agriculture to be as high 
as 80%. How much animal agriculture more exactly contributes to the total of global 
greenhouse gases from all sources is still, however, controversial (see Box 2.1 for discussion). 
 
 
                                                          
22
 The numbers for the Global South are lower, 2050 and 1750 litres, respectively (Hoekstra, 2017). 
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 Box 2.1. Contribution of the global meat system to greenhouse gases  
The amount of GHG emissions related to animal agriculture has been a controversial topic especially 
after the FAO (Steinfeld et al., 2006) made their estimate of 18% of all global GHG emissions, 
including the impact of land use changes.  
The range of estimates made after 2006 is large, with Goodland and Anhang (2009) calculating a 
contribution as high as 51%, and the FAO recalculating their own estimate at 14.5% (Gerber et al., 
2013), this being perhaps the most often currently quoted number. The Meat Atlas (Heinrich Böll 
Foundation, 2014:34) refers to a range from 6 to 32%, where the correct proportion depends on 
whether only direct (6%), or total (32%), so also indirect emissions, are considered.  
The difficulties in making accurate estimations originate partly in the complexity of the issue, 
disagreements over which processes, inputs, outputs and impacts should be included, as well as 
methodological and political disagreements over e.g. the relevant time reference point for GHGs, 
especially methane, in the atmosphere. A notable disagreement between the largest (51%) and the 
most commonly quoted FAO figures (18% and 14.5%) arises from such issues, reflected, for example, 
by the arguments between Herrero et al. (2011) and Goodland and Anhang (2012), with the latter 
authors rejustifying their very high 2009 estimate.23 
On a national level, the estimates vary a great deal, depending on the agricultural systems involved, 
the contributions from other sources of GHGs, whether emissions accounting is production- or 
consumption based (for the last, see Wellesley et al., 2015:4). Similar disagreements as for the global 
level add to the uncertainties of the national estimates as well, so that for example for Australia, 
short-term (20-year) GHG emissions from all agriculture could be as high as 54%, with animal 
agriculture contributing most of this (Beyond Zero Emissions, 2014). Garnett (2011) notes that all this 
makes comparisons between countries meaningless. 
This uncertainty (although rarely discussed as such) may have also contributed to the uncertainty 
among the general public as regards the significance of the impact from meat production on climate 
change (see e.g. Austgulen, 2014; Wellesley et al., 2015), and it may have also helped the global meat 
complex in creating a “safe space” for continuing its business as usual (cf. tobacco industry, Proctor, 
2008). Using the highest figure of 51% uncritically may also undermine the credibility of some work 
by animal activists, or even critical animal studies as an academic field (Twine, 2014), and in general, 
the wide range of estimates may be partly due to certain lack of scientific rigor in the assessments 
that do exist, and partly due to politics being also involved.24 Although very relevant, the controversy 
about the numbers is, however, largely ignored in discourses (Twine, 2014). 
Paradoxically, if the contribution of the meat system to GHGs is more moderate (e.g. 14.5%), 
reductions need to be radical to make an impact. Whereas, if the contribution is in fact much larger, 
even a more moderate change (such as the 25% reduction recommended by Goodland & Anhang, 
2009) can make a significant contribution to climate change mitigation, as also noted by Goodland 
(2014). 
According to the oft quoted estimate from the FAO (Steinfeld et al., 2006), 70% of all 
agricultural land, and 30% of all land surface, is used in livestock production, directly or 
                                                          
23
 Goodland (2010) also clarifies the original arguments from Goodland and Anhang (2009) further. 
24
 See e.g. a 2012 column in the New York Times: https://bittman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/07/11/fao-yields-to-
meat-industry-pressure-on-climate-change/. 
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indirectly. An updated estimate from Poore and Nemecek (2018) is that around 83% of all 
farmland is used for animal agriculture, when including that used for dairy farming and 
aquaculture. With the associated continuing destruction of rainforests and grasslands, 
intensive meat production destroys the diversity of species and ecosystems. The third form 
of biodiversity, within a species (as opposed to between species or between ecosystems), is 
also threatened by the uniformity of livestock breeds used in intensive farming. Industrial 
livestock production, in the hands of a small number of multinationals and using only a small 
number of animal breeds, has, in the recent past, been growing seven times faster than 
small-scale farming in the Global South, according to the FAO (2007).25 As a result, small-
scale animal farming with diverse species is gradually being pushed out by intensive farming 
with uniform species (FAO, 2009).26 All in all, meat production is the number one threat to 
global biodiversity and species loss (Machovina et al., 2015). Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
enormity of the global extent of animal agriculture. According to the estimate provided by 
Smil (2011), out of all the mammal biomass on land in the year 2000, only a tiny fraction 
consisted of wild animals, with around a third of total biomass being humans, and nearly 
two thirds domesticated animals.27 
Figure 2.3. Global biomass of humans, wild terrestrial mammals and domesticated 
animals, 1900 and 2000 (in million tonnes of carbon) 
 
Source: Based on Smil (2011). 
Note: Estimates for humans, domesticated animals and cattle in 2000 are relatively the most accurate. 
                                                          
25
 Gene banks are often seen as a solution for keeping the genetic variety of livestock and therefore providing 
resistance to diseases or challenging climate conditions. However, Gura (2010) notes that this may be creating 
only an illusion of safety. Frozen tissue in gene banks collected from disease-resistant animals cannot keep up 
with the adaptations that diseases themselves make in the real world, and climate change poses a threat to 
gene banks. New breeding technologies, such as cloning, further reduce the livestock gene pool. 
26
 Climate change further threatens small-scale animal farming, as severe draughts make pastoralists abandon 
livestock production (e.g. FAO, 2009). 
27
 Another recent estimate from 2018 (Bar-On et al.) confirms these proportions, with 4% of terrestrial 
mammal biomass being wild animals, 60% domesticated animals, and 36% humans. 
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Relevant for the issues above, the efficiency with which the energy contained in the inputs in 
typical intensive animal agriculture is converted into energy in the outputs is exceedingly 
low. According to Smil (2002), for example, 97% of gross energy in the feed for cows in the 
United States is not converted into beef.28 The European Union imports four fifths of the 
protein-rich feed (Westhoek et al., 2011), therefore exporting the problems created by the 
high demand for energy and other inputs for the feed, as well as the problem of land-use 
change. Comparing the production and transport of 84 food items in a thorough review, 
Gonzalez (2011) concluded that animal-based foods are overall much less efficient than 
plant-based foods in terms of protein delivery, when measured in energy use or emitted 
GHGs. A third of all calories, and a half of all the plant proteins produced globally is fed to 
animals (Cassidy et al., 2013), instead of humans. 
The vast increases in the production and consumption of meat observed in the last half a 
century, and the widely expected further increases for the future decades carry massive 
impacts. The future increases are generally argued to be related to the expected rise in 
world population to nearly 10 billion by 2050,29 and expected increase in living standards 
and more intensive meat production, especially in certain countries in the Global South 
bringing about higher per capita meat consumption. Such increases in a business-as-usual 
system would greatly worsen the current negative impacts from intensive meat production 
and consumption, making, for example, addressing catastrophic climate change impossible 
(see e.g. Kim et al., 2015). The FAO estimate of 455 Mt for the level of meat production in 
2050 is a 75% increase from the level in 2005 (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). If this 
production level would be realised without tackling the GHG emissions from meat and dairy, 
while simultaneously following the path to lower emissions from other sources so that the 
target warming level of 1.5 degrees of centigrade would not be exceeded, 81% of all global 
GHG emissions would come from the meat and dairy production (GRAIN-IATP, 2018).30 
Considering the above, the FAO growth estimate does not, in fact, seem feasible within the 
current frame of science, technology and society. Transforming the meat production 
methods to adequately respond to the issues most likely has to be coupled with a radical 
                                                          
28
 For pork, the number is 91%, and for chicken meat, 89% (Smil, 2002). 
29
 A 2017 median estimate from the UN is 9.8 billion (from 
https://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/Graphs/Probabilistic/POP/TOT/). To compare, in 1960, around the early stages 
of intensive animal agriculture, the world population was at 3 billion. 
30
 This scenario is relying on the potentially low 14.5% estimate of the current contribution to total emissions. 
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reduction in meat production and consumption itself, if not an actual elimination of the 
current intensive meat production methods entirely. A recent estimate contained in 
Springmann et al. (2018) also indicates that the planetary boundaries31 would be far 
exceeded in the next decades without changes towards more plant-based diets. As Garnett 
(2017) argues, however, the issues described in this section need to be addressed in an 
integrated way, rather than by dealing with one problem, such as GHGs, at a time. In any 
case, it is likely that alternative protein sources will have to be developed further, as well as 
incorporated into our everyday lives, on a large scale for a transformation towards a feasible 
future. 
On the one hand, addressing this complex issue adequately seems a huge challenge, 
especially viewed from the production side; on the other hand, it would seem rather 
possible, and even “easy,”32 for people in the industrialized, or newly industrialized countries 
to experiment with, or adopt to new foodways for themselves, considering the motivating 
evidence against continuing with the current path. People could, in principle, gradually, if 
not abruptly, just eat less or no conventional animal-based meat, whenever they have 
alternative plant-based proteins to eat. However, food, or meat eating in particular, cannot 
usually be dealt with purely at a rational level, as firstly, eating any food involves many non-
rational factors such as social rules, cultural meanings, emotions and values, secondly, it is 
also largely one of the automated habits and path-dependent practices embedded in the 
everyday environment people live in, and thirdly, the related industries do their best to give 
us sub-conscious cues to get us eat more meat. Further, most people actually do not want to 
stop eating meat (e.g. Wellesley et al., 2015; Zaraska, 2016a). Also importantly, the topic of 
eating less meat is rather controversial, still a taboo subject in politics very recently (Lang et 
al., 2010), and even today “few governments talk even privately of ‘hard measures’” (Lang, 
2017:330) in meat policy in relation to issues like climate change and biodiversity.33  
In addition to formulating a conceptual outline of social practices more generally, my thesis 
will consider the role of discourses in connection with the above-mentioned obstacles, and I 
will explore how discourses around the new meatways in particular could enable conscious 
                                                          
31
 Planetary boundaries related to GHG emissions, cropland, blue water, nitrogen and phosphorus. 
32
 See Goodland (2014) using the word “easy”, or Reducing meat and dairy consumption: easier said than done, 
or easier done than said? by Richard Twine (in The Conversation, 24 November 2011) encouraging 
experimentation of different diets regarding meat. 
33
 What governments can do is discussed further in Section 2.3. 
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and radical meat reduction, both at individual and at societal levels. However first, the next 
sections will look at some available data on the past and current meat eating practices, and 
what may have influenced the practices. I consider these issues relevant to my thesis, as 
they have an impact on discourses around meat. 
2.1.2. About meat eating over time  
A short history of (not) eating animals34 
From prehistory of the human species, through the beginnings of livestock farming around 
9000 BC (Nam et al., 2010), until around 1950 AD (Aiking, 2011), eating meat used to be 
considered luxury for most people on a global level, rather than everyday practice. However, 
there has been a lot of variation in how much meat has been eaten. Firstly, cultural, 
geographical, and economic differences have had a role in eating, or not eating, meat for 
millennia, so that for example in Europe, the Northern (Germanic and Celtic) cultures were 
consuming more meat than the Southern (Roman and Greek) cultures, more dominated by 
agriculture (de Boer et al., 2006). Further, in medieval Germany, for example, the level of 
meat eating was actually very high for a considerable period of time, especially since 
ordinary citizens often got their pay in meat instead of money (Bork, 2006). More generally 
in medieval Europe, people ate meat whenever they got hold of some, and abstaining was 
seen as a sign of religious heretics, possibly leading to being killed (Zaraska, 2016a). In the 
United States, eating large amounts of meat on an annual basis was commonplace already in 
the early 19th century (Smil, 2013), due to the large amounts of wild animals and land for 
grazing cows, although meat was still more available for the wealthy than to the poor. In 
Argentina, the historically high consumption of meat in the last centuries has been largely a 
consequence of the Spanish invasion in the 16th century (Boyer, 2016). 
York and Gossard (2004) also emphasize the impact of the ecological contexts - factors such 
as climate and resource availability - and their link to cultures that have developed over time 
within each context. For example, in Asia, those living on coastal areas would be traditionally 
eating a lot of fish, those living in hot and humid climates would develop eating cultures 
around largely vegetarian foods. Medieval Japan, on the other hand, was largely vegetarian 
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 This section will also cover some history of vegetarianism, as it is important for the discourses around both 
eating meat and not eating meat. Discourses as such will be the topic for Section 2.2. 
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due to a shortage of land on which to grow food for domestic animals, although religion 
played a role too. Similarly, much of the Chinese diet was traditionally vegetarian due to lack 
of land, but culturally, China was more oriented towards eating meat (Zaraska, 2016a). 
The advance of science in the Western world from the 17th century onwards strengthened 
the belief that humans must dominate nature, and around the same time the average 
amount of meat eaten started gradually to rise. Associated with this were frequent claims 
from the scientific community saying that meat was a source of “strength and vigour”, more 
so than any other foods. With the advances in refrigeration and transport technology in the 
mid to late 19th century, meat consumption levels rose further (Fiddes, 1991). The 20th 
century world wars ended up promoting meat as a prized food, preceding the meat 
industry’s rise after World War II. 
In human history, those who have not eaten meat have usually done so because they have 
not had any choice. For example, due to their poverty, many have not had access to meat, 
but when given the chance, they have happily engaged in meat eating. There have also long 
been those who have not eaten meat because of cultural, philosophical or religious reasons, 
such as the Pythagoreans in ancient Greek, or many Hindus in India. In present-day India, 
around 30% of the population report being vegetarians, according to an Indian government 
survey from 2014.35 As Leahy et al. (2010) argue, those not eating meat out of religious 
reasons, for example, have generally not chosen to be vegetarians, but they have been born 
into vegetarianism. For example, in India, the principle of ahimsa, nonviolence, prohibits 
eating meat within much of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism, as harming animals makes a 
person spiritually impure (Zaraska, 2016a).  
The estimate in Leahy et al. (2010) is that 22%, or around 1.5 billion people worldwide are 
vegetarians, mostly out of necessity. In contrast, they estimate that out-of-choice 
vegetarians would number globally only 75 million, or around 1% of the current global 
population. While the proportion of out-of-necessity vegetarians may have decreased in the 
last years since these estimates, (see Section 2.1.3 and the discussion on the protein 
transition), the proportion of out-of-choice vegetarians is likely to have increased somewhat, 
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 This data is from Office of Registrar General & Census Commissioner of India, sample registration system 
(SRS) baseline survey 2014, and covers all those above 15 years of age. The proportions vary between different 
Indian states from just over 1% to well over 70% of the population being vegetarian. Note that, in India, a 
person is not counted as vegetarian if s/he eats eggs. 
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trends recognized also by Leahy et al. (2010). Interestingly, the Faunalytics study (Asher et 
al., 2014) indicates that there are five times as many former vegetarians and vegans in the 
United States than there are current ones. If the same phenomenon is true at more 
international level, there could be hundreds of millions former out-of-choice vegetarians or 
vegans in the world.36 
In modern times, abstaining from meat as a choice existed in some form in different 
countries, but as a larger movement it has roots in the United Kingdom going back to the 
late 18th century (Shprintzen, 2011), originally as part of Christian mysticism, but also as a 
means for curing medical illnesses. It spread from there to the United States in the early 19th 
century, by which time it had transformed itself to more a movement for social reform. 
Around the middle of the 19th century, there was a period where resistance to the radical 
vegetarian movement created (in the popular media of the time) an image of vegetarians as 
"frail, weak and sexually impotent" (Shprintzen, 2011:9).37 By the end of the 19th century 
US, however, vegetarianism "emerged as a way to build individual character and personal 
health in order to succeed in a society driven by personal gain and monetary advancement" 
(ibid.), and the lifestyle was connected to physical strength, fitness, athletics, individualism 
and masculinity. Although numbers of vegetarians still remained small, there was also a 
growing commercial interest, and food products (meat imitations) and vegetarian 
restaurants were marketed to consumers. During American involvement in World War I, 
meatless meals were encouraged by the United States government as patriotic, in practice 
saving more meat to be sent to soldiers in Europe. 
Regarding ethical vegetarians, an early example includes Leonardo da Vinci (McCurdy, 1932, 
in Fiddes, 1991), and later on in the 19th century Europe, there was an anti-cruelty 
movement focusing on the immoral treatment of animals. The modern ethical movement is 
different from this, however, as it tends to put humans more at the same level as non-
human animals, instead of assuming that cruelty is wrong only after absolute human needs 
have been satisfied, as was the case for the 19th century movement. 
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 According to the Faunalytics study, these former vegetarians and vegans currently eat mostly a flexitarian 
diet. 
37
 Throughout this time, for the mainstream, meat was associated with strength (Fiddes, 1991). 
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The first vegetarian society (and in fact the term vegetarian) was established in the United 
Kingdom in 1847, and the UK has the most longitudinal data to-date on estimates of 
numbers of vegetarians, dating back to the early 1960s (Leahy et al., 2010, see Figure 2.4). A 
2016 estimate of the number of vegetarians in the UK is 3.25%.38 
Figure 2.4. Vegetarians over time in the United Kingdom 
 
Source: Leahy et al. (2010). 
It is usual to categorize modern out-of-choice vegetarians into either mainly ethical 
vegetarians or mainly health vegetarians (Ruby, 2012), although the motivations people 
express for their vegetarianism often depends on the social situation in which they express 
them (Wilson et al., 2004).39 People may also be increasingly likely to make their actual 
dietary choices considering the entire variety of problems related to food production and 
consumption, therefore also considering the environmental issues (Spaargaren, Oosterveer, 
et al., 2012a). These problems are increasingly part of the current discourses around meat, 
explored later in this chapter.  
Of late, there is an increased presence of vegetarianism and veganism in the public 
discourses (as discussed in Section 2.2.2). The meat consumption numbers still do not reflect 
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 See https://www.vegansociety.com/whats-new/news/find-out-how-many-vegans-are-great-britain. 
39
 A related issue, motive alliances, appealing to combined benefits of reduced meat eating to health, animals, 
and environment is believed to be useful (e.g. by Hartmann & Siegrist, 2017; Belz and Peattie, 2009; de Boer, 
Schösler et al., 2013). 
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this in actual eating practices, however.40 The countries reportedly having the largest 
proportion of people identifying as vegetarians or vegans at the moment, apart from India, 
include Germany, Switzerland, Israel, Australia and Taiwan, all around or above 10%. 
However, the results vary from survey to survey, and are unlikely to be comparable.  
It is noteworthy, that vegetarianism as a practice, and discourse around vegetarianism are 
quite apart from each other. This may be partly due to this particular discourse being shaped 
more by those not actually engaging in vegetarian practices themselves, so for example, by 
criticism. As I consider vegetarianism as an important counterpart of the meat system, I have 
covered it in this section and will cover it also in Section 2.2 about discourses. Moreover, as 
regards my empirical analysis in Chapter 5, I will also briefly focus on vegetarianism there as 
an important theme in the discourse. 
The rise of industrial meat 
The rise of industrialized animal agriculture after World War II, the associated increased 
availability and decreased prices for meat, the (especially US) government policies, as well as 
industry marketing and advertising, all encouraging meat eating, and the psychological 
distancing of animals from their flesh through the separation of industrial meat production 
far away from most people, all resulted in meat eventually becoming an everyday food item 
for nearly all those living in the Global North, and increasingly also for many in the Global 
South. Regardless of the new everyday character of meat as a food item, it retained its 
central celebrated role at the centre of the plate. Apart from the enormous increases in 
overall consumption of meat, in what is lately called the protein transition (see Section 
2.1.3), the most obvious change has been in chicken meat replacing beef to a significant 
extent. In other words, levels of per capita chicken consumption started rising faster from 
around 1990, near the time when per capita beef consumption started decreasing. 
De Boer et al. (2006) argue that factors mainly related to globalization, such as increases in 
the equality of national incomes, global food trade, and internationalization of both 
                                                          
40
 FAOSTAT, the frequently used source of fairly comparable global data on meat eating, generally lags 5-6 
years behind in its publicly available data, therefore not showing trends that might have taken place during 
that time period. Whether there is actually a decreasing trend taking place in the last few years, globally or 
regionally, still therefore remains to be seen. But an indication that the numbers for meat consumption may 
not have gone down much is that e.g. in countries such as Germany and Finland, the national data shows that 
meat consumption rose further or stayed stable in 2017, despite the vegetarian or vegan “trends”.  
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industrial animal agriculture and eating habits, have evened out differences in meat 
consumption between countries, although many differences still remain. Figure 2.5 shows 
trend lines for meat consumption for 12 different countries, representing a variety of 
societies and cultures, mainly from industrialized, or newly industrialized countries.41 
Figure 2.5. Per capita meat supply in various locations from 1961 (in kg/person/year) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
Note: Data for USSR ends in 1991, and data for Russian Federation starts from 1992; for the difference between 
supply and consumption, see Box 2.2. All food and agriculture related data from FAOSTAT is available from 1961. 
Excluding India where per capita meat eating has not essentially changed (but see later in 
this section), Figure 2.5 shows that most industrialized or newly industrialized countries have 
not only increased their meat consumption over the last half a century, but also to some 
extent approached each other’s levels of consumption. Consequently, some of these 12 
countries have stabilized their per capita meat consumption, and some are, in fact, 
                                                          
41
 These same countries are also those chosen for the first ever large cross-country survey on public attitudes 
on meat contained in the Chatham House Report (Wellesley et al., 2015), except that Italy and Poland have 
been replaced by Spain and Australia, adding more variety to the data. 
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consuming slightly less meat per person now than they were 5-10 years ago, while others 
have been consuming increasing amounts nearly throughout the 50 or so years.  
In Europe in 2013, every EU citizen was “supplied” with 81 kg of meat on average, of which 
she/he actually ate about two thirds.42 After a longer period of growth, the total per capita 
meat consumption in Europe has not changed much in the last 25 years, but there is still 
much variation between countries. For example, by the late 1990’s the average Spaniard ate 
more than five times as much meat as he/she did in 1961 (at that time more along the lines 
of the Mediterranean diet43), but since around 2000, the consumption has come down 
somewhat. The average French or German eats slightly less meat now than they did 20-30 
years ago. On the other hand, the average British person has eaten fairly stable and large 
amounts of meat throughout the half a century, although the average amount increased 
somewhat 10-15 year ago.44  
Outside Europe, the average American and Australian have eaten the most meat compared 
to those living in the other 10 industrialized, or newly industrialized countries in Figure 2.5. 
Japan started from very low levels of meat consumption in the early 1960’s, and currently, 
the average Japanese eats an amount just above the world average.45 Lastly, China started 
from very low meat consumption levels in the early 1960’s, well below the Japanese and at 
the same level as India, but has climbed steadily upwards, especially since the late 1970’s, 
and the trend line seems to point to the average Chinese reaching the level of most 
Europeans in the next decade, unless the trends change direction in the near future.  
Due to its still very modest level of meat consumption, India is seen by the global industry 
mainly as a potential future market for meat consumers, although a very large one at that. 
                                                          
42
 See Box 2.2 for how supply and consumption figures are related. 
43
 The Mediterranean diet refers to food consumption patterns typical of some Mediterranean regions in the 
early 1960s, such as Crete, other parts of Greece, Spain, southern France, and southern Italy. The diet 
emphasizes relatively low consumption of red meat, among other things (Tyrovolas & Polychronopoulos, 2010). 
44
 The discourse data for the empirical analysis in Chapter 5 comes for the most part from the UK. The notable 
changes over the last half a century in the UK include a sharp increase in eating chicken, a slow decrease with 
sheep and goat meat - although the UK still remains one of the countries with most per capita consumption of 
sheep and goat meat - and a temporary dip in the 1990’s (during the time of the BSE crisis) in the otherwise 
slower decline with beef. The pig meat consumption has remained rather stable throughout the time period. 
45
 The Japanese differ from other industrialized countries in the world in their consumption of fish and other 
seafood. The average world citizen has been eating about twice as much meat as fish over the last decades, but 
the average Japanese has until lately eaten much more fish than meat, up to six times as much in the early 
1960’s. However, Japan is at a point in time right now when meat and fish consumption are at the same level, 
or in fact, for the first time in 2013, meat consumption was slightly higher than seafood consumption. 
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The per capita consumption of meat in India is projected by the FAO to grow six-fold, from 
an extremely low current base of 3 kg/year to around 18 kg/year by 2050, most of which 
would be chicken (Alexandratos & Bruinsma, 2012). Eating meat in India (or ‘non-veg’, as 
meat is traditionally called there) is increasingly seen as part of a modern and successful 
lifestyle, with the appreciation for the meat-eating West replacing the previously highly 
valued Indian vegetarian elites (see e.g. Zaraska, 2016a). Further increases in 
industrialization, urbanization, growth of supermarket chains, mobility, and secularism are 
likely to drive growth. It is therefore currently more popular in India to change from veg to 
non-veg, rather than the other way around, although out-of-choice vegetarianism is an 
existing phenomenon in India as well. In fact, Bajzelj and Bothra (2016) refer to a “tug of 
war” between the veg and non-veg groups in society, tangled with the special status of 
cows, and going up all the way to the top political circles, illustrated by the 2017 attempt by 
the government to ban beef exports.46 At the same time, the Indian governments have 
generally welcomed investments from foreign meat industry companies (Bajzelj & Bothra, 
2016), and it is likely, that unless strong and swift political action is taken to prevent the 
formation of networks of global industrial actors (similar to China), and choose an alternate 
path for future protein in India, the projections for growth may be realized. India’s rapid 
recent rise to be one of the world’s top beef exporters47 is already a big challenge from a 
sustainability point of view.  
An important point for the discussion about increasing global meat consumption is that the 
recent increases have not been evenly distributed among the new middle classes in the 
Global South.48 For example, Lange (2016) notes that such increases are rather unevenly 
distributed, firstly, in the sense that many of countries in the South are increasing their 
average meat consumption only marginally, whereas others are increasing it substantially, 
and secondly, within the higher meat consumption countries (such as China), there is a vast 
amount of variability, due to various cultural, geographical, political or other factors. 
However, in addition to the current individual meat eaters eating more meat, there is a large 
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 See e.g. https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/beef-ban. 
47
 FAOSTAT data indicates that over five years from 2008 to 2013, India’s total meat exports tripled. These 
exports are almost exclusively of buffalo meat (categorized as beef), and India is now on par with Brazil as the 
two largest bovine meat (beef) exporters in the world. 
48
 The new middle classes in the Global South are not “rich” if measured against a Global North standard. Their 
average absolute income level borders the income of the low income groups in the North. However, they 
generally have enough money to buy household appliances (TVs, computers, etc.), and meat. 
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group of people, 1.45 billion, according to Leahy et al. (2010), who are not current, but 
potential future meat eaters. In other words, these people have been eating a vegetarian 
diet until now, mostly only out of necessity. This very large group of people could have a 
significant impact on future trends. In China, some of the substantial recent increases in 
meat consumption may have been due to the rise of the new middle classes there, 
benefiting from government policies opening markets to foreign investment in industrial 
animal agriculture since the late 1970’s (MacLachlan, 2015). 
Box 2.2. Between production, supply and consumption of meat 
There are certain differences in how data related to meat production, supply and consumption is 
presented in various sources and publications, and what the numbers entail. 
One relevant issue is how losses during the food supply chain are dealt with and reflected in the data. 
There are still large data gaps regarding how much food exactly is lost or wasted in the various food 
supply chains. According to the FAO (2011), about one third of all food produced, and more than a fifth 
of meat, is lost or wasted globally, more or less equally in the Global North and the Global South. 
However, in the North, the main losses take place mostly at the end of the food supply chain, within 
distribution and consumption. These are defined as waste. On the other hand, in the South, the main 
losses take place at the beginning and middle of the food supply chain, in production, handling and 
storage, and processing and packaging, together defined as losses. For the meat supply chain in the 
North, waste at the consumption level makes up about half of total meat losses and waste. According to 
the FAO (2011), as a total, about 24% of edible meat and meat products are lost in the European food 
supply chain for meat and meat products, between the farm, the dinner plate and the waste bin.  
How losses and waste are taken into account in statistical data on food varies. The FAO meat supply 
data, used for the figures in this section, takes estimates of at least some of the food losses between 
production and household into account. However, losses during the consumption stage are not included, 
due to the lack of accurate data up to now. The FAO defines “food supply” data as estimates of food 
supplies available for human consumption, and remark that “it is important to note […] that the amount 
of food actually consumed may be lower than the quantity shown”, depending on the degree of losses 
and waste, e.g. during storage, in preparation and cooking etc. (http://www.fao.org). Presumably, also 
institutional waste occurring at the consumption stage (in restaurants, schools, hospitals etc.) is not 
accounted for, and it is unclear whether retail waste is included or not. The losses and waste not 
accounted for by the FAO can be estimated to be roughly 10-20%.  
Finally, it is important to note that the FAO includes much of the bone in the animals in the meat supply 
data. The FAO data is expressed in carcass weight at slaughterhouse exit level (Westhoek et al., 2011). 
However, different animal species, different types of the same farmed species, and different cuts of the 
same animal all have different quantities of bone in them. Westhoek and colleagues give a rough 
estimation of a live cow consisting of about 45%, a pig 55%, and a chicken 60% of retail meat. Further, 
comparing retail meat to the FAO carcass weight data, the proportions for different species are 70% for 
cows, 75% for pigs, and 80% for chickens. Finally, the actual meat consumed after processing and 
cooking, and taking further losses into account, is around 80% of the retail meat. 
In much of the literature using FAO data, “supply” has been taken to represent “consumption”, and the 
latter word is also used mostly in this thesis. To get the actual average human consumption based on the 
FAO supply figures, roughly a third should be deducted, so that the eaten meat is about 60-67% of the 
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FAO supply data, depending on the species in question, according to Westhoek et al. (2011). To note, 
Hallström and Börjesson (2013) provide a critical discussion on meat consumption statistics and 
discrepancies within it. 
After this review of the actual consumption trends, the next section will look further into 
potential past influences, as well as potential future influences on how and whether people 
will use animals for food, mostly through a brief review of literature. Understanding 
influences on meat eating in the past, present or future are relevant for the sustainability of 
human life on Earth. How could the global society respond to the meat crisis, radically 
reduce or change the way meat is produced or eaten, or perhaps eliminate eating animals 
altogether? 
As the Chatham House Report (Wellesley et al., 2015) and others have argued, the necessary 
and radical future change in responding to the meat crisis cannot apply in just the Global 
North, where large quantities of meat animals have been used for food for quite some time 
already, but it has to also take place in the newly industrialized, or industrializing countries in 
the Global South, where plentiful meat is a much more recent, but often equally problematic 
phenomenon. The change must be global in its reach.49 
Finally, to note that the industrial production and largely unsustainable consumption of dairy 
foods, eggs, and seafood, as well as the overuse of wild seafood, share many of the related 
environmental, human or animal welfare or ethical issues with those related to meat eating. 
A shift away from the overconsumption of also other animal-based foods to a more plant-
based diet is therefore important (see e.g. Verain et al., 2015). However, these topics cannot 
be covered in this thesis, as the scale and scope of the work would get too large. 
2.1.3. Potential influences on meat consumption 
To some extent, it is possible to evaluate or measure what might have contributed to 
different levels or trends in meat eating, for example, the often, but not always upward 
trends in the last half a century, as shown by the graphs in the previous section. In the 
following, I will consider the discussion in literature. 
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 Also important to note is that the low levels of meat consumption in the least economically developed or 
industrialised countries or regions often still reflect lack of adequate amounts of protein. Domesticated animals 
are also used in these countries (as well as in some newly industrialized countries) for purposes other than 
meat or dairy (or leather, wool etc.), as labour or as economic security, for example, and discussion on 
changing this system would involve issues beyond the reach of this thesis. 
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The level of regions and nations, or a global level, is where changes up or down in meat 
production and consumption have their main impacts, and at this level, only larger and more 
persistent trends are significant.  The discussion is largely based on connections (e.g. 
correlations) between different factors that could influence meat consumption. A critical 
literature on meat production and consumption has also grown in recent years around the 
growing awareness among the research, media and sometimes also policy communities of 
the enormous problems related to the global meat complex, as discussed earlier.50  
The most dominant factors regarding meat production at this level are often identified as 
linked to demand. There is an obvious demand effect from increasing population, and 
consequently more people needing food of any kind. However, apart from as a consequence 
of population growth, demand for meat is generally expected to increase (and these 
correlations are found) with an increasing standard of living linked to urbanization and a 
decreasing price of meat, with globalization considered as the general engine behind much 
of the other factors, for example, through increased international trade and investment. 
These three factors are discussed in the sub-sections that follow. 
The critical voices regarding this demand focus, on the other hand, are calling more 
attention to the influence from industry, either in terms of the industrialization process 
itself, in terms of lobbying pressure on governmental policies, in terms of influencing 
academic research (Nestle, 2018), or in terms of direct marketing and advertisement to 
consumers. These criticisms are partly incorporated into the following three sub-sections, 
and partly follow as a separate sub-section on the demand vs. supply issue.  
There are also demographic factors that are linked to the level of the individual, and do not 
necessarily reflect differences at the level of nations or regions. These include education, age 
and gender. For example, older age and female gender have both been linked to lower 
consumption of meat (e.g. Lea & Worsley, 2001), and higher education has also been linked 
to lower consumption of meat (Regmi & Gehlhar, 2001). The level of the individual is crucial 
for change, and I will discuss it after the sections focusing on macro level influences. 
Further, cultural factors play a significant role in influencing larger trends in meat eating. At 
least within Europe, cultural and national differences in meat eating may be larger than the 
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 Wellesley et al. (2015) provides an often referenced report and discussion on the larger trends. 
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demographic or socioeconomic differences within cultures or geographical  areas (Evans & 
Miele, 2012). Culture will be further referred to in the following sections when appropriate. 
Finally, and partially linked to culture, further large scale changes to the levels of meat 
consumption come from factors which can be seen at the level of discourse. Here influential 
may be food scares, such as the BSE crisis in the United Kingdom in the 1990’s, the more 
general unhealthy image of red meat, and concerns regarding factory farming or climate 
change. Importantly, discourses can be seen to integrate the individual level with the 
society, i.e. the regional, national or global level. Section 2.2 will explore discourses around 
meat. 
Standard of living – The protein transition 
Globally speaking, the biggest phenomenon to do with income and nutrition in the last 
decades is argued to be the protein transition, whereby meat consumption is said to rise 
together with the rise of economic development and rising incomes. Although a rising GDP 
(gross domestic product) per capita - as an indicator of standard of living – may not be 
claimed to directly cause rising meat consumption levels, a positive association between 
GDP and meat consumption can be found (see e.g. FAO, 2009; Smil, 2002; York & Gossard, 
2004), as the mostly rising curve in Figure 2.6 illustrates.  
Figure 2.6. Protein transition – Meat consumption vs. GDP 
 
Source: FAO (2009). 
Note: GDP per capita is measured at purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international US dollars. 
Based on FAO data for per capita meat consumption and the World Bank for per capita GDP. 
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However, such a positive link (as in Figure 2.6) is more valid at global level, and not nearly 
always seen at national levels (see e.g. Wellesley et al., 2015). The relationship between 
income and meat is therefore more complex, even when considering the protein transition 
an inherent development in human societies. 
For example, it is acknowledged that sociocultural factors have an influence above income 
growth, as can be seen from countries such as India and Japan (see Figure 2.5), where for 
India, the level of meat consumption has remained extremely low despite rapid income 
growth in significant parts of the population in recent decades,51 and for Japan, where a 
moderate meat diet has prevailed to some extent, despite Japan being an overall high-
income country already for decades. Further, the Chatham House Report (Wellesley et al., 
2015) found out in their survey of 12 countries that affluent respondents in China and India 
(where historically meat has not been widely eaten) were more likely than lower earners to 
want to eat more meat, but in Brazil and South Africa (where meat has traditionally been 
central) higher earners were less likely to want to eat more meat than low earners, similarly 
to many Global North countries, such as France, Germany, United Kingdom or United States. 
Similarly, York and Gossard (2004) note that on average, people in the Global North and the 
Middle East have tended to eat more meat the wealthier the nations have become, whereas 
at least in some parts of Asia, people tend to shift towards eating more fish, rather than 
meat, when they become wealthier. 
As argued by many by now, GDP does not measure human well-being adequately. To 
explore an alternative, Pradhan et al. (2013) analysed food consumption data in detail for 
the last half a century for all the countries in the world, using the Human Development Index 
(HDI) instead of GDP. Interestingly, they found that, similar to GDP, also HDI correlates 
strongly and positively with the consumption of animal products on a global level. 
It has also been presented - and the curve in Figure 2.6 would also seem to support this - 
that meat consumption increases with income according to a Kuznets curve, an inverted U-
curve (see e.g. Cole & McCoskey, 2013) or an S-curve (Keyzer et al., 2005; Westhoek et al., 
2011), and this curve may already be in the downward or levelling off part in certain 
countries, especially in the Global North. At some point, so the theory goes, people with 
                                                          
51
 But see Section 2.3.1 for the future of India. 
 
 
32 
 
higher income cease to consider meat as a sign of wealth, or they start to view eating more 
meat in a negative light (for various reasons), and therefore, they reduce their meat 
consumption. According to Popkin (1999), the final stage of a five-stage nutrition transition 
(where different stages can also co-exist) in effect takes diets back to eating less meat, more 
unprocessed and simpler foods in general. This would also seem to be in line with the recent 
fairly stable, or slightly decreasing meat eating trends, for example, in some European 
countries. However, for most countries, according to these analyses, the time to reach the 
income level where consumption would turn down would still be long, and much too long to 
help with the current global meat crisis (Cole & McCoskey, 2013). 
Finally, Figure 2.7 shows results from a study estimating the number of vegetarians and 
comparing this to income levels at a global level. As can be seen, the inverted U-curve in 
Figure 2.6 above matches rather well with the U-curve in Figure 2.7, so that the rising part of 
the curve in Figure 2.7 could reflect the fifth stage of the nutrition transition (Popkin, 1999).  
Leahy et al. (2010) distinguish between out-of-necessity vegetarians as those on the 
downward part of the curve in Figure 2.7 (eating meat when given the chance), and out-of-
choice vegetarians as those on the upward part of the curve (increasingly not eating meat). 
Figure 2.7. Vegetarianism and GDP per capita in different countries (in international dollars) 
 
Source: Leahy et al. (2010). 
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I would conclude that, while increased income may often lead to more meat being eaten 
(when it is available), the relationship is more complex, and so, this is by no means an 
absolute rule. The Kuznets curve, even if reflecting a real phenomenon, is not, however, 
practicable as most people, or nations, have not reached the level of income at which meat 
consumption might start decreasing, as also noted by Cole and McCoskey (2013). 
Meat prices 
According to economic theory, the lower the price of a desired item is, the more people will 
buy and consume it. Many (e.g. Rivera-Ferre, 2009; Westhoek et al., 2011) argue this to be 
the case with meat as well, in particular with lower income population segments, and 
currently more generally in the Global South.  
Similarly, when asked what people take into account when buying food in a supermarket, 
price is often one of the top considerations, in addition to taste, health and food safety (see 
e.g. Wellesley et al., 2015). However, as discussed later in Chapter 3, most behaviour, 
including routine shopping, is automatic, driven by path dependency and subconscious 
decisions (based on intended or unintended cues in the environment at home or in shops). It 
may therefore be more that people think – or even, that they prefer to answer a survey52 
saying that they think - they consider certain attributes, such as price or healthiness, rather 
than that they actually buy food items based on these attributes, and not some other 
attributes (such as the aesthetics of the packaging), while engaged in automatic behaviour.53 
In the Global North, prices are also considered to have less relevance for meat purchases 
than for some other commodities (e.g. PBL, 2008). On the other hand, there is some recent 
evidence that a tax on meat could possibly be an efficient way to limit or reduce meat eating 
(Bailey & Harper, 2015; Springmann et al., 2016; Wellesley et al., 2015). 
The falling trend in meat prices in the last half a century is most clear for chicken (see e.g. 
Rivera-Ferre, 2009) which used to be considered a particularly luxurious meat still in the 
early part of the 20th century. At the same time, the last half a century has seen a steeper 
rise in chicken consumption over other meats in many countries, both in the Global North 
and South. 
                                                          
52
 See e.g. Hartmann and Siegrist (2017) for criticism about asking people’s preferences about meat eating in 
surveys. 
53
 However, most likely price nearly always has some influence on food purchases. 
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The sharp fall in chicken meat prices is, to a significant extent, due to the industrialization of 
poultry production since the 1950s in the United States and in Europe (see e.g. Westhoek et 
al., 2011), and later also in the Global South, with the speed and scale of industrialization, 
and also the concentration and globalization (in terms of international trade) unparalleled by 
any other foods or food products (Marí & Buntzel, 2008). However, there are other, more 
controversial factors contributing to low meat prices, such as government subsidies, and 
intentional price dumping by the industry (e.g. Heinrich Böll Foundation, 2014). Also, the 
externalization of social, environmental or ethical issues arising from meat production in 
general keeps meat prices much lower than they would be, if these factors were calculated 
in (e.g. Gjerris et al., 2011). 
The situation regarding artificially low meat prices is particularly extreme in the United 
States, as US agricultural policy, in terms of government subsidies to feed crops, makes feed 
grain and therefore meat cheaper than most other US foods. According to Donaldson 
(2016a), US meat is, in fact, cheaper than Chinese meat because of the subsidies. McMullen 
(2016) argues that Big Meat in the US has been supported by the government generally in 
three ways: with subsidies, with advertising54 and with nutrition advice.55 
In Europe, apart from chicken, meat prices have, in fact, not decreased significantly in the 
last half a century when adjusted with a food consumer price index, i.e. when comparing 
changes in the price of meat to the changes in the average price of all food items. Kanerva 
(2013) correlates meat price and meat consumption data for a number of European 
countries, and finds indications for some relationships between certain meats and certain 
countries. However, in the United Kingdom, for example, pork and sheep meat consumption 
have come down together with the prices, indicating that there may have been other, 
stronger influences on pork and sheep meat consumption. Rivera-Ferre (2009) has made 
similar observations for the United States from 1955 to 1995, where the consumption of 
chicken was correlated with price, but the consumption of beef and pork was not. 
                                                          
54
 For example, the long running and still influential advertising campaign "Beef, it's what's for dinner" 
originated from a government supported advertising programme (McMullen, 2016:41). 
55
 Due to industry pressure, e.g. from the National Cattlemen’s Beef Association (Simon, 2013), the latest US 
dietary guidelines mainly fail to recommend eating less meat, although the advisory committee supported 
including a clear message regarding that (see e.g. 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2016/01/07/462160303/new-dietary-guidelines-crack-down-on-sugar-
but-red-meat-gets-a-pass). 
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The policy of the Chinese government since the late 1970s of opening of the Chinese market 
to foreign industrial meat producers (MacLachlan, 2015) has seen not only meat prices drop, 
but indeed consumption rise (in line with a governmental goal) to the extent that the 
government turned around in 2016, and issued new nutrition guidelines recommending only 
modest amounts of meat to be consumed, together with a campaign to curb the current 
excessive meat consumption, and its negative impacts on the population.56 In China, lifting 
the population from poverty has coincided with rise in meat production and fall in meat 
prices.57  
Culture can, however, trump price, similarly to the case of the protein transition discussed 
above. Westhoek et al. (2011) explore the link between household expenditure and food 
culture. Southern European countries have traditionally spent considerably more money on 
food as compared to Northern European countries, so, culture may have outplayed prices in 
Southern Europe. Food in general has also occupied a more central place in people's lives in 
Southern Europe, as opposed to Northern Europe, where only in the last half a century 
food's cultural position has gradually gained importance (see also van Otterloo, 2012). De 
Boer et al. (2006) link this to the contribution of religion to food culture, as their study 
indicates that traditionally catholic countries in Europe have spent more money on meat 
than traditionally protestant countries, with the catholic culture appreciating meat 
specifically as a culinary pleasure.  
A conclusion for this section is that meat prices are in many cases intentionally lowered in 
order to increase consumption, and while this approach often works (although not always), 
the low prices are a significant problem in and of itself, as exemplified by the Chinese case.  
Finally, I would note that price can, in fact, be seen a supply factor. To explain, arguing that 
low prices push meat consumption up implies that the process does not start from increased 
demand pushing the industry to produce more (an argument often made), but from the 
lower prices produced by the industry creating the demand.  
                                                          
56
 See http://www.fcrn.org.uk/fcrn-blogs/lucy-luo/new-chinese-dietary-guidelines-%E2%80%93-what-do-they-
really-say-meat-consumption-and.  
57
 Recently, China has invested in cell-based meat, possibly seeing it as a partial solution for Chinese meat 
consumption (http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/china-israel-trade-deal-lab-grown-meat-
veganism-vegetarianism-a7950901.html). 
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Urbanization 
The degree of urbanization is generally considered to be strongly related to increased meat 
eating, through changes in lifestyles and diets overall, both in the Global North and 
increasingly also in the South (e.g. Rivera-Ferre, 2009). For example, double-income families, 
supermarkets and convenience meat products are linked to urbanization, and indeed, the 
enormous increases in the consumption of poultry over the last half a century is probably 
partly due to the convenience factor (Westhoek et al., 2011). Anderson and Shugan (1991) 
observed a while ago that the perceived high convenience was the main contributor for the 
shift from beef to chicken at that point in the United States, rather than perceived 
healthiness of chicken which is often argued to be the main cause for the switch. Similarly, 
Schroeter and Foster (2004) find that the higher the share of women in the workforce, the 
higher the consumption of chicken (and fish, which can also be quick to prepare) in the US.  
With data for 132 countries, the regression results of York and Gossard (2004) indicate that 
urbanization generally does seem to increase together with not just chicken, but also total 
meat consumption. They however, also emphasize that different geographical regions have 
had different impacts from the processes of urbanization. Rivera-Ferre (2009) remarks that 
the relationship between urbanization and increasing meat consumption is not as simple as 
it might seem, and urbanization is only one aspect in the expansion of industrial meat 
production. She argues strongly that the complex process is driven more by political and 
economic interests, than simpler forces such as urbanization. 
In conclusion, although standard of living, urbanization and meat consumption often rise 
together, and meat prices may have an inverted relationship with consumption, these trends 
may also be related to other simultaneous factors. Importantly, the industrialization of meat 
production through related factors, such as marketing and government subsidies for feed 
crops, may have both increased consumption and decreased prices. The following section 
explores further the basic chicken and egg question of whether demand for meat drives 
supply (as often claimed), or the other way around, as also discussed in literature.  
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Supply vs. demand 
As an example, the report by OECD and FAO (2014:180) says that "it is mostly consumer 
preferences, together with income and population growth, that lead and drive the meat 
sector over time”. This is still often an accepted paradigm, but some critical literature argues 
that consumer preferences are in fact largely created by industry marketing and advertising, 
and the availability of (convenience) products in supermarkets. Early criticism was provided 
by Gailbraith (Galbraith, 1971, in MacLachlan, 2015). 
Similar to Rivera-Ferre (2009) above, MacLachlan (2015) believes that the rising meat 
consumption especially in the Global South – often named the Livestock Revolution - is less a 
question of demand (from higher income earners) and more a question of supply. In other 
words, the spread of both industrialised animal agriculture and supermarkets in cities in the 
Global South, combined with industry promotion, are driving meat prices down (while also 
driving grain prices up) and meat “demand” up. A similar process has taken place in 
previously industrialized countries earlier. He compares this supposedly “demand-driven 
revolution” to the Green Revolution which was “supply-driven”, since it came about from 
the development of new forms of high-yielding cereal grains and technology transfer to the 
Global South. I would, in fact, even argue that, unlike the Livestock Revolution, the Green 
Revolution could actually be seen as more demand-driven, since it was largely a response 
from the Global North to the food insecurity in the Global South. 
Similarly, Marí and Buntzel (2008) question the demand/supply relationship in meat. Rather 
than the increased demand creating markets for industrial meat production in the Global 
South, the intensification of meat production by large multinationals has created the 
markets that consumers have adjusted to. They argue further that the vastly increased 
international trade in chicken meat over the last half a century has also brought about an 
increase in chicken consumption, rather than the other way around. Rivera-Ferre (2009) also 
maintains that many development agencies have seen specifically industrial meat as a 
solution to both malnutrition and increased economic development in the Global South. 
Further, Zhou (2015) describes in detail how actions by the global meat complex together 
with government policies in the United States, China and Brazil (together the Triangle) have 
shaped production and consumption in different, but equally demand increasing ways. The 
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US has exported its successful model and related technology for industrial animal agriculture 
first to Brazil, and more recently to China, while also exporting large amounts of meat and 
feed (for Chinese meat animals) to China.58 Brazil is the other major supplier of meat and 
feed to China. In both Brazil and China, the governments have considered the entry of 
foreign (mostly US) meat industry as a very positive turn for their economies (see also Tian 
et al., 2016 for China). 
One way to examine quantitatively the relationship between the growth of the global meat 
complex and consumption trends, would be to look at developments in industry 
advertisement and marketing. Detailed data on industry advertisement or marketing 
expenses is, however, generally difficult or impossible to obtain from public sources, as 
companies are usually not obliged to disclose such data. Nonetheless, some research on the 
effect of advertising and marketing does exist. For example, Zimmerman (2011) concludes 
from his thorough review that both marketing and advertising have had a major, and 
perhaps the largest, impact on the obesity epidemic in the United States since the early 
1980’s, while excessive meat eating is related to obesity. Linking advertisement to meat 
eating directly, Brester and Shroeder (1995) performed a study whereby branded meat 
advertising had a clear increasing effect on meat eating.59 
More generally, I would argue that it is not only the marketing or advertisement for specific 
meat products that increases meat eating, but these advertisements can be seen as a sign of 
the prevailing meat eating culture (or carnism, see Section 2.2). Their mere existence is 
enough to have an impact on meat eating; if there were no advertisements, no marketing 
for any kind of meat or meat products, not in the media, and not in supermarkets or 
elsewhere, this could have a significant lowering impact on consumption, as it would likely 
play down the importance and visibility of meat. The acceptability and desirability of high 
meat consumption could also be lower in such a scenario, similar to the case of tobacco or 
alcohol advertising and marketing. 
                                                          
58
 In the early 2010s, the US domestic consumption of meat decreased due to increased exports, according to 
the USDA (Zhou, 2015). In other words, US consumption was driven by industry decisions to export to the new 
lucrative markets in China. 
59
 Nestle (2007) notes that the expenses on marketing and advertisement for any single nationally distributed 
food product in the US far exceed (often by 10-50 fold) the expenditure of the US government on the food 
pyramid, which supposedly promotes a healthy diet, as opposed to what the industry advertisements usually 
promote. See discussion on nutrition guidelines in Section 2.3. 
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Finally, although often discouraging and challenging from the point of view of sustainability, 
the demand paradigm - the default explanation by industries and also policymakers to the 
supply vs. demand question - could have an upside as well. Industries generally justify many 
of their actions by saying that the actions are a response to what their customers want. In 
some cases at least, this claim may be a way to justify either continuing with business-as-
usual, or doing something new. It can also be a form of “face-saving”, i.e. not having to 
admit that the industry needs some reorientation because of environmental reasons, for 
example. In the case of industries such as the global meat complex, it would indeed be quite 
possible in theory at least for the food industry as a whole to use such a face-saving 
justification for an orientation away from intensive animal-based food production, towards 
either (lower yield, but more pricey) extensive meat production, or towards some of the 
meat alternatives discussed later in this chapter. The scale of change necessary for the 
industry will be an enormous challenge, and all sustainable alternatives entail radical cuts to 
meat produced by slaughtering animals, as the Earth system cannot support current levels of 
meat consumption from organic or extensive meat production (see e.g. Stǎnescu, 2016). 
The level of the individual 
Factors, such as industrialization of meat production, lower prices, and pervasive industry 
influence, urbanization, increased income, globalization of Western food culture,60 all indeed 
have had the potential to increase meat eating, at least to a point. Further, political factors, 
such as agricultural and food policies, often influenced by industry, and demographic factors, 
such as age, gender or education may play a role in influencing the level of meat 
consumption. Finally, food scares or concerns regarding factory farming, health or climate 
change can run counter to the increasing trends, with some potential to reduce meat eating, 
or to reduce some environmental or health impacts from eating meat, such as with a switch 
from eating beef to eating chicken.  
Focusing on the level of the individual, all the different factors - and in fact, many others not 
discussed above and beyond the scope of this chapter - combine. Figure 2.8 illustrates the 
different possible influences on meat eating at the level of an individual person.  
                                                          
60
 A Western diet is defined e.g. by Popkin et al. (2012:6) as “high intake of refined carbohydrates, added 
sugars, fats, and animal-source foods”. 
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Figure 2.8. Influences on meat eating practices at the level of the individual 
 
Source: Figure by author. 
Notes: The arrows are only illustrative, and mostly very little of the interconnecting relationships is actually known; the 
factors marked darker are discussed more in this section, and most of the factors marked in lighter grey are discussed more 
in Chapter 3. 
Figure 2.8 illustrates how complex the situation is. As regards quantifying the influencing 
factors, some of them, such as economic factors, can be fairly easily quantified. However, 
others, such as cultural factors, are difficult to measure, although they can be described. 
Some tacit factors may not even be describable, let alone measurable. Importantly, the 
factors also influence each other, for example, one’s gender or life situation, or availability of 
money, will have some effect on how much importance the availability of different options 
in the shops has, and individual values regarding animal ethics will have some impact on how 
much the national food culture influences one’s meat eating practices. Balancing between 
different needs or values, for example, between family and animal ethics, or between cost 
and taste, also plays a very relevant role (see e.g. Evans & Miele, 2012; Sobal et al., 2006). In 
fact, many factors often do not directly affect how people eat meat, even though they play 
their often very relevant part in the bigger picture. However, Shephard and Raats state that: 
…because human food choice is influenced by so many potential factors, there 
is often a tendency to look at the impact of these factors in isolation rather 
than trying to arrive at some overall understanding of the interplay between 
different types of influences. 
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The sheer number of factors, their qualities, and their complicated relationships to each 
other, make it, therefore, impossible to quantify such a model. It is largely a question of 
“drowning out by numbers” (Kasper, 2015:29).  
To view the issue through a social practice lens, as in Chapter 3, the web of overall factors, as 
in Figure 2.8, is what makes how people act or behave relatively stable, but it is also what 
makes practices change on their own over time when different factors change. As Shove et 
al. (2012) argue, this coinciding stability and change is typical for social practices, of which 
meat eating is one. However, the crucial question for the near future is how the patterns of 
many unsustainable practices, including meat eating related practices, could be purposively 
and radically changed.  
Intentionality can originate top-down or bottom-up, or both. Firstly, it can come from 
policymakers, advocacy groups, or other macro-level actors, through thinking in terms of the 
above factor model, whereby individuals could be influenced with our without their explicit 
awareness. For example, attempts to motivate people towards different behaviour as 
regards climate change mostly take place through information sharing and appeals to fear 
(Hunter & Röös, 2016). Choice architecture also belongs to a top-down approach to 
behaviour change. However, there are large scale phenomena that prevent such methods 
from creating the desired change. For example, society is often blind to the countering effect 
of the most dominant values present, such as the importance still based on (increased) 
consumption. Generally, decades of research on values (see e.g. Maio, 2011; 2017) has 
shown that values – or more specifically, value priorities and value dispositions - do matter 
and they are important for behaviour.   
Secondly, change can also originate from the bottom up, from ordinary people. With nearly 
all practices, however, such bottom-up change can be - and has to be for real and more 
extensive social change - enabled by, or combined with support from other societal actors, 
such as policymakers, the industry or various advocacy groups.  
An example regarding bottom-up change in eating practices is related to the debate 
regarding whether those eating only a little meat (flexitarians) or no meat (vegetarians or 
vegans) have any agency to influence larger trends towards eating less meat. Is the (future) 
supply of the new meats offered by the industry the only way for ordinary eaters to have an 
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impact within a capitalist system? Some maintain (e.g. Spiller & Nitzko, 2015) indeed that 
flexitarians or vegans have little market power, as compared to intensive meat eaters. The 
“humane meat” producers61 even argue that such people are worsening the situation, by not 
eating meat and thereby not being able to “vote” as effectively via their purchase behaviour 
(Stǎnescu, 2016). However, an individual decision for eating less or no meat, and therefore, 
for example, pulses, is not a passive act, but an active choice for a different vision of future 
(idem). These eaters have citizen power, or agency through their choices (Spiller & Nitzko, 
2015).  
This citizen power may be realized, however, only to the extent that such actions are in 
some ways public. Therefore, essential elements for intentional and lasting change - i.e. not 
dependent on situational factors such as choice architecture – include discourses, as I will 
argue further in Chapter 3. Discourses connect the macro level of society to the micro level 
of the individual, or put in another way, as van Dijk (2015:469) says, “language users as 
social actors mentally represent and connect [society and discourse]”. Discourses can be 
seen as a prerequisite to an awareness of problematic practices and their solutions - 
whether at the level of individuals or at the level of societies - especially since discourses can 
also lead to an increased awareness of potentially conflicting values, emotions and 
knowledge. Without acknowledged awareness, purposive and lasting change at individual or 
societal levels is unlikely. Section 2.2 will, therefore, explore recent and current discourses 
on meat. 
2.2. Meat related discourses 
In Section 2.1, I already touched on discourses around eating, and not eating meat, as, due 
to the values and emotions attached to eating, it is not really possible to discuss the history 
of meat without mentioning what eating, or not eating animals has meant to humans over 
time. In this section, however, I will briefly cover the discourses over the last half a century, 
and then focus on the present day. Chapters 3 and 4 will discuss further the role of discourse 
in society. 
  
                                                          
61
 Meat producers, mainly in the US, who call themselves “humane meat” producers, produce mainly organic 
meat. However, the US market has not been well regulated in this respect, and these produces have also 
received a good deal of criticism for being manipulative towards consumers (Stǎnescu, 2016). 
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2.2.1. Rise of discourses 
Nearly 30 years ago, Fiddes (1991) noted that meat eating could be considered just as 
ideological or political an issue as vegetarianism, as it involved an abundance of social rules 
and meaning. He went on to say that, consequently, the habit of meat eating required 
justification just like vegetarianism, and it could not therefore just be passed as something 
obvious. It should rather be a conscious choice. 
When questioned, meat eaters have generally justified their diet as something natural, 
traditional or necessary for humans. In prehistory, meat eating is argued to have been an 
integral part of the development of our species (e.g. Zaraska, 2016a). Meat was also 
considered necessary for religious reasons (e.g. Swatland, 2010), and nowadays people often 
justify their practice simply because meat tastes good, and it is an important part of social 
eating. These lines of thought go back a very long time. However, before the rise of 
industrial animal farming there was a certain “eat with care” attitude to eating meat (Foer, 
2009).  
For our age of industrial meat, Joy (2010) talks about the three Ns of justification regarding 
eating meat: Normal, Natural and Necessary. People have internalised these so well that 
they have usually been considered truths rather than opinions, and therefore, any moral 
considerations regarding eating animals have not even entered the picture for most people. 
Joy introduced the term carnism to indicate the culture, or the invisible belief system of 
meat eating, and the discursive hegemony that the culture of meat enjoys. Piazza et al. 
(2015), add a fourth N for Nice to the three Ns from Joy. Further, Monteiro et al. (2017) 
develop a distinction between carnistic defence (justifying meat eating) and carnistic 
domination (justifying killing animals for meat), with the first relating more to Normal, 
Necessary and Nice, and the second more to Natural. Before the term carnism, other 
authors, in addition to Fiddes above, have linked meat eating to an ideology. Adams (e.g. 
1991) claims that meat eating has become an ideology whereby the ideology itself makes 
meat eating appear natural and predestined. In fact, she argues that killing animals for food 
has changed from something we do to them into something that is “part of animals’ nature” 
(idem:135). Palmer (1997) includes an early discussion of the human domination over 
domesticated animals potentially being legitimized through a social contract. 
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Meat eating has traditionally symbolised masculinity, strength, higher socioeconomic status, 
and human dominion over nature (e.g. Allen & Baines, 2002; Ruby & Heine, 2011). There are 
some signs, however, that the image of meat may be changing (e.g. de Bakker & Dagevos, 
2012; Ruby, 2012), or that the symbolic meaning of meat could even be successfully 
manipulated (Allen & Baines, 2002). The ideas of what is “normal” tend to shift considerably 
over time (Shove, 2003; see also Chapter 3), so has also the meaning of meat changed and 
will continue to change.  
As I mentioned earlier, meat, and especially red meat has been discussed negatively, not 
only in academic literature, but also in many media stories, especially in relation to its 
healthiness. However, conflicting dietary advice for health, and especially weight loss, can be 
found in many places, especially in popular media, with governmental dietary guidelines 
being only a minor source of information for many people who tend to be persuaded 
simultaneously to two, often opposite directions. On the one hand, people have become 
more conscious about the links between eating habits and health, encouraging them to 
follow a diet less heavy on meat, among other things. On the other hand, certain popular 
diets have pulled some health-conscious people towards eating more meat. In particular, the 
“low carb” diet has often been understood in particular as a high-meat diet. Coinciding with 
the rise of such diets, also the so called lipid hypothesis (i.e. that saturated fats and blood 
cholesterol are major factors in cardiovascular disease) has also been questioned, even in 
some scientific literature (e.g. by Siri-Tarino et al., 2010).  
There have also been clear cultural differences seen in the discourse. Halkier et al. (2007) 
make a comparison between four European countries in terms of the discursive framings of 
food consumers, and concludes that there are fairly large national or cultural differences 
within Europe, and that conflicts in northern European countries may be more between 
different food related issues, such as food safety, quality, nutrition and ethics, and in 
southern European countries between different types of actors, such as public authorities, 
the food industry and the retail sector. Kjærnes and Torjusen (2012) also find some regional 
differences in that, people from southern and Eastern Europe tend to be lately more 
pessimistic about food than especially Scandinavian consumers. Further, a comparative 
study by Bauer et al. (2006) in Germany, Finland, Italy and the United Kingdom on the 
impacts of the BSE crisis illuminates how national media influences the perception of risk. 
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Priorities and framings also change over time as a result of changing practices, scientific 
research, and public debates. Framings of food (and often, meat) related concerns in general 
have varied a lot just in the last half a century. In the 1950s and 1960s they were mostly 
about safety, convenience and prices, in the 1970s and 1980s about fertilizers and 
pesticides, in the 1980s and 1990s about risks and taste, and in the 2000s about animal 
welfare and fair trade (Spaargaren, Loeber, et al., 2012). 
Often in the last decades, public and media discussions around meat eating have largely 
risen from issues related to intensive animal agriculture. Larger health scares, such as the 
European BSE crisis in the 1990s, the avian influenza epidemic taking place mostly in Asia 
from the early 2000s onwards, or more local crises of meat contamination with dioxin or 
other toxins, have generated much discussion which has often lead to a wider debate on the 
issues related to a diet relying heavily on eating meat. 
Several narratives have existed for quite some time already as to how problems related to 
the global meat complex could be solved while still continuing to consume meat from 
slaughtered animals. Organic meat has been a popular answer to those concerned with 
industrially produced meat. However, as mentioned earlier, large scale organic meat 
production shares many of the same problems as conventional production, especially in 
term of climate change or deforestation (e.g. Foodwatch, 2009; Steinfeld et al., 2006), and 
organic meat producers can also deceive consumers by marketing “humane” meat from 
“compassionate” farmers with few regulatory constraints (see Stǎnescu, 2016). Further, 
grass-fed cows have been suggested even as a solution to the contribution of meat to 
climate change (by the grazing locking away soil carbon), and such discourse has been 
popular online as well. This account has, however, also been firmly disputed (see a thorough 
review of the issue by Garnett et al., 2018), although there remain arguments that a small 
number of well-placed grazing cows may be relatively harmless as regards climate change 
(see Garnett et al., 2018; Röös et al., 2016). There is also another popular “less, but better” 
narrative which acknowledges the array of serious problems, and the urgent need to find 
solutions, but aligns with the paradigm of the necessity of meat eating. An example of this is 
the Eat well -campaign in the United Kingdom. The idea is that decreasing meat eating, and 
concentrating on better quality, i.e. less intensively produced meat, can help solve the meat 
crisis. Although this is an appealing idea to many, and probably designed to cause less 
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antagonism (Santini et al., 2015), the lack of radical absolute reductions in this model, 
however, casts doubt on its viability as a sustainable global solution. The question is about 
quantities: a truly small amount of grazing cattle could be beneficial, if it would replace the 
current mass production of beef. The focus of any such “less, but better” -campaigns would 
therefore better be more strongly on the “less”, rather than the “better”.62 
The FAO prediction of 75% increase by 2050 of the demand for meat carries a message of 
“people will want meat”, and assumes that there cannot be a radical reduction in the meat 
that people eat globally, and more generally, that humans have to keep eating animals. Even 
though this business-as-usual approach requiring growth of production is also criticized by 
food production related organisations (see Soil Association, 2010), the growth paradigm is 
also included in at least some of the alternative meat discourse.63 
Less visible in the public discourses have been, on the one hand, the answer from the global 
meat complex and from some international organisations to the anticipated increased future 
demand for meat, and, on the other hand, their answer to the contribution of meat 
production to climate change. The suggested and researched solution to the issue of 
demand, has been to make intensive animal farming even more intensive, widespread and 
efficient, and the answer to the issue of climate change has been to intensify science’s focus 
on developing animal breeds, or animal feeds that are less harmful in terms of the 
production of GHGs, so for example, reducing the methane emissions from cows (e.g. in 
many FAO reports on the issue). This discourse, especially related to the increased intensity, 
has largely stayed out of the media focus, and presumably might not always be well received 
by the publics. Neither would all stakeholders necessarily want to draw attention to the 
realities of intensive animal agriculture. However, as for example, Garnett (2011) or 
Springmann et al. (2018) conclude, it is not possible to make the meat system efficient 
enough to take account of climate change. Reductions in consumption must be an integral 
part of the picture. 
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 Some, for example de Boer, de Witt et al. (2016) argue, however, that switching to eating organic meat can 
have positive spillover effects to other, more environmentally beneficial behaviours. 
63
 See for example Paul Shapiro, Vice President of Policy, the Humane Society of the United States, and a self-
declared vegan, talking at a Stanford University panel discussion on cell-based meat at 
http://www.gfi.org/stanford-on-meat-without-animals. 
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Despite the narrative of especially red meat being bad not only for humans, but for the 
environment as well, no very large scale, or radical changes in the image of meat have been 
widespread until now, as the Chatham House Report’s (Wellesley et al., 2015) findings about 
(especially red) meat in the United States still being strongly associated with being American 
demonstrate. Similarly, all the different discourses on ethical and other problems related to 
eating animals, have not, until now, lead to a more permanent increase in the numbers of 
vegetarians, which in Europe, for example, have ranged in recent decades from around 1% 
to between 5-10%, or vegans which number generally under 1% of a population.64 
Temporarily, these numbers have changed, e.g. in France the share of vegetarians rose 
reportedly to 6% around 2001, possibly as a consequence of the BSE crisis, but soon after, 
the figures fell towards what has been more typical for France, i.e. only 1-2% of the 
population (Kjørstad, 2005).  
There have also been narratives countering the superiority of a vegetarian or vegan diet, as 
regards environmental impacts from the food system. For example, the vegetarian myth 
(Keith, 2009) claims that vegetarians or vegans falsely believe that their diets can be a 
solution to the crisis of industrial animal agriculture. There has also been a debate on 
whether those eating grass-fed animals or those eating no meat end up killing more animals, 
with the arguments being between accidental killings during plant harvesting and intentional 
killings in animal agriculture, a discussion largely initiated by Davis (2003), and mostly 
revolving around ethics. While convincingly aiming to end the fight as regards numbers of 
animals killed, Lamey (2007) points to the new discourse over, not whether animals deserve 
protection or not, but which kind of protections produce the best results. He also points out 
that field animals do get killed even within the production of a vegan diet, in other words, 
his is an argument for the importance of choice of farming methods. He also points out that 
“not all meats are created equal” (idem:344), so that, while both produce the same amount 
of meat, killing 100 chickens is ethically worse than killing one cow.  
The disconnection between meat production and consumption is largely due to the 
industrialization of meat production and growth of supermarkets. Gouveia and Juska 
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 The numbers also depend on the definition of what counts as a vegetarian or vegan diet. Unfortunately, 
there is sparse longitudinal or geographically comparable data available on the share of vegetarians or vegans 
in different countries, and the estimates tend to be using different definitions, and carrying various 
methodological issues with them. 
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(2002:384-385) argue that, in fact, the popular media has been falsely reconnecting 
production and consumption by “framing food and cooking as a lifestyle” by discussing, for 
example, seasonal and locally produced foods, or engaging celebrity cooks to visit rustic 
small farms, while in reality, most eaters are still faced with the same industrially produced 
supermarket meat. In this narrative, the reintegration of production and consumption is 
therefore made into a matter of individual choice, while actually the two realms are perhaps 
even further distanced from each other with this framing.  
As the following section will discuss, the (conscious) awareness of the enormously 
challenging and critical issues related to the current meat system is still low among most 
people, but has increased in the last years in the scientific community, some media outlets, 
and even within policymakers and the industries involved. New solutions have been 
considered, and new discourses have been born, taking some of the focus away from more 
modest or incremental changes to the system, or the narratives that are based on disputed 
science, to more radical alternatives. As a result, the older discourses mostly keep on 
existing while new discourses are born, and so, the numbers of different, and often 
contradicting, narratives around meat are increasing also in the public sphere. 
2.2.2. The new discourses 
There seems to currently exist new and diverging narratives, or discourses, around the 
various solutions to the meat crisis, at least in the Global North. Two of the most obvious 
strands include, on the one hand, the necessity of overhauling the current meat system, and 
on the other hand, apparent denial of the need for large-scale changes. The new meats, such 
as cell-based meat, plant-based meat, or insects, as well as flexitarianism - as an additional 
new meatway – are an important theme in the first strand of discourses. 
Firstly, there is a great deal of excitement among start-up businesses developing cell-based 
(cultured) or plant-based meat,65 major investors,66 and organisations67 involved with the 
                                                          
65
 The developers of meat analogues have developed the term plant-based meat to emphasize the fact that 
these products aspire to resemble meat in every way, the only exception being that their origin is from plants, 
rather than animals. More recent terms used by the companies developing animal-based, cultured meat are 
clean meat (from 2016), cellular agriculture (from 2015), and cell-based meat (from 2018). I mostly refer to cell-
based, plant-based and animal-based (conventional) meat in this thesis. See Chapter 3 for some more 
discussion on the names. 
66
 See e.g. FAIRR (2016), or https://www.cbinsights.com/research/future-of-meat-industrial-farming/. 
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start-ups in building the new industry (see the next section and Table 2.1 for more on these 
developments). There is a degree of hype attached to these alternatives. Some policy circles 
are supporting these developments,68 and through increasing media reporting in the recent 
years, many ordinary citizens have had a change to learn about the new potential directions.  
Figure 2.9 shows the number of articles in the Guardian newspaper on different alternatives 
to eating conventional meat (including insects and flexitarianism, discussed later). The media 
event in 2013 where the first ever cultured beef burger was prepared and eaten in London 
caused the peak around that year. However, the overall trend is clear. The number of 
articles was rising between around 2007 and 2017. 
Figure 2.9. Number of mentions in the online Guardian of different alternatives to eating 
conventional animal-based meat from 2000 to 2017 
 
Source: Based on the Guardian archives. 
Notes: The keywords used in the search for articles include the following: cultured meat, artificial meat, lab-grown meat, 
synthetic meat, in-vitro meat, clean meat, eating insects, plant-based protein, impossible burger, beyond meat, 
flexitarian, reducetarian, semi-vegetarian, meat alternative.
69
 Many articles mention several of these keywords; therefore 
the numbers do not refer to the number of articles, but to the mentions of these keywords. 
In these discourses, conventionally produced meat from slaughtered animals can actually be 
seen as the “wrong technology” to produce meat, “convenient, but incredibly inefficient”, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
67
 Such as the Good Food Institute (www.gfi.org) and New Harvest (www.new-harvest.org), promoting the 
alternatives, and financing research in cell- and plant-based meats. 
68
 For example, at the EU level, a research project called LikeMeat (Likemeat.eu) was EU-funded. Further, the 
Dutch government has funded research on cell-based meat (see http://www.new-
harvest.org/mark_post_cultured_beef). 
69
 The term “cell-based meat” was only invented in 2018. 
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and the future Earth citizens may look back at people eating animals (for their flesh) as 
something weird and archaic.70 However, more often cell-based meat creates controversy, 
with the discussion often moving from stronger initial reactions of disgust, or “wow”, to 
concerns for health or social consequences on the one hand, and environmental and ethical 
benefits on the other hand (see e.g. Laestadius & Caldwell, 2015; Onwezen & van der Weele, 
2016; Verbeke et al., 2015). The perceived unnaturalness and high-tech character of cell-
based meat, and the perceived naturalness and low-tech character of (intensively produced) 
conventional animal-based meat, are also apparent in the discourses. On naturalness, Ethan 
Brown, the founder of one of the new plant-based meat companies has argued that 
intensively produced conventional animal-based meat has already become “artificial”, as it 
is, in fact, so unnatural (Stǎnescu, 2016). 
Special about the discourses around the new plant-based meats is that these products are 
not aimed so much at vegetarians or vegans, but at those who until now have been 
conventional meat eaters, i.e. the majority of people.71 Similarly, cell-based meat is not 
presented as a another product for vegetarians or vegans, but for non-vegetarians, although 
Hopkins (2015) argues that the media may sometimes do a disservice by assuming 
otherwise.  
Another narrative is built around eating farmed insects, as something exotic and good for us. 
Since the technological input is much smaller, and since insects also represent something 
either formerly, or currently, rejected (mostly in the Global North), something mundane, or 
something very traditional (in some parts of the rest of the world), the excitement, or the 
hype - related to other promising, but more technological solutions (such as cultured or new 
plant-based meat) - is less obvious, although still existing. Largely, the initial reception by the 
publics in the Global North has been that of disgust (e.g. Looy et al., 2014). Insect start-ups 
tend to be dwindling businesses in many cases (Ana C. Day, personal communication, 9 April 
2016),72 although policymakers in the Global North are gradually making an effort to 
                                                          
70
 From Pat Brown, the founder of Impossible Foods, on BBC program The Inquiry in January 2017. 
71
 Indeed, Beyond Meat estimates that 70% of its customers eating Beyond Burgers are meat eaters 
(https://www.foodnavigator-usa.com/Article/2018/01/12/An-estimated-70-of-Beyond-Burger-fans-are-meat-
eaters-not-vegans-vegetarians-says-Beyond-Meat). 
72
 Ana C. Day is the founder of 4Ento.com, an organization promoting insects as primary future protein 
alternative for human consumption. 
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accommodate them.73 Insect eating eventually gaining ground in the Global North has been 
compared to sushi’s rise in popularity in the North outside Japan. However, the two differ 
from each other to a significant extent, even if the initial yuck-factor or the exotic nature of 
these foods are common features. Sushi in the Western world has been an additional, by 
now normalised food choice without any meaning of transformation attached to it, whereas 
insects are attached to the narrative of challenging the conventional animal-based meat 
eating related practices, and potentially transforming the conventional meat system.74 
Contrasting the above solution narratives, the narrative around eating traditional and 
minimally processed plant-based proteins, pulses75 (various beans, and lentils, chickpeas and 
dry peas) - nutritionally rich (see e.g. Mudryj et al., 2014), beneficial from an agricultural 
point of view (e.g. FAO-FNS Forum, 2016), and inexpensive replacements for meat - has been 
attracting much less attention. Such discourses do exist among some mostly development 
oriented researchers, some similarly directed international organisations (e.g. parts of the 
FAO), and perhaps some of the people who are actually eating pulses on a regular basis, i.e. 
(part- or full-time) vegetarians and vegans. Eating pulses is already normalised for the latter 
group of people who have often been doing it for years, or even all their lives, either in the 
Global North, or in the South, out of choice or, more often, necessity. Generally, pulse 
consumption is however low, especially in the Global North.76 An indication of the weak or 
                                                          
73
 For example, EU food regulations changed from 2018 to accommodate insects as food. Further at the EU 
level, a research project called PROteINSECT (Proteinsect.eu) was EU-funded. Moreover, the Dutch government 
supported the 2012-2013 Edible Insects –project carried out by Wageningen University and the FAO (see Paul 
Vantomme interview at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TyIfq4Azhr4). 
74 Considering the Global South and discourses on the new meats, the number of articles from the last few 
years seems to be fairly modest, and there have been usually few, if any reader comments. Here are, however, 
examples of such articles: A couple of Mexican English-speaking newspaper articles (in Mexico News Daily and 
The News) about insects are very enthusiastic about Mexico's culinary history in the sense that insects have 
been part of the Mexican diet for centuries, and still are very much so (for example, Are bugs a solution to 
global food shortage?). A Hong Kong article in South China Morning Post about insects is positive as well (Lead: 
de-bugging nutrition), as is their article about cell-based meat (Why stem-cell hamburger tastes like the future), 
and their article on plant-based meat (Bleeding, plant-based burger is coming to a trendy restaurant in New 
York City). An article from the Indian newspaper The Hindu is also relatively optimistic about cell-based meat 
(Q&A on the science of growing hamburger in the lab). A South African article in the Mail & Guardian about 
insects is also fairly positive, although some personal disgust is expressed by the journalist as well (Waiter, 
open up a can of worms). Finally, an Argentinian article in the Clarin newspaper is optimistic about plant-based 
meat (La carne de las plantas - Ningún animal salió lastimado en esta hamburguesa). 
75
 In the FAO definition, pulses are also called grain legumes; they are plant species from the Fabaceae family, 
harvested annually and only for dry grain, so not for oil or as vegetables. Soy is not considered as part of pulses 
in this definition. 
76
 FAOSTAT data shows that world per capita pulse consumption decreased between 1961 (start of FAO 
statistics) and the early 2000’s, after which there has been a slight increase. However, in most countries there 
has been a decrease in per capita consumption, or the consumption has been rather marginal to begin with. 
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non-existing new narrative around pulses is the lack of media attention to pulses,77 lack of 
research on pulse varieties until recently (see e.g. FAO-FNS Forum, 2016), or the fact that the 
2016 UN International Year of Pulses passed mostly unnoticed in the Global North at least.78 
Pulses seem to create modest enthusiasm, they are mainly covered in the discourse as an 
obligatory mention of an existing option (see e.g. FAIRR, 2016), albeit with less potential for 
big profit margins, unless processed into further products, such as ingredients into plant-
based meat products. 
Pulses also receive a good deal of criticism, sometimes accompanied by humour, of being 
difficult to digest, difficult to cook, or plain boring. In their article discussing the necessary 
large scale meat reduction and replacement, Schösler et al. (2012) themselves present lentils 
as “cumbersome” and “out of fashion”. This negative narrative about pulses may also work 
as an excuse to not to have to consider them as real alternatives, or to really move away 
from meat. There seems to currently also exist a narrative whereby people would cook 
vegetarian food more often, if only they knew how. Schösler et al. (2012:39) argue that “in 
particular, a lack of familiarity and skill hampered the preparation of real vegetarian meals” 
among the Dutch. This is also noteworthy, seen in the context of the Global North where 
cooking, including exploring new recipes, is considered a common hobby, and there is an 
abundance of cookbooks, including those with only vegetarian recipes.79 
However, there may indeed be a point about a need to update the image of pulses (Jallinoja 
et al., 2016; Schyver & Smith, 2005), when researchers involved with sustainable food 
themselves (such as Schösler et al., 2012) call pulses in effect “boring”. There is current 
research going on, for example, on developing new more productive and resistant varieties 
of pulses, easier or quicker to prepare, and more integrated into current food systems (see 
e.g. Global Pulse Confederation, 2016 for a 10-year research plan). Much of the research is 
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 For example, the two UK based newspapers the Guardian and the Daily Mail have hardly any articles 
regarding pulses, apart from some cooking recipes. However, both Guardian India and Daily Mail India do have 
several articles (usually without reader comments) from the last years, with pulses being culturally and 
nutritionally important in India. 
78
 For example, in the online Guardian, there have been almost no articles referring on the 2016 Year of Pulses. 
79
 A search in the online New York Public Library catalogue with the word "cookbook" produces a list with many 
more titles included in the collection in the last 20 years (331 titles for the period 1998-2017) than in the 
century that preceded (140 titles for the period 1898-1997). The proportion of entirely “vegetarian cookbooks” 
in these English language titles is over 10% for the last 20 years (38 titles). The trend in cookbooks in Europe 
has been similar. 
 
 
53 
 
directed on solving food insecurities in the Global South. Section 2.3.4 will focus some more 
on pulses. 
Independent of the low status of pulses, of late, a new rise of vegetarianism or veganism in 
public discourses in the Global North is visible. This rise is likely to originate partly from the 
(still low but) seemingly rising conscious awareness of issues around the global meat 
complex, and partly from the availability of more vegetarian or vegan products in Western 
supermarkets and restaurants, and recipes in cookbooks. However, meat consumption 
figures are still not reflecting such a trend. Looking at collections of surveys on the numbers 
of people identifying as vegetarians, or vegans, e.g. in Wikipedia80 - a source of information 
many turn to - it would certainly seem that the numbers are up from the 1-5% of people in 
most countries that have seen themselves as (out-of-choice) vegetarians in the last decades, 
or the no more than 1% that have identified as vegans. Several surveys from the last couple 
of years quoted in Wikipedia indicate that around 10% or more of people identify as 
vegetarians or vegans in several countries. Although the data as such may not be reliable, 
there does seem to be a rise in numbers of vegetarians and vegans in these surveys.81  
This rise in survey figures can be explained in several ways. Firstly, it may be a reflection of 
actually more people not eating meat. Secondly, it could also indicate that more people 
allow themselves to say publicly that they identify as vegetarians or vegans. Thirdly, it may 
be that people consider being vegetarian or vegan more morally correct now than before, 
and since survey often tend to capture the ideal person rather than the real person (e.g. 
Lalwani, 2009), the rise in numbers may be a reflection of this. Fourthly, it could be that the 
definition of vegetarian or vegans diets is becoming looser,82 and so, a considerable number 
of those identifying as vegetarians might still eat meat (see e.g. Haddad & Tanzman, 2003). 
The concept of flexitarianism, or part-time vegetarianism, also plays a role here, discussed 
below and in Section 2.3. The last three alternatives could explain the “veggie trend 
paradox” of why meat consumption levels have not (yet) actually come down in the Global 
North despite the recent vegetarian or vegan trend at the level of discourses. The first 
option – actually increased numbers of people not eating meat – could also be accurate, but 
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 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vegetarianism_by_country. 
81
 However, for the same country, and around the same time, different surveys may give fairly different results. 
See also Hartmann and Siegrist (2017) for criticism on surveys asking people about their meat eating practices. 
82
 The survey definitions of vegetarianism or veganism may also have changed over time. 
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not show up in statistics, if those identifying as meat eaters are correspondingly eating more 
meat,83 or if the meat industry is able to channel more meat into other consumption.84 
Further on discourses around vegetarianism or veganism, Rothgerber (2014:34) refers to 
Adams (2001) in arguing that “the mere presence of vegetarians reminds omnivores of their 
[own] behaviour, causing guilt, anger, and a host of other negative emotions”. His empirical 
results support Adams’ theory. These negative emotions can be seen expressed in the 
discourses of the last decades, for example in the references to a “veggie lobby” – 
particularly popular in online discussions85 - that supposedly tries to influence governmental 
policy to reduce or ban meat eating. In reality, however, governments have been very 
reluctant to discuss or implement any actual meat reduction related policies (e.g. Laestadius 
et al., 2014; Wellesley et al., 2015). Devaluing vegetarians or vegans has also been part of 
this discourse, and as Rothgerber (2014) argues, it is another coping mechanism of meat 
eaters, aroused by the presence of vegetarians and vegans, and used to overcome the 
cognitive dissonance created from eating animals, while knowing what it means for the 
animals being eaten, or what some other impacts from this practice are. Loughnan et al. 
(2010) coined the term meat paradox to describe our love for meat (dead animals) and our 
love for (live) animals as pets, for example, and Loughnan et al. (2014) explore how different 
people use different coping mechanisms regarding meat paradox and the associated 
cognitive dissonance and strategic ignorance, topics discussed further in Chapter 3. 
Next to the vegetarian and vegan related discourses, there is a new discourse whereby a 
more relaxed attitude is applied, as regards radical change in eating animals. Here belongs 
the discourses around flexitarianism, a new name for an older idea of a low contribution of 
animal-based foods in the diet.86,87 While the end result from reducing the amount of 
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 There is also a new trend, seen by some as a backlash against veganism, the “carnivore diet”, whereby a 
person’s diet is mostly based on animal foods. Such a person ends up consuming considerably more meat than 
an average meat eater. See They mock vegans and eat 4lb of steak a day: meet 'carnivore dieters' from the 
Guardian on 11 May 2018. 
84
 For example, the meat consumption by domestic cats and dogs is significant (about a quarter of total meat 
consumed in the US is eaten by cats and dogs), and does also include meat that could be eaten by humans (see 
Okin, 2017). 
85
 See, for example, reader comments to the Daily Mail article Eating red meat regularly ‘dramatically increases 
the risk of death from heart disease,’ published online 12 March 2012. 
86
 See e.g. Vegans, vegetarians and now… reducetarians. 
87
 Globally speaking, flexitarianism has been, and still is, the most common and normal way of eating meat, 
even if it is not called by that name (e.g. Hicks et al., 2018). As regards Europe, Dagevos et al. (2012) found 
nearly 20% of the Dutch in 2011 to eat in a manner comparable to either strong flexitarianism or 
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animal-based foods in one’s diet may be very similar to being a flexitarian, the term 
reducetarian refers to action or process of reducing meat eating, rather than already being a 
semi-vegetarian, or flexitarian. It seems that even some of the vegan discourse is positive 
about the idea of simply reducing, rather than eliminating animal-based foods. However, to 
some it may be counterproductive to focus on small reductions, rather than radical 
change.88 Finally, while “reducetarian” or “flexitarian” (or even “vegetarian” or “vegan”) do 
not directly distinguish between different motives on cutting back on meat eating, other 
new terms for diets do, such as climatarian or sustainitarian,89 which focus on the 
environmental consequences of food, or more specifically the meat that is eaten.90 Focusing 
on co-benefits to human health, animals and the environment (motive alliances, see Belz & 
Peattie, 2009; de Boer et al., 2013; Hartmann & Siegrist, 2017) may, however, be more 
beneficial than focusing on single benefits, as discussed further in Chapter 3. 
There also seems to be some division between optimism and pessimism about change in the 
meat eating related discourse within academia. Certain optimism is contained in the writings 
about flexitarians, for example in the Netherlands (e.g. de Boer et al., 2013) or in Germany 
(e.g. O'Riordan & Stoll-Kleemann, 2015), while there seems to be certain pessimism about 
the proportion of vegetarians or vegans being low and unchanging, for example in France91 
or the United States.92 This might be a reflection of (un)willingness to tinker with food 
cultures (e.g. in Germany vs. in France), or, it could be reflecting higher tolerance and 
freedom contained in flexitarianism vs. stricter vegetarianism or veganism, or both.93 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
vegetarianism/veganism, and the majority of the Dutch (77%) to qualify as weak flexitarians. However, when 
asked, only 13% of the respondents identified with being a flexitarian. 
88
 See e.g. Compromise isn’t complicity: Four reasons vegan activists should welcome reducetarianism – and 
one big reason reducetarians should go vegan  
89
 See https://www.lessmeatlessheat.org and Climatarian, vegavore, reducetarian: Why we have so many 
words for cutting back on meat.  
90
 In this thesis, the term flexitarian is used as a general, most common and rather neutral term for someone 
eating less (smaller amounts or more infrequently) meat than the average person in the Global North. 
91
 Around 10% of the French see themselves as vegetarians in the future, yet only 2-3% report being currently 
vegetarian (Opinionway survey, http://www.20minutes.fr/societe/1808807-20160318-journee-viande-
pourquoi-deviennent-tous-vegetariens). Ouedraogo (personal communication, 21 February 2017) argues this 
to be a sign of food “malaise” in the French society. Arouna Ouedraogo works for the French National Institute 
for Agricultural Research (INRA). 
92
 See https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/animals-and-us/201109/why-are-there-so-few-vegetarians. 
Harold Herzog is a Professor of Psychology in the US. 
93
 It could also be that researchers’ personal optimism or pessimism colours their arguments. 
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At the same time as all these narratives exist, the vast majority of people, and seemingly a 
large proportion of policymakers, have still been either unaware of the critical issues to do 
with the broken meat system (see the meta-study by Hartmann & Siegrist, 2017), or even if 
aware, reluctant to change their own practices (see also e.g. Wellesley et al., 2015) or 
policies encouraging others to do so.94 Similarly, even many NGOs have not pushed the 
issue, for example in their campaigning (Laestadius et al., 2014), and even those that do, 
tend to advocate for small reductions in the consumption of meat, rather than for radical 
reductions or an overhaul of the meat system together with larger adoption of plant-based 
diets (Linnea Laestadius, personal communication, 19 October 2017).  
There are recent attempts within international organisations, such as the European Heart 
Network (2017), the International Panel of Experts on Sustainable Food Systems (IPES FOOD, 
2017) and the World Bank (2017), to recommend reductions in meat consumption, 
combining benefits for human and planet health. A report from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute from 2011 was an early voice in this, suggesting around 20% reduction to 
the global baseline growth scenario for 2030, in effect bringing consumption of meat back by 
2030 to the level it was in 2000 (Msangi & Rosegrant, 2011). At the same time, a 2018 
opinion piece from the EU Observer (an independent online newspaper writing about EU 
matters) suspects that in terms of denial, meat is “the new climate change”.95 
Looking back, the meat crisis reached awareness even in the wider scientific community 
mostly only after the publication of the 2006 Livestock’s long shadow -report by the FAO 
(Steinfeld et al., 2006). Newspapers did eventually report on the issue.96 During the period 
after the 2006 report, there were high-profile calls for change. In 2008, the then head of the 
IPCC, Dr. Rajendra Pachauri, called for people to significantly reduce their meat eating.97 In 
2009, the Meat-free Monday campaign was launched.98 In the same year, Lord Nicholas 
Stern took a significant political step as a high-profile climate change expert when he said 
that “meat is a wasteful use of water and creates a lot of greenhouse gases. It puts 
                                                          
94
 See e.g. Europeans should eat less meat, but EU keeps silent from 2015. This EU Observer article also 
discusses a European Commission report on sustainable food that the Commission planned to publish by 2013, 
but then subsequently “buried”. 
95
 See https://euobserver.com/opinion/141344. 
96
 See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/may/16/ghent-belgium-vegetarian-town-
environment. 
97
 See e.g. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2008/sep/07/food.foodanddrink. 
98
 See https://www.meatfreemondays.com/about/. 
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enormous pressure on the world’s resources. A vegetarian diet is better” in an interview by 
the Times newspaper.99 His comments created a lot of, often negative, media attention,100 
and since then, he has apparently not returned to publicly say that, from the point of view of 
climate change mitigation, a vegetarian diet would be better than a diet with meat.101 In an 
interview by an Indian newspaper the Indian Express in 2017, when questioned, he referred 
to his comments in 2009 and said that he “did not advocate vegetarianism”, and that “diet is 
an individual choice”.102 Further, in his recent book on climate change mitigation, Stern 
(2015) does not discuss meat’s contribution to climate change at all, although the book does 
include one very short mention of cultured (cell-based) meat (on p. 78) as an example of a 
number of potentially helpful private-sector innovations.103 In the decade since the FAO 
report and the high-profile calls for meat reduction, not much seems to have changed, other 
than that the new alternatives to meat are becoming a reality, and at least partly due to 
them, the spread of discourses has widened. Meat consumption as such has only increased 
at a global level, and has not significantly decreased for any individual country. 
There are multiple explanations for the low awareness - or denial - and the related lack of 
action until now. They include the discursive hegemony of carnism (discussed in this chapter 
and Chapter 3), strategic ignorance as a coping mechanism for the internal conflict rising 
from the meat paradox (see Chapter 3), the disconnection between the production and 
consumption of meat (this chapter), the seeming lack of certainty in terms of the 
proportional contribution of the global meat complex to climate change (see Box 2.1)104 or 
to many of the other related problems, and the overall complexity of the issues related to 
the global meat complex (this chapter). Another psychological factor may be the 
underestimation of impacts from behaviour within which changes are perceived as 
(personally) difficult (de Boer et al., 2016; Tabi et al., 2013).105 
                                                          
99
 See Climate chief Lord Stern: give up meat to save the planet from 27 October 2009.  
100
 See Go green, go vegan in the online Guardian on 27 October 2009. 
101
 An indication of this is that e.g. Google search results regarding Lord Stern talking about vegetarianism being 
good for the climate generally only refer to the interview in the Times in 2009, in other words, there are very 
few newer internet search results on this. 
102
 See Costs ignored, climate change a function of market failure, says Lord Nicholas Stern from 31 March 
2017.. 
103
 He also says that discussing such innovations would be “beyond the scope of this book” (p. 78). 
104
 However, in current discourses, a certainty is usually asserted by using a number (usually 14.5% or 18%) 
without reference to any uncertainty of the science behind it. 
105
 However, this can also be seen as a coping mechanism, linked to strategic ignorance. 
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Notably, there is relatively little research focusing on the pressure from the conventional 
animal-based meat industry to maintain the status quo, although this pressure is possibly a 
major contributor to the lack of action, similarly to the impact of some other industry 
lobbies, e.g. in the fossil fuel industries. Joy (2010) blames the media for having framed the 
meat related discourses in a way that has often supported the existing state of affairs, by for 
example framing cases of clear animal cruelty in intensive agriculture as exceptions, omitting 
the discourse, or even sometimes prohibiting it. Stibbe (2018) demonstrates how the global 
meat complex tries to manage the images of meat and of the industry itself, reinforce the 
positive stories around meat that benefit the industry, and create uncertainty about the 
science on the negative impacts from the meat system. Nestle (2018) points out how the 
meat industry produces its own biased research in order to keep meat’s image positive, or at 
least neutral.106 Austgulen (2014) believes that lack of consensus on the issues around meat, 
and in particular around negative and positive aspects of meat production and consumption 
present in the public discourse, confuses the public debate, and may act against change. It 
may be argued that this not only benefits the global meat complex, but could also be fed by 
them (see also Stibbe, 2018).107 Complexity gives an advantage to those opposing reductions 
in meat eating (e.g. the industry), as it is easy to create uncertainty from complexity 
(Wellesley et al., 2015). Such tactics would then compare to the tactics used earlier, for 
example, by the tobacco industry “to fatally undermine public understanding and encourage 
ignorance in even the most clear-cut of public health issues” (Christensen, 2008:266).  
The data I have analysed and will discuss in Chapter 5 reflects some of the narratives and 
discourses described above. In the rest of the current chapter, however, I will explore some 
issues related to the transformation of the meat system. 
2.3. The sustainable future of protein? 
Reducing or eliminating of meat from our diets is considered “outstandingly” efficient as a 
way for people to have a positive impact on climate (e.g. de Boer et al., 2016). Further, for 
example Davis et al. (2016) agree in their study with many other researchers that societies 
simply cannot move into a sustainable global food production and reduce our water, 
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 Nestle (2018) points to a new tactic by the industry in positioning meat as a health food. 
107
 An unexplored issue is whether the food industry has attempted to shape discourses by e.g. purposefully 
participating in online discussion, similarly to what has happened in (other) political online discussions (see e.g. 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/14/russia-us-politics-social-media-facebook). 
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nitrogen, carbon and land footprints enough to account for the growing world population, 
unless the intake of animal-based proteins is radically reduced. The next sections will look at 
the possible pathways to changing the course. The options proposed as replacements for (at 
least some) conventionally produced industrial meat, such as plant-based or cell-based 
meat, and insects will be examined, and simply eating less meat will be discussed as well. 
2.3.1. Peak meat 
Similar to keeping much of the oil in the ground in order to move to a sustainable, fossil-free 
future (the peak oil discourse), there could be a peak meat moment.108 In other words, 
industrial meat production and consumption could have reached its peak, at least in the 
Global North, and be eventually on its way down – unintentionally, or intentionally.  
Scenario research indicates that reducing meat production and consumption can have a 
significant effect on GHG emissions. For example, Westhoek et al. (2014) calculates that a 
50% reduction in all meat, dairy and egg (production and) consumption in the European 
Union could reduce agricultural GHG emissions in the EU up to 42%, in addition to leading to 
what is currently considered a healthy level of saturated fat and red meat consumption. 
Further, Röös et al. (2016) build scenarios based on agroecological principles whereby meat 
(production and) consumption would be cut by 60-80%, such diets could be produced using 
globally fair land attribution, and the climate impacts would be within the 2-degree pathway. 
There are basically two main approaches discussed in the literature for intentional reduction 
in meat (production and) consumption, reviewed e.g. in Verain et al. (2015). The first can be 
called weak sustainable meat consumption, as it includes relatively minor adjustments to 
consumption patterns, choosing products that are less burdening to the environment, either 
by being more sustainably produced meat products, or by having a lower meat content. 
More sustainably produced meat could consist of a switch between beef and chicken, or it 
could also originate from overall more efficient production. The latter option would most 
likely result in further global expansion of intensive animal agriculture which could, however, 
produce lower GHG emissions per unit of production. Advocating for minor reductions in 
meat eating would also belong to this approach. While such “green” meat production or 
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 The term “peak meat” has been used e.g. by Spiller and Nitzko (2015), and also in the media, e.g. in a 2013 
Guardian article Peak meat: is animal consumption falling out of style in the US?. In these contexts, it refers to 
a reduction that is not collectively and purposively designed. 
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consumption might be preferable by most stakeholders, it has clearly been argued that it 
would not result in large enough, and fast enough absolute reductions in the negative 
impacts from the meat system, especially concerning the dual crises of climate and 
biodiversity.109 In fact, if it entailed a further expansion of intensive animal agriculture, it 
could even lead to an increase in negative impacts (see e.g. Henning, 2016, on FAO’s 
recommendation to accelerate the intensification of animal agriculture in the Global South). 
Similarly, any rebound effects, such as increased meat exports as a response to falling 
domestic consumption would be likely to cancel any positive impacts at a global level. Weak 
sustainability as such could also be an entirely separate trajectory, not leading to strong 
sustainability, as argued by Voget-Kleschin et al. (2015). 
The second approach can be called strong sustainable meat consumption, and it involves 
radical changes to the system, substantial reductions in, or the elimination of, intensive 
meat production, and radical behavioural dietary change, at a global level wherever this is 
achievable. The far (and as of today, very unlikely) end of this path is a world where 
everyone is vegan. This approach also relates to the sufficiency concept in sustainable 
consumption policy and research (see also Verain et al., 2015).110 An option less explored in 
theory, this approach would likely lead to faster and more relevant changes, bringing about 
large absolute reductions in meat production and consumption and the related negative 
impacts. Subsequently, this pathway would also result in large positive impacts, e.g. in terms 
of human health, significantly reduced GHGs and air and water pollution, and in terms of 
rewilding of landscapes.  
The scale of transformation in the strong sustainability approach is daunting. However, meat 
consumption can be argued to differ somewhat from certain other areas of consumption. 
Firstly, the challenges are felt at two levels, very personal - most people are strongly 
attached to eating animals, even with the conflicts involved - and systemic (changing the 
protein production systems). To compare, transformation in transport may have some 
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 See e.g. Garnett (2011); Davis et al. (2016); Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future (2018); GRAIN-IATP 
(2018); and Springmann et al. (2018). 
110
 In this thesis, sustainable consumption generally refers to “sustainable resource consumption, taking into 
account the complete product life cycle”, and involving the “consumption patterns of industries, governments, 
households, and individuals” (Lorek & Fuchs, 2011:36). More specifically, the Oslo Roundtable (1994) has 
defined sustainable consumption as “the use of goods and services that respond to basic needs and bring a 
better quality of life, while minimising the use of natural resources, toxic materials and emissions of waste and 
pollutants over the life cycle, so as not to jeopardise the needs of future generations”. 
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common features – e.g. with people arguing for a right to own private cars - but an energy 
transformation tends to be more about changing the system, and to some extent less about 
equally personal issues. Secondly, there can be considered to be an aspect of “people 
power” in meat eating. In other words, in principle, and to some extent at least in practice as 
well, many people can have some say in what they buy, cook and eat, and therefore they 
can also be, to some extent, steering the change. Again, to compare, forcing change from 
the bottom up in transport or energy is likely to be more challenging for individuals. Chapter 
3 will further discuss such potential agency, while the next section of this chapter will look at 
existing attempts by societal actors at changing things around meat. Subsequently, Sections 
2.3.3 and 2.3.4 will still review the main current or future options for replacing meat. 
2.3.2. Potential and real action for change in the present 
At the level of the discourse, there are changes taking place (see Section 2.2.2), spurred by 
increased scientific knowledge of the various crises related to the meat system, and with the 
media playing a large role in the new discourses, and with some NGOs raising awareness. As 
mentioned earlier, at the level of actual meat consumption, data up to date shows no real 
change from business as usual, although there does appear to be an increasing number of 
people in the Global North experimenting with a vegetarian or vegan diet in the last few 
years. While the global meat complex is generally likely to prefer, or even try to maintain 
ignorance (see e.g. Stibbe, 2018), a small but increasing number of industry related actors 
have responded with new technologies, products and investments (such as cell-based or 
plant-based meat).111 The internet is inevitably assisting the spread of doubt about the 
relevance of the issue, but also campaigns for change.112 Finally, and perhaps most 
importantly, governments have been largely inactive in terms of policy measures until now 
(see e.g. Spiller & Nitzko, 2015; Wellesley et al., 2015). Wellesley and colleagues refer to a 
cycle of inertia to describe the negative feedback loop between low awareness, policy 
priorities and overall inaction (see Figure 2.10). 
  
                                                          
111
 Some major investment funds have also encouraged food companies to shift more to plant-based foods, see 
Investors urge food companies to shift from meat to plants from Reuters on 26 September 2016. 
112
 See e.g. https://www.lessmeatlessheat.org which “aims to devote all of its effort to addressing the most 
powerful driver of climate change (livestock agriculture) through the cheapest and fastest way possible 
(behavioural change)”. 
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Figure 2.10. The cycle of inertia 
 
Source: Modified from Wellesley et al. (2015).  
Note: The essential difference to the original figure is that its unidirectional arrows (clockwise) have been 
replaced by bidirectional arrows.  
Breaking this cycle must be a policy priority, according to Wellesley et al. (2015). They argue 
that the governmental inaction regarding meat comes from fear of public backlash (seeing 
meat as taboo), fear of industry resistance, lack of (evidence-based) research, lack of issue 
visibility in discourses (until very recently), and possibly also lack of awareness among 
policymakers until recently. Basically, governments have perceived the issue as too 
controversial and too challenging. However, Wellesley and colleagues maintain that “public 
outrage and tacit acceptance should not be considered mutually exclusive" (idem:16), and 
their own research indicates that initial public resistance to changes can be overcome. This 
matches with the understanding that value dispositions can change during the process, 
rather than them having to change first (as I will discuss in Chapter 3). 
Further, Wellesley et al. (2015) believe that governmental intervention at national and 
international levels would be necessary for larger-scale action among populations 
themselves to reduce meat eating, and similarly, businesses lack incentives to reduce 
production on their own, and therefore need governmental support. Indeed the focus group 
research done by Wellesley and colleagues suggests that populations (in otherwise diverse 
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societies)113 feel that governments must take the lead, and when they do not, this is a signal 
of the unimportance of the issue.  
In general, governments tend to assume individual behaviour change as the solution to 
many areas within sustainability (e.g. energy use), but apparently not so within meat.114 I see 
this as a kind of (governmental meat) paradox, as opposed to the other meat paradox, 
mentioned earlier and discussed further in Chapter 3, as in fact, effective individual change is 
in principle more feasible within meat consumption than within many other areas of 
consumption, and yet, it has not been supported by governments. This is so in particular at 
the present moment with an increasing amount of seemingly good alternatives available. 
Individual action, especially in something where it is more feasible, can be a prerequisite for 
political change. As discussed in Chapter 3, political change can also change individual 
attitudes and values. These two combined could enable a positive feedback loop, a cycle of 
action for change. 
Lastly, Wellesley et al. (2015) discuss industry power. Food businesses hold enormous sway 
over influencing the publics in terms of advertising,115 and therefore, “in the absence of 
industry buy-in or regulation of private-sector marketing, government-led nudges would be 
unlikely to trump those of food retailers” (idem: 13).116 Although they do not go into details 
regarding what the industry buy-in could entail, it is considered essential by Wellesley and 
colleagues, and should cover a variety of industries with a stake in meat production, such as 
feed, livestock, meatpacking, pharmaceutical and food retail industries. 
As regards further recommendations on how to make real change, Box 2.3 highlights two in-
depth discussions on how to transform meat eating related practices towards radically lower 
meat consumption. The first is from the book by Marta Zaraska (Zaraska, 2016a) on the long-
term human species’ dependency on meat, and the second is from the Chatham House 
                                                          
113
 The focus group research was done in the US, the UK, China and Brazil, and similar results in this issue were 
found in all four countries. 
114
 And meat is also treated differently to other foods, where governments do encourage people to eat 
differently. Arguably in an obesogenic environment, eating less fattening foods as such can be difficult. Of 
course, some of those foods, such as hamburgers, have had conventional animal-based meat as an essential 
element. 
115
 Six of the ten largest global advertisers in terms of spending in 2013 were food and beverage companies 
(Wellesley et al., 2015). 
116
 On the other hand, Wellesley et al. (2015) argue that governments could well use tactics similar to industry 
advertising and marketing in their anti-meat messaging. 
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Report (Wellesley et al., 2015) looking at different pathways to lower meat consumption. 
The recommendations as regards these two documents are similar, with Wellesley and 
colleagues being more detailed, however. Both sources focus more on shrinking the 
consumption side, albeit comprehensibly, and on changing production mainly by indirect 
financial means. While they do not include more radical methods of transformation, they do 
both include discourses, changing meanings, the new meats and the idea of co-responsibility 
(at least between governments and civil society, including individual citizens), topics for 
Chapter 3. The results of adopting the suggestions could in principle fundamentally change 
the system, and radically reduce consumption, which already implies following the principle 
of strong sustainability.117 
Box 2.3 Ideas for a transformation towards sustainable meat production and consumption 
Zaraska (2016a) discusses the main elements of a purposive stage five nutrition transition, 
mentioned earlier in this chapter as a more “natural” phenomenon of societies moving towards 
eating less meat after a certain level of income is reached. Zaraska’s main points about this transition 
include: 
 Raising awareness about the “factors that drive our food choices, instead of blindly following 
our routines, our culture, and [industry] advertising” (p. 201) should be the first step in the 
change. Zaraska also believes that cell-based and plant-based meat, and insects will change 
our attitudes towards meat, and result in us radically cutting the consumption of animal-
based meat: “once the idea catches on, it may quickly gain traction” (p. 198). 
 Incorporating new meats (such as plant-based or cell-based meat) into diets gives people the 
taste of meat, while pulses satisfy the “protein hunger”. 
 New governmental policies can divert subsidies, establish a meat tax, and change certain 
laws, such as the United States ag-gag law favouring the meat industry118. 
 A certain amount of “propaganda” for vegetarian diets is necessary. Using imagery similar to 
what the meat industry uses, such diets should be presented as convenient, economical, 
positive, and also as something that can make a person strong and beautiful. Some of this, 
Zaraska argues, can be done by people themselves, for example, creating positive 
associations of vegetarian meals by pairing them with a delicious dessert, or by grilling 
vegetables in the summer barbeque, instead of sausages. 
 It would be important to be flexible with dietary purity, in the form of seeing part-time 
vegetarianism (flexitarianism) as positive, rather than as negative. 
 It would be essential to try to work with the meat industry, rather than be against it.119  
 The actual impact (e.g. in terms of the environment) of changes is crucial, and considering 
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 One more comprehensive list of measures, similar to the ones in Box 2.3, but in fact closely following the 
elements of social practices in Shove et al. (2012) are included in Jallinoja et al. (2016, see especially their Table 
5 on p. 11). Also, Rothgerber (2013) includes several suggestions for changing attitudes and perceptions of 
norms, raising awareness and redefining the link between masculinity and meat eating. 
118
 The ag-gag laws make it illegal in the United States to record animal rights abuses (with video or photos) 
within industrial animal agriculture facilities. 
119
 Zaraska mentions the Dutch brand Vegetarian Butcher as an example of one type of working with the 
industry. 
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this, Zaraska points out that strong flexitarianism may be better than vegetarianism with a 
lot of cheese, milk and eggs.  
Wellesley et al (2015) argue that short-term change should focus on reducing meat consumption, i.e. 
eating in moderation, rather than entirely substituting meat, while focusing on larger shifts in the 
status of plant-based and meat-based diets. Their further recommendations include the following: 
 National debates should be initiated on meat consumption by: considering different national 
contexts (political, social, cultural); focusing messaging on co-benefits of reducing meat 
(health, price, local environmental concerns, food safety, foo security), and using simple 
messaging ("hard-hitting facts and visual linkages between meat, dairy products and climate 
change", p. ix). Further, governments, academia and civil society groups should be connected 
to media around the issue, and responsible businesses and celebrities used in messaging 
about new social norms and reduced consumption. 
 Comprehensive approaches should be pursued by: making meat alternatives (plant-based or 
low-meat) better available to consumers in shops, cafeterias etc.; using public procurement 
to promote alternatives (e.g. in schools and hospitals, or by agreeing targets with firms); 
focusing on pricing (meat more expensive, vegetables and meat alternatives less expensive), 
taxes (carbon tax), removing subsidies for meat, and subsidizing existing plant-based 
alternatives; being prepared to review and revise policies, as more knowledge is built up 
regarding what works; supporting innovation regarding development of new plant-based (or 
low-meat) alternatives, as well as cell-based meat; increasing education about what a well-
balanced diet consists of (against the current protein transition to more meat and increasing 
use of industrial foods), as well as education regarding preserving food traditions and 
knowledge about food preparation. 
 The case for governmental intervention should be built by: figuring out economic costs of 
inaction, and gains from action (reduced consumption); aligning with sustainable 
development goals and Paris climate agreement; focusing on new sustainable food 
guidelines with recommendations to reducing meat; generating more research on 
encouraging individual behaviour change (comparing to other nutrition interventions, e.g. 
with sugar); developing consumption based national GHG emission targets (current ones are 
production based and not as effective); and making consistent policy, i.e. taking the issue 
into account across various governmental ministries. 
 Finally, change agents should include: firstly, celebrities who can reach socioeconomic 
groups that can otherwise be difficult to reach; and secondly, women who can be first 
movers in a transition to eating less meat (an indication from many of the surveyed countries 
in the Chatham House Report), due to their generally lower will to eat meat, and their often 
central role in food provision. 
Box 2.3 focuses on medium- to high-level meat consuming populations everywhere. 
Regarding the low-meat consuming populations in the Global South, Garnett (2012) notes 
that there needs to be much more research on what a healthy and sustainable diet could 
look like in many, especially low income developing country contexts. The InterAcademy 
Partnership’s report (IAP, 2018) suggests further research also in this area. 
Some small signs of actual change are emerging in treating interventions in meat eating as 
less of a societal taboo. For example, there have been sessions within the UNFCCC (COP) 
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meetings on meat consumption in both 2015 and in 2017, although only on a very limited 
and unofficial scale.120 Further, the SR1.5 report from 2018 includes reduced meat eating as 
an option for limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees centigrade, and the 2019 IPCC report on 
land use discusses the relevance of reduced meat production. There has also been some 
research at the EU level into a “what if” scenario, i.e. investigating the impacts from a more 
substantial reduction in meat eating in high-income countries (see Santini et al., 2015), 
although this scenario considers only an 11% reduction between 2014 and 2024, involving a 
doubling of the number of both vegetarians and flexitarians in this time.121 
Until recently, options for governmental interventions explored in practice include some 
attempts at obligatory vegetarian days (perhaps most famously in Ghent, Belgium already 
since 2009), fat tax (in Denmark, however, abolished soon after its enactment), and a 
number of new nutrition guidelines, based on both the most up-to-date science on human 
health and environmental sustainability aspects. This last option is perhaps the safest for 
governments, being a rather low profile, and passive form of policy action, yet at the same 
time, such guidelines can send a powerful message to society. They are also the basis for 
nutritional education in schools. In the following, I will give a brief review on the current 
state of affairs as regards dietary guidelines. 
The official dietary guidelines in European countries and elsewhere, generally adopted after 
World War II, have been going through several periods of adjustment, and the national 
dietary guidelines have been quite diverse. Some of the newest guidelines aim to bring more 
consistency with the current science and between different (European) countries, while also 
taking local food cultures into account (see EUFIC, 2009). The Mediterranean diet (already 
part of the national guidelines in Greece) which encourages the consumption of red meat 
only occasionally, is supposedly taken into consideration. However, until lately, 
recommending a limit to meat for health purposes has been rare, and considering 
sustainability rarer still. The guidelines are generally a compromise between the priorities of 
different interest groups, such as food industry and scientific experts, and are often 
published by governmental departments or agencies dealing with the food industry as well 
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 See also Meat ‘taboo’ debated at Bonn climate summit, an article in EU Observer on 14 November 2017. 
Further, COP24 in Katowice, Poland, included some more discussion on meat, but still at a low-key level. 
121
 The number of vegetarians was estimated at 3%, and the number of flexitarians at 15% (eating 50% of the 
average per capita meat consumption) in 2014. 
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(Korthals, 2016). Such is the case in the United States where the USDA is responsible for 
both nutrition guidelines and the promotion of food industry. Consequently, the USDA has 
had an informal policy to avoid saying that the US population should be eating less meat, or 
any other food for that matter (Foer, 2009).122 
Gonzalez Fischer and Garnett (2016) review recent official dietary guidelines. Currently, 
there are guidelines for over 90 countries.123 Of these, only a handful of countries (such as 
Germany, Brazil and Sweden, UK and China) have published official dietary guidelines that 
include some (implicit or explicit) aspects of sustainability of foods and eating.124 Some 
countries (such as the US and Australia) have attempted to include these, but (at least in 
some cases mainly due to industry pressure) the final guidelines have excluded sustainability 
aspects. Several other countries do include some sustainability in unofficial guidelines. 
Generally, however, even when environmental sustainability is included, the messages are 
not radical, as the limits on meat are often not very far from the average intake (Gonzalez 
Fischer & Garnett, 2016), and demand for meat-like alternatives to meat is not stimulated by 
these guidelines (Korthals, 2016). However, it is still significant that pulses are promoted as a 
healthy protein alternative, in at least some of these new guidelines.  
The new Canadian guidelines from 2019 go as far as to seemingly encourage people to eat 
more plant-based proteins, e.g. pulses, than meat. They are also very comprehensive in 
offering food, nutrition, and eating related advice.125 One of the other somewhat stronger 
messages in terms of cutting down on meat eating comes from the newest 2016 UK 
guidelines where meat is far down the list of proteins to choose from: “Eat some beans, 
pulses, fish, eggs, meat and other proteins”.126 Also, the new guidelines in France (a 
traditionally meat heavy food culture) from 2017 include some limits to meat, while giving 
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 The USDA dietary guidelines from 2016 are the first US guidelines to include a message about some people 
(teenage boys and adult men) potentially eating too much meat. They also imply that limiting red meat might 
be a good idea. However, 111 g of meat (red meat, chicken, eggs) a day is recommended for a 2000 kcal diet, 
and this is still a rather substantial amount nonetheless. 
123
 At the time of the publication of the report in 2016, there were 83. Since then the number has grown 
significantly, which is something to note in itself. See http://www.fao.org/nutrition/education/food-dietary-
guidelines/en/ for up-to-date details. 
124
 Sustainability is mostly focused on environmental sustainability in these guidelines (except for Brazil), not 
social or economic sustainability. 
125
 See https://food-guide.canada.ca/en/. 
126
 From http://www.fao.org/nutrition/education/food-dietary-guidelines/regions/countries/united-
kingdom/en/. 
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pulses a greater role.127 Finally, the official Chinese dietary guidelines from 2016 include a 
recommendation to limit meat consumption to about 50% of current consumption among 
the Chinese. Tian et al. (2016) consider that the most important reasons for the policy shift 
would be, firstly, that the increased meat eating is negatively affecting the health of the 
Chinese population, and secondly, that meat production is consuming too much grain that 
could be eaten by people instead. The Chinese Nutrition Society also launched a Less Meat 
Less Heat –campaign in China in 2016 seemingly aiming for cuts in meat eating to also 
reduce GHGs.128  
Further, how an intentional increase in meat prices, for example, through a meat tax, or 
through eliminating governmental subsidies for animal agriculture, would affect meat 
eating, is not only largely unexplored (but see Springmann et al., 2016), but also still a 
controversial matter (see e.g. Dagevos & Voordouw, 2013; Laestadius et al., 2014). Also 
Hunter and Röös (2016:151) argue that “government policy [regarding food] rarely leverages 
such tools [as direct price intervention, taxation or limiting access] because they are deeply 
unpopular with consumers and not without political risk”. Although research has indicated 
that meat pricing might not be very effective in directing people’s consumption, especially in 
the Global North (e.g. PBL, 2008), other recent empirical evidence offers some support for 
the idea of a meat tax (Bailey & Harper, 2015; Wellesley et al., 2015). When asking focus 
groups in China, Brazil, United States and United Kingdom, Wellesley et al. (2015) found that 
meat tax was considered unpopular and unfair (towards the poor), but also possibly 
efficient.129 Comparing to sustainable mobility, pricing measures are seen similarly unfair, 
but restrictions and banning (car use in certain locations) can actually be considered both 
fair and effective by people, even if it restricts their freedom of choice (Gärling & Friman, 
2015).  
An issue less often considered when discussing reductions in meat production and 
consumption, is the rebound effect. In this context, it can take two forms. Firstly, at an 
individual level, reduced eating of intensively produced meat may be replaced by eating 
                                                          
127
 See e.g. https://www.foodnavigator.com/Article/2017/01/30/French-agency-ANSES-slashes-recommended-
meat-intake-in-new-guidelines. 
128
 See http://www.fcrn.org.uk/fcrn-blogs/lucy-luo/new-chinese-dietary-guidelines-%E2%80%93-what-do-they-
really-say-meat-consumption-and for the interpretation of the Chinese guidelines from 2016, and for the 
(originally Australian) Less Meat Less Heat campaign which aims to have a global impact. 
129
 See Springmann et al. (2016) for an evaluation of such a tax. 
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correspondingly more other unsustainable animal protein, such as fish, cheese or eggs 
(Hartmann & Siegrist, 2017), or organically produced meat which shares many problems 
with intensively produced meat (Foodwatch, 2009; Steinfeld et al., 2006).130 Secondly, there 
can be a rebound effect at the global level whereby a decrease in meat eating in the Global 
North leads to increased consumption in the Global South, via production or exports moving 
more towards the South, and/or by lower world market prices for meat (resulting from 
lower demand in the North) enabling the creation of new, or higher level meat consumers in 
the South (Spiller & Nitzko, 2015). The more inclusive in terms of conventional animal-based 
products and more global the transformation, therefore, the better such negative impacts 
(from the point of view of sustainability) can be avoided.131  
In addition to such negative spillover effects, there can also be positive spillover effects (de 
Boer et al., 2016) whereby a change in meat eating at a personal level can lead to positive 
changes in other areas of personal life, such as energy use, due to interconnected goals or 
shared underpinning values being engaged by such action (Sanderson, 2014). Even eating 
organic meat - although not better, and sometimes even worse, than intensively produced 
meat in terms of climate change or deforestation - can also have such positive spillover 
effects (while also potentially having negative spillover effects, as mentioned above). More 
generally, studies done by Lacasse (2016) indicate that labelling someone (after them having 
behaved pro-environmentally) as an environmentalist can lead to stronger positive spillover 
effects than not labelling them. 
Even when policymakers have difficulties engaging in the issue, there would be ample space 
for environmental and other civil society organisations to campaign for meat reduction more 
efficiently and on a broader scale than they have until now (see Laestadius et al., 2014), 
using methods such as those in Box 2.3.  
                                                          
130
 Also, people may engage in moral licencing whereby they compensate one moral behaviour with another 
immoral behaviour (see .e.g. Nash et al., 2017). 
131
 Thirdly, if the production side is the primary focus, and not consumption, increased efficiencies in livestock 
production (e.g. through increased crop yields or livestock feeding efficiencies) can result in a rebound effect 
and actually increase consumption or provide incentives for increased production, e.g. farming more land 
(Smith et al., 2014). 
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As I will argue in Chapter 3, both the new meatways and the related new discourses can 
have their own agentive power. In the next section, I will therefore review the new 
meatways, as real current and near future food choices. 
2.3.3. Some comparisons of the new meatways 
Radical vs. incremental change 
Shove (2010:1278) argues that radical innovations “redefine the rules of the game; […] 
render previously important forms of competence redundant; and […] reconfigure 
interpretations of value and significance”. I believe that the new meats - such as cell-based 
meat, insects (“new” in the Global North), or the new plant-based meats - can be considered 
radical innovations. I would consider even strong flexitarianism, whereby flexitarians eat 
animal-based meat occasionally (and various alternatives, including pulses, as their more 
typical diet), a radical innovation for the present, even if it is, at the same time, a very old 
way of eating, and globally, most people actually are flexitarians to some degree at least, 
even if they do not call themselves that (Hicks et al., 2018).132  
If adopted widely as new practices of eating meat, these new meatways (eating new meats 
and flexitarianism) could have huge impacts on existing multi-billion industries, while 
creating new ones. They could redefine what meat, or meat eating signifies for most people. 
They could also partly reconfigure the values people attach to different ways of eating. For 
example, the strictness inherent in vegetarianism and veganism loses ground to the 
flexibility in flexitarianism. Eating meat occasionally is considered normal in strong 
flexitarianism, whereas it is usually seen in a negative light in vegetarianism or veganism, by 
both vegetarians/vegans and those around them. A potential breach of identity as a 
vegetarian or vegan may lead people to give up their vegetarianism or veganism and join the 
ranks of former vegetarians or vegans who, in fact, often end up being flexitarians, even if 
they would not identify as such (Asher et al., 2014). 
                                                          
132
 Using the Shove (2010) definition for radical innovation, strong flexitarianism redefines the rules of the 
game with the idea of sufficiency, i.e. accepting much lower levels of production and consumption than would 
be “possible”. Strong flexitarianism can also render previous forms of competence redundant, if it leads to a 
large scale, or global, transformation of massive intensive production to smaller scale extensive production of 
meat. Finally, strong flexitarianism reconfigures interpretations of value and significance by, for example, 
redefining what eating meat signifies in a system and society where it is eaten only occasionally, as a special 
treat. Finally, incorporating the new meats into flexitarian diets would redefine the meaning of “meat” as such. 
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Weak flexitarianism,133 whereby change is only small-scale and incremental, is unlikely to 
lead to radical impacts on its own. It is, however, easily argued to be a possible stepping 
stone for more radical change. The potential downsides to this approach range from the 
case where such a process from incremental to radical takes too long to have a timely and 
large enough impact, to the case where the development from weak to strong flexitarianism 
actually never takes place, and the incremental “first” step remains the only step (for this, 
see a review by Nash et al., 2017). Similarly to weak and strong sustainability (see Voget-
Kleschin et al., 2015), weak flexitarianism may well be an entirely separate trajectory from 
strong flexitarianism, where the first does not lead to the second. Taking only a small step 
into flexitarianism could also create a rebound effect or engagement in moral licencing 
(whereby people engage more in other unsustainable actions) negating any positive impacts 
from the incremental change. Behaviour-impact gap is a crucial, but frequently overlooked 
concept (see Csutora, 2012; Geiger et al., 2018; Gjerris et al., 2016).  
In their discussion on various pathways towards sustainable meat eating, Verain et al. (2015) 
also distinguish between radical and incremental change. However, they look at the 
definition from the point of view of the eater, so that in radical change, fundamental 
changes are made in meat consumption patterns. I would argue that, although fundamental 
changes may be required in terms of consumption (or production), the principal difference 
between radical and incremental change might be better defined in terms of impacts, rather 
than in terms of how difficult such change may be to consumers, or other parts of society. 
Defining the radical/incremental contrast in terms of impacts helps us focus on what really 
matters – a way out of the crises – rather than how difficult the change may, or may not be. 
Radical change is very often difficult as such, and although focusing on the difficulties may 
be important for achieving change, the radical reduction in impacts is the ultimate goal.134   
                                                          
133
 Literature also uses terms “heavy flexitarianism” and “light flexitarianism” (see e.g. Dagevos and Voordouw, 
2013). However, there are two reasons why “strong” and “weak” may be better terms. Firstly, they align with 
strong sustainability and weak sustainability, and the radical vs. incremental nature of change in these. 
Secondly, “heavy” can be seen as negative (e.g. referring to weight of a person), whereas “strong” is normally 
seen as positive, and vice versa, “light” is more likely to be seen as positive, and “weak” as negative. The signals 
are therefore pointing to the wrong direction with “heavy” and “light”. 
134
 Radical change in terms of impacts might mean, for example, that less land is needed for agriculture in the 
future than currently, even with the expected global population increases, or that the species extinction rate 
decreases rather than increases. Or, it might mean that GHGs produced by agriculture are made as low as 
possible, not in the current system, but in a transformed agricultural system. Or, that waterways recover and 
become less polluted by agriculture, even with population increases. 
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The new meats 
The new meats – cell-based meat, the new plant-based meats135 and insects - have created 
high expectations, even hype. Donaldson (2016b) refers to “redefining the game” with the 
new meats.136 Cell-based meat is promoted by its advocates as a wonder solution to the 
meat crisis,137 similar to those promoting the new plant-based meats.138 Apart from the 
obvious difference in origin and production methods, one of the main differences between 
these two new meats is that cell-based meat is not yet a real available product, whereas the 
new plant-based meats are. However, even the high-tech plant-based meat is still rather 
new, and only available in limited locations and amounts, which on its own may increase the 
hype. Further, even insects have created some degree of hype, although considerably less 
so.139 Insects are of course an existing food, but not on the scale (and not with the price) that 
would be required, if they were to replace a significant part of currently produced animal-
based meat. 
It is only relatively recently that meat analogues have been marketed and considered as food 
for those eating conventional animal-based meat, i.e. non-vegetarians,140 and the new plant-
based meat, such as the products from Impossible Foods or Beyond Meat have non-
vegetarians as their main target market. This is a significant change, and can have an impact 
on redefining meat. Chapter 3 will discuss further the question of what meat is. 
                                                          
135
 Plant-based meat substitutes as such are of course not a new phenomenon, with tofu being the oldest and 
going back two thousand years in Asia. Tofu and other somewhat older meat analogues, developed in the last 
few decades, are not covered in this thesis, as they have mostly been considered and marketed for vegetarians 
or vegans until now, rather than for meat eaters. While tofu never even intended to resemble meat, also the 
older meat analogues have actually not resembled meat very much, except perhaps in appearance. In 
comparison, the new plant-based meat is intended to be much more meat-like, and the more they develop, the 
more meat-like they are expected to become, in texture, appearance, mouthfeel, smell and taste, up to the 
point of being identical to meat in these respects. In my thesis, I usually refer to new (or new generation/high-
tech) plant-based meats when referring to these meat substitutes. For an overview of both cell-based and 
plant-based meat, see Dance (2017). 
136
 Some of the related popular book titles from the last couple of years include: “The future of meat without 
animals” and “Clean meat: How growing meat without animals will revolutionize dinner and the world”. 
137
 This was clear, for example, in a panel discussion at Stanford University On meat without animals – 
Considering cellular agriculture, from 12 January 2017. See also Behind the Hype of 'Lab-Grown' Meat. 
138
 See e.g. In Singapore soon? The 'impossible' burger that's meatier than real meat from 21 October 2017, or 
A veggie burger that bleeds? Now the ‘clean meat’ revolution is cooking on gas from 18 April 2017. 
139
 See e.g. Grub's up: can insects feed the world? from 5 August 2013, or Why not eat insects?, a TED talk from 
2010. 
140
 An indication of this can be seen already in this 2012 news article Market for fake meat booming: With new 
products hitting the shelves, the meat-substitute industry is getting mainstream attention. 
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As such, new technologies tend to create hype, which is argued to be a necessary part of 
their development (see e.g. Magneson Chiles, 2013). A central idea in the sociology of 
expectations is that “speculation upon what might happen tomorrow makes things happen 
in the present day”, i.e. expectations are performative (idem:514). Usually there is a contrast 
between positive and negative expectations, and the media plays a central role in creating 
and maintaining these expectations, and therefore it also plays an important role in creating 
the future. 
To help avoid a significant behaviour-impact gap (Csutora & Zsóka, 2016), the real world 
impacts of the various alternatives need to be thoroughly estimated. However, there is still 
little precise information on the impacts of especially large scale replacement of 
conventional animal-based meat by any of the new meats, such as cell-based meat, new 
plant-based meats or insects. Figure 2.11 shows some comparisons of impacts as life cycle 
analyses, including also pulses, and comparing the alternatives to the production of beef and 
other conventional animal-based meats and other protein sources. These graphs indicate, 
that although the range of estimates is rather large, and quite high for energy use, especially 
for cell-based meat, the included new meats do come out well for GHGs and land use.141 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
141
 Water use was not estimated in this study. Also, the meat substitutes do not include the new generation 
plant-based meat, but tofu, tempeh etc. (original data for these is from Blonk et al., 2008). 
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Figure 2.11. Energy use, greenhouse gas potential and land use of different protein sources 
 
 
 
Source: Tuomisto et al. (2014) and Tuomisto et al. (2017). 
Notes: The height of the pillars indicates the range of different results; cultured meat refers to cell-based meat; 
water use was not estimated in this study; also, the meat substitutes do not include the new generation plant-
based meat, but tofu, tempeh etc. (original data for these is from Blonk et al., 2008). 
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Further, in some situations, different studies can produce rather different results. With cell-
based meat, the estimates are based on a handful of life-cycle analyses (mainly Mattick et 
al., 2015; Tuomisto et al., 2014; Tuomisto et al., 2017; Tuomisto & Teixeira de Mattos, 2011), 
and these results vary a great deal. Importantly of course, as cell-based meat is not yet a real 
product, it is reasonable that estimates of impacts have a large degree of uncertainty, as 
different production methods related, for example, to bioreactor design and growth 
medium, are considered in different studies (see Tuomisto et al., 2017), and the future 
technology to produce cell-based meat most efficiently may not even be known yet. Also, 
the eventual scale of production can make a large difference. In particular, the large energy 
footprint of cell-based meat could come considerably down in the future (e.g. Smetana et 
al., 2015). 
Moreover, Figure 2.12 shows a detailed comparison of different impacts from chicken, the 
most environmentally friendly from conventional animal-based meats, and various other 
protein sources, such as cell-based meat and insects, as well as substitutes based on soy, 
mycoprotein (Quorn) and gluten. However, the newest meat analogues are not included.142 
In conclusion, cell-based meat does badly in this comparison, mainly due to the amount of 
energy currently required to produce it. Soy-based meats seem to have low impacts, and 
chicken and insects do not perform badly either in these estimates. On the other hand, 
Figure 2.11 indicates clearly that pulses143 have the lowest environmental impacts of all the 
discussed alternatives, with a very narrow range of estimates. 
  
                                                          
142
 Such as the products made by Impossible Foods, or Beyond Meat, i.e. products that are a focus in this thesis. 
143
 Together with spirulina, an algae. 
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Figure 2.12. Life-cycle analyses - Comparing chicken with alternative protein sources (0.3 kg of digestible protein) 
 
Source: Smetana et al. (2015). 
Notes: Dairy-based alternatives refer mainly to milk and cheese; LCA methodology does not measure all impacts, such as animal welfare impacts; further, land-use change 
impacts are not included in the methodology of Smetana et al. (2015), although they argue that these are not substantial for soy meant for direct human consumption. Pt 
refers to points given for the scale of impacts. 
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As regards the newest plant-based meats, such as the products made by Impossible Foods or 
Beyond Meat, there are, as of yet, few comparable life-cycle analyses done. The companies 
have done some of their own estimates, also in cooperation with outside researchers, and in 
these plant-based meat performs well, at least when compared to beef. One such study has 
been done by Goldstein et al. (2017) and contains a life-cycle analysis of the Impossible 
Burger. Figure 2.13 shows a comparison between the Impossible Burger (PBB) and other 
protein sources in terms of GHGs embodied in these foods.144  
Figure 2.13. Greenhouse gases embodied in different foods, including the Impossible Burger 
 
Source: Goldstein et al. (2017). 
Note: GHG emissions are measured in kg CO2e/kg protein produced. PBB stands for plant-based burger, and the 
Impossible Burger, made by Impossible Foods, has been used for the calculations. 
Table 2.1 gives a brief overview of the three new meats, cell-based meat, insects and plant-
based meat, in terms of some of the main actors, issues and developments. The most 
important aims with all such alternatives are, on one hand, to make something that is 
radically better from environmental point of view as compared to conventional animal-
based meat production, and on the other hand, to achieve wide acceptance of these foods 
as meat, as long as “meat” is considered a necessary element of food cultures.  
                                                          
144
 For water and land use, the company itself estimates that “one Impossible Burger uses about one quarter of 
the water [and] 5% of the land” as compared to a burger made from typical US-produced cows. (IF 
Sustainability Report 2017, available at 
https://impossiblefoods.app.box.com/s/edwcfyvojzsvzn5d633dxt4c4ehyzqq3. The energy requirements for 
Impossible Burger, on the other hand, are currently comparable to the low end of beef production (Rebekah 
Moses, Sustainability and Agriculture Manager of Impossible Foods, personal communication, 27 August 2018). 
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Table 2.1. Some of the main actors, developments and issues related to new meats 
References (e.g. 
for technical 
details) 
Cell-based meat (Bhat et al., 2014; Dance, 
2017; Ferrari, 2016; Post, 2012; Stephens et 
al., 2018; Verbeke et al., 2015) 
Insects (DeFoliart, 1999; Lundy & Parrella, 2015; Tan et al., 
2015; van Huis et al., 2013; Yen, 2015) 
Plant-based meat, new generation (Dance, 
2017; Sexton, 2016) 
Examples of 
production and 
sale 
Start-ups: Mosa Meats (NL), Memphis 
Meats (US), Modern Meadow (US), 
SuperMeat (IL) etc.; no sales yet by any 
company 
Wild harvesting, semi-domestication, and some farming in the 
South, for domestic use and exports, e.g. Thailand; small, often 
online start-ups in the North, e.g. Snack Insects (DE), Tasty Bugs 
(NL), Dimini Cricket (FR),Tiny Farms (US); some North small to 
medium-scale farming, and restaurants with insect dishes 
Start-ups: Impossible Foods (US), Beyond 
Meat (US); possibly included in this 
generation: Vegetarian Butcher (NL); 
restaurants and supermarkets especially in 
US selling the new generation products 
Other 
organisations 
supporting with 
research & PR; 
other investors 
New Harvest (US), Good Food Institute (US); 
ShojinMeat (JP); conventional meat 
companies, e.g. Tyson, Cargill investing; Bill 
Gates, Richard Branson; IndieBio (US, start-
up accelerator); China (trade agreement 
with Israel on cell-based meat) 
FAO produced a landmark report in 2013 (van Huis et al., 2013); 
relatively large amount of academic interest in research; some 
EU funded projects, e.g. ProteINSECT; policy interest in China 
(also, 2
nd
 global conference Insects to Feed the World held in 
China in 2018) 
New Harvest (US), Good Food Institute (US); 
IndieBio (US, start-up accelerator); Leonardo 
DiCaprio, Bill Gates; venture capital firms 
History and 
state of play, 
what makes it 
special 
Over ten-year scientific development until 
now; not a real product yet, but prototypes 
exist (hamburger, chicken breast, meatball); 
animal-based without killing animals (in 
principle); several production techniques 
exist; a lot of media attention; part of new 
discourse on clean meat (products) and 
cellular agriculture (field of science); 
promises to open up meat production 
(currently done behind closed doors) 
Existing food for thousands of years, still forms a relevant part of 
diets in many countries in the South; around 2000 edible species 
known; existing food also in the North as animal feed, e.g. for 
pets, chicken, fish; in terms of human food in the North, low 
interest over decades, increasing media attention in the last 10 
years 
Existing product (“bleeding hamburgers” 
etc.), a new, more high-tech generation 
following from older plant-based meat 
substitutes (e.g. Quorn, Tempeh); more 
meat-like; a lot of media attention, especially 
in the US; part of a new discourse on meat 
alternatives; can be seen as plant-based 
cellular agriculture; see Dance (2017) for a 
review of the new meats produced without 
animals 
Main issues for 
the future 
Finding inexpensive animal-free growth 
medium; scaling the production up, bringing 
the price down; making it safe (e.g. from 
pathogens) and efficient enough especially 
in terms of energy use; image building, 
overcoming disgust; legislative issues once 
the product becomes reality; critical issue: 
what are the environmental impacts of 
large scale production of cell-based meat to 
replace conventional animal-based meat? 
Legislative issues partially solved in the North; lack of data on 
harvesting, consumption and trade in the South; overcoming 
disgust, image building (not only food for the poor, but at the 
same time supporting food security); scaling the production up in 
the North, moving into farming or sustainable harvesting in the 
South to prevent serious risk of overharvesting; making farming 
safe and more efficient without environmental damage, research 
regarding feed for the insects; risk issues (EFSA, 2015); ethical 
issues; critical issues: is this alternative still supporting the global 
meat complex (as feed for meat animals), or is it a real 
alternative as food for people? Is mass production of insects 
better for the environment than mass production of chickens?  
Legislative issues in terms of producers being 
able to call their products some form of 
“meat” (e.g. France banned the use of words 
referring to meat, e.g. “sausage” in 2018 for 
plant-based products; the US courts are 
considering similar bans); making the 
product enough meat-like to attract large 
numbers of meat eaters; image building; 
market building; environmental impacts of 
large scale production, if intended to replace 
meat? 
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Strong flexitarianism, which could be defined – in light of the new meats - as including any kind 
of meat, also plant-based or animal-based meat, or insects, only occasionally, and relying more 
on pulses for protein, seems overwhelmingly the best option from the point of view of 
environmental impacts, while also being a healthy option, and arguably healthier than 
processed foods in general, while fairly likely also being ethically more just. Although the 
question remains, how to mainstream strong flexitarianism (occasionally eating meat), as 
opposed to weak flexitarianism (occasionally avoiding meat),145 flexitarianism as a phenomenon 
is seen as a significant step towards sustainable meat future (see e.g. Verain et al., 2015). 
However, it could be that the mere availability of the new meats can function as a way to open 
up, not only what meat is, but also the daily practices of meat eating, and change the values 
attached to eating meat.146 Because of the new meats, it could also be possible for people to 
experiment with, not only the new meats themselves, but also with flexitarianism. The 
oppositional positioning between meat eaters and meat avoiders (vegetarians/vegans), which 
have until now determined each other (Arouna Ouedraogo, personal communication, 15 
February 2017), might be eroding with the new meats and with the newly discovered option of 
flexitarianism which is less dogmatic and, therefore, creates less resentment (de Boer et al., 
2014). Chapter 3 will discuss these issues further. But first, the next section will still have a look 
at pulses, as they are inevitably also an important part of a sustainable future of protein. 
2.3.4. Pulses – The future new meat? 
Since beans, lentils and other pulses are an important option for global future protein, they are 
also included here, although pulses cannot yet perhaps be considered a new meat as such.147 
While being an important part of the diet in many countries, especially in the Global South, but 
                                                          
145
 The term “flexitarian” originally referred to flexible (occasionally meat eating) vegetarians, or semi-vegetarians, 
but now covers also meat eaters who do not eat meat every day (de Boer et al., 2014). Strong flexitarianism can be 
seen to refer to the original meaning and weak flexitarianism to the newer meaning. In fact, many vegetarians are 
strong flexitarians, as they do occasionally eat meat, even if they identify as vegetarians. 
146
 Similar to what de Bakker and Dagevos (2012) argue could happen with extra focus on promoting organic meat. 
147
 But see e.g. Jallinoja et al. (2016) where pulses are treated as an outstanding meat alternative for meat eaters. 
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also in some European countries, especially in Spain,148 pulses have not until now generated 
much interest as part of the solution narrative to the meat crisis, as mentioned earlier in 
Section 2.2.2. This is despite of them being excellent from a nutritional point of view (see e.g. 
Asif et al., 2013; Mudryj et al., 2014), and also from agricultural point of view, especially in 
terms of soil health (see e.g. FAO-FNS Forum, 2016). There are some resent research 
developments, such as efforts to breed short-cooking beans (see e.g. Meadows, 2016) or to 
collect better data for assessing the production possibilities (Cernay et al., 2016), and the 
United Nations International Year of Pulses in 2016 has inspired new research in the area, 
especially within the new ten-year research strategy on pulses (Broom, 2016) coinciding with 
the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025. Further, a Global Pulse Brand149 has been 
launched to help food industry promote pulses, e.g. by incorporating them in other foods. 
There is therefore also some image improvement going on. However, from the point of view of 
wider discourses, media visibility of the Year of Pulses was fairly non-existent, at least in the 
Global North.150 Further, at least in some contexts where the International Year of Pulses was 
seen as successful (e.g. in Australia), its success was claimed to originate from pulses being 
promoted as an additional food to meat, not as a replacement for meat.151 This obviously goes 
against seeing increased pulse consumption as a way to help solve the meat crisis. 
Already in 2002, Schneider called for a strategy for lifting the image of pulses in the Global 
North, calling for communication campaigns, development of more modern, convenient and 
varied pulse products, more research and the coordination of integrated chains from domestic 
producers to industry to consumers. She also noted that in Australia, there was a remarkably 
rapid and steep rise in domestic pulse consumption in the 1980’s (reaching above the levels in 
Spain), and argued that this was due to the image of pulses being changed in Australia. 
However, the FAOSTAT data shows that the rapid increase was followed by a rapid decline 
                                                          
148
 However, many traditional meals in Spain include both pulses and meat, although considering from a nutritional 
point of view only one of these would be desirable. 
149
 See http://pulses.org/pulse-brand. 
150
 For example, there were no news articles in the UK Guardian in 2016 regarding the International Year of Pulses, 
although alternatives to meat as such are a common topic in the Guardian. 
151
 See http://www.farmweekly.com.au/news/agriculture/agribusiness/general-news/campaign-promotes-pulses-
globally/2753776.aspx. 
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about a decade later, which may have been due to increased exports, especially to India where 
markets were opened to other countries from the mid 1980’s (Siddique & Sykes, 1997). It 
therefore remains an open question why the domestic Australian pulse consumption rose so 
rapidly. If this was due mostly to industry strategy and marketing, it was very efficient indeed. 
Figure 2.14 shows the trends in pulse consumption over the last half a century for 12 countries. 
Although the world consumption has risen slightly in the recent years, the longer trend has 
been towards lesser use of pulses. Of the top ten pulse consuming countries, seven are in Sub-
Saharan Africa, with Rwanda and Niger currently at the top152 and with both countries’ per 
capita consumption actually more than twice as much as India’s. 
Figure 2.14. Pulse supply in various locations from 1961 (in kg/person/year) 
 
Source: FAOSTAT. 
Notes: Data for USSR until 1991, for Russian Federation from 1992; the 12 countries are the same as those in Fig. 2.5 for meat; 
The data is supply, not consumption. There is no exact information on how much various losses account for with pulses. All food 
and agriculture related data from FAOSTAT is available from 1961. 
                                                          
152
 These countries are not shown in Figure 2.15. 
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Pulses can hardly compete with the excitement related to the high-tech start-ups working on 
cell-based meat and new plant-based meats. As the original and arguably the best meat 
alternative, from the point of view of human, animal and environmental health, it may be 
unfortunate that pulses even have to compete. Although pulses as basic products without 
much further processing do not create big profits for the food industry, people can, however, 
already incorporate them into their diets. Pulses do not necessarily need further development, 
although the research investigating breed varieties of beans that cook faster, or are more 
weather resistant can certainly make acceptance easier in the Global North, and contribute to 
food security in the Global South. In terms of the giving pulses a “makeover” to make them 
more appealing, Jallinoja et al. (2016:12) argue that new associations are necessary to see 
pulses as “festive, fulfilling, energizing and pleasurable food”, similar to how meat has been 
seen until now.153 Associations can change through practices, and a food can be accepted 
through frequent exposure, so could pulses also change from being associated with only 
vegetarians or vegans to being a relevant meat alternative – a new meat – for everyone. For a 
new “bean-eating practice” to develop in Europe, elements of “positive meanings, appropriate 
materials, and skills and competences” (idem:6) need to be in place. Jallinoja and colleagues 
also call for the promotion of flexitarianism, and seeing meat eating and vegetarianism (or 
veganism) not as opposites, but as points on the same continuum. This could make moving 
along that continuum easier, and replacing (some) meat with plant-proteins a more relaxed 
affair, and therefore more easily a routinized and embodied practice. 
Although, for example, Verain et al. (2015) note that flexitarianism can just be a food style 
among many others, rather than a step towards eventual vegetarianism, it could also be that 
the different clusters of eaters - such as those identified by Verain and colleagues - are on the 
same continuum or journey from avid meat lovers to vegetarians and vegans, but just at 
different points on that journey. While some might never move much forward, others walk all 
the way.  
 
                                                          
153
 Schyver and Smith (2005) also call for work on changing the image of soy. 
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2.4. Conclusion and discussion 
Considering the new meats on a practical level, even if cell-based meat would be a significantly 
more environment and climate friendly option than animal-based meat, and even if it could 
compete in price and quality with animal-based meat in the near future, I suspect that the 
production of it could not replace the massive production system for animal-based meat in a 
short enough time, nor would it seem sensible to perform such full-scale replacement, at least 
from the environmental impact point of view. Further, even if farming insects would also be 
more climate or environment friendly than farming conventional animals (per kg of protein), 
farming insects at a scale even remotely similar to current animal farming in the near future, 
and without causing damage at the same scale, would also seem rather challenging. As an 
illustration, the meat from one single modern meat cow would correspond close to 2 million 
mealworms.154 The new plant-based meat replacing processed animal-based meat would likely 
be a feasible option. Combining different alternatives in individual strong flexitarian diets – such 
as some plant-based meat, some cell-based meat,155 some insects, with a small amount of 
extensively raised more conventional meat animals (at least in the Global South) – might also 
work. However, this would still amount to a radical change in how “meat” is produced, and in 
what people eat when they eat “meat”, and how much “meat” they eat.  
Increasingly the necessity of changing practices related to producing and eating meat is being 
recognized, although still often in minor ways.156 Survey results indicate that many people 
might be willing to cut down on their own meat eating or even change to the new meats.157 It 
could be argued, however, that these surveys reflect the ideal self more than any realized 
action at the level of daily practices (Lalwani, 2009).  
                                                          
154
 This estimate is based on the following: one average meat cow from conventional production has 
approximately 200 kg of meat and one (currently) average size mealworm weighs just over 0.1 grams. 
155
 Or cell-based fish – another product under development – to counter the depleting fish stocks. 
156
 For example, the new scientific IPCC SR1.5 recognizes a need to look into meat consumption, but this is not yet 
recognized officially at the policy (COP) meetings. 
157
 For example, survey results in Lee and Simpson (2016) suggest that 29% of the UK population had cut their 
meat eating in 2013-2014. Other survey results claim that the Generation Z (those born from around the turn of 
the millennium, although definitions vary) is leading the change from meat to plant-based meat 
(http://uk.businessinsider.com/generation-z-is-eating-fake-meat-2017-10?r=US&IR=T). Similarly, a 2017 YouGov 
poll in the UK found that 56% of the respondents agreed that meat is not necessary in order to have a good meal. 
See https://yougov.co.uk/news/2017/04/06/over-half-happy-have-meat-free-meals/. 
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At the same time, in other surveys, awareness of the particular issues related to the broken 
mean system, especially regarding its connection to climate change, still seems to be low (e.g. 
Wellesley et al., 2015). In line with this, the meat consumption data still does not show any 
significant declines for most countries, the global per capita consumption is still going up, and 
the FAO still predicts enormous future rises in the “demand” for meat.  
I would suggest that the willingness of survey respondents to cut down in the future, but not 
today, may be linked to a phenomenon called ethical mirage (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010), whereby 
we expect to behave in line with our ideal self (or our should-self) in the future. Further, it may 
be that the low awareness (when asked in a survey question) is also in fact partly strategic 
ignorance, a coping mechanism for the difficulty in accommodating both the ideal self, and the 
values related to it, and the daily practices of eating animals. Even those who claim to have 
already reduced their meat eating in the past may be influenced by ethical mirage, whereby we 
use our ideal self to explain our past behaviour, and thereby give more inaccurate assessments. 
Chapter 3 will explore these issues further. 
In conclusion, the world needs to question the meat demand paradigm (Garnett et al., 2018), 
and the broken meat system needs to be fixed, if not entirely unmade, redone or replaced. 
Currently, however, there is no societal action plan for any of that. Rather, there is still large-
scale denial and doubt among much of the public, and even policymakers, about the problem in 
the first place. The new meatways, however, offer an alternative (Zaraska, 2016a), even if this is 
not yet given much emphasis. Purposive change may often start from the level of discourse - in 
terms of some agreement about a problem, and a search for solutions - and I suggest that 
perhaps the most important role of the new meatways in the very near future is and will be at 
the level of discourses. Fortunately, discourses as regards both the necessity of change and of 
the new meatways already exist. These discourses are by no means universal, and are still 
limited to certain media, of which the UK Guardian newspaper is an example.  
In Chapter 5, I explore, through the data from the Guardian, answers to my research question 
related to how the new meatways and discourses around them could enable radical changes in 
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meat eating related practices, importantly also bringing the related values closer to the ideal 
self, and thereby hopefully reducing the need for coping mechanisms regarding meat. 
First, however, Chapter 3 will focus on explaining the above concepts in more detail. It will 
combine and expand on different concepts within social practice theories. It will also argue for 
the relevance of discourses as regards changing practices purposively. Bridging social practices 
and discourses has still not been explored much in detail in literature, and as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, I hope to offer some insights into the connections in the next chapter. 
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3. Conceptual framework 
The purpose of this chapter is, firstly, to engage in the research task set in Chapter 1, namely, 
exploring social practice theories and the connections between discourses and social practices, 
in order to create a framework that could help enable purposive change in unsustainable social 
practices both at individual and at societal levels. Secondly, this chapter provides the 
conceptual framework for the empirical analysis in Chapter 5 which aims to answer the more 
specific research question set in Chapter 1. 
In this chapter, I will attempt to adapt social practice theories in the context of purposive 
change towards sustainability. I will build a framework that is based on combining aspects of 
different versions of social practice theories with concepts from social psychology, philosophy, 
cognitive linguistics and critical discourse analysis. My goal is to build a structure that connects 
practices and discourses closely, and emphasizes the connections to values and emotions, often 
given less attention in social practice theories. I will also explore the role of discursive 
consciousness that can help combat two large obstacles standing in the way of purposive 
change towards sustainability, namely strategic ignorance (of knowledge, and of value and 
emotion conflicts) and often invisible, but dominant ideologies, paradigms and frames.158  
First, however, it is necessary in this chapter to briefly go over some background to social 
practice theories, especially in connection with sustainability, and so, in Section 3.1, I will 
discuss social practice theories in comparison to other theories of change, from the point of 
view of sustainability transformations, and explain the notion of meat eating related practices I 
use in this thesis. Following this, in Section 3.2, I will first present the, by now fairly dominant, 
take on social practices by Shove et al. (2012), before moving on to some potential 
modifications to their model later in Section 3.2 and in Section 3.3. These modifications include 
adding the body as the fourth element of practices, replacing the element of meanings with 
                                                          
158
 I attempt to build a structure that makes sense, so to speak, and seeks to explain to a satisfactory level. In 
interdisciplinary work, some fences may be necessarily crossed (e.g. here, using social psychology in connection 
with social practice theories), and this may not always seem appropriate at first sight. However, I hope to be able 
to justify adequately the arguments I make. Many of the mechanisms and related phenomena to do with social 
practices, and human behaviour in general, are still far from being fully explained. This thesis is one attempt to 
suggest some combinations of links that may not have yet been explored fully. 
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general understandings, a broader concept, and incorporating values and emotions more tightly 
as vital connections to the main practice elements. Last but not least, as regards the 
modifications, in Section 3.4 and Section 3.5, I will make the link from practices to discourses, 
through the counterparts of general understandings (on the side of practices) and cognitive 
frames (on the side of discourses). Discursive consciousness and the concept of discursively 
open practices will also be discussed in these sections, as well as ideologies and critical 
discourse analysis, with the latter being not only related to the conceptual framework, but also 
the methodological approach I will take to my data in Chapter 5.159 Finally, before the 
conclusion to this chapter, in Section 3.6, I will briefly align my thoughts on the issue of agency 
for change, being that change is the critical overarching issue I want to tackle in this thesis. 
3.1. Social practices theories as the basis 
This section will first give a brief overview of why social practice theories might work better 
than more individual based theories or even theories that tend to only focus on the system 
level. Further, I will illustrate how there is still no agreement on what social practice theory, in 
singular form, should look like. As a consequence, interdisciplinarity may in fact fit with the 
current social practice theories more easily than with some other more established theories.  
3.1.1. Transformations to sustainability – Between approaches 
Onwards from individual based behaviour change models 
Behaviour change policy methods by governments or other organisations have relied, and still 
often rely, on models of human behaviour whereby individuals are driven to behave in a certain 
way by factors residing inside (e.g. attitudes, preferences) and/or outside (e.g. social norms, 
environmental cues, financial circumstances) of those individuals, while still being relatively 
free to choose which way to behave or do things. In Chapter 2, I referred to the factor model, 
but other names for a similar way of centralizing the individual include the rational choice 
                                                          
159
 Chapter 4 will explain in more detail how I conducted the data analysis in practice. 
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model,160 criticized, for example, as the portfolio model,161 or the ABC model.162 Such a model 
seems to be a functional way of explaining the world in which humans move about, doing 
things, while being affected by various factors. In some circumstances, the individual-based 
behaviour change methods may be beneficial, and the economic theory, sociology and social 
psychology behind many of them offer relevant insights. However, as Welch and Warde (2015) 
argue (see also Southerton et al., 2004), this way of looking at behaviour also:  
…structurally overestimates the role of deliberation in routine purposive tasks, 
and fundamentally underestimates the extent to which individuals’ autonomous 
action is constrained by infrastructures and socio-technical systems […by norms 
and…] resource constraints: social, cultural and economic. 
(Welch & Warde, 2015:88) 
Especially when the question is about complex issues - with more long-term and global, rather 
than short-term and local benefits - and about necessary large-scale changes - whether large-
scale to the individual or large-scale to society - relying on individual based models or methods 
without changing the bigger picture is both inefficient and not transformative enough. 
Moreover, whatever the issue, small or large, when values or emotions are in conflict, a human 
response (including at the level of governments) is to attempt to deal with the situation by 
ignoring the conflict, and thereby attempting to ignore the whole issue in question with it. 
System-wide approaches 
On the other hand, system-wide theories seeking large-scale and systemic social change have 
often minimized the role of the individual. Hölscher et al. (2018) usefully analyse the 
differences between a focus on transition and transformation. The former, mainly in the form 
of theory on sustainable transitions or transitions management (see e.g. Markard et al., 2012 
for an overview), focuses more on changing subsystems, such as energy or mobility, and 
examines the related social, technological and institutional interactions.  
                                                          
160
 What is meant by rational choice model here includes many recent theories about behaviour. One overview of 
them can be found at https://www.apsc.gov.au/changing-behaviour-public-policy-perspective. 
161
 In the portfolio model (originally from Hindess, 1988), people choose their behaviour based on a portfolio 
consisting of more or less stable values, attitudes, norms, interests and desires (Welch, 2017). 
162
 The “ABC” (in the way Elizabeth Shove uses it) comes from attitude, behaviour, and choice. Shove (2010) argues 
that governments hide behind this framework instead of acknowledging their role in sustaining unsustainable 
institutions and ways of life, and their ability to change structures. 
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Whereas, global change research referring to transformations tends to focus more on “large-
scale changes in whole societies, which can be global, national or local, and involve interacting 
human and biophysical system components” (Hölscher et al., 2018:2). In transformational 
systems thinking, interventions at the paradigm level – such as at the level of societal values 
and ideologies - is considered most efficient (Meadows, 2008). O’Brien (2018:157) contends 
that the dimensions of transformation are indeed best tackled collectively “to engage 
individuals and groups […] such that they shift from being seen as ‘objects to be changed’ and 
reduced to their carbon footprints, to viewing themselves as subjects or agents of change who 
are capable of contributing to systemic transformations”. 
In transitions research, concepts such as values, emotions, or individual agency have been 
largely left with little or no role. Although transitions management also sees policymaking as 
building networks in which different actors can participate and interact (Shove et al., 2012), 
transitions research has also been criticized for mainly being concerned with technocratic 
transitions. Approaches on systems-scale transformation, on the other hand, seek more radical, 
large-scale and long-term societal changes (Hölscher et al., 2018). Further, in systems thinking, 
the notion of transformative agency emphasizes the role of “intrinsic motivation, cognition, 
emotions and values as key dimensions of human agency for change” (Hölscher et al., 2018:2, 
also O’Brien, 2012). 
Social practice theories 
A strong recent focus in social practice theories is related to policy-relevant research on 
changes towards sustainable societies (see for example, a much quoted book by Shove et al., 
2012). While some social practice theory approaches to sustainability use transitions theory to 
a larger extent (see e.g. Spaargaren, Oosterveer, et al., 2012b), others do not. Social practice 
theories in general could be seen as approaching the systems level, while at the same time 
focusing on everyday practices performed by individuals. Yet, the one idea connecting the 
range of practice theories is that the unit of analysis is not the individual, but practices as such, 
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and especially the repeated performances of practices.163 However, even when the individual is 
seemingly reduced to a carrier of practices, as is the case in some approaches, but by no means 
all, the individual is nonetheless in the picture, and arguably therefore has a role.164   
As regards the definition for a social practice, several authors have given their versions over 
time. The version that seems to work best in the context of this thesis is the following from 
Welch and Warde (2015:85): a social practice is “an organized, and recognizable, socially shared 
bundle of activities that involves the integration of a complex array of components: material, 
embodied, ideational and affective”. Indeed a relevant contribution of the more recent practice 
theoretical literature has been to see practices, or “the organization of human activity as 
nexuses of generic types of components” (Warde et al., 2017:29) which different authors have 
then treated with different emphasis. 
Although practice theories usually place emphasis on habits, routines, and practical 
consciousness, rather than discrete actions and reflection, or discursive consciousness,165  the 
extent to which different aspects are highlighted, and even more fundamental ideas about 
what human behaviour consists of, can be large. Scholars preferring the stronger approaches 
may see the weaker approaches closer to the individual behaviour change approaches.  
Figure 3.1 illustrates both some of the emphases in different social practice theories, as well as 
the emphases between social practice theories and individual-based behaviour change 
approaches. While stronger social practice theories are often in opposition to individual-based 
behaviour change approaches, the somewhat weaker approaches in social practice theories can 
indeed be placed somewhere in the middle. They, for example, may consider individuals to 
have more agency or grant discursive consciousness some role to play. 
 
                                                          
163
 Nicolini (2017) specifically advices against shifting the focus to large-scale abstract things, such as “institutions” 
or “the state”, which to him are largely incompatible with a practice-based approach. 
164
 Others emphasize that even as carriers of practices, individuals are not passive, but that change is constant and 
natural to practices, and takes place through individual performances of practices (e.g. Shove et al., 2012). 
165
 The terms practical and discursive consciousness come from Giddens’ structuration theory (1984). 
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Figure 3.1. The emphases in different practice theories and in behaviour change approaches 
 
Stronger SPT approaches 
 
Medium and weaker SPT approaches 
 
IBC approaches 
Performances  Acts 
Doing  Thinking 
Knowing how  Knowing that 
Practical competence  Reasoning 
Habit and routine  Action 
Practical consciousness  Discursive consciousness 
Embodied sense  Mental deliberation 
Shared understanding  Motivation 
Dispositions  Decisions 
Source: Substantially modified from Warde (2014).  
Notes: The original comparison by Warde is between practice theories and the “sovereign individual”, and there is no 
middle position; SPT refers to social practice theories, IBC refers to individual behaviour change. 
Warde (2014) argues that the stronger versions of practice theories tend to not only emphasize 
the items on the left of Figure 3.1, but also suggest that some of the items on the left precede 
items on the right, so that, for example, doing comes before, and also directs, thinking, and 
habit, routine and practical consciousness are not only the “default mode of engagement in the 
world” (idem:292), as medium strong versions might see things, but “all consciousness is 
effectively practical consciousness” (idem:285). Medium strong versions would see the left 
hand items more important than those on the right, while the weaker versions of practice 
theories would note that the left hand items should get enough attention. Some authors 
purposefully claim to use weak practice theory, in particular, by not de-centering the human 
actor with agency (see e.g. Goulden et al., 2014). Other seek to maintain a somewhat stronger 
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position and state that agency exists, but mainly transpires through practices (e.g. Welch, 
2017a). 
Social practice theories evolved from the 1970s onwards, partly to solve the long-term issue in 
social sciences of agency vs. structure, moving beyond it, without prioritizing either structure or 
agency, and yet being able to describe and analyse both change and stability (Shove et al., 
2012; Welch & Warde, 2015). Practices, practice elements and their relationships both ensure 
that practices are relatively stable, but at the same time perpetually changing. In a way, 
practices are always open to potential change within their elements, and at the same time 
closed due to their apparent stability. However, stability of practices is only the “outcome of 
successfully faithful reproductions of a practice” (Shove et al., 2012:13). 
Although today social practice theories are seen as cutting across the field of sustainable 
consumption (Lorek & Vergragt, 2015), applying social practice theories on consumption 
related issues mainly came, soon after the turn of the new millennium, as a reaction to social 
sciences seeing consumption increasingly as something done by an “empowered individual, 
exercising freedom of choice through voluntary decisions” (Welch & Warde, 2015:86).  
The question of agency is therefore an essential unifying, yet dividing concept in social practice 
theories, especially when they are applied to the issue of change. Welch and Warde (2015) 
argue that the question of agency indeed has roughly divided those adhering to practice 
theories into two “programmes” as regards sustainable consumption, change and the potential 
that individuals have to change things. The first programme, in their view, represented by 
Elizabeth Shove, and rooted in stronger practice theories, has been sceptical, while the second 
programme, rooted in ecological modernization, and represented by Gert Spaargaren, has been 
optimistic. The first programme has focused more on the dynamics of practices, why they form 
the way they do, and how they change, giving materialities (including infrastructures and 
technologies) a central role. The second programme has focused more on citizen-consumers as 
change agents at “consumption-junctions” where production and consumption meet. Lately, 
however, there has been convergence (Welch & Warde, 2015) whereby the first programme 
has focused more specifically on transforming practices (e.g. in Shove et al., 2012), and the 
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second programme has acknowledged that social practices define, or “produce” individuals 
(Spaargaren, 2013), while at the same time, individuals as citizen-consumers retain agency for 
change.166 
Related to the question of social practice theories and agency, there are also differences in 
terms of the emphasis given to other human-related qualities or experiences potentially 
relevant to practices, such as emotions and values. De-centering the human tends to also de-
center such concepts. However, the relevance of both emotions and values to social practices is 
increasingly emphasized by some authors. Reckwitz (2017) and Welch (2017a) both consider 
emotions being intrinsic to all practices. Similarly, Weenink and Spaargaren (2016) tie collective 
agency to practices via emotions. And Welch (2017a) believes that values are also strongly 
connected to practices. The further development of the concept of general understandings by 
Welch and Warde (2017, concept originally from Schatzki, 2002), as an important component of 
social practices, helps to see both values and emotions linked to practices via such general 
understandings, as discussed further in Section 3.3.  
The embeddedness of emotions and values in social practices makes insights from social 
psychology relevant to social practice theories, even if the policy priority is not to change the 
behaviour of individuals through psychological methods. For example, Nash et al. (2017) argue 
that social psychology and social practice theories can complement and enrich each other in 
attempts to create broader change towards sustainability. However, similar to Hargreaves 
(2011), Nash and colleagues point out that rather than attempt to change behaviour through 
changing value dispositions of individuals, “attempts to change practices seek broader, societal 
shifts in the organization, understandings, and/or performances” of practices, including 
changes in social norms (Nash et al., 2017:11). 
Regardless of the disagreements around agency, Welch (2017a) maintains that a social practice 
approach innovatively reframes the policy question “How do we change individuals’ 
                                                          
166
 Citizens in this context can be seen as prioritizing more sustainability facilitating values (see Section 3.3.2), 
including a sense of responsibility, while consumers would tend to prioritize more sustainability hindering values 
(e.g. Gjerris et al., 2016). Citizen-consumers are a combination of the two, supposedly able to balance different 
value priorities. 
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behaviour?” into “How do we change practices and their performance?”. The latter question 
clearly must pay some attention to the system as well, whether “system” refers to mesh of 
practices or to societal structures in a more traditional way. An iceberg is a useful metaphor 
illustrating the difference between practices as entities and practices as performances (with the 
latter understood commonly as “behaviour”), as provided by Spurling et al. (2013), and shown 
in Figure 3.2. If policymaking only focuses on the visible tip of the iceberg, i.e. the behaviour, it 
is no wonder that not enough sustained change can be made. 
Figure 3.2. Social practice as an iceberg 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Modified from Spurling et al. (2013). 
Mainly, according to Welch (2017a), practice theories offer new insights for understanding 
processes of social change and the framing of problems, while offering new opportunities for 
intervention, and challenging the common assumptions feeding into policymaking. 
Although until now, practice-theoretical research has mostly analysed individual performances 
of practices,167 instead of focusing on the larger system (Warde, 2014), the possibilities are 
                                                          
167
 So, the focus has still been on the tip of the iceberg, but taking the whole iceberg into account. Social practice 
theoretical analysis has traditionally not centered on change. 
Observable 
part of the 
practice 
iceberg 
(practice as 
performance) 
Entire iceberg  
(practice as entity, with 
connected elements, such 
as general understandings, 
competencies, materials 
and the body) 
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there. Using social practice theoretical research for policy insights on practice-related norms, 
values, discourses, knowledge, standards and societal structures could, and perhaps should, 
become the central units of investigation and intervention.168 Social practice theories move 
away from framing problems in term of “false oppositions or alternatives: the individual or the 
social context; behaviour or technology” (Welch, 2016:238). Indeed, sufficiently broad 
interventions that have addressed several components of practices (rather than just one) have 
been more successful (Southerton et al., 2011).169 Using social practice theory to the fullest in 
policymaking would, however, mean that policymakers should be capable of critical self-
reflection. 
Among the policymakers that do see the benefits of incorporating social practice theories, 
there is a tendency to use practice theories to formulate the policy issues themselves, but when 
it comes to motivating behaviour change, policymakers often go back to social psychology to 
address individual consumers (Welch, 2017a). It appears that using practice theories for actual 
social change is still a challenge. This may partly be because changing system-wide elements 
such as worldviews, meanings, or paradigms is not only challenging, but often not something 
policymakers would even wish to do.  
Sometimes reformatting policy issues and looking at them anew from a practice point of view 
can be beneficial. For example, Hargreaves (2011) analyses more traditional behaviour change 
campaigns in a workplace through a social practice theory lens, and concludes that such 
campaigns can be seen as interventions in the organization of multiple connected practices, 
rather than attempts to change the motives and values of individual people. Although the 
campaign may stay the same, the focus of assessing its impact shifts more towards practices 
(both as entities and as performances) and away from individuals, while also better revealing 
the challenges in behaviour change campaigns. 
                                                          
168
 This would be close to the system change approach described above, in terms of most efficient interventions 
being at the paradigm level (Meadows, 2008). 
169
 An example of a successful campaign is the Cool Biz initiative in Japan (see Shove et al., 2012). 
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Welch and Warde (2015) see essentially three outstanding issues calling for further 
development of practice theories, especially in terms of making them into more useful policy 
tools. Firstly, the relationship between production and consumption is problematic, as 
production is mostly neglected in practice theories. However, Welch and Warde argue that the 
recent attempts for a synthesis with socio-technical transition approaches might help in this 
respect.170 Secondly, the relationship between collective agency and everyday routines has 
largely been neglected in practice theories. Welch and Warde suggest that one way to get away 
from this theoretically tricky relationship is to see sustainable consumption as an “organized 
field of strategic interventions”171 (original quote from Barnett et al., 2011:13), whereby 
unsustainable consumption is “taken up as the object of problematizing discourse” (Welch & 
Warde, 2015:97). Thirdly, the relationship between the micro-level of everyday performances 
and the macro-level of institutional context is an issue for sociology as a whole, but it is 
especially so for the stronger practice theoretical programme discussed above. Indeed, usually 
adhering to flat ontology,172 stronger practice theories tend to see no division between 
individual practices and the system level, yet they often stay at the level of practice 
performances for empirical (and even theoretical) research.173 Welch and Warde conclude by 
saying that practice theories still lack fully persuasive conceptual answers to how to make 
change, especially due to the third point above. 
Spotswood and Marsh (2016) believe that the future of behaviour change is transdisciplinary. 
Although incompatibility may not necessarily be an issue in transdisciplinary or interdisciplinary 
research, I would also argue that even when it is, compatibility need not always be a first 
priority (Colyvan, 2008), if certain concepts around a phenomenon nonetheless represent ideas 
                                                          
170
 See also Geels et al. (2015) for another attempt to synthesize. Geels and colleagues also look for synergies 
between the capitalism and efficiency based approaches and full sustainability transformation approaches. 
171
 This is in the sense of political consumption whereby everyday consumption is seen “as a surface of 
mobilization for wider, explicitly political aims and agendas” (Barnett et al., 2011:13). 
172
 I do not follow flat ontology (rejecting a hierarchy of societal entities) in this work as such, even though I agree 
with the view of the world consisting of a near infinite number of interlinked social practices. I would rather see 
that many of those practices form what can be called “the system” (such as in the “meat system”). 
173
 Regarding applying social practice theories on large-scale phenomena, Nicolini (2017) notes that it is not always 
clear what is large and what is small: for example, there can be large-scale phenomena that are not “big” as such. 
He gives the example of greetings as apparently small scale, but at the same time “ubiquitous, pervasive and 
critical to sustain the fabric of social relationships and its orderliness” (idem:100). 
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that may achieve results. This is somewhat in the spirit of bricolage. I would also add that 
compatibility between issues may also be found later on. Colyvan (2008:119) argues that 
ontological consistency is “just one virtue among many”, and in natural sciences in particular, 
inconsistency is sometimes unavoidable. In any event, my purpose is to contribute to new 
insights into complex and urgent problems through working in an interdisciplinary manner. 
3.1.2. Meat eating related practices 
Although the focus of this chapter is more general, it still seems necessary to define here what 
the meat eating related practices are that I examine in my thesis otherwise, before embarking 
on building the fuller conceptual framework. 
The components mentioned in the above definition for social practices (Welch & Warde, 2015) 
include material, embodied, ideational and affective components. In meat eating related 
practices, the material components would include the food that is eaten, cooking equipment, 
but also supermarkets, farms, processing facilities, and so on. The embodied components 
would include for example, skills and practical knowledge for all the related activities. The 
ideational components would include meanings, understandings, knowledge and values, and 
these would be connected to the affective components which would mainly relate to different 
emotions related to food and eating. 
Most if not all practices are more or less closely linked to, and overlapping with other practices 
(e.g. Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016) to the extent that any particular practice is usually part of a 
complex, interconnected mesh of practices. So it is with meat: meat eating related practices are 
part of a mesh of practices, most closely related to shopping, socializing, family raising, cooking, 
disposal and digestion related practices, but they are also part of the larger meat system of 
breeding, feeding and killing domestic animals; production, processing, distribution, trading, 
wholesale, retail, marketing and advertising of meat, further connected to the larger 
agricultural systems, subsidies, governmental policies, and so on. I am therefore greatly 
simplifying the picture by focusing on meat eating as a practice, but by “meat eating” I do not 
only refer to the bodily consumption of animal flesh (or the new plant-based meats), but also 
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the relatively closely related practices – described above and generally taking place after the 
consumption junction, while also being connected to what comes before the consumption 
junction. Since according to the dominant “demand hypothesis”, meat production in intensive 
systems is driven by the demand for meat to be eaten, the “eating side” of the consumption 
junction should certainly be relevant to examine from the point of view of radical change. The 
eating side also reflects the dominant values and worldviews related to the production side, 
including ideologies such as carnism (discussed in Section 3.5.3).  
Eating as a practice is both similar and dissimilar to other practices, especially those seen as 
consumption practices. It is dissimilar in the sense that (together with other bodily 
consumption of substances) it is the only form of consumption where the human body literally 
does the consuming. But much of other consumption is also related to (perceived and often 
real) bodily needs, such as domestic heating or water consumption. The bodily consumption of 
food for sustenance is also not the only reason people engage in eating practices. Other 
reasons include many of the same reasons people engage in other consumption practices: to 
satisfy emotional needs, or to form and maintain social connections. Further, eating involves 
similar linked practices as other consumption practices such as shopping, and knowledge 
related to what to shop. Generally, it is also performed as a means to an end, similar to most 
other consumption practices. Finally, similar negative emotions can be related to eating as 
compared to some other forms of consumption, feelings of guilt, for example. 
Warde (2013) defines eating as a particularly complex social practice, a compound practice, i.e. 
a combination of four component integrative practices:  supplying of food (nutrition), cooking, 
organization of meal occasions (etiquette) and aesthetic judgments of taste (gastronomy).  
Warde also points out how eating is a generally disorganised and weakly regulated practice (no 
clear standards exist).  As exceptions he mentions traditional eating in France, the Slow Food 
movement, and eating out as a treat.  When viewed as a product of history, eating is a practice 
that has changed enormously over time, and also currently differs significantly between 
cultures and geographical areas.  From a long-term historical point of view, eating practices – 
similar to many other social practices – are in a constant process of change. 
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As regards the practices of eating meat, the reason I indeed use more frequently the term 
“meat eating” rather than “meat consumption” is mainly threefold. Firstly, “consumption” in 
general can be a more ideological term than “eating”, on the positive side seen as supporting 
the functioning of economies, and on the negative side seen as contributing to the destroying 
of nature. Secondly, “consumption”, similar to “consumer”,174 infers materialistic values that 
are potentially not beneficial as regards sustainability related communication (Crompton, 2016, 
see also Section 3.3.2). Thirdly, Wilk (2018) warns against using abstractions – and 
“consumption” is an abstraction - in connection with attempts for radical societal change 
towards sustainability.175 However, I do also refer to “consumption” at times, especially when 
referring to the quantifiable amounts of meat being produced and eaten.176 Additionally, I refer 
to “eating animals”. In general in this thesis, I reserve this last expression to contexts where the 
(often hidden) animal origin is the main point, for example, in connection with strategic 
ignorance.  
To note, most of the concepts or topics discussed in this chapter will have a relevance to meat 
eating related practices. Therefore, at certain points, there will either be a subsection entitled 
“* Meat eating related practices”177 in which the links from the concepts to meat will be 
explored, or the meat eating related issues will be discussed directly in the main discussion.  
3.2. Modifications to the elements of social practices - With a view on sustainability 
In this section, I will explain how I have adapted the model of social practices contained in 
Shove et al. (2012). Detailed explanations will follow, but Figure 3.3 provides first an 
illustration. 
  
                                                          
174
 In opposition to “consumer”, “citizen” implies more sustainability facilitating values, such as co-responsibility. 
See more on values in Section 3.3.2. 
175
 According to Wilk, abstraction – making abstract concepts into personified reality, e.g. “the market” - can make 
arguments less convincing to the lay person. Using more concrete and real terms, such as “weather”, are closer to 
the everyday than more abstract and virtual terms, such as “climate”. Weather is experienced, climate is not. 
176
 This is especially so in Chapter 2. 
177
 Regardless of the other headings or subheadings, this section heading is always in italics, and starts with a “*”. 
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Figure 3.3. Social practices and their connections to discourses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figures by author, except for 3.3b which is based on from Shove et al. (2012). 
Compared to the simplified model of practices shown in Figure 3.3b, and originating from Shove 
et al. (2012), Figure 3.3a still maintains the one-to-one connections between elements, as it 
moves from two dimensions to three dimensions. However, as modifications, it includes an 
fourth element, the body, and additionally, meanings has been replaced by general 
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understandings, a term representing a component of practices, originally from Schatzki (2002), 
and developed further by Welch and Warde (2017). Moreover, Figure 3.3c illustrates the 
coupling between general understandings178 and cognitive frames, importantly connecting 
practices to discourses. As Figure 3.3c illustrates, values, emotions and knowledge connect to 
both general understandings (on the side of practices) and to cognitive frames (on the side of 
discourses), as discussed later. 
3.2.1. Brief overview of Shove et al. (2012) 
The 2012 book by Elizabeth Shove, Mika Pantzar and Matt Watson has become a classic in 
social practice theory literature in a short time, even though it has also received some criticism 
(see e.g. Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016; Welch & Warde, 2015). Apart from its approach in 
addressing the crucially important policy side, its emphasis on certain old and new aspects of 
social practice theories themselves have in part helped to solidify some of the rather diverse 
field. The main new theoretical contribution of Shove and colleagues lies in the dynamics of 
practices and in emphasizing materialities as an element of social practices. The main points 
that Shove and colleagues highlight include the following: 
 Practices are composed of elements, which in the simplified model179 comprise of 
meanings, materials and competences 
 Materiality is key to social practices 
 People are carriers of practices, although not passively so 
 Distinction between practice-as-entity and practice-as-performance is central 
 Practices emerge, persist, change and disappear, and this largely happens through the 
links between different practice elements being made, remade or broken 
 Stability of practices only comes from faithful repetitive performances of practices, and 
is therefore always provisional 
 The unit of enquiry for research and/or policymaking are practices, not individuals.180 
                                                          
178
 Schatzki (2002) distinguishes between “practical understandings”, more specific to certain individual practices, 
and “general understandings”, shared between practices. 
179
 The model contained in Shove et al. (2012) is simplified in order to focus on the dynamics of practices, on 
stability and change. See Figure 3.3b. 
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As regards issues I focus on in this conceptual framework, Shove and colleagues do recognize 
both agency and emotions as residing in social practices. They also talk about the relevance - 
for many sustainability related policy issues such as climate change - of the need for profound 
changes in social practices, including dominant worldviews and discourses. Further, they argue 
that the ABC model is in fact a political position downplaying the role that governments often 
have in maintaining unsustainability. However, they do not focus specifically on values, more 
obviously not at individual level, but also not specifically at societal level.181 This is likely to be 
partially a result of their aim of overturning the dominant behaviour change policy framework 
for which the value-action gap, for example, would be a key question. In recognizing discourses 
as relevant to changing practices, for example, when “dominant discourses crumble” (Shove et 
al., 2012:58), they also touch upon my concern with connecting practices and discourses more 
tightly.  
To speak more specifically of the process of change: as stated above, the way Shove and 
colleagues see practices changing is mainly through reconnecting elements. In fact, while 
practices are in a constant state of change, elements may be more stable. Shove and colleagues 
make a distinction between a proto-practice and a disintegrated practice, in both of which 
relevant elements exist without being linked. In the former they are not yet connected, and in 
the latter they are no longer connected. The point is that elements may be replaced, and links 
remade one by one, and during this process, the practice may not go through any sudden and 
radical change as such, but still in the end, it may be radically different from what existed 
before. The example Shove and colleagues use is the change from horse-driven carriages to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
180
 Many of these points come from earlier practice theory literature, such as Reckwitz (2002), e.g. the carrier 
concept and seeing practices as consisting of elements. Also, the main unit of enquiry was seen already earlier as 
practices. And the original idea for the formulation of practice-as-entity and practice-as-performance goes back to 
Schatzki (1996). However, Shove et al. (2012) have further enforced these positions, and brought them together in 
a digestible whole. 
181
 However, in other writing, e.g. in Shove (2003), the meanings of value concepts such as comfort, cleanliness and 
convenience are a central focus, with the message being that the meanings have been, and can be redefined, and 
that diversity in meanings would be better for sustainability than sticking to the current resource-intensive 
Western meanings of these value concepts. 
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automobiles, while arguing that the only really new element during this change was the petrol 
engine itself, and the skills for its maintenance and repair.182 
In the following sections, and later in this chapter, my focus is necessarily selective. I discuss 
materialities mainly from the point of view of power and agency, relating to stability and 
change. Similarly, as regards competencies, I focus on their connection to practical 
consciousness, as the counterpart to discursive consciousness (relevant to discourses, as well as 
change). Finally, I discuss the suggested additional fourth element to the simplified model of 
social practices in Shove et al. (2012), i.e. the body, largely in relation to the ways the body 
connects to emotions and values, which are a key focus for me, together with the element 
related to meanings (which I expand to “general understandings”). 
To recap what Shove and colleagues see as constituting the streamlined elements (as shown in 
Figure 3.3b): materials to them consist of objects, infrastructures, tools, hardware and the 
human body itself; competencies include background knowledge and understanding, know-
how, skills, and practical consciousness; and meanings consist of meanings of practices as such, 
but also emotions and motivational knowledge, ideas and aspirations.183  
Finally, it is noteworthy that I refer to “behaviour” sometimes seemingly in the same way as I 
refer to “practices”. Shove (2010), however, warns against such usage, as practice theories are 
specifically not behavioural theories. She sees the two concepts theoretically in opposition to 
each other. However, I see “behaviour” in most cases as the observable performances of 
practices, the tip of the iceberg in Figure 3.2 (and in Spurling et al., 2013; Welch, 2016), 
whereas normally when referring to “practices”, I refer to the whole body of the iceberg, the 
practice as an entity. With this distinction in mind, it seems justifiable to speak of both 
“behaviour” and “practices” in certain contexts. 
 
 
                                                          
182
 Later on, of course many more elements changed in the new practice of car driving. 
183
 These lists may not be exhaustive. 
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3.2.2. Adding emphasis - Distributed agentive power 
Section 3.6 will return to agentive power,184 but in this subsection I want to clarify how I see 
agentive power in relation to the elements of social practices as depicted in Figure 3.3a. 
Even though Shove et al. (2012), in line with practice theoretical arguments, seek to decenter 
individual humans and bring out practices as the defining unit of social life, they also see 
agentive power as part of practices in several ways, although the reader needs to search fairly 
attentively for the instances where the topic is in fact discussed. Further, and notably, change is 
not specifically attributed to agentive power. 
Firstly, Shove and colleagues see agentive power distributed within practices. They 
acknowledge that human agency exists, and it is: 
…loosely but unavoidably contained with a universe of possibilities defined by […] 
complexes of practice. It is in this sense that practices make agency possible, a 
conclusion that is not at all incompatible with the related point that practices do 
not exist unless recurrently enacted by real life human beings. 
Shove et al. (2012:126) 
Humans as carriers of practices are therefore not passive, and in fact, practices themselves are 
“active” in a way, and form “inherently dynamic” integrations of elements. Practices do not 
exist without human action, and humans could not act effectively without practices. 
Secondly, Shove and colleagues also emphasize the material element of practices, and go some 
way towards Actor Network Theory (e.g. Latour, 2000), in assigning things and materials an 
important role. Therefore, Shove and colleagues are "broadly sympathetic to the view that 
agencies and competencies are distributed between things and people" (Shove et al., 2012:10). 
However, instead of giving materiality a larger agentive role in the way Actor Network Theory 
does, Shove and colleagues integrate materiality tightly as part of social practices.  
                                                          
184
 A useful definition of agentive power for this thesis: “the capability or power to be the source and originator of 
acts” (Sahakian and Wilhite, 2014: 28, with reference to Ortner, 1989). I see agency as agentive power of human 
actors, implying some form of (potential) intention and planning, whereas non-human actors (including “things”) 
can have agentive power, rather than agency, as they do not intend and plan to use such power (artificial 
intelligence excluded). 
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Discussing social practice theories in connection with sustainability, Sahakian and Wilhite 
(2014) refer to agentive power distributed across different pillars of practices, comprising the 
body (including embodied physical and mental knowledge), the material world, and the social 
world (social context, including social normal and values, institutions and legal frameworks). On 
the one hand, the deeper a practice (or a habit) is fixed on these pillars, the harder it is to 
change, and on the other hand, when change (intentional or not) takes place in more than one 
pillar, it is more likely that a change in practices will be persistent and successful. Importantly, 
Sahakian and Wilhite do not take issue with practices being in a constant state of change (as 
Shove and colleagues do), their focus is mostly on purposive change. Crucially for them, all the 
pillars have distributed agentive power. This type of agentive power is what in fact makes 
purposive change in practices possible, as changes in just one pillar is usually not enough.  
Shove et al. (2012) perceive practice elements somewhat differently from Sahakian and Wilhite 
(2014), and the foci of these two approaches on change are also different. Nonetheless, the 
idea of distributed agentive power remains relevant in both, and on this idea I wish to build on, 
emphasising, along with Sahakian and Wilhite, the importance of such power for purposive 
change. 
* Meat eating related practices and material agency 
In line with the idea of material things having agentive power, there can be little doubt that 
Mark Post’s cell-based meat patty from 2013, or the cell-based meat products from Memphis 
Meats since then, or the plant-based Impossible Burger,185 can all be seen as having agentive 
power: “the mere idea [of cell-based meat] is enough to stimulate thought on our present and 
future meat consumption” (van der Weele & Driessen, 2013:653), when normally such 
thoughts tend to be kept hidden through strategic ignorance (see later in Section 3.3.3). 
Expectations are performative (Magneson Chiles, 2013), and so, expectations of the new meats 
have agentive power. In addition to affecting our minds already before their physical existence 
– as mere ideas of materialities - these new meats have now also started to reorganise food 
                                                          
185
 The Impossible Burger is a product from Impossible Foods, see https://impossiblefoods.com. For Memphis 
Meats, see http://www.memphismeats.com. 
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industry, in that conventional meat companies are now taking alternatives to meat seriously, as 
competitors, but also as something to invest in. Moreover, plant-based meats, such as the 
Impossible Burger, already existing materialities, are currently being eaten more or less 
consciously as something actually called plant-based meat by thousands of Americans. Due to 
the marketing and media attention, most customers in the restaurants serving the Impossible 
Burger would be likely to be aware of what it is that they are eating. Further, these material 
things have indeed entered various discourses, not only in the Western public discourses, but 
also beyond that, even though on a smaller scale, as mentioned in Chapter 2.186 Most 
importantly perhaps, these new meats have already significantly contributed to questioning the 
future of intensive animal farming (van der Weele, 2017). Although material things lack 
“intelligibility, intentionality and affectivity”, they can have performative power to influence the 
ways practices unfold (Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016:66)187 – in the form of both expectations 
and actual materialities. 
3.2.3. Adding a fourth element - The body 
Shove et al. (2012) include the human body as part of the material elements of practices, so in 
fact, the body is included. However, it is given very little weight, possibly on purpose, to keep to 
the principle of decentering the individual. Similarly, Shove and colleagues also seem wary of 
incorporating Bourdieu’s concept of habitus188 (idem:5). It is hard to see habitus residing in any 
particular element of practices conceptualized by Shove and colleagues, but rather partly in all 
of them: in materials (which include the body), in competencies (which include skills and 
practical consciousness), and meanings (which include other aspects often seen as part of the 
habitus, such as aspirations and values). In contrast, Sahakian and Wilhite (2014) explicitly bring 
out the significance of habitus. To them, it resides in the body pillar of practices, and plays a 
crucial role in the habitual and routine performances of practices. 
                                                          
186
 See Section 2.2.2. 
187
 I would equate performative power with agentive power in this context. 
188
 Habitus is understood here as various dispositions mediating thought and action, and acquired through past 
experiences (Sahakian and Wilhite, 2014). 
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Moving back to Shove et al. (2012), when combining “body” with other “materials”, Shove and 
colleagues, in fact, not only decenter individual humans, but appear to nearly exclude them 
entirely from the world of practices. However, all of the three practice elements in Shove et al. 
(2012) have bodily connections. I therefore argue that, without having to involve the concept of 
habitus as such, the “body” works well as a fourth element of practices together with the 
conceptualization of practice elements by Shove and colleagues. Since in a tetrahedron all 
corner points are connected to each other, in Figure 3.3a, the body is also connected to the 
other three practice elements, as it is in actual practices. The body connects to competencies 
via skills, embodied knowledge and practical consciousness, to general understandings via 
values, emotions and discursive knowledge (including meanings), and to materials via the close 
connections between human bodies and materials (technologies, infrastructures, things, 
including food) that are made for and used by human bodies.189 The body is involved in some 
way in the performances of all practices. No social practices exist without human action and 
experience. Including our physical and mental capabilities, our bodies enable us and restrict us 
in our practice performances; the body is an essential part of them. The body cannot, therefore, 
be sensibly omitted as a relevant component of practices, even if it may draw unhelpful 
attention to individuals in a practice theoretical scheme that tries to focus away from the 
individual.  
However, reflexivity, discursive consciousness or conscious decisions (also bodily processes) are 
not involved in the performances of all practices. In fact, they are not involved in most routine 
performances of practices. I will return to the theme of reflexivity and discursive consciousness 
in more detail in Section 3.4.1. 
3.2.4. Replacing an element - General understandings 
When streamlining the elements of practices, Shove et al. (2012) give “meanings” a large role. 
One of the practice elements, meanings relate to the “significance of participation” (idem:23) in 
                                                          
189
 Importantly, I would include nature or non-human animals in materials only to the (unfortunate) extent that 
they are objects to be used by humans, such as “meat animals”. This brings the conflict between humans and the 
natural world in view. On the other hand, perhaps non-human animals could also be thought of as engaging in 
social practices, and in such cases, the “body” would include the bodies of non-human animals. 
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practices, and as said, they also connect to motivational knowledge and emotions: “states of 
emotion have been folded into ‘meaning’” (idem:121). It is clear from the discussion by Shove 
and colleagues that competencies do not include conscious mental activities, but meanings 
might do so, on occasion at least. Further, Shove and colleagues do not discuss values, but to 
the extent that they are properties of practices (see later in this chapter), they would be likely 
to connect to meanings as well. 
Welch and Warde (2017) elaborate on the concept of general understandings.190 To Welch and 
Warde, general understandings account for “how very general ideas are incorporated into 
practice”, thereby also accounting for meanings. They are “experienced, articulated and 
negotiated in […] embodied activity”, thereby connecting to the body. Further, they “inform 
and shape practices, and in turn […] are themselves conditioned by practices” (idem:195), 
thereby able to be conceptualized as an actual element of practices. Finally, they also include 
values, and they are connected to emotions: “values – a particular kind of general 
understanding – combine conceptual, pre-reflexive and affective components” (idem:189).  
In most of the above, the role of general understandings is similar to how Shove et al. (2012) 
conceptualize meanings. However, general understandings are conceived as a broader and 
therefore arguably more advantageous concept by Welch and Warde (2017). Importantly for 
the connection between practices and discourses (discussed further in Section 3.4), general 
understandings also connect different practices to each other as they can “inform multiple 
practices”, and help us therefore also understand how both closely and distantly related 
practices “borrow from and change one another” (idem:195). In fact, Shove et al. (2012) also 
see meanings connecting practices.191 This similar function further supports incorporating 
general understandings into Figure 3.3a, and replacing meanings with them. 
 
                                                          
190
 As mentioned earlier, the concept comes originally form Schatzki (2002) who distinguishes between practical 
and general understandings. 
191
 As an example, they discuss how the meaning of being overweight connects practices such as shopping, 
exercising and eating (Shove et al, 2012:113). 
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3.3. Concepts linking to general understandings  
In this section, I will first still continue on the topic of meanings, as it remains important for 
social practices and change towards sustainability. Meanings also carry particular relevance to 
the issue of new meats, discussed below. In the two sections thereafter, I will focus on values, 
emotions and to some extent on knowledge.192 These are all concepts that link to general 
understandings as an element of social practices, and are therefore necessarily part of the 
discussion in this conceptual framework. 
3.3.1. Changing meanings and sustainability 
Shove et al. (2012) argue that while changing competencies often takes time, meanings as 
forms of association can emerge, change and travel far and fast. Therefore, while Shove and 
colleagues emphasize the stability of practice elements in general - as opposed to practices 
themselves which have a natural tendency to change - they also see meanings as often delicate, 
and not necessarily stable. As Lehtonen (2000:117) states, meanings are "always temporary, 
bound to a certain time, place and context”. 
Examples given by Shove and colleagues on natural change – natural, in the sense that it has 
taken place through other changes in practices or societies, and has not been purposive - but 
still rather radical change in meanings over time include car driving (from luxurious to 
everyday), home baking (from a necessity to a hobby), and writing with ink (from normal to 
special). 
A further example on meaning changing naturally, but, in fact, rather rapidly is how the 
meaning of misplaced plastic has in the last few years shifted from simple, but perhaps ugly 
“litter” to something “pervasive and sinister” and a “source of contagion”. This is argued to 
                                                          
192
 Knowledge is connected to general understandings in Figure 3.3c, in the same way as values and emotions are. 
Theories of embodied knowledge also connect knowledge directly to emotions and the body (see Ignatov, 2007). 
Knowledge will be discussed in this section implicitly or explicitly when relevant. For example, knowledge is 
connected to meanings, and ignoring knowledge is relevant to strategic ignorance. My focus is on purposive 
change, and while knowledge is important for practices as such, it is most challenging for change to the extent that 
its existence might or might not produce seemingly beneficial or necessary change; hence the connection of 
knowledge to strategic ignorance, for example, is relevant. 
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have taken place due to the realization – first among scientists and then among the publics - of 
the ubiquitousness of plastic microbeads, initially, in various cosmetic and cleaning products, 
and subsequently, in nature: “the realization that microbeads were pouring down millions of 
shower drains was a key moment in the public turn against plastic”.193 As a consequence, in less 
than five years, a global revolt against plastic, in discourses, but also in action, and at 
governmental levels, has developed. 
However, Shove and colleagues emphasize that meanings can also have their persistent lives. 
Meanings can also swap practices - such as the meaning of being chauffeured in horse carriages 
to being chauffeured in automobiles in the early days of the car. Meanings can also reappear - 
such as cycling in certain locations, for example in the Netherlands, where it was reborn from 
around the 1980s, after decades of a minor role, as the normal method of moving around. 
Meanings can also be changed on purpose. On this, Shove and colleagues give two examples: 
Nordic Walking and Cool Biz, as explained below. 
Nordic Walking was popularized in Finland in the 1990s. In order for it to become popular, 
“walking with ‘sticks’ had to be disassociated from meanings of frailty and somehow connected 
to concepts of vitality and wellbeing” (Shove et al., 2012:53). The manufacturers succeeded in 
this by using two established narratives, one of personal health, and the other of fresh air, 
nature and outdoor life. Although successful in this case, transforming Nordic Walking to an 
internationally popular form of exercise, Shove and colleagues maintain, however, that such a 
process tends to be uncertain and local, constrained and enabled by existing contexts. It can 
also take time, as cultural meanings are often slow to change. 
Nordic Walking was originally only partly about public health, and partly about selling new 
equipment. As an example of policymakers taking action in order to reduce CO2 emissions, 
Shove and colleagues discuss the Japanese Cool Biz and Warm Biz campaigns in the 2000s. 
Although not purposefully applying practice theories, these campaigns were precisely about 
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 The plastic backlash: what's behind our sudden rage – and will it make a difference? An in-depth article by 
Stephen Buranyi in the online Guardian, 13 November 2018. 
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changing elements of practices, most importantly, by changing meanings – and, thereby 
changing also behaviour. Efforts were made to change the meaning of normal office clothing in 
order to affect the material technologies (how much air conditioning and heating was needed 
in offices, and increasing the acceptable range of temperatures) and competencies (how people 
dressed for the office, and how facilities management handled the temperature control). In less 
than five years, for example, “running air-conditioning ‘cold’ and wearing a tie and jacket in the 
summer turned from being a normal to an exceptional thing to do” for many (Shove et al., 
2012:158).194  
For achieving sustainability, Shove and colleagues argue that the focus of policymakers might 
usefully shift towards facilitating the breaking down of old unsustainable practices, including 
redefining meanings of certain “bad” elements of practices, such as the meaning of “comfort”. 
They contend that this may seem radical, but maintain that policy methods focusing on practice 
elements such as meanings have long been used in public health policies. 
* Meat eating related practices and changing meanings 
There are many ways to understand the meaning of meat, including the more literal, the more 
symbolic, and the meaning regarding what is normal or not normal.195  
As regards the literal meaning, etymologically the English word "meat" (from Old English 
"mete") is actually related to the word "meal", referring generally to food. Other old languages 
(Old High German, Old Saxon, Old Islandic and Gothic) have similar histories with the word. At 
some point, however, a "meal" (by then, ground grain) became perceived as incomplete 
without animal flesh (Marder, 2016). In some other languages, the corresponding word for 
meat may have originally referred to “flesh as food”, such as in ancient Greek or in Latin. Only 
from around 1300, however, has the English word “meat” referred to “flesh as food”. In light of 
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 For more details and discussion of Cool Biz and Warm Biz, see Shove et al. (2012). 
195
 I introduced the 4 Ns - Normal, Natural, Necessary and Nice - often associated with eating meat, already in 
Chapter 2. I will discuss them again in connection with strategic ignorance later in Section 3.3.3, as the 4 Ns are 
usually seen as rationalizations for a practice that causes cognitive dissonance (see Piazza et al., 2015). I will also 
discuss them in Section 3.5.3 in connection with the ideology of carnism. 
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history then, the literal meaning of “meat” has changed over time, and is, in fact, likely to 
change again, even if not intentionally, as meanings do change.196 
In fact, and as mentioned in Chapter 2, due to the meat crisis, there are current efforts to 
change the meaning of “meat”. Promoters of the new meats (companies, organisations, 
individuals) are keen on expanding “meat” to cover cell-based meat and plant-based meat,197 
whereas the conventional meat industry is keen on restricting “meat” to conventional animal-
based meat. There is therefore a fight going on about what meat is - together with other, up-to-
now animal-derived products such as milk - and the fight has extended to the courts in several 
countries. The fight can be seen as being over profits, but it can also be seen as a fight over 
power in discourse - for example, who gets to decide what meat is and is not? It is therefore 
also a fight over power in society.198  
Figure 3.4 illustrates the new meats and the older options on a two-dimensional scale, 
measuring conventional meat character – various sensual experiences of “meatiness” that has 
until now defined whether something is considered meat or not – and the amount of animal 
protein in the food in question. The latter has also until now been seen as important for what 
meat is. Looking at the issue as in Figure 3.4, it becomes easier to appreciate that, firstly, the 
definitions for the literal meaning of meat are not necessarily clear-cut, and secondly, that 
variety and change in the meaning is quite possible, perhaps even including the possibility that 
pulses could eventually be considered enough meat-like to be enjoyed as “meat”. Further, I 
have included “hybrids” as a potential cross-over between cell-based and plant-based meat, or 
any other combination, for that matter.199  
 
 
                                                          
196
 Considering sustainability and purposive change, a future meaning for “meat” could even be something like 
“protein food resembling animal flesh”. 
197
 This expansion of course covers the very name “plant-based meat”, used, for example, extensively in the book 
The future of meat without animals, edited by Donaldson and Carter (2016). 
198
 See e.g. Wilson (2015) for a discussion on political discourse. 
199
 Hybrid products with cell-based meat have been discussed. In fact, hybrids already exist as a combination of 
animal-based meat (conventional meat or insects) and plant-based protein in certain processed products. 
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Figure 3.4. Mapping old and new meats 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure by author.  
One popular name for cell-based meat has been “clean meat”. This term was created in 2016 
by the Good Food Institute, an organization involved in advancing the development of cell-
based and new plant-based meats. “Clean meat” has been seen as a term that is catching on: 
“clean meat, clean conscience”.200 Some instances have extended “clean meat” to cover also 
the new plant-based meats.201 Adopting “clean meat” as a larger category consisting of cell-
based and plant-based meats could further erase the strict definition of meat, and facilitate a 
transformation away from conventional meat eating. On the other hand, if they are to stay, the 
most recent terms “cell-based”, “plant-based” and “animal-based” meat might also have some 
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 See Could lab-grown fish and meat feed the world – without killing a single animal? in the online Guardian on 
20 September 2017. 
201
 See e.g. Old Food, New Tech — ‘Clean Meat’, a podcast from 2016, or Our Meatless Future: How The $90B 
Global Meat Market Gets Disrupted from 16 January 2019.  
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agentive power to make different meats more equal, and to narrow the psychological distance 
between the production and consumption of any kind of meat. Ferrari (2016) notes that cell-
based meat, in fact, promises to bring the meat production process (this time in shiny copper 
bioreactors) again to the midst of people, as it used to be, especially in rural settings. Animals, 
on the other hand, would no longer be present at all, at least if such production took place on 
an industrial scale.202 
The idea (a conceptual metaphor) of a continuum (see Jallinoja et al., 2016) of different ways to 
eat meat is related to the literal meaning of meat as well. I see the meat continuum covering 
every meatway from a strict vegan (eating only pulses and/or plant-based meat) to someone 
who restricts their “meat” to large amounts of conventional animal-based meat. The bulk of the 
continuum consists of different versions of flexitarians, eating conventional meat only 
occasionally (strong flexitarians), or more often than not (weak flexitarians).203 The important 
point Jallinoja et al. (2016) see in such a way of conceptualizing different ways of eating meat is 
that it can decrease the polarization between conventional meat eaters and those that prefer 
to eat less or no conventional meat, and it can also help flexitarianism be an acceptable and 
positive way to eat much less conventional meat. With a continuum kind of thinking, all ways to 
eat meat become only points on the continuum. I would add that moving along the continuum - 
as a journey - into whichever direction, is easier to see as normal. So for example, some months 
one may eat almost no conventional meat, and some other months a bit more. When such 
processes become normalized, and less moralized, they also become easier. In the end, it can 
become simpler to eat less conventional animal-based meat, even radically less. 
Applying the practice element thinking from Shove et al. (2012) on the above, normalizing the 
new meats as material elements, and normalizing flexitarianism as a new competence element 
of meat eating practices, can be important for change. Thereby Jallinoja et al. (2016) also call 
for a new “bean-eating practice” to develop in Europe, with elements of "positive meanings, 
appropriate materials, and skills and competences" (idem:6) being facilitated by change agents 
                                                          
202
 The envisioned “pig in the backyard” production of cell-based meat would be different, however: small-scale, 
local, even at-home production. The animals would be very present (see van der Weele & Driessen, 2013). 
203
 This continuum is discussed again in Section 3.5.3 in relation to ideologies. 
 
 
115 
 
such as NGOs, politicians, celebrity chefs and teachers of home economics. This can also be 
seen as reanimating an old bean-eating practice, but importantly, with new skills, and new 
positive symbolic meanings. Jallinoja and colleagues emphasize that new associations are 
necessary between plant-based proteins (including pulses) and "festive, fulfilling, energizing 
and pleasurable food", instead of the old associations between plant-based proteins as a choice 
for vegetarians and vegans only.204 Moreover, the old meaning of animal-based meat as the 
only "festive, fulfilling and satisfying" protein food needs to be challenged.205  
Further on the links between literal and symbolic meanings of meat, Donaldson (2016a) argues 
that calling the new plant-based protein products “meat” (or “milk” or “eggs”) may on its own 
help change the more symbolic meanings as well. 
On the other hand, the conventional meat industry may indeed wish to keep the more literal 
meaning of meat as stable as possible also because that may help keep the (arguably rather 
outdated) symbolic meanings intact. The image of happy cows helps to keep the origin of 
conventional meat in the dark, and fuels the distance between production and consumption, 
beneficial to the industry. Similarly, promoting meat as healthy and symbolizing power is 
favorable to industry growth.  
Lastly, and as already discussed in Chapter 2, the symbolic meaning of not eating meat has 
changed remarkably even in more recent history. For example, some years after vegetarianism 
spread from the United Kingdom to the United States in the early 19th century, an image of 
vegetarians as "frail, weak and sexually impotent" (Shprintzen, 2011:9) was popularized in the 
US media, supposedly as an attack for vegetarianism’s role in social reform. By the end of the 
19th century, however, partly due to larger changes in society, and partly to the movement 
itself, vegetarianism had become connected to physical strength, fitness, athletics, 
individualism and masculinity. Similar strong and relatively fast changes in symbolic meanings 
                                                          
204
 On the same issue, Schyver and Smith (2005) argue that significant improvements in the image of soy could 
increase the human consumption of soy. 
205
 There would seem to be an inherent problem, however, with using the word “festive” for something to be 
eaten regularly (pulses with a new image). However, meat has retained the meaning of “festive”, although in many 
societies, it is currently eaten on a daily basis. In strong flexitarianism, of course, “festive” for meat is entirely 
appropriate, as meat is something eaten only rarely in this meatway. 
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may be possible in today’s societies as well. Pace of change in technologies is much faster today 
that it has ever been. Perhaps, meanings can change faster too. In any case, one pathway to 
change may also be through the important value and emotion connections discussed further in 
the following sections. 
3.3.2. The relevance of values, value priorities and value dispositions 
In the following, I will go over several value-related concepts, using arguments especially from 
social psychology, but also from social practice theories. Interdisciplinarity is necessary in this 
context, as practice theories alone do not offer enough material for the discussion, especially as 
regards purposive change towards sustainable practices. I will first consider the emphasis given 
to values relating to sustainability. After that I will discuss values more specifically in connection 
with social practices. The attention given to values in this chapter is fairly extensive. I see it 
however rather necessarily so, considering the relevance of values to several key concepts in 
the framework built in this chapter (general understandings and cognitive frames, as well as 
strategic ignorance), and their argued importance regarding a transformation towards 
sustainability. Crompton (2016:219) notes that, despite there being a substantial body of 
research “establishing the importance of values in motivation public expressions of concern 
about social and environmental causes”, this particular literature is often overlooked.  
Connecting values to the above section on meanings, symbolic meanings are in fact actually 
also about values, as a symbolic meaning refers to something valued or not valued. Values are 
complex and, similar to some other issues related to cognition, their role and functioning is not 
yet fully understood.206 Schwartz and Bardi (2001:269) define values as “desirable, trans-
situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives”. In 
more abstract contexts, such as regarding the overall importance of protecting nature, 
attitudes – evaluating something positively or negatively – are in fact very similar to values 
(Maio, 2011).207  
                                                          
206
 The complexity of values and value systems is evident, for example, when referring to a 2017 social psychology 
monograph The psychology of human values by professor Gregory Maio.  
207
 In addition to attitudes, norms are another practical application of values. 
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Finally, I want to emphasize that the societal level as regards values is likely to be more 
important from the point of view of a transformation towards sustainability than the individual 
level would be. However, the individual level is also significant, and is likely to be greatly 
influenced by the societal level, in terms of discourses, institutions, laws and ideologies. Most 
value related studies in social psychology refer to the level of the individual. 
Values and sustainability 
According to the Schwartz value theory research (see e.g. Schwartz, 2012), basic human values 
(see the value map in Figure 3.5) are shared across all people and cultures. Further, among 
these, self-transcending values - showing in Figure 3.5 as universalism and benevolence - are 
hierarchically higher across cultures than self-enhancing values, such as achievement, power 
and (partly) hedonism.208 According to Schwartz (2012), in the cross cultural value systems 
“hierarchically higher” values are considered more important to the functioning of society.209 
Schwartz notes further that the social function of values is to “motivate and control the 
behaviour of group members” (idem:14, original reference to Parsons, 1951). More specifically: 
The high importance of benevolence values (ranked 1st) derives from the 
centrality of positive, cooperative social relations in the family, the main setting 
for initial and continuing value acquisition. Benevolence values provide the 
internalized motivational base for such relations. They are reinforced and 
modeled early and repeatedly. Universalism values (2nd) also contribute to 
positive social relations. They are functionally important primarily when group 
members must relate to those with whom they do not readily identify, in schools, 
work-places, etc. […] Behavior based on these values is intrinsically motivated. It 
satisfies individual needs without harming others. Hence, it rarely threatens 
positive social relations.210 
Schwartz (2012:15) 
Maio (2017:32) describes these two groups of basic values as follows: universalism involves 
“understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all”, and benevolence 
                                                          
208
 In the Schwartz value circle (see e.g. Schwartz, 2012:9), hedonism falls partly on self-enhancing values and 
partly on values grouped as openness to change. 
209
 Irrespective of the social desirability of survey answers, see Schwartz et al. (1997). 
210
 A third group of values sometimes seen together with benevolence and universalism is self-direction values 
which ”foster creativity, motivate innovation, and promote coping with challenges” (Schwartz, 2012:15), and which 
are also intrinsically motivated and socially beneficial. 
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involves “preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact”.211 
To explain the structure of values in Figure 3.5, the further apart two values are on the map, 
the less likely they are to be prioritized at the same time. And vice versa, if two values are close 
to each other on the map, they are more likely to be prioritized at the same time. This is not to 
say that values placed far away from each other on the map could not be prioritized at the 
same time. It is, however, less likely that they are. Further, it may be that such somewhat 
opposing values cause a conflict within an individual, or a society, if they cannot be prioritized 
at the same time (e.g. in connection with eating meat, see later in this chapter), or they cause a 
conflict in a larger context, if prioritizing them simultaneously does not work in reality (e.g. 
prioritizing material overconsumption at the same time as nature protection).  
What is also relevant to note about the value map in Figure 3.5 is that, although at the 
individual level there is much variation between prioritized values, the structure of the map, i.e. 
how close or far two values are in relation to each other is consistent across cultures. Further, 
the values in the map are all given at least some importance across cultures, hence the name 
“basic human values”. 
At the level of individuals, how values are expressed, and how important each of them is, 
varies, both between individuals, and between situations or contexts, and over time, even 
though certain value priorities tend to transcend specific situations (Schwartz, 2012). People 
have therefore more permanent value dispositions that may or may not correspond to the 
more stable priorities in the surrounding society (but often correspond to family environments), 
and people have value priorities which can change on a moment to moment (or day to day) 
basis, but still have some correlation to the more permanent value dispositions.212,213 
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 Originally adopted from Schwartz (1992). 
212
 As an example, a person who values self-discipline, would still be likely to want to let go and relax every now 
and then, but would be unlikely to want to do that on a continuous basis. Living in a society or family valuing self-
discipline, a person in general would be more likely to have that value in his/her more permanent value disposition 
than in another societal/family setting valuing self-indulgence, for example. In the value map in Figure 3.5, self-
discipline and self-indulgence are placed fairly far from each other, and are less likely to coincide at the same time. 
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Those values that behaviour change policies might want to prioritize among the public are 
often crowded out by other situational cues, such as advertising, limiting infrastructure, 
personal situations (e.g. limited cognitive, financial or time resources), or social situations 
(expectations, demands, emotional needs). As the Schwartz value theory states: 
The relative importance of multiple values guides action. Any attitude or behavior 
typically has implications for more than one value. For example, attending church 
might express and promote tradition, conformity, and security values at the 
expense of hedonism and stimulation values. The tradeoff among relevant, 
competing values is what guides attitudes and behaviors […] Values contribute to 
action to the extent that they are relevant in the context (hence likely to be 
activated) and important to the actor. 
 Schwartz (2006a:4) 
As the concept of the value-action gap indicates (see also Box 3.1), it seems that people often 
do not act according to values they would consider important. This is, however, not entirely a 
fair assessment, and Maio (2011) argues that the debate of recent years regarding the value-
action gap has somewhat missed the point. Values do have much to do with how we act 
(together with emotions, see Section 3.3.3), but at any particular moment, there are several 
different values competing for our attention, and only some of those values are expressed in 
what we do. The society we live in also promotes and prioritizes certain values, and these are 
often those that ultimately end up influencing our actions. Maio maintains that individual value 
dispositions do have power to explain our actions when looking at a broad range of behaviour, 
whereas one single value has much less power to explain any specific action. The question 
therefore is less to do with trying to solve the value-action gap, and more to do with how to 
engage or prioritize certain values in daily practices, and in society at large.  
Box 3.1. On the value-action gap 
The value-action gap (concept from Blake, 1999) has been frequently claimed as the basis for 
individuals or even societies not making better choices. The often unbridgeable gap has become a 
defining discourse frame among many policymakers and some academics, and Maio (2011:1) 
believes that it is also a "potentially paralysing cultural truism" preventing human progress. In the 
last 15 years or so, it has turned policymakers from having to bring about more regulation into trying 
to make people cross the gap with persuasion (e.g. with nudging, choice architecture).  
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 Many of the literature references I have used do not separate between value priorities and dispositions. 
However, I have made this distinction in my writing. 
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However, there is a variety of approaches to this phenomenon arguing that, in fact, the value-action 
gap is the wrong focus as such, as explained below. 
As mentioned elsewhere in this section, Maio (2011) argues that the match between values (or 
attitudes) and action is fairly good when looking at a broad range of behaviour, rather than a 
particular concrete action. A practical example with liking fruit: Someone who likes fruit will generally 
eat lots of them, but predicting, based on that attitude, whether he/she will eat oranges on 
Thursdays is impossible. Too many other variables, some of which are conflicting values, come into 
play. Similarly, someone who values protecting nature very highly might still drive to work at least a 
part of any month, as it may be much more convenient than other options for achieving the 
particular objective of getting to work those days. The problem may also be about mentally 
translating specific values into very specific actions. People are not always motivated or able to do 
the translation. Additionally, particular values may not be salient enough in the context of a 
particular action, and people may not even recall their more permanent value dispositions at the 
right moment. Generally speaking, there are often several competing values, making the application 
of any particular value more challenging (see also Burford et al., 2015; Kollmuss & Agyeman, 2002). 
In addition, the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance and strategic ignorance can affect value 
priorities on their own, when a conflict between values is seemingly solved by ignoring the conflict. 
Social practice theories approach the value-action gap from a different angle, arguing that it is not a 
relevant concept, due to the dynamics of practices, and due to their focus on practices instead of 
individuals. Behaviour is not seen as an expression of individual values or attitudes, but the 
observable performance of a practice, the tip of the iceberg (Figure 3.2), whereby the body of the 
iceberg contains also worldviews and societal value priorities, among other things. Practice theories 
have until recently (but see e.g. Welch, 2017a for an exception) tended to not focus on values, due to 
much of recent practice theoretical literature in the area of sustainability being a reaction against the 
focus on individual behaviour change policies, and due to the relationship between these policies 
and attitudes (the abstract form of which are values). However, practice theories have, at the same 
time, maintained that societal worldviews and values are important for how practices thrive or 
change (see e.g. Shove et al., 2012). Viewing social practices through the pillar concept (Sahakian & 
Wilhite, 2014) similarly helps to appreciate why values are not enough to change practices without 
larger scale changes in more than one pillar, especially in the case of stronger individual or societal 
“habits”, including many unsustainable practices. Further, as discussed in this chapter elsewhere, 
social practice theories argue that action can affect values, rather than the other way around, and 
some empirical studies in social psychology point to this important mechanism as well. 
Yet another way to explain the value-action gap (also relating to the issue of competing values 
mentioned above) is to focus on value priorities and decision-making processes taking place in 
individuals. The concepts of the want- and should-selves (Bazerman et al., 1998), as well as ethical 
mirage (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010) help in this. In short, the should-self (similar to the ideal self, and 
holding certain value priorities) dominates both before and after an, often unconscious, decision to 
do something is made, but the want-self (often holding different value priorities) dominates during 
the actual decision. The concept of ethical mirage refers to how we view our action both beforehand 
and afterwards. Beforehand, we may think we will act with different value priorities (according to the 
should-self) than we actually do when the action moment comes (and the want-self decides). 
Similarly afterwards, it is the should-self that reflects back on the action, and therefore, we may think 
we have made a choice with different value priorities than we did in actuality. This separation of 
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want- and should-selves implies that there is a gap, but it is a gap between our different “value 
selves”, rather than between values and action. The value priorities of the want-self tend to be more 
impulsive, and involve more self-enhancing values, whereas the value priorities of the should-self are 
often more self-transcending, and determine what we consider the appropriate thing to do in a 
particular situation, also relating to social norms.214 The want-self tends to involve more emotions 
and the should-self more thoughtfulness.215 This distinction can also partly help explain related 
phenomena, such as why surveys can fail to capture actual behaviour. Further, the common concepts 
of citizen and consumer identities can be aligned with the should- and want-selves. 
Tenbrunsel and colleagues have some recommendations about how to better realign the want- and 
should-selves, so that the should-self values can have more influence on action. For example, they 
suggest that asking why the want-self is not aligned with the should-self can be beneficial, as 
becoming conscious of the issues (engaging in discursive consciousness) can help to realign the value 
priorities. Further, combining being more aware (of the value conflict and the should-self values) 
with the planning of action can be useful.  
Importantly for issues involving societal value conflicts, uncertainty and doubt let the want-self 
dominate more easily (Tenbrunsel et al., 2010). So, when there is uncertainty about facts (e.g. to do 
with climate change), the should-self may play a smaller role in decision making. While the approach 
of Tenbrunsel and colleagues does not take into account contextual constraints (or the main part of 
the practice iceberg), it does help explain some of the variety in the ways people engage in practices, 
as well as what the core dilemma may be in situations where there indeed is some choice. 
Combining these approaches then, I would argue that the distinction between individual value 
dispositions and priorities, and societal value priorities is important, with societal value priorities 
being more stable, yet also changeable. Further, reflecting on how values compete for attention 
could help align, not only the want- and should-selves of individuals, but also societal value priorities 
and more sustainable practices.216 The phenomenon of strategic ignorance of value conflicts is, 
however, a crucial further complication to be addressed in connection with climate change, or other 
complex issues where values are in stark conflict. 
                                                          
214
 Other research (e.g. Shiv & Fedorikhin, 1999; Zimmerman & Shimoga, 2014), have explained the want-self 
phenomenon so that when cognitive processing resources are limited (e.g. when we are tired), emotions get to 
have a bigger impact on our choices, and when our cognitive resources are not limited, the reflexive side gets a 
bigger share of the decision-making. However, research reviewed in Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) indicates that it is not 
simply a question of availability of cognitive resources, but indeed, the want-self can have bigger role in certain 
situations than in others. 
215
 However, it would likely be wrong to say that the want-self is all about emotions and the should-self is all about 
reason. Science still has not yet fully explained emotions as such, but they are heavily involved in many things we 
do, including decision making. There are cognitive theories of emotions, and emotion-based theories of cognition 
(e.g. Edwards, 1999). These two selves also map, roughly speaking, and with fewer moral undertones, to the 
concepts of fast and slow thinking of Kahneman (e.g. 2011). 
216
 Reflecting on values has indeed been found effective for affecting value dispositions (Lekes et al., 2012). 
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Figure 3.5 The structure of basic human values shared across cultures 
 
Source: Holmes et al. (2011), based on Schwartz value theory (Schwartz, 1992). The structure is based on data from over 80 countries and 65,000 people. 
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The division between self-transcending and self-enhancing values mentioned above is not 
only relevant socially for group functioning, but self-transcending values are also related to 
affinity to sustainability related issues (Crompton, 2016; Sanderson, 2014).217 Engaging with 
and prioritizing particular values, such as unity with nature, and a desire to protect the 
environment (both in Figure 3.5) can, in particular, help build public acceptance of ambitious 
change towards sustainability, and also create public demand for such change. A review of 
the literature on the association between self-transcending values and the environment is 
provided in Crompton (Crompton, 2010:84-86; see also Kasser, 2004, 2011; Crompton, 
2016). The centrality of self-enhancing, and especially materialistic values (focusing on 
image, status, wealth, possession) among those, on the other hand, tends to be associated 
with little concern for the environment (e.g. Hurst et al., 2013; Kasser et al., 2004), in 
addition to also decreasing individual and societal well-being, as Kasser et al. (2004:22) 
believe: “materialistic values not only heighten our vulnerability to serious social and 
environmental problems, but also undermine our ability to work cooperatively in finding 
solutions to these problems”.218, 219, 220 
Drawing further from social psychology literature, pro-environmental or pro-social actions as 
such are argued to reinforce our self-transcending values, therefore making it more likely 
that we involve in new similar actions. In fact, only thinking about values can make them 
stronger. Based on a study by Lekes et al. (2012), people reflecting on their particular self-
                                                          
217
 Some related literature uses terms such as we-centered values and ego-centered values for a similar, but not 
exactly the same grouping (see e.g. Power & Mont, 2013). 
218
 Kasser and colleagues demonstrate in their work that “when materialistic values become relatively central 
to a person’s system of values, personal well-being declines because the likelihood of having experiences that 
satisfy important psychological needs decreases” (Kasser et al., 2004: 13). Similarly, at societal or community 
level, a strong materialistic value orientation is associated with less civil, pro-social, or pro-environmental 
behaviour. 
219
 I am not making any moral claims about an absolute inferiority of certain values, such as self-enhancing 
values. However, from the point of view of sustainability in the current global context, a strong and exclusive 
focus on self-enhancing values is likely to be problematic. It seems an open question whether self-transcending 
and self-enhancing values can work in combination. In any case, in order for such combinations to work within 
the context of sustainability, self-transcending values need to have a more permanent priority. For example, 
protecting nature in order to obtain wealth from it (e.g. responsible forest management) can fit within the 
sustainability frame. However, unless protection of nature is prioritized (e.g. in laws), another more attractive 
way of obtaining wealth from the same piece of nature (e.g. turning it into a mine, grazing area for cows, or 
holiday lodges) may lead to the destruction of it. 
220
 It is of course important to remember that association is not causation. However, my thesis assumes that 
value dispositions at the individual level, and value priorities at the societal level, do have an impact on the 
range of social practices engaged in, and therefore, associations found in empirical studies are important. The 
literature (e.g. Kasser et al., 2004) also points to pathways whereby particular value systems have influence. 
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transcending values for a few weeks made them prioritize these over self-enhancing values, 
and also feel that their well-being had increased. So, it would appear from this that value 
dispositions can be changed consciously.  
Although drawing attention to self-enhancing values (e.g. in relation to saving money) may 
lead to pro-environmental behaviour, this is argued by some to only lead to short-term 
benefits (e.g. Bolderdijk & Steg, 2015; Power, 2011), not as likely to lead to positive 
spillovers to other pro-environmental or pro-social behaviours (Nash et al., 2017), and more 
likely to lead to the rebound effect221 than a focus on self-transcending values (e.g. Mont & 
Power, 2013).  
Significantly, in social psychology, drawing attention to self-enhancing values is also claimed 
to diminish the impact of self-transcending values, and vice versa, in a see-saw effect 
(Kasser, 2016; Maio et al., 2009). Further, engaging with certain values - regardless of which 
type - repeatedly seems to make them stronger, i.e. they are prioritized more often as a 
result (Sandel, 2012). This is particularly important in connection with the discussion in Box 
3.3 on the concept of dominant social paradigms. Values such as a focus on financial wealth, 
competition and power (self-enhancing values), are repeatedly engaged with in most current 
societies, and as culturally dominant values, they are also more readily incorporated in the 
more permanent value dispositions at the individual level (original claim for this connection 
from Rogers, 1964), while also impacting social practices engaged in.  
Further, communications framed with emphasis on self-transcending values seem to be 
effective in strengthening these values (i.e. increasing their priority) regardless of the more 
permanent value dispositions of people. Research also indicates that while drawing 
attention to self-enhancing values has the result of strengthening them, engaging with both 
self-enhancing and self-transcending values is not found to be helpful in this respect 
(Crompton, 2016). This could be because self-transcending values are generally focused on 
less within, for example, Western societies, and therefore, an equal emphasis between the 
two value groups in a certain narrow context, in the end, still keeps self-enhancing values 
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 Rebound effect refers to, for example, savings (more fuel efficient car) leading to more spending (driving 
more, buying a second car) whereby the total amount of (natural) resources spent is the same or more than to 
begin with. 
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more prioritized, due to the larger context where they are much more present, in discourses, 
for example. 
There are at least two important situations where may be beneficial to combine matters, 
however. The first has to do with combined motivations, motive alliances, between different 
issues. Underpinning values can connect issues such as poverty, inequality and climate 
change. The bleed-over effect helps strengthening values between different issues (Chilton 
et al., 2012; Kasser, 2016; Maio et al., 2009). Therefore, it makes sense to address issues 
together, rather than in isolation, at least when they are linked by similar values (Sanderson, 
2014). Further, action towards sustainability need not always involve altruistic motives; it 
can also, for example, be about responsibility towards one’s own health and wellbeing in 
addition to benefits to others. 
Secondly, and also importantly, social labelling222 may be able to extend across the divide 
between self-transcending and self-enhancing values, so that some of the potentially 
negative effects of self-enhancing values on pro-environmental or pro-social behaviour could 
be overcome. Engaging self-transcending values by labelling people as pro-environmental or 
pro-social - even though originally the behaviour was motivated by other reasons - can 
change their view of themselves, and with this, also change their more permanent value 
dispositions. The phenomenon of social labelling can make people justify their previous 
behaviour according to the new label (Cornelissen et al., 2007), also possibly leading to 
stronger positive spillover effects to other pro-environmental or pro-social behaviours 
(Lacasse, 2016). Social labelling can, therefore, lead to an environmentally or socially 
beneficial practice, originally associated with other values, but being associated with self-
transcending values later on. 
Additionally, this phenomenon of value change following behaviour change has also been 
observed in other empirical contexts. Hoff-Elimari et al. (2014) concluded from their study 
on European countries that pro-social government policies can drive public value prioritizing, 
making the public potentially more accepting of future harsh policy measures. Similarly, the 
study by Hargreaves (2011), applying practice theories on organisational behaviour, 
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 Social labelling is different from “ecolabelling”, a field that is about labelling products, and considered 
controversial by some in terms of its usefulness for change towards sustainability (see e.g. Gjerris et al., 2016). 
Social labelling is about labelling behaviour (not products), and it is argued to have power because of our social 
connection to other people. 
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indicates that value change need not always precede pro-environmental behaviour change. 
In his study, people specifically rejected environmental values as motivators, but 
nonetheless, were favourable to certain pro-environmental practices for their organization. 
As shown in several contexts above, changing behaviour can therefore change attitudes and 
value dispositions, so the arrow from values to behaviour is reversed, and doing affects 
thinking. Indeed, social practice theories (e.g. Warde, 2014) argue that doing can precede 
thinking, in other words, that value dispositions can change after certain related practices 
are already enacted. Shove (2010) also contends that both new attitudes (and values) and 
related new behaviours may be the results of changed practices and their performances. 
Social psychology and social practices theories, in fact, at least partially agree on this. 
To conclude the above, the discussion on the relationship between value change and 
behaviour change is by no means settled, and one should take a rather critical approach to 
the view that individual value change must precede individual behaviour change. Instead, 
the view - also aligned with social practice theories - that value dispositions can change 
during and after behaviour change, or after a change in practices, is worth considering more 
widely. As Berzonsky and Moser say when discussing the importance of values for 
transformation towards sustainability: 
Emphatically, we do not propose a sequential process, wherein values must 
change first before other changes in practice and policy can be initiated. One is 
always implicated in and intertwined with the other. Values change in some 
and then inspire others; behaviors change values and values change behaviors; 
those passionate to spread certain values use bully pulpits, policies and 
markets. Inner change is in these ways linked to outer change. Ignoring the 
psycho-cultural component [involving values] of the transformation, however, 
risks missing what may well be the most obstinate obstacle to the change so 
many call for as humanity enters the Anthropocene. 
Berzonsky and Moser (2017:21) 
As Berzonsky and Moser imply above, the precise modes of influence are less relevant than 
the overall focus on values. It can be argued that, when taking a wider view of literatures, 
there may be more pathways to achieving a transformation of values that are important for 
solving the ecological crisis and transforming societies towards sustainability. However, 
more relevant that concentrating on day-to-day value priorities might be to concentrate on 
the more permanent value dispositions people hold. These then are likely to be greatly 
affected by societal value priorities, and therefore, changing societal discourses as well as 
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“norms, standards and institutions” (Warde, 2014:295), up to the level of social paradigms 
or master frames (see Box 3.3) is increasingly believed to be necessary (see e.g. O’Brien, 
2018).223 As Berzonsky and Moser (2017:15) put it, many calls are made for “society to move 
away from values that drive environmentally unsustainable and economically and socially 
unjust trends to a new set of values supporting the emergence of true ecological, economic, 
and social sustainability”.  
I would also add that at the societal level, consistency in values is a key issue, in terms of 
policies and discourses. One reason (among many) why behaviour change policies often do 
not produce long-term results may be that the promoted actions (and the related values), at 
the level of individuals, tend to be misaligned with the values that the same policymakers – 
and societies at large - embrace and promote otherwise (see e.g. Crompton, 2016).  
Schwartz has worked on societal level values in his cultural value theory (see e.g. Schwartz, 
2006b).224, 225 In this theory (see Figure 3.6), the self-transcending and self-enhancing value 
groups correspond to egalitarianism and harmony, on the one hand, and mastery and 
hierarchy, on the other. Cultures that prioritize egalitarianism prioritize values such as 
equality, social justice, responsibility, helpfulness, and honesty; and cultures that prioritize 
harmony, consider values such as world at peace, unity with nature, and protecting the 
environment important.226,227 Comparing these cultural, or societal level values to the 
individual level values (as shown in Figure 3.5), the similarities are obvious. The structure of 
the circle in Figure 3.6 is also built the same way as the structure of the map in Figure 3.5 
(often also presented as a circle), in other words, distance matters for the co-incidence of 
values. One distinction between the two models is worth mentioning, however. At the 
individual level, benevolence values include dependability (called “responsible” in Figure 
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 In the language of social practice theories, these would involve the practices-as-entities, the larger part of 
the iceberg in Figure 3.2. 
224
 Hsu (2013:150) offers a comparison of different cultural value theories (of Hofstede, Inglehart, Schwartz and 
Steenkamp) and concludes that, at least in the consumption behaviour context examined in the study, in 
general, the Schwartz cultural theory is “more theoretically and empirically useful” than the other three. 
225
 Schwartz (2006:138) defines a culture as “the rich complex of meanings, beliefs, practices, symbols, norms, 
and values prevalent among people in a society”. Further, he notes that “in addition to a dominant culture, 
subgroups within societies espouse conflicting value emphases” (idem:139). 
226
 On the other side, cultures prioritizing mastery, consider values such as ambition, success and competence 
important, and cultures prioritizing hierarchy prioritize values such as social power, authority and wealth 
(Schwartz, 2006). 
227
 An example from the grouping of cultures according to the Schwartz cultural value theory (Schwartz, 2006): 
there are clear differences between the English-speaking countries and Western Europe as regards harmony – 
it is high in Western Europe, but lower than average in English-speaking countries, especially the United States. 
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3.5). This refers to one’s immediate social group, and not to wider society. However, at the 
cultural/societal level, the same value shows up as responsibility, and in particular, as 
collective responsibility within the egalitarianism value group (see Schwartz, 2006b). Also the 
hierarchy value group includes responsibility, but there it is in the form of conformity. 
Figure 3.6. Cultural value dimensions 
 
Source: Schwartz (2006b). 
In the rest of this thesis, I will generally refer to values either facilitating or hindering 
sustainability. By these terms, I refer to the individual, but especially the societal (cultural) 
level, and to the value groups discussed above. The values facilitating sustainability include 
values such as unity with nature, protecting the environment, and collective responsibility 
(co-responsibility), but also social justice and equality. 
Values and social practices 
While human actors have individual value priorities and dispositions, values themselves 
reside more within social practices (Welch, 2017a), and these often reflect (more stable, yet 
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changeable) societal value priorities, rather than necessarily individual priorities. Practices 
can in fact be seen to have a range of potential values. When performing practices in a 
certain way in a certain context, human actors (usually unconsciously) match their own value 
priorities with at least some of the values residing in practices. For example, the practice of 
showering in a Western everyday context holds certain values. In fact, comfort, cleanliness 
and convenience (from the title of Shove, 2003) are certainly among those. All performances 
of showering are likely to prioritize cleanliness, but some performances by the same person 
might prioritize convenience (short and efficient shower) over comfort (long and enjoyable 
shower). What is important from the point of view of (un)sustainability, however, is that all 
of those values belong to everyday showering as a practice (and can lead to excessive 
resource use).  
On a daily level, value priorities (and emotions, see more in Section 3.3.3) are significant 
determinants on the ways we do things, and perform practices. This also holds within the 
same practice, at least when it is not a very strong habit (see Box 3.2). 
Box 3.2. Social practices as habits 
Sahakian and Wilhite (2014:28) contend that “all habits are practices, but not all practices demand 
habitual reproduction”. The habitual nature of practices can therefore be either weak or strong. With 
weaker habits, there is more variation in the performance of practices, we make more choices, using 
some discursive consciousness and fewer automated strategies than with strong habits. In general, 
many practices - at least those practices that are not entirely dependent of other people, and where 
there is at least some choice - actually boil down to processes similar to the food choice processes 
discussed below in the chapter text. Many of the choices are automated, as they are part of habits 
and routines, but there is variation, especially with weaker habits, and in these situations we make 
more conscious choices. We may consciously choose a longer shower over a shorter one, or oatmeal 
over bacon, even though we are unaware of the majority of actual choices made,228  as we employ 
various strategies to help us through our daily lives. In such weaker habits, value dispositions are 
argued to have more influence on what we do (see e.g. Dahlstrand & Biel, 1997; Matthies et al., 
2002). 
Sayer (2013) sees practices existing on a continuum, where at one end are the most habitual 
practices (i.e. strong habits), and at the other end, practices to which a certain amount of 
deliberation and variation is typical (weaker habits). 
Stronger unsustainable habits are a particular problem from the point of view of sustainability (e.g. 
Sahakian & Wilhite, 2014; Verplanken & Roy, 2015). Stronger habits are performed with much less 
variation and much less discursive consciousness. Only bigger changes (such as life changes involving 
new employment, marriage, birth of children, moving house, retirement) are often believed to 
disrupt the stronger habits enough on their own. Sahakian and Wilhite (2014) would see stronger 
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 For example, regarding food-related decisions, we tend to be aware of only a very small proportion of them 
(see Wansink & Sobal, 2007). 
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habits potentially shifting when one of the three pillars of practices - the body, the social world and 
the material world - goes through change, but dissolving only when larger changes take place in 
more than one pillar.  
Stronger practice theories would be likely to maintain that consciously trying to change, especially a 
strong habit, would be the wrong approach, and focusing on the structure of the practice, and what 
changeable societal elements support that structure, would bring more results. 
While social practice theorists tend to downplay the importance of individual values (being 
principally against the ABC model), societal values are nonetheless critically important for 
social practices, as argued above. What is also noteworthy is that until recently, practice-
theoretical research has mostly analysed individual performances of practices, instead of 
focusing more on “the norms, standards and institutions which produce shared 
understandings and common procedures” (Warde, 2014:295), while at the same time 
arguing for the importance of worldviews and discourses (as e.g. in Shove et al., 2012). 
Societal value priorities reflect worldviews, and are reflected in discourses, while also 
impacting on the value dispositions of individuals, societal structures, and practices as 
entities and as performances. 
Going back to the elements of practices (see Figure 3.3), values “inform the cognitive and 
affective dispositions through which individuals respond to their environment [… and] values 
illustrate how general understandings may combine the tacit and the discursive” (Welch & 
Warde, 2017:6). Values therefore link to general understandings, as well as to practical 
(tacit) and discursive consciousness, and to emotions (see Section 3.4). 
* Meat eating related practices and values 
In the case of choosing which food to eat, or whether to eat meat or not, values turn into 
food choice values (see Sobal et al., 2006). Food choice values are about what makes us want 
to eat or not eat certain foods. If something tastes very nice, we are likely to want to eat it, 
so taste is a food choice value. Similarly, price, convenience, variation and healthiness are 
food choice values. Many people prioritize price, even if they could afford something more 
expensive.229 However, in other cases, people do not value taste, price or convenience more 
than quality, safety, ethics, or how a particular food fits with the social eating situation 
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 In such a situation, price is considered more in a symbolic way, and in this situation, we may buy either 
cheap or expensive items, depending on the situation. When price is only about true ability or inability to buy 
something, it is not a similar kind of value. 
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(related to the basic value conformity). So, in those cases the relevant food choice values 
may make a person choose not to eat a particular food, meat, for example, no matter how 
tasty it is. Or vice versa, a person who would normally prioritize animal welfare (and not eat 
meat) eats meat in occasions where avoiding social conflict is considered more important. In 
many cases indeed, food choice values are in conflict, in which case it depends on the 
situation (and whether the want- or the should-self is dominating, see Box 3.1), which values 
win. However, in many cases, certain situations repeat. For example, every weekday 
morning a person may be faced with the same situation between healthier, but perhaps less 
tasty, and potentially tastier, but arguably less healthy foods (e.g. oatmeal or bacon). In such 
situations, people tend to develop strategies for themselves, so that they do not have to 
consciously deliberate about the choices every time. These strategies230 make the choices 
automatic and routinized, and when using such strategies, only a more or less new situation 
makes people rethink their food choices and food choice values.  
At societal level, the issues discussed in Chapter 2 relating to different factors potentially 
increasing or decreasing meat eating are in fact also ultimately about food choice values. For 
example, urbanization tends to make people prioritize convenience, and therefore pre-
packaged convenient cuts of meat.  
At the individual level, more permanently prioritizing universalism values may be directly 
related to reduced meat eating (de Boer et al., 2007). Eating organic meat may not 
necessarily have an impact on reducing meat consumption, but it can emphasize the related 
food values, such as sustainability, fairness and animal welfare (de Bakker & Dagevos, 2012). 
The new meats (cell-based or plant-based meats and insects) could have a similar effect. 
On motive alliances regarding meat eating, if expressed motivation to not eat meat depends 
on the context (see Wilson et al., 2004), then trying to motivate people with multiple 
motivations (environmental, human health, animal welfare) could make it more difficult for 
people to continue ignoring or denying the issues related to eating animals; and vice versa, it 
could make it easier for people to be motivated to change their own meat eating related 
practices and support wider changes. Indeed, Hartmann and Siegrist (2017) conclude from 
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 Such strategies include only focusing on one value every time, or using heuristics where certain foods are 
always excluded from the choices, or conversely, are always added as an extra item. See Sobal et al. (2006) for 
more examples. 
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their systematic review of 38 different research articles that it seems that focusing on 
several reasons to eat less meat can produce better results than focusing only on the 
environment. 
As regards social labelling, calling occasional meat eating flexitarianism - rather than not 
calling it anything in particular, or calling it “failed vegetarianism” - can help people view 
themselves more positively, and continue to engage in this behaviour, as long as 
“flexitarianism” is seen as a positive label. The effects can also spill over to other practices. 
It may also be that social norms (and therefore societal value priorities) change due to 
societal discourse. In the United Kingdom, for example, it seems that an increasing number 
of people feel that they should eat less or no meat (irrespective of whether they do). This is 
evident in survey answers which report increasing numbers of vegetarians, flexitarians and 
vegans.231, 232 And significantly, there are currently no real government policy actions 
supporting such changes. 
3.3.3. Linking values and emotions 
In this section, I will focus on the links between values, emotions and social practices. I will 
cover emotions in this particular setting, rather than in a broader context.233 Suffice it to say 
that emotions are another critical area where, despite recent advances, for example, in 
measuring emotions in brain activity, there is still much to discover on their role and 
functioning. On the connection between emotions and thought, Ignatov (2007) claims - 
along the lines of theories of embodied knowledge - that people are first and foremost 
feeling and only sometimes also reflexively thinking.234 Emotions have been defined as 
embodied thoughts (Rosaldo, 1984), among many other things, but generally they are 
defined as including a bodily component and a thought component, and psychology sees 
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 At least until now, meat consumption statistics do not show a significant enough decrease that would be in 
line with such survey results. 
232
 See e.g. Third of Britons have stopped or reduced eating meat - report in the online Guardian on 1 
November 2018. 
233
 Some specifically prefer to use the term “emotion” (e.g. Scheer, 2012) in connection with social practices, 
while others prefer to use “affect” (e.g. Reckwitz, 2017). There are somewhat conflicting definitions of affect, 
but e.g. Stangor (2010) sees that there are two components of affect: emotion and motivation, while 
Chatterton (2016) defines affect as the experiencing of emotion. I prefer to use the term “emotion”, instead of 
“affect”. 
234
 This can in fact fit well with stronger social practice theories. 
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them mostly as directing attention and guiding action (e.g. Stangor, 2010). They can, 
therefore, be seen to also have an important role in performances of practices. 
Weenink and Spaargaren (2016) argue that emotions link to not only general understandings 
(in the form of emotionally charged general understandings), but also to competencies and 
material elements.235 Further, emotions literally move people into action, including thought; 
they are what we care about, and human agency resides in emotions. Bodily action systems 
and emotion processing systems in the brain are closely connected, and emotional reactions 
are always bodily reactions, however, differing in intensity, duration and awareness. Our 
“relentless emotional processing […] directs our acting, thinking and feeling”, to the extent 
that humans can “only ‘be’ through the emotional experience of practices” (idem:71). 
However, we are mostly unaware of our emotions.  
To Weenink and Spaargaren (2016), practices in fact produce emotional energy, and the 
more emotional energy a particular emotionally charged practice produces, the more likely 
we are to want to engage in it, and vice versa. Humans, on the other hand, have emotional 
agency, and Weenink and Spaargaren see that collective emotional agency can help change 
practices. These two concepts can be seen to link so that the emotional energy - a form of 
agentive power – produced by practices turns into emotional agency in people. Change can 
originate in high intensity emotions that generate new ideas, and through changing general 
understandings shared by different practices.  
* Meat eating related practices and emotional energy 
Meat eating practices have traditionally produced a lot of emotional energy (for most 
people), and following Weenink and Spaargaren (2016), this has made people more likely to 
want to continue engaging in them, regardless of the downsides. Further, strategic 
ignorance of emotion conflicts related to meat eating is likely to prevent any sense of 
emotional agency for changing these practices. On the other hand, movements such as the 
vegan movement could be seen as having a significant amount of the collective emotional 
agency for change that Weenink and Spaargaren discuss. 
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 Figure 3.3 provides for connections between emotions and other elements of practices, also via the fourth 
element of body. 
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Some concrete ways that values and emotions link 
Similarly as with values, practice theories have tended to side-line emotions. Reckwitz (2017) 
believes this to be related to social theory long relegating emotions to psychology, and to 
the overall preference of reason over emotion in modernity. I would add that, in practice 
theories, emotions may have been seen even more to do with individuals than values, and 
therefore, not the main focus. However, in the last few years, more practice theory 
literature has paid attention to emotions. Welch (2017a), for example, calls for better 
incorporation of emotions to practice theories. Like values, emotions are inherent to 
practices (Reckwitz, 2017; Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016; Welch, 2017a).236  
Values and emotions are often intimately connected to both each other and to our goals. 
We may express our prioritized values in our action seemingly for the sake of those values 
(values as motivators), but we may also have other, perhaps more basic goals, and the 
values are expressed in the process of reaching those other goals. Such more basic goals are 
often related to emotions (emotions as motivators). As etymology of the two words would 
suggest, motivation has a strong link to emotion (Welch, 2017a). Further, “motivation 
without a process of being [emotionally] affected by something is not thinkable” (Reckwitz, 
2017:120). Sayer (2013:171) argues that values “merge into emotional dispositions” to 
inform our valuations of various things, including people, ideas, behaviours and practices. 
Schwartz also notes that the basic human values (see Figure 3.5) in particular link to 
emotions, as “when values are activated, they become infused with feeling” (Schwartz, 
2006a:3).237 
In many cases, when making a usually unconscious choice for practice A rather than practice 
B, we prioritize certain values, and often also (unconsciously) want certain emotions (in a 
way then, we also have emotion priorities). Once performing the practice, we experience 
these emotions as bodily sensations, whether conscious or mindful about them or not. 
Emotions are therefore obviously also part of us, in both the wanting and the experiencing 
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 Weenink and Spaargaren (2016) talk about practices having “emotional mood”, and Reckwitz (2017) refers 
to practices having “affects”.  
237
 For example, even when we attempt to tell the truth in a certain situation for the sake of being honest (i.e. 
honesty as a prioritized value), we may, in fact, aim for our action to be in line with our prioritized value mainly 
for the sake of feeling content with ourselves and our behaviour, or of not feeling guilty. If we, on the other 
hand, do not feel guilty about lying, we may be less likely to aim for honesty. 
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of them. Many practices may be performed because they have to be. For example, we have 
to eat. However, value priorities and emotional wants have a role also there, in how we 
perform the practices we have to perform. Emotional wants can be linked to the emotional 
energy that Weenink and Spaargaren (2016) see in practices. We want the emotional energy 
of certain practices. 
* Meat eating related practices and moral emotions 
There are also concepts that blend in both values and emotions. Moral emotions are linked 
to moral values (in some way referring to right and wrong). Moral values tend to be on the 
right-hand side of Figure 3.5. Moral emotions include anger, contempt, disgust, guilt, shame 
and embarrassment, but also positive emotions such as elevation, gratitude and pride (Rozin 
et al., 1997; Tangney et al., 2007). On the negative side of moral emotions, especially guilt 
and moral disgust are linked to eating animals, as well as to the alternatives to meat, such as 
cell-based meat.  
There are several ways that guilt relates to eating animals. The phenomenon of strategic 
ignorance (see later in this section) often rises as a result of guilty feelings about eating 
animals. Further, Stanescu (2016) argues that eating meat from organically farmed animals, 
may, in fact, be more to do with assuaging guilt, and less to do with prioritizing self-
transcending values to do with nature (i.e. animal welfare in this case). Moreover, people 
who are not full vegetarians, but occasionally eat meat, seem to feel/express more guilt 
about their food practices than those eating meat on a daily basis (Verain et al., 2015). This is 
possibly so because such people are more consciously aware (engaging in discursive 
consciousness) of their eating practices and the consequences of those than regular meat 
eaters are. The occasionally meat eating vegetarians are also likely not engaging in as much 
strategic ignorance in relation to meat, and therefore feelings of guilt are more acute.238 
Finally, the presence of vegetarians often causes guilt, and other negative emotions, such as 
anger and resentment, in regular meat eaters, as it reminds them of their morally 
problematic behaviour of eating animals (Adams, 2001; Rothgerber, 2014).  
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 Such people might feel less guilt, however, if they saw themselves as flexitarians, rather than failed 
vegetarians. 
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Guilt has also been linked to pro-environmental action as such, in the way that this negative 
moral emotion could possibly be used as a motivating tool for persuading people to change 
their behaviour towards sustainability (see Rees et al., 2015). 
One could theorize that being in the presence of people who eat such new meats might 
cause even more guilt (and anger) in those eating conventional meat. This would be so as 
there would now be even less reason for the meat eaters to not join those who eat the 
meat-like alternatives than before, when the options were either eating a completely 
vegetarian or vegan diet or eating animal-based meat on a regular basis. It was easier then 
to justify not choosing a full vegetarian or vegan diet. 
Moral disgust is linked, among other things, to eating animals being wrong, expressed by 
some vegetarians and vegans (e.g. Loughnan et al., 2014). It has likely its roots in another 
more basic form of disgust which has probably originally functioned as a survival tool, 
warning humans of dangerous items (see e.g. Rozin & Haidt, 2013). Moral disgust can also be 
felt towards new meats such as insects (see e.g. Tan et al., 2015)239 and cell-based meat (see 
e.g. Verbeke et al., 2015). However, exposure, curiosity and knowledge, and changing 
meanings of normality may lessen feelings of moral disgust (see also van der Weele & 
Driessen, 2013). 
Lastly, the concept of moralization is relevant in connection with meat. Moralization is a 
process which converts preferences into values, and in which a previously value neutral issue 
can become morally disgusting (Rozin et al., 1997). Rozin and colleagues use cigarette 
smoking in the United States as an example of this process. Applied to the case of intensive 
animal agriculture, a process of moralization could, with time, turn this way of meat 
production immoral, and disgusting. At the same time, the alternatives to industrial meat 
production, such as cell-based meat, could become the morally acceptable choices, and 
disgust could therefore be redirected from cell-based meat to conventional animal-based 
meat (Driessen & Korthals, 2012).240 
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 In some cases at least, disgust related to insects may be more basic disgust than moral disgust. 
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 However, some argue (see e.g. Ferrari, 2016 or Miller, 2012) that cell-based meat would support the 
immorality of eating animals, rather than offer a moral alternative. 
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Further conflicts between values and emotions  
This subsection will focus more heavily on meat eating related practices - rather than have 
them as specific examples, as is mostly the case in this chapter - since meat eating illustrates 
extremely well issues to do with value and emotion conflicts, and the resulting tension and 
cognitive dissonance, and ambivalence regarding how to resolve the conflicts, as well as 
strategic ignorance and other coping mechanisms, as ways to deal with the conflicts. 
Further, I will discuss the related challenges to do with changing practices. For example, 
strategic ignorance often leads people to ignore the problem of meat, rather than just their 
internal conflicts. Other coping mechanisms can further close practices from changing, and 
also lead to unhelpful conflicts between people, for example, between meat eaters and 
vegetarians or vegans. When examining meat eating as a “moral practice”, it is possible to 
shed light on how emotions, cognitions, values, beliefs and identities intimately combine 
(Loughnan et al., 2014). Other topics in this context, similar to meat, include climate change 
and (un)sustainable practices more generally. 
Ambivalence and strategic ignorance 
Ambivalence is another concept bringing values and emotions together, however, as a result 
of a conflict. Maio (2017) defines ambivalence to rise in situations when we feel conflicted 
about an issue; we feel both positively and negatively about something. He also notes that 
ambivalence is evoked towards issues which put values into conflict.241 In everyday contexts, 
ambivalence is often seen either as a conflict between values, or as a conflict between 
emotions. But as emotions and values are closely connected, it’s more a question what kind 
of a frame is used, i.e. a value frame or an emotion frame. To give an example from online 
Merriam-Webster English dictionary (for the term “ambivalence”): “I'm ambivalent about 
going to the show. On the one hand, it would be fun. On the other hand, I really should stay 
home and get some work done”. Merriam-Webster refers to this as a conflict between 
feelings, but in fact it is also about values (and about want- and should-selves): valuing a 
positive social experience, a pleasant evening (perhaps related to hedonism or benevolence 
values, see Figure 3.5) more than the feeling of accomplishment from work completed 
(perhaps related to self-discipline, a conformity value; or ambition, an achievement value) at 
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 Maio (2017) argues that ambivalence can, however, also rise when two values pull to the same direction, if 
they are in principle far from each other (e.g. in terms of the value map). 
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that particular time, will make a person select the first option. Vice versa, valuing the work 
accomplishment more on that particular day will make the person select the second option.  
We are often aware - at some level - of a feeling of ambivalence, but not necessarily of the 
reasons for it, especially not regarding the value conflict. Ambivalence does not need to (and 
often does not) lead to any action that would correct the value conflict; the conflict can stay, 
and we may eventually suppress the related conflicting emotions and the feeling of 
ambivalence itself, and it changes into strategic ignorance. But the more aware of it we 
become, the more likely we are to do something about it, in terms of more consciously 
choosing action in line with one value over another. Figure 3.7 illustrates a simplified process 
that often arises from conflicting values. 
Figure 3.7. Sketching a process of value and emotion conflict 
 
Source: Figure by author. 
To go over the process in Figure 3.7,242 the two values that are in conflict may both be 
prioritized by us, but one of them is more likely to be linked to our ideal selves, our more 
permanent value preferences (the should-self), and the other one is more likely to be linked 
to our (perhaps more immediate) wants and needs (the want-self). For example, “I know I 
should not eat meat, but I want it anyway”, or “my partner wants us to eat meat” are 
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examples of this. The value conflict may also arise from differences between individual and 
societal value priorities (e.g. Sanderson, 2014). The cognitive dissonance (psychologically 
uncomfortable conflict) and more general ambivalence that result especially from longer 
term inconsistent behaviour, are addressed by either changing behaviour (Action 1), so that 
there is no conflict, or by ignoring the conflict to the extent that it can be coped with in 
connection with the behaviour that may have been originally more desirable (Action 2). A 
further, although perhaps less common option (included in Figure 3.7) is that one remains 
consciously ambivalent, but still chooses one of the actions. In this situation, consciousness 
about the conflict situation regarding choices made might stay. Both of the situations where 
either ambivalence or strategic ignorance are present in the “end state” in Figure 3.7 have 
some emotional costs, and therefore the action that resolves the conflict (Action 1 in Figure 
3.7) results in more experienced emotional energy than the other two options. 
Eating animals is an excellent example of value conflicts. Loughnan et al. (2010) coined the 
term meat paradox to describe our love for meat (dead animals) and our love for (live) 
animals as pets, for example. 
According to the theory of cognitive dissonance (concept originally from Festinger, 1957; see 
also e.g. Onwezen and van der Weele, 2016), people attempt to solve conflicts between 
value priorities in relation to action, by changing the actions, changing the value priorities, or 
changing thoughts or beliefs related to the action. In a way, the last option relates to 
changing accepted “knowledge”. In connection with meat, this could involve believing, for 
example, that animals are not worthy of moral concern (e.g. Bratanova et al., 2011), often 
regardless of whether the person would overall prioritize moral concerns. Or, it can relate to 
justifying meat eating by arguing that it is necessary. It may sometimes be easier to change 
what you think than what you do, and so, in this context, addressing cognitive dissonance by 
changing otherwise desired behaviours tends to be more difficult than the other ways to 
address the dissonance (e.g. Nash et al., 2017), so Action 2 in Figure 3.7 is often more likely 
than Action 1.243 Both resulting actions - behaviours or practice performances - have 
emotional energy, as all practices do (Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016), but this energy may be 
experienced differently in different situations. Critically, strategic ignorance itself costs 
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 Even when changing behaviour (e.g. stopping eating meat), strategic ignorance, together with confirmation 
bias may continue in other forms. For example, vegetarians may deny ever liking the taste of meat, or believe 
that no amount of meat is healthy to eat (van der Weele, 2013). 
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emotional energy which makes Action 2 more resource intensive than Action 1 (van der 
Weele, 2013). Additionally, strategic ignorance of the original emotion conflict is likely to 
prevent a sense of emotional agency. 
The simplest form of strategic ignorance is avoiding thinking about the related issues in the 
first place. In connection with eating animals, avoiding thinking about anything to do with 
meat production is such strategic ignorance (see e.g. Rothgerber, 2014). This is likely to also 
relate to avoiding information about any negative consequences from eating animals (see 
the next subsection). Many coping strategies can be regarded as forms of strategic ignorance 
(van der Weele, 2013). Regarding eating animals, a variety of strategies have been identified 
over the last years (discussed e.g. in Loughnan et al., 2014; Rothgerber, 2014; van der 
Weele, 2013).244 They mainly fall into the three basic approaches described above. First, 
radically reducing (in the form of strong flexitarianism) or stopping eating animals altogether 
(vegetarianism or veganism) is the approach in line with Action 1 in Figure 3.7. Second, in 
addition to what was mentioned above, changing value priorities can be realized by rejecting 
certain moral behaviour (such as not harming animals) on the basis that it cannot be 
absolute, or consistent. For example, there is no way to eat so that no living creature would 
ever be harmed; therefore, eating animals on a regular basis is alright. Paying attention to 
any real or imagined inconsistencies among vegetarians or vegans, or, devaluing them to the 
extent that their behaviour is supposedly less moral than our own behaviour (e.g. by calling 
them hypocrites or fanatics), are part of the same strategy.245 Moreover, giving a lower 
moral status to certain animals (meat animals) as compared to others (e.g. pets) is also 
related to values. Third, changing thoughts and beliefs (or accepted knowledge) is often 
related to dissociation of the food product from the animal it originates from, including 
calling them by different names (e.g. beef vs. cow). Further, denying that meat animals 
(including fish) experience pain, or that they can have feelings such as fear, or have similar 
intelligence to pets, for example, is about changing beliefs.  
Beliefs about our own behaviour can also function as coping strategies. For example, eating 
“humane” meat (often not produced essentially differently from other meat, see Stǎnescu, 
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 In a way, this research was started by Rozin (1996) when he appealed for psychologists to “take meat eating 
seriously” (Loughnan et al., 2014: 107). 
245
 Minson and Monin (2012) call the putting down of vegetarians and vegans by meat eaters do-gooder 
derogation. 
 
 
141 
 
2016) may only be about perceived behaviour change. Similarly, believing in, and proclaiming 
our intentions to reduce meat eating in the future, or belittling the extent of the amounts of 
meat we have eaten in the past (also related to ethical mirage, and therefore values) can 
operate as coping strategies. Additionally, some negative emotions could function as further 
coping strategies. Feeling disgust towards insects or cell-based meat may work as a 
justification to continue with our current meatways, as the new ways are not conceivable. 
Similarly, environmental melancholia (Lertzman, 2015) is related to feeling disempowered 
(and unable to act) regarding overwhelming issues, such as the miserable lives of meat 
animals, environmental destruction, or climate change. 
Rationalizations or justifications of behaviour can also function as coping strategies, whereby 
the value conflict is ignored, as the behaviour or practice performance is too central to not 
pursue. In connection with eating animals, Joy (2010) identified three such justifications, to 
which Piazza et al. (2015) added a fourth. Together these are the four Ns: meat being 
Normal, Natural, Necessary and Nice.246 These justifications are very common, and also used 
alongside other coping strategies (Piazza et al., 2015). Interestingly, men tend to use more 
direct justifications, such as the four Ns, and claim to not generally mind as much to think 
about animals dying for their food – correlating with how masculine men perceive 
themselves - whereas women tend to prefer more indirect justifications, such as dissociation 
and avoidance (Rothgerber, 2013). 
At times, the cognitive dissonance can resurface. A rather common and interesting context 
this happens in is when meat eaters and vegetarians and vegans confront each other. In such 
situations, vegetarians activate the meat eaters’ inner conflict surrounding meat 
consumption, causing guilt, anger, and other negative emotions, and thereby reinforcing the 
coping strategies in meat eaters. Rothgerber’s empirical study (2014) supports these 
arguments originally made by Adams (2001).  
Even though strategic ignorance and the related coping strategies help keep a practice more 
solid, or closed to changes, things are not set in stone, and the process in Figure 3.7 can 
indeed start all over again when something changes. In addition to confrontations between 
crucially different practices (meat eaters vs. vegetarians), new information, or a particular 
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life event, can also sometimes challenge a particular coping strategy, and return the process 
to addressing the conflicting values and emotions again (e.g. de Boer et al., 2016). In 
connection with meat eating, the new meats may also have this impact. Further, linking 
several issues together, for example related to eating less meat being good for animal 
welfare, one’s own health, and the health of the planet (see e.g. de Boer et al., 2013) can 
make persisting with strategic ignorance more difficult, as values and emotions can link 
together in new ways in such motive alliances. It may be important, however, that whatever 
is “new” is not forced upon anyone in large quantities, but can be taken in little by little, to 
avoid strengthening the coping strategies further. Doubt about our own practices can in 
some circumstances also make resistance stronger (e.g. Zaraska, 2016a). 
The concepts of cognitive dissonance and ambivalence are not often addressed in the same 
literature. Meat eating is, however, one such instance where somewhat more attention has 
been paid to ambivalence. Together with strategic ignorance, ambivalence is believed to be 
particularly wide-spread in connection with eating animals, and possibly increasing in society 
in general (van der Weele, 2013; van Harreveld et al., 2009), and further, true ignorance 
about the impacts from eating animals is likely to be rarer than it appears (see also Holm & 
Mohl, 2000).247  
Confronting the meat paradox, by acknowledging and embracing the ambivalence may help 
us to be conscious about, and potentially change, our eating practices (Zaraska, 2016b). It 
may also decrease polarization, often present in connection with controversial issues, and 
increase our willingness to look for solutions. Van der Weele (2013) argues that cell-based 
meat (together with other new meats) can help in this process by making us acknowledge 
our ambivalence about meat, question current practices, and bring meat eaters and 
vegetarians closer to each other. It can also give energy to look for new solutions. 
Flexitarianism as a recognised practice can work in the same way. 
Finally and importantly, not everyone experiences cognitive dissonance about eating animals 
(Monteiro et al., 2017; Onwezen & van der Weele, 2016). Those people that do not, tend to 
be indifferent to the conflicts other people have in this context, as their own prioritized 
values are not in conflict. Sometimes the 4N justifications may, in fact, have little to do with 
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strategic ignorance regarding eating animals, and more to do with a need to justify socially 
something that other people disapprove of (Piazza et al., 2015). In the first study of strategic 
ignorance in a real-life context Onwezen and van der Weele (2016) emphasize that to 
support changes in practices, it is important to try to tell apart those being truly indifferent 
from those strategically ignoring the issues. One way they suggest to do this is to focus on 
the feeling of responsibility which they argue is present in the strategically ignorant. 
Strategic ignorance of knowledge 
Strategic ignorance is actually multifaceted in the sense that it is, first and foremost, 
ignorance of the value and emotion conflicts, or difficult emotions as such, and as a 
consequence, it translates into ignorance of information and knowledge, as a coping 
strategy. Strategic ignorance therefore combines all three aspects of values, emotions and 
knowledge linked to general understandings as an element of social practices (Figure 3.3).  
Strategic ignorance is usually related to very ordinary daily situations, not only more 
extreme ones, such as ignorance of atrocities or disasters (van der Weele, 2013). 
Nonetheless, it is by no means a minor phenomenon. All the ways to deal with cognitive 
dissonance “deny, obscure or deform threatening forms of knowledge in more or less 
automatic and subconscious ways [… strategic ignorance is] a paradoxical phenomenon, for 
in order not to want to know, one has to know enough to know that knowing more would be 
undesirable or dangerous” (van der Weele, 2013:292; see also Bankier, 1996). 
Another name for strategic ignorance is wilful ignorance, and from this term, it becomes 
obvious that “will” or “want” is a relevant component of this form of ignorance, as it is really 
about wanting (or not wanting) something (Wieland, 2017). For example, a meat eater does 
not want to consider the negative effects of his/her meat eating, because he/she wants to 
go on eating meat. Considering all the negative impacts would question the practice, and 
endanger it. In a way, this could be seen as a kind of a permanent want-self situation, 
whereby the should-self never gets a say. Wieland also emphasizes the strength of 
wilful/strategic ignorance by arguing that “the claim that it is implausible that people could 
[stay] wilfully ignorant for so long underestimates the force of wilful ignorance” (idem:118). 
Wieland argues that wilful/strategic ignorance is motivated by backward-looking and 
forward-looking self-interest, which again can be seen relating to a more permanent reign of 
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the want-self values while the should-self values (and the resulting emotional conflict) get 
strategically ignored:  
We do not want to consider whether our practices are wrong, first because we 
have engaged in them for too long, and realizing this will seriously affect the 
image we have of ourselves. Second, we do not want to consider it, because 
it’s in our interests if we stay ignorant: slaveholders want to keep their cheap 
workers, and consumers want to keep on buying cheap clothes. 
Wieland (2017:118) 
As I argued in Chapter 2, the low awareness of issues to do with meat is very likely linked to 
strategic ignorance and denial of the related knowledge and information. Similarly to people 
not wanting to really know how meat animals are treated, people also do not want to know 
– even though they actually do, in some ways at least - the environmental impacts of 
intensive animal agriculture. Such a theory is supported by some empirical data. A study 
using data from the 2014 British Social Attitudes Survey248 found that more than a third of 
those who continued to eat meat as before, and had no intentions to change their practices, 
did not have an opinion on a question regarding whether eating no meat or less meat is 
better for the animals themselves, the environment, or human health (Lee & Simpson, 
2016). Usually such a large proportion of “neither agree nor disagree” answers would be a 
sign of a poorly phrased question, but in this case, the authors suspect it relates to either 
lack of awareness, or “perhaps a feeling of not wanting to engage with [the issues]” 
(idem:11). I believe that indeed, rather than a case of true low awareness, this is a case of 
strategic ignorance of knowledge. Further, in this group of respondents (continuing to eat 
meat as before), only 25% thought that eating less or no meat would be better for animals, 
whereas 45% of all respondents thought so.249 Similarly, de Boer et al. (2016) also found in 
their study that meat eaters were less likely than those eating less or no meat to think that 
meat has a big impact on climate change.250  
Steg (2015) argues that one situation where values facilitating sustainability may be 
strengthened is when scientific evidence indicates that unsustainability seriously threatens 
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 Performed annually since 1983. 
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 Even so, 45% is a low proportion thinking that not eating meat, or eating less meat, would be better for the 
animals, at least if “animals” refer to “animal welfare”. Out of all the respondents 31% thought that eating less 
or no meat would be better for the environment, while 21% out of the regular meat eaters thought so. 
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 It may of course be that those believing in the impacts from meat had reduced their meat eating, while 
those not believing in it had not reduced their meat eating. But this would imply straightforward rational 
behaviour in a matter (eating meat) not usually thought of as rational. 
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the current way of life. This, however, requires that such evidence is not ignored. Related to 
the value-action gap, the concept of knowledge-action gap revolves around the dilemma of 
why knowledge – long the building block behind public understanding of science and a 
supposed cure for the knowledge deficit - does often not create desired action. This is of 
course partly related to the same reasons why value-action gap is an issue (but see Box 3.1). 
However, the difference is that no matter how much new knowledge is poured into society, 
this may have little or no impact when it is ignored to begin with: "it's always possible to 
wake someone from sleep, but no amount of noise will wake someone who is pretending to 
be asleep" (Foer, 2009:102). Strategic ignorance can, therefore, be seen as an enemy of 
sustainability.  
When uncertainty of knowledge exists, it is easier to remain strategically ignorant (e.g. van 
der Weele, 2013). Tenbrunsel et al. (2010) argue that uncertainty and doubt let the want-
self dominate more easily, and so, engaging with behaviour more in line with the should-self, 
and the knowledge it may hold, is not necessary. In the case of industries wanting to sustain 
themselves, maintaining, creating or manufacturing uncertainty (Michaels, 2008) about the 
negative effects of their business-as-usual is therefore greatly beneficial, as already 
mentioned in Chapter 2. Similar to climate change as a whole, the meat crisis is complex 
(even regarding the contribution the meat system makes to climate change), and therefore, 
the easily created uncertainty gives an advantage to those opposing reductions in meat 
production and consumption, such as the related industries (Wellesley et al., 2015). 
Strategic ignorance does not only exist at the level of the individual. It is in fact also 
collective (van der Weele, 2013). Norgaard (2011) argues that the denial of climate change 
has been socially and culturally organised. It has been supported by the current dominant 
social paradigm (e.g. Peattie, 2011, see also Box 3.3) and by the strategic nature of the 
denial. It connects to societal value priorities that, as more stable, can be difficult to 
influence, but easy to ignore (in terms of value conflicts), and emotions that are difficult to 
confront, yet not easy to ignore altogether.251 Mont and Power (2013) note that cognitive 
dissonance itself has been largely ignored in policymaking.252 
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Huddard-Kennedy et al. (2015) refer to the potential of discursive consciousness to question 
and potentially change unsustainable practices. This relates also to discourses (the topic of 
the next section), but discursive consciousness is likely to drive change only when the related 
values and emotions are also addressed. Without this, strategic ignorance can block the 
awareness that reflexivity requires. 
On addressing values, value priorities and dispositions, and conflicts, Macdiarmid et al. 
(2016) conclude from their study in Scotland on the awareness of impacts on the 
environment and climate from the meat system that a certain moral disengagement253 
around meat is obvious. Regardless of evidence against meat eating, people want to keep on 
eating it. Macdiarmid and colleagues emphasize the importance of considering the many 
strong “meat values” related to eating meat, such as pleasure, identity, status, masculinity, 
tradition and sociality.254 For any change to take place, these values must be addressed first, 
they argue.  
On addressing emotions, van der Weele (e.g. 2013) believes in the potential of more 
awareness of feelings of ambivalence in lessening strategic ignorance. Further, unless we 
allow ourselves to feel negative emotions, for example, climate change related fears, and 
the emotional conflicts, for example, regarding the practice of eating animals, or other 
unsustainable practices, and unless we allow ourselves to be motivated by these emotions 
rather than demotivated by ignoring them, the inertia that has impeded adequate global 
responses to big sustainability challenges so far will not be overcome (Andrews, 2017b; 
Andrews & Hoggett, 2019). 
3.4. Linking practices to discourses 
Drawing on from insights in the above section on values, emotions and knowledge, all in 
connection with general understandings and social practices, this section will make the link 
from practices to discourses, via correspondence between general understandings (on the 
side of practices) and cognitive frames (on the side of discourses). This section, however, 
starts with discussing the concept of discursive consciousness, critical for purposively 
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 The concept of moral disengagement is originally from Albert Bandura (1986). See also a discussion on 
moral engagement and meat eating in Graça et al. (2014). 
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 Meat values, as opposed to more general food values discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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changing practices. Later the concept of discursively open practices will be introduced, 
before making the final jump between practices and discourses. 
3.4.1. Discursive consciousness 
In Giddens’ duality of consciousness, practical consciousness comprises of “the mental states 
and knowledge that allow individuals to engage in routine everyday activity” (Huddart 
Kennedy et al., 2015:8), such as riding a bike. These mental states allow us to perform most 
of our daily activities without much effort. Strong versions of practice theories argue that 
practical consciousness is our “default mode of engagement with the world” (Warde, 
2014:292). Discursive consciousness, on the other hand, is about being able to verbally 
express what, how and why we and others do what we do. In discursive consciousness, 
everyday practices can be (not effortlessly, but nonetheless) “questioned or challenged, and 
as they are reconsidered, dismantling (and changing) a practice becomes possible” (Huddart 
Kennedy et al., 2015:9). To Warde (2014:292), discursive consciousness consists of “irregular 
and occasional” moments of attention, reflection and decisions - normal to practices as such, 
even when only rare.255 
Giddens (1984) argues that the line between discursive and practical consciousness on the 
one hand, and the unconscious on the other, is strong, and stronger than that between 
discursive and practical consciousness. However, it may be that the line between the 
unconscious and practical consciousness is not very strict at all (or does not even really 
exist), being that it seems likely, from studying brain activity, that at least some of our 
decisions are in fact first made unconsciously, and only rationalized afterwards (e.g. 
Chatterton, 2016). The rationalization leads us to believe that we have made such decisions 
consciously. Structuration theory maintains that much of our decision making regarding our 
daily routine practices takes place in practical consciousness, and so, combining brain 
sciences with Giddens, these two states of mind - unconsciousness combined with 
rationalization, and practical consciousness - may not be so far from each other, and we use 
them more than we might assume. However, even if a significant amount of decision making 
does not take place within discursive consciousness, there is little doubt that reflection on 
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issues, our own practices, or those of others, does take place in conscious thinking, where 
we are also able to put ideas, knowledge, emotions, preferences, attitudes, value priorities 
or dispositions, etc. into words.256 
When connecting discursive consciousness to the concept of strategic ignorance, they can be 
seen to an extent as opposing situations. When we are being strategically ignorant, we 
cannot fully reflect on our practices, and we tend to repress (into the unconscious) the 
conflicting emotions rising from the value conflict. Warde (2014) argues that social sciences 
should not focus all their attention on the exceptional moments of discursive consciousness. 
However, I would say that for purposive change in practices involving strategic ignorance 
those rare moments can be greatly beneficial, and therefore, worth focusing attention on. In 
addition to strategic ignorance, the issue of dominant paradigms, frames and ideologies can 
keep individuals and societies from engaging in discursive consciousness.257 This is a topic 
returned to later on in this chapter. 
In connection with everyday practices, discursive consciousness normally only rises when 
things go wrong (Spaargaren, 1997), and some new, corrective action or actions need to be 
performed. Perhaps the practice in question even requires larger changes. The corrective 
action is likely felt necessary, due to a “threat” of some sort. Spaargaren uses the example of 
a system that delivers water to people. We are likely to become aware, discursively 
conscious, of the system only when tap water turns brown, the pipes are leaking, or some 
similar threat to the continuity of our water use practices. Instead of engaging in strategic 
ignorance of the problem, we normally do something to take care of it, and once that is 
done, we are able to return to practical consciousness regarding using tap water. There are 
importantly, however, no real value conflicts involved, and therefore, wanting to take care 
of the problem is straightforward. In terms of sustainability, it is, in principle, evident what is 
“going wrong”, but at least until now, and for most people, the threats are not enough to 
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 In the model of social practices contained in Shove et al (2012), practical consciousness falls within the 
element of competencies, and discursive consciousness would potentially fall within the element of meanings, 
although this is not discussed. By using general understandings instead of meanings in Figure 3.3a, it is easier to 
see discursive consciousness connecting to general understandings which Welch and Warde (2017) argue to 
display both discursive and tacit components. 
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 One could argue that the invisibility of dominant paradigms, ideologies or frames could even be a bigger 
problem than strategic ignorance. However, there are attempts, e.g. via the degrowth movement, to address 
the paradigm side. There seems to be much less discussion of strategic ignorance in the sense discussed in this 
chapter. An earlier example of such discussion as regards climate change can be found in Norgaard (2011). 
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counter strategic ignorance, due to the significant value conflicts and repressed emotions 
involved.  
It is likely that discursive consciousness rises more easily in connection with weaker habits 
where performances of practices have more variation, and value priorities change more 
easily, and more conscious choices are made in any case. Therefore, some people may also 
experience engaging in more sustainable practices, such as eating less or no meat, easier 
than others.  
It may also be that when enough things start changing at the level of practice elements, the 
impersonal “something going wrong” - e.g. pollution, harm to animals, climate change - 
starts to feel more personal, especially, if the changed practice elements offer ways to 
change performances of practices. In the case of eating animals, this can be a question of 
new material elements (the new meats), new competences (learning how to cook in a 
flexitarian way), or new general understandings (new meanings of meat, new discourses 
emphasizing values that facilitate sustainability, new social norms for expressing difficult 
emotions).258 
As discussed in Section 3.3.2, focusing and reflecting on values facilitating sustainability can 
make them more often prioritized (Burford et al., 2015; Crompton, 2016; Lekes et al., 2012), 
also in everyday practices (Maio, 2001). This can happen at the level of the individual, but 
also, and more importantly for sustained change, at the level of organisations (Hargreaves, 
2011), and at the societal level, through discourses, and through the actions of governments 
(Hoff-Elimari et al., 2014).  
Addressing (individual and societal) value priorities and dispositions, however, may not be 
enough, if the related emotions are not addressed as well. Andrews (2018) sees possibilities 
for this through the building of new social norms for expressing emotions related to climate 
change or other sustainability related threats. The meat system is involved in most large-
scale environmental issues, and so, if we are able to be more aware of our ambivalences, 
express not only anxieties about threats, but also feelings of loss of our current way of life 
which must be transformed, and also perhaps hope for a future, we may be able to ignore 
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 Regarding new social norms for expressing difficult emotions about the ecological crisis, see Andrews 
(2018). 
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knowledge less, and do more corrective actions. All of the above could be facilitated by 
societal discourses on sustainability related issues focusing on value priorities and 
dispositions, and expressions of emotions, in order to address the strategic ignorance. Most 
likely one could help the other, so that focus on values could bring up related emotions, and 
focus on expressions of emotions could assist in clarifying values. 
* Meat eating related practices and discursive consciousness 
An example specific to meat eating where practices have entered discursive consciousness 
and produced change can be seen in the case of conscious flexitarians who, according to the 
study by Verain et al. (2015), place the responsibility for change on regular people (so also 
on themselves), more than on other societal elements, including governments, supermarkets 
and various organisations, including firms which all get their share of responsibility too. A 
conclusion may be made that, having changed their own practices consciously, these people 
accept responsibility for themselves as well. This can also be seen as conscious flexitarians 
showing their political agency which requires both intentionality and autonomy (Halkier & 
Holm, 2008).259  
Finally, reframing climate change discourses by paying more attention to human-animal 
relations, such as those related to eating animals, could give us a more accurate picture of 
both the causality and effects of climate change (Twine, 2014). Specifically, it could also 
encourage reflexivity - discursive consciousness - about responsibility and the urgency of 
change towards sustainability. 
3.4.2. General links between practices and discourses 
Even if only an occasional state of mind, discursive consciousness of either practice 
performances, or of practices as entities, is one way social practices and discourses are 
linked. Further, discourses help to “shape the practical ways that people and institutions 
define and respond to given problems” (Tonkiss, 2004:375). In terms of practice elements, 
discourses can be said to shape general understandings. Moreover, central to the sociology 
of expectations (Magneson Chiles, 2013:514) is that "speculation upon what might happen 
tomorrow makes things happen in the present day", in other words, expectations are 
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 The study by Halkier and Holm indicated that 20% of the Danish people would identify with such political 
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performative. So, what we expect from tomorrow, for example, in terms of how humans will 
get their protein in 2050, influences our actions, practices and policies today, even though 
2050 is still far in the future. Discourses, and their boundaries, define what is deemed 
possible, what the range of issues and their solutions are. As an example, discourses 
regarding cell- or plant-based meat push the boundaries of what meat is, and the mere idea 
of flexitarianism produces a workable solution to the issue of sufficient future protein for the 
world. 
Although not focusing on discourses in her own writing on social practices, Elizabeth Shove 
(personal communication, 26 February 2018) agrees that discourses can, in fact, be seen as 
part of practices, and also as means of connection between them.  
Most practices as such involve a smaller or larger component of discourses. Some practices 
involve more discourse only temporarily, or in some cultures more than in others. Discourses 
can be an inherent part of many practices, for example legal practices or teaching practices, 
whereby discourses and practices are “enmeshed with each other” (Daniel Welch, personal 
communication, 5 September 2017). Importantly, the discourse within a practice, and the 
discourse of a practice are often not separable. For example, in food practices, we talk about 
the food we buy, cook and eat, but talking (about food and about other things) is also a big 
part of social cooking and eating. Much of this is intertwined, and these discourses remake 
the practice performances while also sometimes affecting the practices as entities. 
Welch (2017b) refers to practice-discourse assemblages, and he agrees that practice related 
ideologies such as veganism or carnism can be seen as such assemblages. Regarding the 
dynamics of veganism and carnism: 
…in European societies most […vegans…] choose to become vegan […] through 
exposure to discourse around veganism, and vegan discourse is tightly 
enmeshed with the practice of being vegan, whereas for carnism, the 
discursive elements are both more culturally widespread and perhaps less 
tightly integrated with practice. 
Daniel Welch, personal communication, 5 September 2017 
While critical, the relationship between practices and discourses, and the ways discourses 
can affect practices, have until now, however, not been widely studied. Davide Nicolini 
(personal communication, 26 February 2018) suspects that this is partly because the issue 
falls between disciplines. Discourse scholars do not focus on effects of discourse on social 
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practices in general, and especially contemporary social practice theorists rarely discuss 
discourse.260 
3.4.3. Discursively open practices 
Concluding from the above, it seems indeed that practices can change partly through 
changing discourses. Although at the level of practice performances, changes are often slow 
and resisted by the complexities of the web of practices as entities, at the level of discourses 
things may move faster. With the term discursively open practice I refer to a practice that 
may be well established and discursively dominant in society, but is still increasingly being 
questioned, creating tensions between different values, affecting general discourses and 
creating openings to different ways of going about the practice. Welch (personal 
communication, 5 September 2017) formulates this as practices potentially being opened up 
for change by “moving from the doxic/pre-reflexive to the discursive/reflexive”.261  
Especially notable in such discursively open practices can be different and new meanings 
(replacing or) co-occurring alongside old meanings. The discourses also disseminate the new 
meanings and potential new ways of doing things to a wider social group or society. I would 
argue that meat eating related practices are an emerging case of discursively open practices. 
Shove (personal communication, 26 February 2018) states that “in a way, all practices are 
‘open’ […] though some are perhaps more so, at particular times, than others”. If all 
practices are open in principle, then differences between more stable and changing practices 
may partly lie in the discursive openness/closeness of practices. Discursively open practices 
may be purposively challenged, whereas, practices that are discursively closed may change 
on their own, or not. Discursive consciousness can be seen to be a key component of 
discursively open practices. 
3.4.4. General understandings and discourses 
As Foucault has stated, discourses produced knowledge, beliefs and “truths” (Seppänen & 
Väliverronen, 2012), and thereby they also contribute to producing general understandings 
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 Foucault did work on both spheres, and their combinations. However, as I noted in Chapter 1, I am focusing 
in this thesis on the contemporary social practice theories and their views on change towards sustainability. 
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 In sociology, doxic refers to something taken for granted, being unquestioned. 
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within social practices. Welch and Warde (2017:184) argue that general understandings may 
originate in either discourses or in practices, sitting “somewhere across the boundary 
between the discursive and the non-discursive”. Further, they contain both tacit and 
discursive elements, therefore also connecting to (embodied) competencies as an element 
of social practices. General understandings as a concept focus attention on the relationship 
between practices and discourses, a “thorny” problem for social practice theories, according 
to Welch and Warde. 
Welch and Warde (2017) see general understandings as components of individual practices, 
but also as connections between different practices, similar to Schatzki (2002). New general 
understandings as well as new practices, can be seen as results of problematized existing 
understandings, “commonly in the context of socio-technical and political economic change” 
(Welch, 2017b:9). 
In conclusion, general understandings connect discourses to practices, and change in 
practices can start from changing general understandings, for example, the meaning of 
“meat”. Additionally, we may be able to become aware of the general understandings of 
particular practices through discourses, i.e. through discursive consciousness which can 
result in discursively open practices. The next section will continue with the discussion on 
the side of discourses. 
3.5. Further to the side of discourses 
In this section, I will first present the discourse counterparts to general understandings, i.e. 
cognitive frames, and then go deeper into some discourse theory, discussing framing, 
ideologies and critical discourse analysis, all linked to this conceptual framework, but also to 
the empirical data analysis in Chapter 5. 
3.5.1. Cognitive frames 
With reference to Figure 3.3c, the way general understandings are conceptualized by Welch 
and Warde (2017), and further elaborated on above as regards their connections to values, 
emotions and knowledge, bears a strong resemblance to the way cognitive frames are 
conceptualized, for example, by Lakoff (2010). I therefore propose to consider general 
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understandings and cognitive frames as counterparts, representing similar elements 
common to both practices and discourses. 
Kuypers (2010:301) explains that “when highlighting some aspect of reality over other 
aspects, frames act to define problems, diagnose causes, make moral judgements, and 
suggest remedies”. Cognitive frames are stored in our long-term memories, and connected 
to meanings, experiences, emotional components and values (e.g. Darnton & Kirk, 2011; 
Lakoff, 2010). Semino et al. (2016) also argue that frames are connected to agency and 
empowerment (or lack of agency and disempowerment).262 When a particular frame is 
activated, the whole structure (of related knowledge, values and emotions) it is connected 
to in our brains is also activated. Lakoff (e.g. 2010) states that human thinking, feeling and 
social interaction is fundamentally structured by cognitive frames. 
While general understandings (in the form conceptualized in this thesis) are related to 
practices, cognitive frames are very often also related to practices, but in principle, cognitive 
frames are a broader concept. To give an example on related to practices, however, if we 
see a pig in a neighbour’s backyard, this may activate different long-term cognitive frames in 
us. It may activate a pig-as-bacon frame, and all the value, emotion and knowledge 
connections to it, including all the practices related to it (e.g. slaughtering, shopping, frying, 
eating a Sunday breakfast with family), some of which we may be engaged in as a result, or 
alternatively, we may only think or talk about them.263 The pig may also activate a pig-in-
need-of-rescue frame, and lead us to potentially engage in practices related to animal 
protection (talk to our neighbours, educate our kids, join a local organization). Or the pig 
may activate a pig-as-pet frame, which may lead again to different consequences, perhaps 
we end up getting our own pig for our backyard, or we manage to ban our neighbour from 
having one, as we imagine pigs to be smelly. Since seeing the pig itself can carry very 
different frames, which frame the animal ends up activating most robustly in us, and what 
the consequences are, depends on the long-term frames stored in our brains, and our value 
priorities and dispositions which assist in the activation process, as well as our knowledge, 
and our emotional wants. 
                                                          
262
 Semino et al. (2016) connect agency and empowerment so that empowerment or disempowerment equate 
to the degree of increased or decreased agency a person has, or perceives him/herself to have. 
263
 In the future, seeing such a pig might also indicate the production of cell-based meat (see van der Weele 
and Driessen, 2013). 
 
 
155 
 
In discourses, on the other hand, things work out slightly differently. If a newspaper has a 
photo of a pig in someone’s backyard, we tend to use the ready-made frames offered in the 
attached news article in order to interpret the theme of the photo (although the concrete 
framing of the photo has its impact too), and the meaning of the article. Some of these 
frames offered match with our own long-term frames, and some of them do not. The ones 
that do match will activate the values, emotions and knowledge attached to them, the ones 
that do not match may still eventually enter our long-term system of frames, if they are 
persistently enough being offered through different discourses. For example, what can be 
called sustainability facilitating value frames can engage the related values in individuals, 
and may motivate for pro-environmental action. However, as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, importantly, action itself may also lead to changes in value dispositions, for 
example, in connection with social labelling. 
Lakoff (2010) also points to the key difference between short-term and long-term cognitive 
frames. We all have a large number of frames within our minds, some short-term (recently 
formed, but possibly disappearing when there is not enough reinforcement), but most long-
term. When something we do, hear, read, or see (or taste, smell or touch) activates a certain 
frame, this tends to be one of the long-term frames. Long-term frames are well-established, 
whereas new frames are first short-term frames before some of them may become new 
long-term frames. This process may take quite some time, however (Lakoff, 2010).  
At the societal level, long-term societal (or cultural) frames produce long-term societal (or 
cultural) meanings, both also linking to societal value priorities. As Lorek and Fuchs (2011) 
argue, societal actors with discursive power (such as non-governmental organizations) may 
be given a task of drawing attention to sustainability facilitating societal value priorities, in 
connection with a sustainability transformation. 
To conclude from points made above and earlier in this chapter, there are several ways 
general understandings and cognitive frames are conceptually similar. First, general 
understandings are elements of individual practices, but they are also common to and 
connecting different practices. Similarly, cognitive frames can be part of single discourses 
while also connecting different discourses. Further, frames can also connect different 
practices together. For example, a sustainability frame connects different sustainability 
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related practices together, such as recycling, avoiding private car use, or not eating meat 
(see also Box 3.3). Second, through their bodily connection, general understandings relate to 
values, emotions and knowledge, and produce meanings, all similar to cognitive frames. 
Third, general understandings are argued to sit between discourses and practices. It can be 
similarly said, for example, that cognitive frames interpret discourses for the benefit of 
various practices. And finally, ideologies can be reproduced in everyday action through 
general understandings (Billig, 1995; Welch & Warde, 2017).264 Similarly, ideologies are 
reproduced (and represented) by frames, and frames can reflect ideologies, as I will discuss 
later in this chapter. But first, Box 3.3 discusses the concepts of societal master frames and 
dominant paradigms. In the next section, I will focus on framing devices (Strydom, 2000) 
which are relevant for analysing frames, and therefore also the data analysis in Chapter 5. 
Box 3.3. Societal master frames and dominant paradigms 
Strydom (2000) refers to three historical master frames of modernity, from the 16th century onwards. 
They are the rights frame, the justice frame and the current responsibility frame, around from the late 
20th century. All three master frames are still present, but the first two have currently less dominance. 
These frames have provided a structure for various crisis discourses of each historical time period, 
including the current crisis discourse of responsibility where the main concern is the survival of society in 
its natural environment. Indeed, a responsibility frame is present in different forms in current societies, 
either as consumer/individual responsibility, societal responsibility or co-responsibility, with the last one 
being the original sense in Strydom (2000, but originally from Apel, 1991). Co-responsibility “brings a 
public level of responsibility for common or shared problems into play without disburdening individuals of 
their personal responsibility” (Strydom, 1999:67). 
However, from another angle, a dominant social paradigm (term originally from Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974) 
can be seen as related to societal master frames as well, perhaps as an umbrella term. Although as a 
concept, a dominant social paradigm does not specifically link to any particular ideologies (or frames), it 
supports and reflects the dominant ideologies that are present at any particular time or location. A 
dominant social paradigm “helps make sense of an otherwise incomprehensible universe and […] make 
organized activity possible” (Pirages & Ehrlich, 1974:23). The current dominant social paradigm in the 
globalized world is in conflict with a potential sustainability master frame (e.g. Peattie, 2011), as it 
understands humans as superior to other species, and the Earth to provide unlimited resources for 
humans (Park, 2007). Further, disconnection from nature, dependence on and faith in technology and 
markets, as well as consumerism and materialism are considered as part of the current dominant social 
paradigm (Peattie, 2011). Berzonsky and Moser (2017; the below list is directly quoted from p. 16) list the 
values relating to the current dominant social paradigm that they see being problematic for sustainability 
as follows, with the right-hand column giving the extreme expressions of each value: 
Anthropocentrism  Gives humans absolute superiority over any other part of nature, ultimately 
devaluing all things non-human; becomes speciesism and human chauvinism that 
rejects all human embeddedness in and dependence on non-human nature.  
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Dominion over 
nature 
Justifies human appropriation of and control over non-human nature for human 
benefit only. 
Scientism Claims that the positive natural sciences provide the only model of explanation of 
the phenomena (natural and social) of the world and ties the rational, detached, 
science-based exploration and understanding of the world to the modernist 
ambition of becoming all-powerful, freeing humanity from the bonds of nature. 
Dualism Insists on the physical and moral separation of humans from nature, fostering a 
distancing of the material from the divine, of mind from matter, and devaluing all 
that which is believed to be embodied in the material (feminine, indigenous, body, 
Earth) relative to its opposite (masculine, rational, mind, God). 
Individualism Elevates the individual over the communal, insisting on individual rights over 
mutuality and responsibility; it glorifies egocentrism and selfish achievements, while 
negating the psychological and social benefits of altruism and self-transcendence or 
even denying equal rights to and responsibility toward other humans and non-
humans. 
Freedom Gives license to live beyond or without limits and consume without restraint or 
regard for others, the environment or the future, and as such insists on human 
exceptionalism. 
Never-ending 
progress and 
growth 
Expresses a future orientation that unwaveringly anticipates improvement over the 
past and present; has become virtually synonymous with economic development 
and higher levels of material consumption. 
Further on frames, Strydom (2000) argues that discourses tend to move societies from one master frame 
to a new master frame, and during the transition period, there is competition between different frames. In 
his thorough analysis, Strydom shows how such competition has happened in the past between different 
master frames. This concept of competing frames can be applied to the conflict – also playing out in 
discourses - between the current dominant social paradigm and a potential future sustainability master 
frame. The former tends to blur and obscure the idea of responsibility, seemingly placing it largely on 
consumers, on the one hand, but relying on market mechanisms to solve problems, on the other hand. The 
sustainability master frame, however, contains the idea of co-responsibility - including individuals, but 
heavily also other societal actors, such as governments and businesses - and does not rely on “the system” 
to solve problems on its own. 
Source: Partly from Berzonsky and Moser (2017:16, see also for a list of further sources they used). 
A final point about frames as such, Olsen (2014) notes that frames that work together can 
build a longer narrative, or a story. Creating new narratives can be an important part of 
normalizing something new. An increasing amount of calls are indeed made for positive 
frames and narratives about sustainable futures, both in the academic literature (e.g. Stibbe, 
2015), within global organisations (e.g. Corner et al., 2018)265 and in the media.266 
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 A report commissioned by Working Group I of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
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 See e.g. Telling stories is great for sustainability marketing, in the online Guardian, 21 January 2013. 
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While there is no categorical proof yet that hope is effective in making change happen 
(Chapman et al., 2017), positive narratives are not only producing hope, they are also about 
being able to imagine the future to aim for.267 Lakoff (2010) stresses the importance of 
stories - for effective change in society - that exemplify values and rouse emotions. Co-
responsibility could be one useful value to include in such stories. Further, discourse 
regarding sustainability is argued to more usefully focus on the positive side effects, and 
gains rather than losses (Lorek & Vergragt, 2015). For example, well-being has already 
largely decoupled from economic growth in the Global North, and similarly, well-being does 
not have to be tied to consumption. 
* Meat eating related practices and narratives 
There are also calls for new stories about positive futures where animals are no longer 
farmed for food. Currently, we have difficulties imagining a world without meat animals, 
arguably hindering change. In his 2017 film, Marc Pierschell tries to portray narratives of 
such futures.268 
The meat and dairy industry has used stories to successfully sell their products for decades 
as “healthy, delicious, masculine, natural, and a path to love” (Stibbe, 2018:1). Stibbe calls 
for such stories to now be resisted, and instead, a negative image of meat, and positive 
visions of animals as “beings deserving respect and consideration” to be conveyed, together 
with positivity regarding plant-based foods. 
Finally, Ferrari (2016) discusses cell-based meat, whereby several narratives already exist. 
On one hand, instead of focusing on the novelty of this meat, Mark Post, the scientist behind 
the first cell-based hamburger in 2013, emphasizes continuity with conventional animal-
based meat, in that cell-based meat is different only in the way it is produced, going directly 
from cells to meat, skipping the animal part. On the other hand, cell-based meat is often cast 
as an ethical product - both in terms of sustainability and animals - of new science, better 
able to meet the great challenges of our time, and a sign of moral progress for humankind. 
Cell-based meat offers "the material basis for a profound change in culture" (Ferrari, 
2016:267). Van der Weele and Driessen (2013:647) suggest that the slate is in fact still rather 
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 Backcasting works in a similar way, starting with a desirable future, and subsequently identifying policies 
etc. that lead to such a future (see e.g. Vergragt & Quist, 2011). 
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 See the discussion in the film End of Meat (by Marc Pierschell). 
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blank, and with different visions, we can explore the possibilities for cell-based meat, and 
“ethics can take an active part in these searches, by fostering a process that integrates (gut) 
feelings, imagination and rational thought”. One of the visions they found in their workshops 
is “of a hybrid community of humans and animals that would allow for both the 
consumption of animal protein and meaningful relations with domestic (farm) animals” to 
continue. 
3.5.2. Framing devices 
Welch (2017b) criticizes social practice theoretical research for using practices as the nearly 
exclusive focus of analysis, especially when the research is related to sustainability:  
The focus on practice-as-unit-of-analysis tends to militate away from the use 
of concepts that capture the kind of large-scale configurations of discourse and 
practice that enable engagement with […] concerns with consumer culture. 
Welch (2017b:3) 
Instead, he finds that concepts that connect different practices may be more illuminating in 
this.269 I argue that cognitive frames – being rather similar to general understandings – can 
work in this regard as the focus of analysis related to the societal discourses relevant to 
purposively changing social practices. This is especially so, due to the connections from 
cognitive frames to values, emotions and knowledge. 
Strydom (2000, drawing from Klaus Eder and William A. Gamson) suggests a useful method 
for frame analysis based on the idea of various frames building larger discourses, while 
themselves being built by different framing devices. A sentence within a particular discourse 
can contain one or more framing devices which reflect one or more frames, while a frame is 
often part of a larger discourse. 
Strydom conceptualizes three main cognitive framing devices that appear in different 
proportions, and with different emphasis, to build frames in all public discourses. These 
three framing devices include empirical objectivity (comprising the factual world), moral 
responsibility (social world) and aesthetic judgement (subjective world). So, it can be said 
that people justify some action based on facts, based on duty or morality, and/or based on 
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 For Welch (2017), one such connecting concept is teleoaffective formations, based on Schatzki’s 
teleoaffectivity (2002). Teleoaffective formations are “characterised by a nexus of general understandings” 
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aesthetics (including meaningfulness, emotions, and sensations). Environmental action, for 
example, can be based on facts: recycling is necessary to have enough material resources, 
and less pollution; on morality: as citizens, it is our responsibility to recycle; and/or on 
meaningfulness: a desire towards balance with nature. As regards environmental inaction, 
however, people often reject facts through denial or strategic ignorance; do not want to be 
told what to do, in effect, avoiding responsibility; and are far removed from feeling, or even 
wanting to feel a connection to nature as such. 
I call the three framing devices here, and in my analysis in Chapter 5, as factual, normative 
and emotive. The factual framing device relates to knowledge, the normative framing device 
relates, at a more abstract level, to values,270 and the emotive framing device relates to 
emotions.271 As Strydom argues:  
Employing the factual […] framing device, actors rely on empirical knowledge 
of the world in order to form a concept of it. The [normative] framing device is 
a cultural tool by means of which actors lay down certain principles according 
to which they behave towards the world. By means of the [emotive] framing 
device, actors organise their subjective experience and perception of the 
world in a way that makes it meaningful to them. 
Strydom (2000:64) 
However, the division to three distinct framing devices simplifies matters to some extent, as 
there can be overlaps between them. Firstly, factual and normative can overlap, in situations 
where facts are used to convey a message related to normativity or morality, for example, 
“meat alternatives are better for the environment” (therefore you should eat meat 
alternatives instead of meat).272 Further, normative and emotive can also overlap, when the 
result of behaving in a normative or moral way produces something virtuous, for example, 
“not eating meat is the right thing to do” (and doing the right thing will make me happier). 
Despite these relevant overlaps, I keep the framing devices separate in the analysis, in order 
to explain and explore the structure more clearly. More specifically, I group statements 
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 To Schwartz (2006a:3) values “transcend specific actions and situations. Obedience and honesty, for 
example, are values that may be relevant at work or in school, in sports, business, and politics, with family, 
friends, or strangers. This feature distinguishes values from narrower concepts like norms and attitudes that 
usually refer to specific actions, objects, or situations”. I consider the connection between values and norms 
therefore to be similar to that between values and attitudes. Values are a more abstract concept that can 
translate to either norms (how to behave in a certain situation) or attitudes (how to think about something 
particular and concrete).  
271
 Strydom (2000) also calls the aesthetic framing device a conative framing device, with “conative” referring 
to effort, desire or striving for something. As both “aesthetic” and “conative” have a strong emotional content, 
I use the term “emotive”. 
272
 Using “alternative facts”, or propaganda, in order to influence people also mixes these framing devices. 
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presented as facts belonging to the factual, statements focusing overtly on the normative, as 
normative, and statements that are mainly related to emotional experiences belonging to 
the emotive, even if all of these may also have some somewhat hidden secondary elements. 
Analysing hidden elements is also relevant, and in the data analysis I do look for implicit 
meanings and hidden ideologies, for example. However, at the level of framing devices, I 
take the apparent framing device, for example, apparently factual statement, as contributing 
to a particular frame which can then contain hidden elements to be analysed further. 
Table 3.1 shows an example of how discourses, frames and framing devices relate. The crisis 
or solution discourse related to a problem such as “there are lots of people on Earth, how 
can they have enough protein to eat?”273 may be answered by the currently dominant frame 
of “meeting the demand with meat” or with what can be seen as a counter frame of 
“transformation to new meatways”. These two frames tend to be then constructed with one 
or more of the three different types of framing devices (as explained above and depicted in 
Table 3.1), emphasized in different proportions. 
Table 3.1 Linking discourses, frames and framing devices 
Discourses Frames274 Framing devices 
Crisis/solution 
discourse 
Problem: There are 
lots of people on 
Earth, how can 
they have enough 
protein to eat? 
Meeting the 
demand with more 
meat 
Factual: Demand for meat is strong and will be even 
stronger; obstacles to more production can be overcome 
Normative: Demand for meat must be met 
Emotive: Meat tastes good; meat is satisfying 
Transformation to 
new meatways 
Factual: Both current production scale and increased 
production are unsustainable; new meatways are feasible 
Normative: Co-responsibility towards Earth, and towards 
providing humans enough protein 
Emotive: Affection towards nature and non-human animals; 
fear of consequences to all life of the business-as-usual 
Note: The phrases used in the right-hand side column are merely for illustrative purposes, and are not from the 
data analysed in Chapter 5. 
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formally: Currently, there are 7.5 billion people, and this is expected to rise to 9-10 billion by 2050. 
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Importantly, I argue that these three framing devices can also be seen to connect to the 
three domains of emotions, values and knowledge that both cognitive frames and general 
understandings connect to. This is significant, as it contributes to these framing devices 
being effective in translating discourses, narratives, social interactions, behaviours and 
events to something people can relate to.275,276 
To note, at a more general level, what are often described as framing tools, such as 
metaphors, images, arguments, examples, or personification, are instances of how the three 
framing devices are frequently expressed in context. In other words, a framing device can 
also be expressed with a tool such as an image, or a metaphor. Conceptual metaphors are a 
common and powerful framing tool which tend to rouse emotions, and with which 
perceptions are easily influenced, actions justified, and ideologies transmitted. Change can 
be generated by changing the metaphors used in discourses (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, but 
see also e.g. Foss, 2009). Chapter 4 will discuss conceptual metaphors some more, as they 
also related to the data analysis in Chapter 5. 
3.5.3. Ideologies 
Many of the frames that are built from framing devices reflect ideologies which in turn also 
colour the emphasis with which the three framing devices are applied (Strydom, 2000). It 
seems clear that ideologies can colour answers to questions such as, how something is 
defined or perceived (factual), what is important, or how to behave (normative) and how 
something is experienced (emotive). Ideologies can also influence how the three framing 
devices are expressed, or emphasised in any particular frame. As discussed above, ideologies 
can also create overlap between different framing devices, such as the factual and the 
normative. 
Van Dijk (1995:243) defines ideologies as “basic systems of fundamental social cognitions […] 
organizing the […] social representations shared by members of groups”. Social 
representations refer to shared notions, such as values, beliefs, ideas, knowledges, 
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 However, how people respond to the framing devices is a different matter. For example, the emotions 
seemingly connected to a particular framing device may be quite different from the emotions experienced 
through a discourse, or through a practice (before, during or after). 
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meanings, norms, practices, and so on. Van Dijk argues further that ideologies indirectly 
control frames that are used to interpret discourse. As regards the relationship between 
values and ideologies, ideologies are evaluative, in other words, they provide the basis for 
what is considered good or bad, right or wrong. Therefore, values are basic building blocks of 
ideologies, or rather, a certain value hierarchy forms the basis of an ideology. 
When ideologies are dominant, they seem “neutral”, and contain assumptions that stay 
largely unchallenged (Wodak, 2014). Wodak defines hegemony as a situation where “people 
in a society think alike about certain matters, or even forget that there are alternatives to 
the status quo” (idem:306). Dominant ideologies therefore have a tendency to not be visible: 
“the most common is the most obscure” (Lehtonen, 2000:7), or as van Dijk (2006) puts it, 
when an ideology becomes part of the “common ground” accepted by all, it is no longer a 
recognizable ideology. Dominant social paradigms contain one or often more somewhat 
related dominant ideologies (see Box 3.3). Dominant ideologies usually also have counter 
ideologies which may paradoxically be more visible than the dominant ideologies, due to 
their state of being against the invisible dominant ideologies. When counter ideologies, 
however, become more prominent, they can make the dominant ideologies more visible as 
well. 
* Meat eating related practices and ideologies 
The dominant ideology as regards eating animals is carnism (Joy, 2010),277 and what can be 
called counter ideologies in this regard are meatways such as veganism, vegetarianism, or 
flexitarianism. Although, not every person needs to be engaged in an ideology through his or 
her eating practices, many practices do contain elements of ideologies, such as certain value 
priorities, and “consuming animal meat is related to [carnism ideology], just as a plant-based 
diet is related to beliefs regarding veganism or vegetarianism” (Monteiro et al., 2017:59). It 
is also clear that veganism and vegetarianism as counter ideologies tend to be more visible 
than carnism. Flexitarianism may contain some ideological elements even when this 
meatway is not named (i.e. with people eating meat only occasionally but not identifying 
themselves or their behaviour through this practice), but it is likely to become somewhat 
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more ideological once called “flexitarianism”. However, the naming can have its benefits, as 
discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  
On the other hand, naming carnism draws attention to the relationship of eating meat to not 
eating meat, and to how meat eating is supported discursively (Welch, personal 
communication, 5 September 2017). Being a dominant ideology, carnism is also part of the 
dominant social paradigm. The new meats, such as cell-based meat, are argued by some 
(e.g. Miller, 2012) to support the dominant social paradigm, in this case, the importance of 
meat, and implicitly also the idea of continued exploitation of animals.278  
Monteiro et al. (2017) attempt to quantitatively measure carnism as an ideology,279 using a 
two-way structure between carnistic defence and carnistic dominance. Carnistic defence is 
about defending the practice of eating animals, while also not wanting to harm animals as 
such. Typically this involves cognitive dissonance, strategic ignorance and various coping 
mechanisms, especially seeing meat as Necessary, Normal and Nice. Carnistic dominance is 
about supporting the killing of animals for meat, seeing meat eating as Natural, and typically 
this can involve being indifferent (not strategically ignorant) to the fate of animals, and 
possibly to other negative sides of the practice of eating animals. Monteiro and colleagues 
also link carnistic domination in their study to other social domination behaviour (as do 
Dhont & Hodson, 2014), while strongly emphasizing that not all meat eaters would subscribe 
to such ideology: “carnism and meat eating are not synonymous, and it is important to 
distinguish between the behaviour (killing and eating animals) and the ideology associated 
with it (carnism)” (idem: 53). 
In Section 3.3.1, I discussed the idea of seeing different ways to eat or not eat animals on a 
continuum (from Jallinoja et al., 2016). Figure 3.8 illustrates this continuum, from the point 
of view of meat eating related practices at an individual level, but also from the ideological 
point of view.280  
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 On the other hand, the new meatways can offer a softer, more flexible counter point to conventional 
animal-based meat eating than vegetarianism and veganism have been able to do. 
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 Their study aims to empirically study what Joy (2010) concluded theoretically. 
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 This continuum is in fact a conceptual metaphor, and metaphors can carry their own ideologies. So may this 
one. 
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Figure 3.8. The continuum and journey of different meatways 
 
Source: Figure by author. The idea of such a continuum is however present in literature (see Jallinoja et al., 2016). 
Note: The positions of the vertical lines offer a rough estimation of the closeness of the meatways, also from an 
ideological point of view. 
In Figure 3.8, I distinguish between an individual and a societal carnist, whereby an individual 
carnist would express carnistic dominance (Monteiro et al., 2017) and a societal carnist 
would express carnistic defence. Societal carnists prefer to eat meat on a regular (often 
daily) basis, out of a habit, a social convention, or because meat is Nice. At the same time, 
these people are often somewhat uneasy about their diet, and therefore employ coping 
strategies. A societal carnist has normalized regular meat eating, usually as a small child. 
Societies tend to be supportive of carnism, both as a practice and as an ideology, but as 
Monteiro and colleagues believe, not all meat eaters would support carnism as an ideology. 
Individual carnists, however, would likely do so. Regardless of differences between 
individuals, the fact that the ideology is supported by most societies, makes eating animals 
easier, and not eating them harder. 
Carnistic values per se, are argued to comprise values such as: tradition, conformity and 
security (with social focus), and power, achievement and hedonism (with personal focus) 
(Suveri, 2016; see also Figure 3.5). These carnistic values are more likely to be prioritized by 
individual carnists than by societal carnists. Notably sustainability facilitating values, as 
defined in this thesis, are not present among these carnistic values. 
The following will include some final points for this chapter on critical discourse analysis, 
particularly as regards research on social practices, a less common combination.281 
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3.5.4. Critical discourse analysis 
Van Dijk (2015:467) understands critical discourse analysis to focus “primarily on social 
problems and political issues rather than the mere study of discourse structures outside 
their social and political contexts”. He also sees such analysis of social problems as usually 
multidisciplinary. Further, van Dijk understands critical discourse analysis necessarily 
bridging the gap conventionally perceived between the micro and macro levels of society, 
also in terms of discourses.282 As especially stronger social practice theories do not perceive 
such a gap to begin with (see Section 3.1.1), critical discourse analysis can be seen fitting 
ontologically with social practice theories.  
Van Dijk (2015:479) also laments that no proper theory of critical discourse analysis exists 
yet: “despite a large number of empirical studies […], the details of the multidisciplinary 
theory of critical discourse analysis that should relate discourse and action to cognition and 
society are still on the agenda”. My conceptual and analytical configurations fit to this area, 
in relating discourse and action (social practices) to cognition (cognitive frames), and the 
related notions of values, emotions and knowledge. 
Wodak (2014:304) argues that the "critical" in critical discourse analysis has three 
dimensions. Firstly, critical discourse analysis may attempt to make "explicit the implicit 
relationship between discourse, power, and ideology, challenging surface meanings, and not 
taking anything for granted". Secondly, being critical in critical discourse analysis includes 
being self-reflective and self-critical, criticising the "critical". Thirdly, critical discourse 
analysis often aims to contribute to social change. 
As Chapter 4 will explain further, I carry out my analysis in Chapter 5 mainly at three levels, 
starting from more basic content analysis, and, via the middle level that focuses on frames, 
ending with some sociological analysis. Frame analysis is a frequently used method in critical 
discourse analysis, in particular because of its ability to bring out otherwise possibly hidden 
meanings, values and ideologies (Paltridge, 2006). I would also argue that a focus on frames 
in analysing discourses on and within social practices highlights the extent to which 
ideologies can be coupled with social practices. 
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order. Power, dominance, and inequality between social groups are typically terms that belong to a macro-
level of analysis.” (van Dijk, 2015:468). 
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The first notion behind the critical discourse analysis in this thesis is that discourses are 
integral to social practices (Fairclough, 2001a), and discourses also determine practices to a 
large extent, especially due to their influence on cognitive frames and general 
understandings. Critical discourse analysis focuses largely on the relationship between 
discourses and power relations in society, and attempts to contribute to solving societal 
problems. The focus may be on power in discourse (struggle over interpretations of 
meaning) or power over discourse (“access to the stage”). While not forgetting those, I focus 
also on the third kind of power discussed by Wodak (2014), power of discourse itself 
(influence of macro-structures of meaning, or of frames) over societies and social practices. 
Fairclough (2015) also refers to power behind discourse which includes ideologies as power 
behind the discourse, and is therefore related to the power of discourse. My data analysis (in 
Chapter 5) explores frames in a real life discourse context, while my conceptual analysis (in 
this chapter) explores the power of frames as an element of social practices, among other 
things. I consider the uncovering and reassessment of this kind of power critical for a 
transformation towards more sustainable social practices. 
The next and last section of this chapter will still discuss power and agency in different 
forms. 
3.6. Power and agency 
Much, but not all, of what I will discuss in this section has already been covered before in 
this chapter. Power and agency are, nevertheless, critical in relation to purposive changes in 
social practices, or society at large, and therefore, I recap the relevant issues here.  
To start with, however, I will briefly discuss differences between power and agency. 
Sahakian and Wilhite (2014:28) reference Ortner (1989) for a definition of agency as “the 
capability or power to be the source and originator of acts”. I see agency as focused on an 
actor, usually human, and additionally, agency is usually directed towards change (usually 
positive from the point of view of the actor). Agency is therefore mostly centered on human-
induced intentional change. On the other hand, power can be about human or non-human 
actor, or an entity, maintaining the status quo, about curbing change, as well as about 
furthering change, therefore it can be agentive or non-agentive (dominative) power. Power 
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is therefore a more general and neutral term.283 In line with Sahakian and Wilhite (2014), I 
believe that agentive power is therefore similar to agency, but it can also be applied to non-
human entities, such as materials, discourses, etc., furthering change in some form. Agency 
is the human form of agentive power, and implies intention. In any particular context, 
agentive power (of a non-human entity) and agency (of a human actor) can also work in 
opposite directions. 
In the next sections, I will discuss different forms of power and agency relevant to changing 
social practices. 
3.6.1. Non-agentive (dominative) power 
As regards power and social practices more generally, a criticism social practice theories 
have sometimes received is not focusing on power enough (e.g. Hargreaves, 2011; Weenink 
& Spaargaren, 2016). Watson (2017) offers a defence by saying that although, for example, 
Shove et al. (2012)284 do not focus on power, power is ubiquitous in practices - and therefore 
not necessarily discussed. He goes on saying that especially the interconnectedness of 
different practices across different sites, large or small, is important in terms of power. 
Indeed several authors focus on this power of networks of practices, what can be seen as the 
“structure” in a flat practice theory ontology.285 Weenink and Spaargaren (2016:77) call this 
network an “enormous vibrant web of interconnected practices” that intermesh, overlap 
and connect. This seems a useful way to solve the conflict between flat and non-flat 
ontologies, i.e. seeing structure as the power of networks of practices. 
Several authors also connect the dominative power of interconnected practices to the 
challenges of transforming practices (e.g. Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016), especially from the 
point of view of potentially motivated and empowered individuals involved in such practices 
(Halkier, 2010; Verain et al., 2015). To Halkier (2010) in particular, challenged consumption, 
seen as practices, should be understood so that both the optimistic position where 
individuals can change things, and the pessimistic position where they cannot, may be 
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 Power can also be negative or positive, so to speak, so that commonly desired change would be seen as 
related to positive power of a human or non-human entity, and vice versa. 
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 The third author of Shove et al. (2012) is Watson himself. 
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 Warde (2014:295) argues that a “strong theory of practices will insist that structural characteristics are 
nothing other than the effects of the intermingling of many practices”. 
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wrong. People can (and want to) change things, but the “messy” everyday contexts make it 
difficult. 
Further, the restrictive power of practices lies not only in the interconnected network 
aspect, but also within the elements of particular practices. For example, we can only 
achieve what we can imagine possible (general understandings), we can only use or employ 
what is available (materialities, infrastructures), and we can only do what we are able to 
(competencies). This, in a way, connects to the iceberg metaphor for individual practices in 
Figure 3.2, whereby one reason practices are hard to change lies in the invisible main part of 
practices, consisting of all the elements. 
To look at a specific interconnected mesh of practices, meat production - comprised of 
bundles of large-scale practices - and meat “consumption” - comprised of bundles of 
smaller-scale practices - usually connect at the consumption junction (shop, restaurant, etc.). 
Each side holds its own restrictive powers, but one can also compare the two sides. As 
discussed in Chapter 2, the power relations between production and consumption in the 
meat system is often presented in societal discourses as consumption (demand) holding 
power over production, although many argue that it is the production (marketing, spread of 
industrial animal agriculture and supermarkets etc., and the related lobbying) holding power 
over consumption. With the new meatways, it could be that there is a more equal power 
relationship between production and consumption, as with the new meats, producers would 
be pressed to respond to a need towards more sustainable production and products, and 
away from the current meat system, and with strong flexitarianism the idea of continued 
growth of production or profits would be challenged. This in fact, would then relate to 
collective human agency, discussed further below. 
3.6.2. Agentive power 
Regarding the issue of agency and agentive power and social practice theories (see e.g. 
Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016), it may be that some of the differences, especially between 
the stronger and weaker versions of the theories, partly rise from the history of practice 
theories in the context of sustainable consumption being a reaction against behaviour 
change policies. In part, due to this history, social practice theorists may sometimes see 
agency narrowly defined as only being about individual human agency, rather than about 
 
 
170 
 
collective agency in humans. Welch and Warde (2015) note indeed that collective agency 
has largely been ignored in social practice theories. Non-human agentive power is, however, 
often considered relevant to social practices. 
Sahakian and Wilhite (2014) discuss agentive power within practices through the concept of 
distributed agentive power within the pillars of practices.286 Below I will focus on three 
separate aspects of such distributed agentive power, namely linked to discourses and 
general understandings, to materialities, and to human actors. There are also several 
linkages between these spheres, which makes it impossible to separate them entirely. In 
short, the agentive power in discourses and general understandings can make people aware, 
reduce strategic ignorance and provide emotional agency; the agentive power in 
materialities makes change practically achievable; and the agentive power (agency) in 
humans, collectively or not, makes the actual purposive change possible. 
Discourses and general understandings  
As I discussed in Section 3.5.4, power in terms of discourses has many faces, but the one 
most relevant for the context of this thesis is the agentive power of discourses. This includes 
what relates to discourses. 
Earlier in this chapter, I argued for the agentive power of discursive consciousness, on the 
one hand, and of discursively open practices, on the other. Much of this connects to human 
agency, and in fact, it is discursive consciousness of human “practitioners” that can create 
discursively open practices which in turn may be more susceptible to purposive change. 
Below are some of the links to literature. 
Huddard-Kennedy et al. (2015) perceive discursive consciousness of and within social 
practices creating agency. Halkier (2010) also notes that some of the interventions by 
governments, companies or NGOs into unsustainable practices can be on purpose to initiate 
discourses which can then open practices up for revision, in other words, create what I call 
discursively open practices.  
Further, arguably discourses on the new meatways, in a way, push people to reflect on their 
practices, and with that, make political choices, by consuming politically (e.g. less meat), or 
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not, with the point being that discourses in a way force people to make choices, especially 
since not making a choice is also a choice.  
Weenink and Spaargaren (2016) make a case for changes in emotionally charged general 
understandings, shared by several practices, helping to overcome the dominative power of 
the interconnectedness of practices. As argued earlier in this chapter, such general 
understandings are not only an element of practices, but connect practices to discourses. 
Lastly, individual words can have agentive power. For example, Chung et al. (2016) examine 
the difference between terms for certain kind of ground meat whereby those reading about 
“lean finely textured beef” were less concerned about risks related to ground meat than 
those reading about “pink slime” (an alternative term sometimes used for this type of meat 
by the media). Similarly, the new meanings of meat, such as those discussed in Section 3.3.1, 
may have agentive power to impact general understandings, and therefore also practices. 
One could also argue that discourses on the new meatways, in a way, push people to reflect 
on their practices, and with that, make political choices, by consuming politically (e.g. less 
meat), or not, with the point being that people are forced to make choices, especially since 
not making a choice is also a choice.  
Materialities 
Social practice theories (Shove et al., 2012e.g. ) refer to Bruno Latour and Actor Network 
Theory in that material things have agentive power. Although they lack “intelligibility, 
intentionality and affectivity”, materialities can have performative power to influence the 
ways practices unfold (Weenink & Spaargaren, 2016:66).  
As in the example I have given in Section 3.3.1, the first cell-based meat hamburger cooked 
in London in 2013 can be seen as having had agentive power to change discourses, cognitive 
frames and general understandings (e.g. in terms of what meat is). Together with other 
material developments – including the parallel development of the new plant-based meat 
products, and the attempts to popularize insect eating in the Global North – that took place 
in parallel and soon after the first cell-based meat hamburger, there have been concrete 
changes in the related industries. Further, although it is not known yet how many people 
have changed their meat eating related practices due to the new plant-based meat products, 
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such as the Impossible Burger, it is likely that some have.287 Also insect eating as a new 
option may have changed the practices of some people. Some may have also changed their 
practices due to the new discourses brought on partly by these new developments. So, far, 
however, the most significant change from this particular material agentive power has been 
at the level of discourses, arguably in cognitive frames and general understandings. 
Emotional and collective human agency 
To Weenink and Spaargaren (2016), practices produce emotional energy, and this turns into 
emotional agency in humans. Weenink and Spaargaren, however, see this mostly as 
collective emotional agency which, importantly, has potential to both transform and 
maintain new practices (an example given by Weenink and Spaargaren is the vegan 
movement).  
Further, as argued before, acknowledging ambivalence about conflicting values and 
emotions can, in some situations at least, lead to a sense of agency.288 Lertzman’s concept of 
environmental melancholia (Lertzman, 2015) can, in a way, be seen as the opposite of the 
emotional agency potentially gained from social practices. In environmental melancholia, 
not acknowledging emotions regarding, for example, environmental destruction or climate 
change, leads to disempowerment, and vice versa, a process of acknowledging these 
emotions can lead to empowerment and a sense of agency. 
Apart from collective emotional agency, others have also argued for the potential of 
collective agency for change in social practices. As mentioned above, Huddard-Kennedy et 
al. (2015) point to its potential through discursive consciousness. Further, Spaargaren et al. 
(2012) and van Otterloo (2012) discuss human agency from a transition theory point of view.  
To them, individual consumers collectively “put alternative views and practices on the map” 
and other societal actors, such as producers and retailers, can then take notice and 
incorporate changes in their professional practices. Spaargaren et al. (2012) also refer to a 
tipping point after which a social movement is large enough to impact the system as such.289 
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 Data on any concrete changes at the level of eating practices is still lacking, however, and therefore, we can 
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 From the point of view of addressing collective strategic ignorance (see van der Weele, 2013), collective 
agency would need to be harnessed. 
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Van Otterloo (2012) uses a phrase “frappez, frappez toujours” which refers to keeping at it, 
repeating your point (individually or collectively) until something desirable happens.290 
Finally, on collective agency, O’Brien (2018) also discusses tackling all the dimensions of 
systemic transformation, from systems and practices to worldviews, collectively. In this 
process, individuals shift from being objects (to be changed) to being subjects. 
Non-collective (individual) human agency 
Last, and to many practice theorists the least, is the thorny issue of individual human agency 
which requires a few comments. There are basically two potential forms of individual human 
agency in connection with social practices; one is acting as a regular individual and having 
power to transform one’s own practices, and the other is to act as a change agent, 
transforming practices either from within or from the outside, together with others or alone.  
Social practice theories tend to dismiss individual agency, although, as discussed in the 
above subsections, and earlier in this chapter, individuals can be seen to have certain 
amount of agency. In short, as Halkier (2010) argues, individual agency has to be seen in the 
“messy” context of the everyday performances of practices. Furthermore, in some practices, 
such as meat eating related practices, individuals can be seen to have more potential for 
agency than in some other practices, more restricted by the general interconnectedness of 
practices. Halkier and Holm (2008) also refer to environmentally challenged food 
consumption - such as eating vegetarian or organic food - as its own type of practice, 
showing political everyday agency, with the qualifying criteria of intentionality and 
autonomy. Eating in line with the new meatways can be seen similarly political. 
As regards how the publics feel about individual agency and responsibility, the meat 
consumption related focus group research by Wellesley et al. (2015) indicates that although 
in the United Kingdom and the United States, people might not take personal responsibility 
for causing climate change, for example, through having eaten large amounts of beef, they 
do (especially in the United States) seem to believe in individual agency. Further, in Brazil 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Chenoweth has argued for an even lower percentage of 3.5% of active participants in civil resistance bringing 
about transformative societal change (see https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2019/02/why-nonviolent-
resistance-beats-violent-force-in-effecting-social-political-change/). 
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and China, personal responsibility for action was also acknowledged among the focus group 
participants, and people seemed to be more open to modifying their behaviour accordingly. 
The other way individual agency can have an effect is through the concept of change agent, 
collectively, or individually. As O’Brien argues, 
Directly recognizing and engaging people as agents of change can drastically 
speed up […] transformation processes because everyone is part of a system, 
and everyone has a sphere of influence. Activating conscious human agency 
that is critically reflective of individual and shared assumptions, beliefs and 
paradigms is a powerful way to shift norms and institutions in ways that 
support [a transformation]. 
O’Brien (2018:158) 
Individual change agents are discussed in detail by Sahakian and Wilhite (2014) in 
connection with several real life cases of collectively changed practices. Further, Jallinoja et 
al. (2016) discuss the power of certain societal actors, such as NGOs, politicians, celebrity 
chefs and teachers of home economics, in potentially affecting change in meat eating 
related practices. Finally, Verain et al. (2015) discuss the topic in terms of individual 
consumers (however, considering their constraints), for example, in terms of flexitarians 
creating change in their own particular environments. Further, individual action may actually 
lead to political change: "reformation of the self, including our behaviours as consumers, can 
inspire, inform and sustain political and cultural action".291 
3.6.3. Ought implies can 
A general principle in ethics states that ought implies can (Voget-Kleschin et al., 2015). In 
other words, we cannot claim that something needs to be done on moral grounds, if it is 
impossible, on cognitive, physical or psychological grounds. Certain amount of agency is 
required for responsibility to be given. The “ethical core issue regarding sustainable 
consumption” is the question of whether individuals are responsible for changing their 
practices as regards sustainability (idem:118). Voget-Kleschin and colleagues do see 
changing one’s lifestyle, in order to contribute one’s fair share, as one of the three core 
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duties for individuals as regards sustainable consumption.292 Importantly, however, this 
assumes that changing lifestyle does not overburden individuals. 
Further, the cognitive and psychological hurdles for most individuals prevent the issue from 
being a felt responsibility (Luchs & Miller, 2015), as part of co-responsibility for sustainability 
shared by all societal actors. However, through the different sources of agentive power 
discussed in this Section 3.6, it may be possible to also tackle the problem of strategic 
ignorance. The example of conscious flexitarians (Verain et al., 2015) acknowledging co-
responsibility, and using their political agency (Halkier & Holm, 2008) indicates that there are 
possibilities reflecting and applying the ought implies can -principle. 
Although practice theories have tended to argue against individual responsibility, Welch and 
Warde (2015:94) call for constructing “a plausible set of connections between the habits and 
routines of everyday life and lay normativity and collective mobilization”. The new social 
norms Andrews (2018) sees as necessary, to allow  people to express more emotion 
regarding the overwhelming issues of environmental destruction and threats such as climate 
change, could also be part of this, enabling cognitive and emotional labour to resolve 
strategic ignorance. 
3.7. Conclusion and discussion 
This conceptual chapter has covered a lot of ground in an interdisciplinary manner. First, I 
discussed different approaches to sustainability transformation, while focusing on social 
practice theories in more detail. Subsequently, I presented my social practice framework as a 
graph, and then proceeded to explain it, especially focusing on the parts that relate to my 
particular areas of interest here, namely the connections between practices and discourses 
in relation to change towards sustainability. The corresponding elements of general 
understandings (on the side of practices) and cognitive frames (on the side of discourses) 
form the main connection. Values, emotions and knowledge importantly link to both of 
them. Discursive consciousness of conflicts between values, emotions and knowledge, as 
well as discursive consciousness of practices themselves is a necessary step towards 
discursively open practices which may subsequently be open to purposive transformation. 
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 The other two duties are: duties to comply (with institutions aiming for more sustainable consumption), and 
duties to promote (institutions, e.g. with political action, but also by example). 
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As regards values, I emphasized the importance of seeing societal, and especially individually 
held values relating to specific behaviour, as not static, but as differently ordered value 
priorities, partly doing away with the value-action gap concept. I also explored the many 
ways that values and emotions connect, not the least in the form of strategic ignorance of 
value and emotion conflicts, as well as ignorance of the related knowledge. I also stressed 
the importance of discourses in defining current practices, especially through various 
dominant ideologies often carried by cognitive frames, and in potentially leading to the 
unbundling and rebundling of discursively open practices. At the end of the chapter, I also 
recapped the potential for (distributed) agentive power in social practices and the related 
discourses, and discussed the ethics-based ought implies can principle for co-responsibility 
for sustainable societies.  
I consider the sustainability facilitating values - including co-responsibility, concern for, and 
unity with nature, social justice and equality - to be relevant especially at the societal level, if 
and when embedded in discourses and societal master frames, ideologies and paradigms. 
Societal value priorities can influence individual value dispositions, and vice versa, and as 
social practice theories would agree - with some supporting evidence from empirical 
research - doing can influence thinking, as well as the other way around. In other words, we 
need not necessarily first prioritize, for example, nature related values in order to act in 
ways that support the wellbeing of nature, but while doing so, our individual value 
dispositions may also change.  
Central concepts in this chapter, strategic ignorance and discursive consciousness tend to 
work in opposite directions. Although somewhat uncomfortably, strategic ignorance helps 
people keep the status quo, while discursive consciousness may offer opportunities for 
acknowledging the ambivalence regarding conflicting values and emotions, and thereby 
reflecting on practices with a more open and critical eye. Even strategic ignorance, however, 
although problematic, may be better, from the point of view of change, than true ignorance, 
as strategic ignorance may already include a sense of responsibility (Onwezen & van der 
Weele, 2016), even if this responsibility is ignored. 
Generally speaking, strategic ignorance may be an appropriate reaction in some issues – for 
example, we cater to terrorism, if we do not ignore it to an extent - but it is problematic in 
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connection with many other societal issues, such as threats from climate change in general, 
and destruction of nature and its biodiversity through industrial animal agriculture in 
particular. As stated earlier in this chapter, strategic ignorance can therefore be seen directly 
in opposition to sustainability, as ignoring knowledge, and the related value and emotion 
conflicts, or difficult emotions as such, all help maintain unsustainability. Problems do not 
exist when they are ignored, so to speak. Addressing strategic ignorance - also through 
addressing values and emotions - is therefore vital. 
The above also links to the importance of societal discourses reflecting the “norms, 
standards and institutions” which Warde (2014:295) hopes to be a focus for social practice 
theoretical research in the future. Although Warde believes in the near constant presence of 
practical rather than discursive consciousness in the everyday lives of people, discourses do 
reflect the rare instances of deliberation where changes can be instigated at any level of 
societies, including questioning the dominant social paradigms or master frames, and the 
dominant ideologies that often tend to invisibly restrict purposive change. Analysing 
discourses may also partly help address the concern of Welch and Warde (2015) as regards 
the focus of social practice theoretical research largely staying at the micro-level of practice 
performances, and therefore it not being able to offer fully persuasive conceptual answers 
to policymakers on how to make societal change. 
Further on policymaking, Shove et al. (2012) see the main benefit of social practice theories 
in their ability to redefine policy issues. Moreover, they see policymaking successfully 
changing practices, and behaviour with it when it: addresses all main elements of practices 
(including worldviews and meanings); involves also non-policy actors; recognises the 
unpredictability of the process of practice transformation, and the perpetually moving 
targets for change; and builds networks and coalitions that facilitate the formation of new 
practices. Shove and colleagues ponder that one solution to unsustainable practices could be 
getting rid of bad practice elements, such as meat, or the valuing of convenience, in 
particular, since policymakers “often have a hand in influencing the range of elements in 
circulation” (idem:19). While trying to provoke and engender “a transition in dominant 
paradigms” (ibid.), Shove and colleagues wish for an explicitly practice-oriented approach to 
public policy.  
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As social practice theories argue, change is constant. However, humans do have a power to 
“change the change” (O'Brien, 2012:590), although this requires both agency and 
responsibility, and addressing the “conscious and unconscious assumptions, beliefs, values, 
identities, and emotions of individuals and groups that influence perceptions, 
interpretations, and actions” (idem: 589). Using social practices theories on analysing 
societal challenges as well as their potential solutions may be valuable - especially when 
adapted, as in this chapter, to include discourses, and when allowing for some emphasis on 
distributed agentive power. 
Chapter 6 will reflect back on this chapter in connection with both my overall conceptual 
research task and my more specific research question. 
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4. Data and methods 
4.1. Introduction  
I introduced critical discourse analysis - my main methodological approach - already in 
Chapter 3, as it forms an important part of the framework intended to both fulfil the 
research task set in Chapter 1, and provide the conceptual background to the empirical 
analysis in Chapter 5. In this chapter, I will therefore focus more on the actual methods of 
carrying out the empirical analysis to answer my research question, in addition to other 
necessary considerations regarding data and its analysis. This introductory section will first 
discuss philosophical assumptions consistent with the applied methodology, as well as 
assumptions about the data, and then move on to briefly describe the means used to 
manage both the data and the progression of the research. In Section 4.2, I will justify my 
choice for the type of data I have, go over the process of choosing, collecting and processing 
my final data, give a brief overview of it, as well as talk through the preliminary analysis of it. 
Further, in Section 4.3, I will explain the main characteristics of the methods used. Section 
4.4 will discuss the necessary questions of quality as regards the methodology and methods, 
and finally, Section 4.5 will conclude the chapter. 
4.1.1. Philosophical considerations 
A methodology can be simply defined as the combination of methods with (compatible) 
positions on the nature of reality – ontology - and the ways in which we come to know 
reality - epistemology (Fierke, 2004). Herrera and Braumoeller (2004:16) see discourse 
analysis uniting “epistemology to ontology in that [it] asks how we came to know the 
representations (words, phrases, language, gestures, etc.) that we claim constitute reality”. 
Since discourse, how we talk, and what we talk about, defines what we see and constructs 
our experienced reality (e.g. Schreier, 2012), analysis of discourse attempts to uncover that 
reality and the production of it. This is the critical realist position (the position adopted in 
this thesis) whereby the world exists even if we don’t know of it. There is an experienced 
reality and an actual reality separate from each other. We construct our experienced reality, 
and this is then subject to revision, e.g. involving theories of the actual reality.  Although 
revision of such theories does not change actual reality, our constructed reality influences 
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nonetheless our actions, and therefore, through our actions, it also influences the actual 
reality (Bazeley, 2013).293  
Although the basic goal of discourse analysis stays the same - to analyse how discourse 
constructs experienced reality - there are two traditions: one which is more descriptive and 
linguistic, and the other which is critical discourse analysis, introduced already in Chapter 3 
as the main methodological approach for the data analysis in this thesis.  
4.1.2. Two basic assumptions about the data 
There are some assumptions about the data analysed in this thesis, partly arising from the 
assumptions in the previous section, partly relevant to the type of discourse data used.  
Firstly, as meaning is a central concept in this thesis, I will give it some context here. Arising 
from the discussion in the previous section (and previous chapter), meaning is culturally 
determined. Once something (an experience, an object, a way of behaving) becomes 
“defined and labelled, we tend to interpret it in the terms ascribed to that label and to 
neglect features from a wider perspective that don't fit" (Bazeley, 2013:22). In the context of 
my data, for example, the meaning of “meat” is culturally – temporally and contextually – 
determined. Discourse, from a sociological point of view, is about filling reality with meaning 
(Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). 
Secondly, also arising from the previous section, what someone says within a discourse is 
not assumed as a fact – in the world in general, or for that person – but a component (a 
“true component”) of the discourse in question (Keller, 2013). We cannot look directly inside 
the minds by asking people what they think, as what people express as their attitudes 
depends on the situation (Billig, 2009). Wilson et al. (2004) conclude from their rhetorical 
study on motivations of vegetarians that since meat eating continues to be normative, and 
ethical motivations of not eating meat are still stigmatized, the motivations given within the 
discourse are about fitting the right arguments in the right places: "It is not a case of health 
or ethics, but rather what serves the purpose of accounting for preference best in a 
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 This is by no means the only way discourse analysts can approach ontology and epistemology. In a strict 
version of constructivism, the world exists only in our construction of it, and since there are many 
constructions, there are also many realities. Similarly to the critical realist position, however, the construction 
of reality occurs through discourse (Bazeley, 2013). 
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particular argumentative context" (idem:579). However, the point of exploring the discourse 
is to cover what is true within that discourse. As such, my analysis can only discover partial 
truths about the discourses reflected in the data (for example, that they are seemingly rich); 
however, it can better discover truths within the discourses examined. More assumptions as 
regards the type of discourse data analysed in this thesis will be included in Section 4.2. 
4.1.3. Management of data and research process 
Over the time period that I worked on this PhD project, I used a variety of methods to keep 
track of plans, ideas, processes, decisions, data, and so forth, both in digital and non-digital 
form. The main documents created were:  
 Notes on issues related to the research process 
 Audit trail and more general notes on methods 
 Data plan and overview of final data 
 Detailed track record of all final data 
 Hand-drawn sketches of the discourses and the conceptual framework 
 Notes on the used literature in Endnote 
 A variety of additional notes as regards both analysis and theoretical concepts. 
Additionally I used the MAXQDA software294 to aid data management, coding and analysis. 
Especially valuable was the ability to create individual comments (“memos”) on codes, 
coded segments and any interesting parts of the textual data in general, as well as a logbook, 
in my case used to create summaries of the different discussion threads within the data. I 
also generated several additional Excel files from MAXQDA to assist in the data analysis. The 
final data itself was downloaded from the Guardian website into Word, processed there, and 
then imported to MAXQDA. Section 4.2.3 will explain more about my using the software. 
The above description of the various aids used may give the image of a more orderly process 
than the real progression of the project was at several points in time. Bazeley (2013) makes 
the point that indeed a “messy” process – going back and forth between theory, data, 
research questions, methodology, and so forth - is normal for qualitative research. The aids I 
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 Version 11. See https://www.maxqda.com. 
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employed all proved useful and necessary also from this point of view, and greatly helped 
me to keep the tasks moving further and the project coming to an end.  
Last but not least, I used some literature to guide the research process and data analysis. 
The most useful guide for data analysis has been Bazeley (2013). Other literature used in 
data analysis is referenced elsewhere when appropriate.295, 296  
4.2. Data choice, processing and preliminary analysis 
In this section, I will explore the character of online news media, describe and justify the 
particular data chosen for this project, as well as explain how I handled it prior to the 
analysis proper. To start with, however, Table 4.1 shows a brief overview of the data, all 
from the UK based online Guardian newspaper. 
Table 4.1. Overview of the data from the Guardian 
Theme Date of online 
publication 
Title of the article  
Number of reader 
comments 
included in data  
Cell-based 
meat 
20 Sep 2017 Could lab-grown fish and meat feed the world – 
without killing a single animal? 
154 
Plant-based 
meat 
2 Jun 2016 It looks like a burger, tastes like a burger – but 
it's a plant 
153 
Insects 5 Nov 2015 Insects should be part of a sustainable diet in 
future, says report 
147 
Flexitarianism 25 Jun 2017 Vegans, vegetarians and now… reducetarians 153 
 
4.2.1. Online news media 
A large part of current and recent public discourses around meat eating – explored in 
general in Chapter 2 – take place online, frequently within online news media. Although 
there are clear differences between on- and offline new media, much of the traditional role 
of news media and media discourse holds online as well. What counts as news in the media 
has an agenda-defining function, and is a product shaped by political, economic and cultural 
forces (van Dijk, 2015). Even just the belief that the media has influence on attitudes and 
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 Additionally, of course, several people have been of great assistance. They are mentioned in the 
Acknowledgements. 
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For the structure of some of the chapters in this thesis, I used a guide by Lynch (2014). 
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actions can already produce an impact (e.g. on political actions), regardless of the actual 
direct impact of the media (McNair, 1998). In other words, this belief is another way the 
media contributes to agenda setting. Further, the audiences of news media often tend to 
hear what they want to hear, and interpret content according to their pre-existing views, 
sometimes leading to misunderstanding or misremembering of news (Bell, 1991), a 
phenomenon also known as confirmation bias. 
In the online news environment, reader comments become part of the news stories 
(Cambria, 2011; Shanahan, 2010). In an interactive process between readers and texts, 
readers tend to create their own meanings, rather than accept ready meanings (Lehtonen, 
2000). In the online environment, this is extended, so that old meanings may be confirmed 
or new meanings created in the interplay, not only between news articles and their readers, 
but also between posters and their readers.297 Cambria (2011:135) refers to a new type of 
news genre, the article-cum-comments genre whereby, with the possibility to comment on 
online news, the “entire processes of producing, accessing, and perceiving news is […] 
undergoing fundamental changes as regards the activities of representing, construing and 
experiencing news”. Similar to Letters-to-the-Editor (see Hogan, 2006), reader comments are 
argued to influence opinions of other readers (Henrich & Holmes, 2013) and affect 
perceptions of what the public opinion on a particular matter is, what “my” opinion is as a 
reader, and indeed what the actual news is (Lee, 2012).298 The comments may even have 
more influence on the readers than the actual articles (Yang, 2008).299 
In the online article-cum-comments environment, the confirmation bias of readers 
mentioned above has an additional function in that it can lead to a more polarized discourse. 
Although the argument culture to which the media contributes has existed already before 
the internet (Tannen, 1998), online discourses tend to be particularly polarized (e.g. 
Caldwell, 2013; Pavasovic Trost & Kovacevic, 2013). This can both influence the impact such 
discourses have on individuals and on society, and affect the use of instances of such 
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 As well as between the posts and the researcher. 
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 However, unlike Letters-to-the-Editor, online news comments are normally not edited, and are screened 
only for bad language. 
299
 However, considering that few readers would read all of the comments in the cases when they run up to 
hundreds or thousands of individual posts attached to a single news article, this influence can be somewhat 
random and be determined more by the posts appearing at the top. Nonetheless, the posts reflect the 
experienced reality for the readers writing the posts, and this is relevant for analysis. 
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discourses as data for analysis. Caldwell (2013), for example, could not conduct his original 
analysis of online comments due to the large amount of flaming300 in the data. However, he 
employed media play theory to reanalyse his data, and “the seemingly irrational and chaotic 
instances of participation” (idem:504) took on a different meaning and became part of the 
debate.301 Further, Papacharissi (2004:259) argues that, apart from incivility, heated 
discussion as such is not a threat to deliberation, and that “disagreement and anarchy” 
might actually promote democratic emancipation. 
Online discourse has indeed been repeatedly measured against the Habermasian criteria for 
deliberative democracy (see e.g. Dahlberg, 2004, for a discussion), and although some 
studies have found that the criteria are frequently not met in online discussions (e.g. Noci et 
al., 2010), others see more potential in online deliberation for democracy (Manosevitch & 
Walker, 2009; Sampaio & Barros, 2012). 
Flaming and trolling tend to result from the characteristics of online communication such as 
anonymity, lack of status cues and social context, as well as topicality (Diakopoulos & 
Naaman, 2011). These same characteristics can, however, also be beneficial for 
communication. For example, missing social cues can draw in people who would otherwise 
be excluded, and anonymity can equalize the interaction (e.g. Albrecht, 2006). However, 
gender differences do tend to be visible online based on an overview by Herring and Stoeger 
(2014) of two decades of studies on the topic. A characteristic of online discourse is also its 
multimodality (combining text, images, video, hypertext), and that it is spatially and 
temporally fragmented, something atypical for speech; nonetheless, the style of online 
communication is considered closer to speech than writing (Cambria, 2011; Sindoni, 2013). 
Due to the often large amount of rough postings, most journalists are critical of (especially 
anonymous) online comments, but even so, Santana (2011) found in his study that about 
half of journalists had changed their reporting practices, topics, writing, and so forth, as a 
result of online comments. 
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 Flaming is usually understood as hostile, offending commenting online, and trolling as deliberate flaming, 
with the purpose of disrupting or hurting the other participants. 
301
 Play is understood here as something between the concepts of citizen and consumer, and replaces the 
rational citizen (who would not get involved in flaming) with cultural citizen (who might). 
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Despite the downsides and the criticism, many researchers maintain that online news 
comments - as part of Discourse 2.0 (Herring, 2013) - are valuable data. Online news sites 
with their reader comments are seen as “naturally occurring and ecologically valid 
experimental setting” for researchers (Lee, 2012:43). Since a relatively large part of the 
population302 participates in commenting and reading others’ comments, the discussion can 
be seen to reflect a considerable share of people. Although online comments tend to be 
more “impulsive, shallow and aggressive” (Henrich & Holmes, 2013:2) than public opinion 
obtained by more traditional means, Henrich and Holmes among others (e.g. Hancock, 2007; 
Pavasovic Trost & Kovacevic, 2013) argue that they may be providing a more true insight into 
people’s opinions than surveys, interviews or experimental studies,303 potentially providing 
policymakers another input into policymaking.304  
Online discourse data allows for large sample sizes, when necessary, provides for real-time 
data, and has no constraints by researchers as to what is worth mentioning or asking. 
Henrich and Holmes (2011) conclude from their study on online news comments in Canada 
that their results have a high degree of consistence with results from other comparable, but 
offline studies, and believe that this type of data works as stand-alone data, as well as in 
combination with other data sources.  
Further, Barr (2011) claims that analysing online discussion can provide important insight 
into the social construction of issues to do with sustainability, something that policymakers 
could indeed use in making challenging, but necessary policy decisions. A study by Cooper et 
al. (2012) contains one such analysis of the online discussion following a Guardian journalist 
opinion piece on consumption, one conclusion being that the discourse analysed “echoes 
themes and debates within the academic literature” (idem:26). 
As said, media has both real and imagined power to set agendas in society. With the publics 
participating in creating news through their comments, ordinary people take on some of that 
power. Online comment forums “demonstrate the growing power of citizens to influence 
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 For example, a PEW survey published as early (for online commenting) as in 2010 (Purcell et al.) found that 
25% of users of online news in the US had commented. 
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 My data is therefore mainly spontaneous discourse, as opposed to induced discourse, more common in 
sociological research, e.g. in interviews or surveys (Ruiz Ruiz, 2009). 
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 Although one might conclude from this that more polarized opinions might be more “truthful” than less 
polarized opinions, one has to also keep in mind that the online environment tends to have its particular 
polarizing effect which adds on to otherwise more open communication. 
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[the media] in their agenda-setting role” (Santana, 2011:77). Social power rests with those 
who talk and whose talking is listened to through dominant discourses. However, counter 
discourses may turn out to be future dominant discourses (Schreier, 2012). In effect then, 
there are two types of social power: current power and potential (future) power. Through 
their ability to participate in agenda-setting online, the publics also have such potential 
social power. 
4.2.2. Final selection of data 
In addition to what was discussed in the introductory section to this chapter, it can be 
assumed that differences in the kinds of comments the readers of online newspaper articles 
post depend on temporal and contextual factors such as: 
 The type of newspaper (e.g. broadsheet vs. tabloid) 
 The country/culture in which the poster is based (broadly, e.g. Global North vs. 
South, the United States vs. Europe, but also Southern vs. Northern Europe) 
 The overall topic in the newspaper article: some, especially political topics are “hot” 
and tend to get not only more posts, but often also more posts containing flaming or 
trolling305  
 Style and frame of the article itself, including e.g. the metaphors used 
 Certain controversial elements or actors in the article, e.g. “the UN” or “Paul 
McCartney” acting as messengers: such elements tend to invite more derogatory 
posts (“shoot the messenger”) 
 Other contextual issues, such as the time of day the news is published (are people 
reading and commenting at that time the story is new and more visible?), what other 
news are around at the same time, and the personal situation of the poster at the 
time of reading and commenting. 
While working on other aspects of this thesis, I considered various different online discourse 
data sources, in terms of different countries (including different languages), newspapers, 
and specific (meat related) topics. After deciding on the country (the United Kingdom), I then 
examined a large number of newspaper articles and comments from the last decade. During 
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 Meat related topics are often somewhat political, but they still do not get a great deal of derogatory posts 
containing flaming or trolling, at least not in the Guardian newspaper. 
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these phases, I read through a lot of potential data. The main benefit of having gone through 
this search period is that I became quite familiar with the different topics and viewpoints 
and the arguments present in such discourses. I also attempted some initial coding to get a 
feel for what to expect, and for how the coding will work. Having decided on the specific 
topics to include, I continued further to select appropriate examples of the discourses, and 
eventually arrived at the final selection of data. During this last phase, I read through the 
final data in some greater detail to become thoroughly familiar with it. In the following, I will 
justify the choices made, regarding the rough geographical location of the discourses, the 
particular newspaper, topics, actual articles and the kinds of posts included. 
My reasons for choosing Northern discourses on meat eating over Southern ones are three-
fold: one is principal, the other two more practical. First, in the climate mitigation discourse, 
there are two basic ways of “dividing the cake”, or justly distributing “a limited resource that 
no-one owns” in Peter Singer’s words306 - in other words, dividing GHG emissions that stay 
under a critical limit. The principles are the historic principle of justice (e.g. polluter pays), 
and the per capita principle. According to both principles, it is the Northern nations that are 
(most) responsible. Similarly for intensive animal agriculture, it can be argued that both 
principles hold, so that this destructive industry was created in the North (in the United 
States), and only through it, has per capita consumption of meat been able to rise to its 
currently unsustainable levels on a global level. Even though there are some exceptions of 
longer term high meat consuming countries in the South, such as Argentina,307 it is mainly 
through the exportation of intensive farming systems that Southern countries, such as China, 
have been able to increase their consumption of meat animals to the extent that they have.  
Secondly, the first practical reason for my selection of geographical location is that currently 
there are no means of collecting similar online data from the South, as a similar online 
newspaper discussion culture does not (yet) seem to exist in at least the English-speaking 
Southern news media. Based on my quick scan of a number of online English-speaking 
national newspaper content between 2010 and 2016, the news media in the South also has 
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 Peter Singer in his presentation on the ethics of climate change during the Climate change – Views from the 
humanities conference from 3 to 24 May 2016, taking place online. See 
http://ehc.english.ucsb.edu/?page_id=13544. 
307
 Even in Argentina, the high consumption of meat was not indigenous, but largely a consequence of Spanish 
invasion (Boyer, 2016). 
 
 
188 
 
not (yet) contained anywhere close to the same amount of articles on the impacts of eating 
meat, or the alternatives to meat. 
Thirdly, the global transformation of the meat system will quite possibly be a two-way 
cultural exchange, i.e. between the North and the South. Coming from a Northern culture, I 
am looking at the end that is more familiar and understandable to me personally. 
Regarding particular newspapers, Ruiz et al. (2011) divide national (broadsheet) online 
newspapers into two types, 1) communities of debates (such as the New York Times, and the 
Guardian), in which opposite views to the majority are welcomed, and 2) homogenous 
communities (such as Le Monde, El País and La Repubblica), in which the comments are 
often a "collective reproduction of the same positions" (idem:20), i.e. less debate takes 
place. Ruiz and colleagues attribute these differences largely to culture, and conclude that 
“conversations [in the New York Times and the Guardian] showed a greater deal of 
argumentation, respect among participants, and diversity of ideas” (ibid.) than those in the 
other three newspapers. Further, Ruiz et al. concluded that the comments in the first two 
newspapers were closer to the principles of democratic deliberation mentioned above. 
Moreover, Ruiz and colleagues note that the Guardian has the least amount of derogatory 
language out of the five news websites. Finally, their justification for choosing “quality press” 
for their study was that such papers portray themselves “as the main arena for public 
opinion formation” (idem:6).308  
From my own experience, I have also drawn the conclusion that the discussion in the 
Guardian usually has a fairly high quality (reasonably long posts, relatively focused 
discussion, justified arguments, not a lot of flaming), also when compared to another 
popular UK national newspaper, the mid-market tabloid Daily Mail. Comparing these two, 
the Guardian has also had better technical possibilities for discussion between posters over 
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 All five newspapers include moderation in their online commenting, and so, there is probably less 
polarization because of that. Different ways to do moderation (pre-moderation, post-moderation, in-house, 
outsourced) did not seem to make much difference in the study by Ruiz et al. (2011). Also, another feature of 
at least some of these newspapers is that not all stories can be commented on. The Guardian itself says on its 
website that “where comments are likely to add value (for us and other readers) in terms of additional insight, 
perspective or knowledge, and where we have time and resource to be involved in the conversation, we try to 
ensure commenting is turned on”. So the most polarizing topics and articles do not necessarily have 
commenting possibilities. However, the point I wish to make in the text is about the diversity of opinion, 
justifying arguments etc., and this Ruiz et al. (2011) attribute to the culture of the newspapers, or more 
precisely the “the relationship between political systems and journalistic culture” (idem:5). 
 
 
189 
 
the last few years, i.e. it has been easier to comment on others’ posts. Based on my 
experience, such “conversations” can offer relatively rich data.  
The Guardian has a background as an upmarket (i.e. traditionally “broadsheet”) 
newspaper,309 and usually in the United Kingdom, newspaper readership profiles are 
particularly distinct and stable, and go along socioeconomic lines (Bell, 1991). Some of this is 
still valid in the UK online journalism, although the readership profiles are more mixed, also 
geographically.310 Interestingly, however, the readership profiles for all major UK online 
(traditional tabloid and broadsheet) newspapers are similarly divided across socioeconomic 
classes, so that the upper classes form a much larger group of readers of online news than 
the lower classes, whereas for the downmarket tabloid papers (in particular, the Sun and the 
Daily Mirror), the lower socioeconomic classes form a larger proportion of readers for offline 
newspapers than the upper classes do.311,312  
In Chapter 2, I discussed the new meatways as getting a fairly large amount of media 
attention. These are also the chosen specific topics for the Guardian articles comprising my 
data:  cultured meat, plant-based meats, insects and flexitarianism. I also discussed pulses in 
Chapter 2, and in principle, I wanted to include discourse around pulses in my data as well. 
However, as mentioned in Chapter 2, such discourse does not really exist. I therefore 
decided to discuss pulses, and the lack of enthusiasm, in Chapter 2, and include pulses only 
rather indirectly in the flexitarianism discourse, if and when appropriate.  
Henrich and Holmes (2013) emphasize the importance of considering methodological issues 
when using this relatively new type of data, online news commenting, especially for 
qualitative research. They discuss a number of points, and these - and my choices regarding 
them - are:   
 Demographic depth vs. breadth: This is a question between choosing a larger number 
of articles and their comments from a single newspaper, or a smaller number from 
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 Similar to other UK broadsheet papers The Daily Telegraph, The Independent and The Times. 
310
 Based on profiles of e.g. Guardian posters, many posters do live outside the UK, although the majority are 
living in the UK. However online readership may be more international. 
311
 The readership profile for the Daily Mail is similar to the upmarket papers in terms of differences between 
the off- and online versions. However, the differences are not as stark. For example, the offline Daily Mail gets 
proportionally more readers from the lower classes than the upmarket papers do. 
312
 This readership profile information is from Newsworks.org.uk, providing profiles for the UK, downloaded in 
March 2017. 
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several newspapers. As Henrich and Holmes also argue, it is challenging, and perhaps 
ill-advised to try to generalize from a few articles to the whole readership, or in this 
case, to the group of posters for a particular newspaper (of which we know even less, 
as discussed below), and therefore, comparing newspapers does not necessarily 
make sense. Indeed, generalization to a population is not, and could not be the aim 
of my analysis. In the end, I chose four articles from a single newspaper. A larger 
sample would not have allowed for the same depth of analysis. 
 Uncertainty of commenters’ demographics: Profiles of commenters do not 
necessarily match with online or offline readership profiles, and there is lack of 
research in this area. However, Chung (2008) found that for a US newspaper, the 
profiles of posters did match with the profiles of readers. Further, the Guardian did a 
large survey of their posters in 2016, and concluded that two thirds of their posters 
are male, partly attributable to there being slightly more male Guardian readers than 
there are female ones. Nonetheless, male readers are more likely to comment: 21% 
of male Guardian readers said they have commented, whereas only 12% of female 
readers said so.313 In my analysis, I do not make any assumptions about the 
demographics of the posters. 
 Article inclusion criterion: After a long period of considering which articles to include, 
I chose the latest article I found on each topic that included rich enough discussion in 
terms of both the number of posts and their contents.314 Originally, I did several 
keyword searches on the Guardian website (with keywords such as “insect”, 
“cultured meat”, “lab meat”, “synthetic meat”, “in-vitro meat”, “frankenmeat“, 
“plant-based meat”, “impossible burger”, “beyond burger”, “flexitar*” etc.), but as 
mentioned earlier, I also followed the Guardian news over time, and usually caught 
potentially relevant articles before even doing keyword searches. 
 Comment inclusion criterion: After considering several different options, I decided to 
include “topic conversations” only, whereby one topic conversation is one discussion 
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 See How we analysed 70m comments on the Guardian website from 12 April 2016. 
314
 The Guardian article on eating insects was the only one where I doubted whether I should include it, as 
there were fewer and shorter comments than for the other themes. However, there was much less to choose 
from for this theme, and so I went with the original criterion for choosing the latest article that was still 
adequate for my purposes. 
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thread where at least half of the posts are relevant to the topic of interest.315 
Further, I included the around 150 first relevant conversation posts (including the last 
thread entirely, so the number was not exactly 150). Since many Guardian articles on 
controversial topics have especially lately included hundreds or occasionally even a 
thousand or more individual posts, this method does eliminate a lot of posts. 
However, a strict criterion was necessary to allow for depth of analysis. Further, 
some comparable research includes only one post per poster to allow for enough 
diversity of views. However, this method would not have worked in my data, as my 
main criterion was to include posts that are part of a conversation.316 
 Time limited access to comments: Newspapers do not tend to leave comments 
indefinitely to their websites. However, for me this was not a problem. First of all, the 
Guardian does seem to still include all (or most of) the comments since the beginning 
of the possibility for such interaction on their website, and secondly, I did not go back 
in time for very many years for my final data. 
 Using public consensus data (e.g. the up or down arrows next to a post showing 
agreement or disagreement): I decided not to use such data, as to my view it is not 
reliable. It may, at least on occasion, be purely by accident that some posts get lots of 
feedback, and others do not. 
Lastly, a point not mentioned by Henrich and Holmes (2013), but discussed by e.g. Sindoni 
(2013) and Cambria (2011), is to consider whether or not to include multimodality in the 
analysis, in particular visual effects, graphs, photos or videos. There are no videos in the 
articles I chose, but there are a number of photos. Due to time constraints I decided not to 
include the photos in my analysis. I did, however, consider and include in the analysis the 
hyperlinks contained in the reader comments. 
To describe the final selection of data, again, it includes four articles from the Guardian, 
described in detail in Chapter 5, and shown in the overview of Table 4.1, and the first around 
150 relevant posts within topic conversations. The total number of posts included in the data 
is 607. The articles vary somewhat in length, and the number of existing comments to them 
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 “Relevant” here means that the post touched upon at least some arguments related to eating meat, not 
eating meat, or eating meat replacements. 
316
 Shanahan (2010) also included conversation threads only – or conversational episodes - in her data for full 
analysis. 
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varies as well.317 As regards the included threads, the final data consists of 90 different 
discussion threads within the four documents.318,319 This amount of data is comparable to, or 
slightly more than in similar qualitative studies of online comments (e.g. Cooper et al., 2012; 
Sneijder & te Molder, 2005), and less than in quantitative studies of online comments (e.g. 
Henrich & Holmes, 2011) or a quantitative study by Hogan (2006) on Letters-to-the-Editor. 
Before moving on to the next section, I will still briefly discuss an issue not raised in the 
literature I have just discussed, but something that has been in the news since the 2016 US 
presidential elections and the UK Brexit vote. There are clear attempts to manipulate public 
online discourses on certain political issues.320 Additionally, many industries are known to 
have manipulated public discourses on science over decades, e.g. the tobacco and fossil fuel 
industries. It is a possibility that there would also be purposeful attempts to manipulate 
online discourses on newspaper websites by individuals or groups with interests in such 
action, including on topics such as meat eating. Meat is in fact a rather political issue, and 
involves powerful interest groups. This is an unexplored area, to my knowledge. However, 
for the sake of the kind of exploration I carry out in terms of discourses on meat, it may be 
less relevant how and why individual posts come about. More relevant, from the point of 
view of analysing particular discourses, is that all the posts exist, and are therefore part of 
the discourse and part of the news, in the way discussed earlier in this section. If some of 
them are produced with manipulation in mind, it may be an important issue for other 
research focusing on such manipulation, as it has to do with controlling discourses and with 
power in society. All in all, there is no way to know about the honesty or motivation of any 
single individual poster in his or her comments, although there is research indicating that 
overall, people tend to be fairly honest in (anonymous) online communication, as discussed 
in the previous section. In conclusion, all the posters taking part in the conversation are part 
of the discourse and the discourse is what matters for my particular research. 
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 The article on cultured meat includes 1084 posts, the one on plant-based meats 437 posts, the one on 
insects 302 posts and the one on flexitarianism 1033 posts. 
318
 The number of threads is 18 for cultured meat, 17 for plant-based meats, 16 for flexitarianism and 39 
(shorter ones) for insects. 
319
 In Chapter 5, I use frequently the word “document” to refer to any of the four Guardian articles and the 
posts that follow them as one entity, the article-cum-comments entity. 
320
 See How Russia used social media to divide Americans a Guardian article from 14 October 2017 on the issue. 
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4.2.3. Processing, coding and preliminary analysis of data 
As mentioned earlier, I downloaded the final data (in a threaded form) from the Guardian 
website into Word, processed it there, and then imported it to MAXQDA. The preparation 
within Word involved cleaning the text from unnecessary (often html) elements, 
reformatting it, colour coding each post based on its relevance to the topic of the article, 
marking each conversation thread with another code, and saving the articles with the topic 
conversation threads only into a separate Word document. I then imported each of these 
four Word documents into MAXQDA where I processed them further. To anonymize the 
data (as requested by the Guardian), I coded each post with a codename – CUL, PBM, INS 
and FLEX – and a number representing the order in which the posts appear in the 
threads.321,322 As part of the preliminary analysis, I also provided a brief summary of each 
thread in MAXQDA to assist in getting an overview of the data, and drew a rough map of 
connections for each document (Bazeley, 2013). 
Although my research question took its final form only during the further analysis of data 
discussed in the next section, it started developing further from its initial state already 
during the preliminary analysis, based on what was most significant or insightful about the 
data (Foss, 2009), and based on how the data affected the ways I was approaching the 
whole topic. The research task for Chapter 3 was also essentially related to my research 
question, and the two were formed in a simultaneous and gradual process. 
The first round of coding of the data in MAXQDA was also part of this first stage of analysis. I 
used MAXQDA mainly only for coding and note taking, and to have an overview of the data. 
Such limited use of the software also tends to prevent problems with giving the software too 
much influence in the analysis, or letting it fragment the data extensively and leaving out the 
important context of each coded piece of text.323 The type of analysis I was conducting also 
did not call for the more advanced features of this type of software. 
                                                          
321
 In other words, the posts were not coded in time order, as for example, two separate comments posted at 
9:10 and 9:15 am could each gets tens of posts that would run possibly to the following day. These two threads 
would however appear in the data so that the whole thread started at 9:10 am would come first before the 
thread started at 9:15 am. 
322
 Each post forms one unit of analysis. 
323
 For criticism of using software for qualitative analysis, see e.g. MacMillan and Koenig (2004) or Bong (2002). 
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As regards the coding itself, the initial or primary coding was two-fold, based on concepts 
thought of beforehand, based on literature, and on a significant number of further concepts 
rising from the data, or inspired by the data. Later on, when conducting further analysis, and 
also when going through the existing codes, memos, notes, and so forth, I still added on to 
the codes in a secondary round of coding. Table 4.2 shows an overview of the codes from 
both the first and the second round of coding in MAXQDA, while Annex 1 explains the codes 
in more detail.324  
Table 4.2. Codes used for analysis 
Main codes Sub codes 
Interesting  
Old meatways Vegetarianism/veganism 
 Conventional meat system 
New meatways Insects and insect protein as food 
 Flexitarianism 
 Plant-based meat 
 Cell-based meat 
Making positive future with meat alts   
Business/technology - meat and meat alts  
Labels  
Story  
Knowledge  
Conflict  
Cognitive frames about meat   
Carnism  
Metaphor   
Values and morals Values and morals general 
 Watching/not watching others and their choices 
Modality   
Agency or lack of agency  
Emotions Emotions general 
 Catastrophizing 
Disgust   
Environmental melancholia   
The 4 N justifications Not normal 
 Normal 
 Not natural 
 Natural 
 Not necessary 
 Necessary 
 Not nice 
 Nice 
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 Included in Annex 1 are descriptions for the codes, and an indication of where the code came from, i.e. is it 
from literature, or the conceptual framework more generally, or did it come directly from the data. A few of 
the initial codes had no actual data linked to them, especially a couple of the coping strategies identified in 
literature but not present in the data. 
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Acknowledging ambivalence   
Indifference   
Actual behaviour change  
Other coping strategies All or nothing 
 Animal death is unavoidable 
 Devaluing vegetarians 
 Freedom to choose 
 Blaming vegans 
 Denial of animal mind 
 Denial of animal pain 
 Neocarnism 
 Perceived behavioural change 
 Disassociation 
 Avoidance 
 
Most codes in this scheme had a description (a “code memo”, developed during the coding 
process) usually related to where the code came from, how it is used, and how it may be 
related to other codes. Table 4.3 shows an example of two such code memos. Many of the 
coded segments of text also included a further note regarding the coded data.  
Table 4.3. Code memos from MAXQDA - Example 
Disgust 
Disgust either towards meat/fish, or towards meat/fish alternatives, such as cultured 
meat, insects or plant-based meats.  
Audit trail: I initially put "disgust" under coping strategies, but since it is not clearly a 
coping strategy in these contexts (at least not yet from CUL, but maybe other docs?), and 
since I don't know of any literature that would define it as a coping strategy (it's just my 
idea, as in, alternatives to meat are disgusting, therefore, we have to keep eating normal 
meat). Would be interesting to see if I found that meaning for disgust in my data. If I do 
find it, then I should maybe have two codes separately for "disgust", one under "coping 
strategies" and one otherwise. 
Disgust is of course also an emotion, but since it is both an emotion and (possibly) a 
coping strategy, it is not under either of those. 
Animal death is 
unavoidable 
This is a version of the "all or nothing" coping strategy, but it is separate as there are a lot 
of references to it. So, the meaning in short: Even a vegetarian diet causes a lot of animal 
death (on the fields themselves, or because of agricultural expansion). Humans cannot 
live and not have others die for it. It's inevitable, and the more humans, the more 
animals die. And it is not the meat eaters' fault alone that animals die.  
I can reference this to literature, but not as a coping mechanism?  
Audit trail: I have added some stuff to the description above, so the "too many people on 
the planet" argument is added, although it belongs more to environmental melancholia 
or catastrophism than here, but it's related. 
Qualitative research is sometimes criticized for giving coding too central of a role, especially 
if software is used for coding (see e.g. Bong, 2002). However, when extending the analysis to 
conceptual coding (Schreier, 2012), as is often the case in qualitative analysis, this may be 
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less of an issue. Conceptual coding refers to creating links between data and concepts, 
between concepts, and between data, and can be also used to generate theory from data. 
Further, my specific methods of analysing the data (described in the following section) also 
hopefully decentralized the impact of coding as such. Finally, regarding my coding of the 
data, although I had a preliminary idea of the concepts significant to the research, and of 
what to look for in the data, the coding process was still exploratory to some extent.  
4.3. Methods of further analysis 
As explained earlier, I approached the data from a critical discourse analytical viewpoint. 
Since the approach taken within critical discourse analysis is also intertwined into the 
conceptual framework of my thesis, I introduced this methodology already in Chapter 3. 
Otherwise, Chapter 3 deals with discourses at a general level, exploring their importance in 
relation to social practices, and, among other things, the concept of frames, and the 
relevance of values, ideologies, and issues of morality present in discourses. This section will 
go over the actual ways in which I conducted the data analysis within the critical discourse 
analysis framework. 
My overall goal in the data analysis was to reflect through discourse data the potential of 
certain mechanisms (as discussed in Chapter 3) to contribute to change in social practices, 
and to look for possible levers for change. Bazeley (2013) considers a focus on processes 
important for qualitative research and analysis, also increasing the chances of legitimate 
generalizing of research results. Qualitative research often also seeks to generate – rather 
than test – hypotheses (Curry et al., 2009) which can then be tested in further, qualitative or 
quantitative research. 
More specifically, critical discourse analysis involves a certain attitude with which the data is 
approached. According to Fairclough (2001b:236), a suitable research problem for critical 
discourse analysis is “a social problem which has a semiotic aspect”. Consequently, the aim 
of critical discourse analysis is often not to generalize results as regards language, but to 
“understand and make explicit the potential social implications which follow” from certain 
discourses (Taylor, 2001:317). 
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The following sections will explain the structuring of my analysis and the different methods 
involved. 
4.3.1. Structuring the analysis 
The main data analysis can be seen organised at three distinct levels. Including the actual 
methods used, these three levels were: 
 Textual / qualitative content analysis: focus on themes and dimensions 
 Contextual discourse analysis: frame analysis (incl. metaphor analysis) 
 Interpretation of the previous levels for sociological / societal context (incl. 
ideological analysis). 
The first level involves close textual analysis and much of the coding of the data, looking for 
explicit and implicit themes, and the dimensions of the discourse. The second level involves 
looking at further implicit meanings in the data, using more structured methods such as 
frame analysis, as well as ideas from the related theory discussed in Chapter 3, in addition to 
further coding. Finally, the third level involves looking at the impacts of the discourses to 
society, drawing further from the concepts discussed in Chapter 3.  
Perceiving discourse analysis at three levels seems to be a relatively common way of 
theorizing such analysis, including critical discourse analysis. For example, Norman 
Fairclough (e.g. 1989; 2001b; 2015) uses it in his micro-, meso- and macro level 
interpretation of discourse: 
Text, interaction and social context [are] three elements of a discourse, and 
the corresponding distinction […] between three stages of critical discourse 
analysis; description of text, interpretation of the relationship between text 
and interaction, and explanation of the relationship between interaction and 
social context.  
Fairclough (2015:128) 
Further, a similar structure going from detail, via context, to societal relevance is also 
sometimes used in frame analysis, as with Eder (1996) in analysing ecological 
communication, and in Strydom (2000:84) in theorizing on frames in his work on the 
relationship between discourse and sociology. Also, Paltridge (2006:179) states that critical 
discourse analysis “may include a detailed textual analysis and move from there to an 
explanation and interpretation of the analysis”.  
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Although different authors interpret the levels somewhat differently, a three-level structure 
seems commonly used. Also Ruiz Ruiz (2009) organizes his sociological discourse analysis 
methodology on three levels, as Box 4.1 explains. 
Box 4.1. Sociological discourse analysis according to Ruiz Ruiz (2009) 
Ruiz Ruiz (2009) defines a three-way structure for sociological discourse analysis, so that the first 
level is about textual (characterizing the discourse), second about contextual (understanding it), and 
the third about interpretative analysis (explaining it and its impact). Analysis is often conducted at all 
levels simultaneously in a dynamic dialogue between them.  
To describe further, textual discourse analysis considers discourse as an object and often uses 
qualitative content analysis and/or semiotic analysis as tools, and involves some degree of coding of 
the data.  
Contextual analysis, on the other hand, considers discourse as a “singular event produced by 
subjects” (idem: 8) in a context which is both situational (a discourse in relation to its particular 
production) and intertextual (a discourse in relation to other discourses). Frame analysis is one form 
of situational analysis (in addition to, e.g. conversation analysis), while intertextual analysis often 
attempts to look for the meaning of a discourse from its relationship to other discourses. Ruiz Ruiz 
argues that discourse analysis frequently ends at this level, but that for sociological analysis, the third 
level is required.  
The final level interprets discourse as either social information, a reflection of ideologies, or as a 
social product. Social information tends to contain partial knowledge of social reality, while with 
ideological analysis, partiality becomes a crucial limiting factor for an informative interpretation of 
discourse. Critical discourse analysis often focuses on analysing hidden ideological constructs within a 
discourse. When discourse is interpreted as a social product, the focus is on the social conditions 
under which it has been produced (and which it may in turn influence).  
Both inductive and abductive reasoning are typical of the third level of analysis. On the one hand, 
inductive reasoning moves from the particular to the general, whereby one part of the system 
reveals something from the whole system. In sociological analysis, unexpected or atypical cases 
should either expand the theory, or necessitate building new theory. On the other hand, abductive 
reasoning moves from the particular to the most likely explanation, in sociology often forming new 
hypotheses, instead of conclusions as such. Although especially abductive logic is often criticized as 
weak, Ruiz Ruiz argues that it is in fact the only process “by which new ideas can be introduced in 
science” (idem:13) in the form of new hypotheses. Such hypotheses can initially take the form of 
conjectures, somewhat uncertain conclusions, which can later be formatted into hypotheses.  
Ruiz Ruiz concludes his description of sociological discourse analysis by arguing that two things 
differentiate it from other discourse analytical approaches, namely its eclectic character (several 
different traditions are combined), and the links that this analysis makes with broader social realities. 
The overall analysis I conducted resembles the structure and content of the analysis 
described in Ruiz Ruiz (2009) and explained in Box 4.1. 
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4.3.2. First level of the analysis – Focus on themes, dimensions and meanings 
My aim with the initial content analysis was to look for diversity and as many different 
aspects as possible that are relevant to the main themes in this thesis, and in particular, to 
find the most relevant research question(s) to investigate further. Upon identifying a 
particular theme, I further identified the different dimensions of the theme, and the 
endpoints of these dimensions (Bazeley, 2013). To give a simple example, upon identifying 
the discussed impacts from a particular new meatway, say, eating insects, I would then 
identify extracts from the data describing the opposite, contrasting ends of the impact 
dimension, e.g. the nature will do better when humans eat insects, or it will do worse when 
humans eat insects. Or similarly, a theme about the wellbeing of nature more generally 
would contain the contrasting ends of nature needing humans, to look after it, so to speak, 
and nature being better off without human influence.325 The data contained most of the 
contrasting ends of the dimensions I found, and when it did not, for the sake of 
completeness of the analysis, I used theoretical or imaginary example of the opposite end in 
order to create the dimensions themselves, as advised by Bazeley. Searching for the 
dimensions of a theme greatly aided in finding the themes themselves, as well as meanings 
present in the data. The key in this part of my analysis was to find the issues (related to my 
main themes and potential research question(s)) brought up in the discourse. The positions 
of the posters on these issues were not relevant as such, a key point for such qualitative 
analysis raised by Bazeley (2013). 
To note, this type of thematic analysis is rather general with its aim being to get to know the 
data, and present it to others, although using the technique involving dimensions does make 
it more involved and detailed. Joffe (2011) advices against claiming that a superficial reading 
of a text - looking for themes - would be proper thematic analysis. Generally, thematic 
analysis is an extensive method of analysis of its own.  
4.3.3. Second and third levels of analysis – Focus on frames, values and ideologies 
Unlike separating the first level from the rest of the analysis, it is harder to separate the 
second level from the third. This is because the frame analysis is more intertwined with 
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The focus in the particular comments was indeed on nature’s wellbeing, not on humans, and it seemed that 
at both endpoints humans were seen as separate from nature. 
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ideological analysis, with examining the more psychological aspects of the discourse, and 
evaluating the societal dimensions. I will therefore discuss both levels in this same section. 
Most of the theory behind this stage of analysis has already been covered in Chapter 3, 
necessarily so, as discourses, and therefore also concepts related to discourses, such as 
frames, are part of my conceptual framework. Similarly, Chapter 3 discussed the relevance 
of values, especially sustainability facilitating values, and finally, the psychological concept of 
coping strategies in relation to meat eating was also covered in Chapter 3. 
My main aim with the frame analysis was to find the relevant dominant and counter frames 
and their implicit meanings and relations to ideologies, often expressed through values. For 
example, the following extract contains a counter frame to both carnism as an ideology and 
to an Absolute morality frame326 (whereby only absolute measures count). I call the counter 
frame associated with the extract a Solution frame, and in this case, it is also linked to 
sustainability facilitating values: 
If more suffering is reduced by many people reducing their meat consumption, as opposed to 
a few people becoming vegan and the rest not wanting to go that far, then I support 
reducetarianism. 
FLEX75, 25 Jun 2017 
In my frame analysis, I used analytical concepts and structure similar to Strydom (2000),327 
whereby cognitive framing devices help construct frames in a discourse, as explained in 
Chapter 3. Further, a larger discourse can be seen to be built up from the various 
constructed frames. Many frames can reflect ideologies, which in turn also colour the 
emphasis with which the three framing devices are applied. Indeed, frame analysis is a 
frequently used method in critical discourse analysis, in particular because of its ability to 
bring out hidden meanings, values and ideologies (Paltridge, 2006). 
Although I did not initially intend to look for metaphors, I decided in the end to include two 
specific conceptual metaphors that rose implicitly, but relatively unambiguously from the 
data, as discussed in Chapter 5. In fact, they both became apparent already in the first stage 
of analysing and coding the data.  
A conceptual metaphor (originally from Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) is "a way of knowing the 
world" (Foss, 2009:270), where one idea (target domain, e.g. time) is understood in terms of 
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 Frames are often written with a capital initial letter. 
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 Strydom (2000) partly draws from work by Klaus Eder and William A. Gamson for his theory on frames. 
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another (source domain, e.g. money), and knowledge people tend to have of the source 
domain (e.g. money is valuable, not to be wasted) carries over to explain the target 
domain.328 A conceptual metaphor can make a point more efficiently and comprehensively 
than typical argumentative structures often can. Further, metaphors play a key role in 
framing perceptions, and therefore also in framing action. Metaphor analysis is therefore 
frequently a part of frame analysis, as analysing metaphors can be very illuminating in 
bringing out implicit frames, meanings, values, and so forth. Although the significance of 
conceptual metaphors is obvious, metaphor analysis is, however, sometimes criticized (see 
Box 4.2). 
Box 4.2. Metaphors and criticism of metaphor analysis 
Semino et al. (2004) are very critical of metaphor analysis. Their main issue, and a crucial one as such, 
is that deciding what exactly in a text is a metaphor, and further, what this particular metaphor 
means, is tricky, and depending on the answers (which may all be equally valid), different conclusions 
to the research itself may be drawn.  
As regards the concepts, a linguistic metaphor is the way the metaphor is expressed in the actual 
language in use (e.g. “It's time to take stock of my life” or “You are wasting your time”), and a 
conceptual metaphor is the meaning at a more conceptual level (e.g. A PURPOSEFUL LIFE IS A 
BUSINESS or TIME IS MONEY).   The link between these two, however, is often up to interpretation, 
in other words, the problematic issue is interpretative variability.  
Conventional metaphor is part of a frequently occurring, systematic pattern of conceptual metaphors 
(i.e. not a single case, or a novel metaphor). TIME IS MONEY is a conventional conceptual metaphor.  
Whether something is actually a metaphor (the metaphoricity of an expression), rather than a literal 
expression, is a matter of degree, and therefore the boundary between the literal and the 
metaphorical is fuzzy, and some expressions can be both literal and metaphorical.  
Semino et al. (2004) emphasize that if one performs metaphor analysis, it is very important to be 
transparent and explicit about the criteria applied. Only rather careful and general conclusions can 
be made about the data, due to the challenges of metaphor analysis. 
Partly due to the criticism that metaphor analysis can receive, and even though metaphor 
analysis is often a considerable part of frame analysis, I decided not to do actual metaphor 
analysis with my discourse data.  
During this stage, a notable element of my analysis was also comparing the different 
discourse examples (of different new meatways) to each other, and interpreting their 
similarities or differences in light of the conceptual framework. My main aim was to widen 
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 So, for example, in the conceptual metaphor TIME IS MONEY. 
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the view on the different aspects of the discourses.329 For example, a frame I named 
Technological innovation frame was, perhaps as expected, present in both the cultured meat 
and plant-based meats documents, whereas it was not present in the insect and 
flexitarianism documents. This frame among other similar ones, however, can have an 
impact on the kinds of values the discourses invoke, and their connections to the larger 
discourses on which ways societies should approach sustainability.330 
Further, and bordering on ideological analysis, I explored how the coping strategies 
regarding meat eating were showing up and employed in the discourses. This included a 
significant amount of meaning-based questioning (Bazeley, 2013), whereby the data is 
questioned in order to look for the implied meanings of statements. For example, when 
someone says “It’s not a burger then”,331 this implies certain things about the posters view 
on what meat is or should be, and what is important about meat or food to him/her. It also 
indicates that this poster may be trying to avoid information that would likely increase 
cognitive dissonance regarding the issues to do with eating meat.332 
Similar to the two conceptual metaphors, a theme rose from the data that I eventually 
incorporated into the framework presented in Chapter 3, namely that of the issue of labels 
and labelling, including social labelling.333 During the analysis, this became significant enough 
of an issue to not ignore. Lastly, one more focus deserves to be mentioned. After looking for 
normalization of the new meatways in the data, I decided to also explore the extent to which 
narratives about the future, or narratives about the new meatways, are part of the 
discourse, as such an element can be critical for normalization. This was not a question of an 
issue rising from the data, as much as of me deciding to add something potentially relevant 
to the range of focus.  
As mentioned, the third level of analysis, the societal context, was interlinked with the other 
analysis. Yet, as Ruiz Ruiz (2009) notes (See Box 4.1), this is an essential level for any 
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 I did the comparisons mainly via overviewing several times the coded segments from the different 
documents within one Excel table. 
330
 This issue is discussed further in Chapter 5 and 6. 
331
 This is a comment to the plant-based burger article. 
332
 Avoiding information is one coping strategy, see Rothgerber (2014). 
333
 “Labelling” as such represents a conceptual metaphor, of course. For example, HOW YOU BEHAVE IS WHAT 
YOU ARE could describe the labelling of behaviour as a conceptual metaphor. However, since there is a distinct 
theory attached to it – social labelling – I did not handle labelling as a metaphor in my analysis. 
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discourse analysis with a critical approach. In my research, this level was mainly about 
linking the discourses more firmly into the conceptual framework, and interpreting the 
findings for further discussion and evaluation. As a result, I ended up with a number of 
conclusions which could also be seen as hypotheses (Curry et al., 2009; Ruiz Ruiz, 2009),334 
as answers to my research question. These are presented in the final Chapter 6. 
4.4. Quality criteria vs. methodological criticisms 
In this section, I will address the quality criteria generally set mainly for qualitative research, 
criticisms received, and some of my own reflections on ways of dealing with the issues. 
Although there is no definite agreement on the necessary quality criteria for qualitative 
research (Bryman et al., 2008), the literature discussing such criteria, however, seems to 
more or less agree that the following issues are important to consider (see e.g. Bazeley, 
2013; Taylor, 2001): 
 Objectivity/subjectivity and reliability of interpretation 
 Internal validity 
 Reflexivity 
 Transferability/generalizability, also in terms of the data analysed 
 Usefulness 
I will address these criteria in the following sections. Although most of the following applies 
to qualitative analysis more broadly, I will generally refer to discourse analysis, or more 
specifically to critical discourse analysis. 
4.4.1. Objectivity vs. interpretation of data 
One of the main criticisms of qualitative discourse analytic research is of it not being 
objective.  
Firstly, this is related to discourse analysis being inherently interpretative. Therefore, its 
results are criticised of being less reliable. Indeed, in critical discourse analysis, "the analyst 
imposes her reading [on the data] which she must be aware is only one of countless 
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 Or perhaps conjectures, still somewhat uncertain hypotheses. 
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possibilities" (Mautner, 2005:819). Generally, this criticism is addressed by the analysis and 
its results being grounded in detailed evidence and persuasive and well supported 
arguments, through which the data is not open to any number of interpretations (Tonkiss, 
2004).335 This is also related to the criteria of internal validity discussed more below. 
Secondly, (critical) discourse analysis is also challenged for researchers possibly taking sides, 
for example, by being politically committed (see e.g. Antaki et al., 2003; O'Halloran, 2010). 
Burman (2004) notes, however, that no researcher can help taking sides, and even trying not 
to is actually about taking sides, as the status quo is then maintained: “objectivity is not the 
absence of subjectivity, but a particular form of it” (idem:2). For Taylor (2001), the main 
point is about acknowledging that the research has an agenda. 
Similarly, sustainability research (such as this research) often takes sides, as it usually aims to 
contribute to changing societies towards more sustainable ways of existence. Such research 
tends to be based on certain values and driven by a desire to do something good (Peattie, 
2011). The criticism is, however, that real research should be value-free, objective and 
dispassionate. Peattie notes, however, that most research is actually laden with the 
dominant social paradigm and with its associated values. As this paradigm is dominant, and 
therefore mostly invisible, researchers are usually not aware of it. One must also remember 
that in some areas of research, such as in health research, there is a clear and accepted 
societal goal, a desire to make populations healthier. In a similar vein, John Dewey (see e.g. 
in White, 1972) has argued that science in general should be directed at improving the 
world. 
Specifically reflecting on critical discourse analysis, O’Halloran (2010) states that one way to 
address what he calls the “over-subjectivity” of critical discourse analysis is to incorporate 
corpus linguistics software, as then “it is the software which reveals salience and not the 
analyst” (idem:565). With software, he notes, also larger data sets can be used for critical 
discourse analysis. Koenig (2004) also suggest using textual analysis software to aid 
qualitative frame analysis. Software could in principle also add to the robustness of analysis 
(linking again to internal validity discussed below), and indeed the reliability of results. Apart 
from separate software packages, some of the claimed benefits could also be reached by 
                                                          
335
 Hardy et al. (2004) notes that differences in interpretation may, in fact, be a source of new data. 
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using certain advanced features of programs such as MAXQDA,336 often used to manage and 
code discourse data. 
As regards my own methods of analysis, I did consider using both the more advanced 
features of MAXQDA, and additional corpus linguistics software. As already mentioned in 
Section 4.2.3, I decided not use the MAXQDA features for more advanced analysis, for 
example, because doing this would have taken the focus away from the context of the data 
and too much towards the (reliability of the) coding itself. These features also seemed to not 
be particularly useful to my analysis. The separate corpus linguistics software I considered 
included AntConc337 (freeware), with a concordance table feature where data can be 
compared to e.g. standard English corpora, and LIWC,338 able to do more advanced textual 
analysis. However, I did not find that the analyses the software provided would add anything 
significant to what I was already pursuing with the data. It may be that the situation would 
have been different with a much larger dataset, but with such data, I would have had to do 
different kind of analysis in any case, as the level of detail in the analysis with a much larger 
dataset would have had to be different.339 
4.4.2. Internal validity 
External validity is generally not considered a reasonable criterion for qualitative discourse 
analysis, whereas internal validity is (discussed e.g. by Georgaca & Avdi, 2011; Taylor, 2001; 
Tonkiss, 2004). Taylor (2001) presents several criteria for qualitative analysis such as critical 
discourse analysis. Those most relevant for this section are: 
 Coherence of arguments and analysis 
 Persuasiveness, based on arguments 
 Rigour, systematic analysis 
 Looking for deviant cases, oppositions and diversity in analysis. 
                                                          
336
 As a group, such software packages are called computer-assisted qualitative data analysis (CAQDAS) 
software. 
337
 See http://www.laurenceanthony.net/software/antconc/. 
338
 Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count. See http://liwc.wpengine.com. 
339
 One example from a test with LIWC perhaps worth mentioning is that, according to a basic analysis of my 
data with this software, the article on flexitarianism is more focused on the present, and the other articles are 
more focused on the future (the article on insects, however, was not yet included in the this test run). Although 
this insight seems reasonable, it did not appear as something I could not have concluded from comparing the 
four article texts on my own. 
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In developing and working on my analysis, in theory development, in describing my 
methodology and specific methods, as well as in presenting results, I have tried to apply such 
principles. In other words, I have tried to be systematic and coherent, and give enough detail 
of the data and the process of analysis. Having extensive notes has certainly assisted in this. I 
have also tried to make reasonable arguments as regards the data, also so that my 
conclusions could be tested in further research. In searching for the “counter data” (e.g. 
counter frames), I have also tried to look for diversity as much as possible.  
Goodwin and Shoulders (2013) and Bazeley (2013) discuss peer debriefing as a validation 
strategy. In peer debriefing, the other person plays “devil’s advocate” (Goodwin & 
Shoulders, 2013), questioning the theory and methods. This is a strategy I have used on 
occasion. 
4.4.3. Reflexivity 
Reflexivity is particularly important for qualitative research. Hardy et al. (2004:21) argue that 
in discourse analysis, reflexivity is necessarily high, as the researcher “is part of the process 
whereby meaning is constructed”. Reflexivity is about being critical and open about the data 
and its analysis, by questioning assumptions, critically examining the processes of the 
analysis, and evaluating how these processes affect the results (Tonkiss, 2004). Taylor (2001) 
also asks for rich detail in explaining the process of analysis, and in presenting findings. The 
value of keeping an audit trail is clear for any research project, and its usefulness is probably 
most obvious for the criteria of reflexivity. 
In my work, I have tried to be critical of my analysis, including assumptions and processes. 
Further, I have kept detailed notes about the developments, both in the form of an audit 
trail, and in many other notes, as explained in Section 4.1.3. Chapter 6 will include a section 
on limitations where I will also reflect further on what could have been done differently, but 
in the following criterion of transferability, I will also reflect on my choices for data. 
4.4.4. Transferability 
Data for critical discourse research often just happens to be there. It is not random, or 
randomly selected, as it might be in quantitative media content analysis, for example, nor is 
it usually designed, as in surveys or interviews. It is frequently therefore not representative. 
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Such is also my data, reflecting some of the discourses around the new meatways. Taylor 
(2001) warns against assuming that any results from critical discourse analysis would 
describe the real world in a more general way. Instead, such results are partial (not general), 
contingent (not necessary, but possible), and situated (claims made can only refer to the 
specific situation). In fact she maintains that all knowledge is such, as experienced reality is 
inevitably influenced by any research processes. This connects back to the critical realist 
position discussed in Section 4.1.1. 
As said, external validity is not considered a criterion for qualitative discourse analysis. The 
results of critical discourse analysis, for example, are usually not representative, and 
therefore not generalizable to a larger population. However, results of discourse analysis can 
be theoretically generalizable (Bazeley, 2013; Tonkiss, 2004), or transferable to other 
situations, especially when such analysis focuses on processes and mechanisms.  
Regarding the value and transferability of small-scale qualitative data, Bazeley argues that: 
Each singular person or event embraces a degree of universality, reflecting 
dimensions of the social structures and order of their time. What is learned 
from individual cases or case studies reflects this: it is not that we can describe 
the characteristics of a larger population, survey style, but rather that we gain 
understanding of the way some aspect of society works – an understanding of 
processes and principles, theory rather than facts. 
Bazeley (2013:411) 
Critical discourse analysis frequently engages in abductive logic (discussed in Box 4.1) 
involving interplay between existing theoretical understandings and empirical data, in which 
the data can generate new theoretical understandings (Bazeley, 2013). In other words, 
abductive logic is able to create theoretically generalizable data. I would suggest that the 
conclusions (or hypotheses) from my data may be theoretically generalizable, but they could 
also possibly be tested in further research. 
4.4.5. Usefulness 
Last but not least, although the claims in discourse analysis tend to be modest, with an open 
approach to knowledge (Tonkiss, 2004), usefulness of the findings, both theoretically and in 
terms of the real world is a general criterion for research. Georgaca and Avdi (2011) suggest 
that findings from discourse analysis can provide new insights, and generate new questions 
(or theory, as argued above), and in real world, they can deconstruct dominant assumptions 
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and challenge practices. They note further that there are no direct implementations that 
discourse analysis can usually lead to, but such analysis can inform interventions, especially 
interventions challenging the dominant understandings and practices.  
In line with Georgaca and Avdi, I would contend that, assuming the general relevance of 
discourses around meat (an argument in Chapters 2 and 3), findings from research such as 
mine can contribute to deconstructing dominant assumptions, and challenge unsustainable 
practices, for example those involved in producing animals for human consumption, as well 
as in eating such animals. I will further address this “so what” question – a key motivation 
for this research - in Chapter 6, but suffice it to say here that the discourses around meat are 
out there, and although my interpretation of the data I have collected is likely to be only a 
small part of the whole discourse universe, it is valid as a justified interpretation. 
4.5. Conclusion 
In the previous sections, I have tried to cover the main points as regards philosophical 
arguments, aspects of my data, and its analysis, and issues to do with the quality of research. 
I have also described the ways I managed the data and the project itself. Critical discourse 
analysis was already introduced in Chapter 3, and in this chapter I explored it further. 
Chapter 6 will still get back to some of the issues mentioned in this chapter, such as 
limitations to the research, alternative ways of pursuing it, and relevance of the research. I 
have tried to use a methodology and create methods that are suitable, interdisciplinary, 
adequately adopted, and open-minded, while offering detail useful for discussion and 
further research. 
A final point to this chapter: looking into Chapter 3 and its focus on expanded social practice 
theories, and the exploration of the relationship of practices and discourses, this approach 
to the data could be presented as a novel methodology. However, as Wiles et al. (2011) 
note, researchers have always adapted methods for their own purposes, and while this is 
good, it need not necessarily be presented as something new. Over-claiming in methods can 
lead to several issues: it "encourages a focus on the latest methodological fads", instead of 
furthering the development of well-established methodologies, it "encourages a view that 
the established social science methods of the past are 'old hat' and inappropriate", and it 
"risks losing credibility in the same way as over-claiming by academics of 'international' 
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standing in research" (idem:601). In other words, new and different is not necessarily better 
than the old and familiar. 
The following chapter will present the analysis of my discourse data.  
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5. Exploring discourses on the new meatways 
As Chapter 4 explained, my data analysis generally progresses from several different angles 
to the data.340 As an introduction to the data, Section 5.1 will explore the themes and 
dimensions of the discourse contained in the four documents,341 especially from the point of 
view of the new meatways. 
Further, in Section 5.2, I will first discuss some of the frames found, both more dominant as 
well as more counter frames, and explore in practice the three framing devices introduced in 
Chapter 3. I will argue that the new meatways have relevance for the frames in the 
discourse, and that the discourse itself matters, also in terms of the ideologies it highlights. 
Following from discussion in Chapter 3 on values, this section reflects upon the potential of 
certain frames to activate certain values, in light of the data. I will also discuss two 
conceptual metaphors arising from the data, and linking to wider discourses and literature. I 
will argue that, as important framing tools, they both have implications for potential 
solutions to the meat crisis.  
Next, in Section 5.3, I will first explore how the four Ns (Normal, Natural, Necessary and 
Nice) - in other words, the four most common justifications and coping strategies for meat 
eating - are showing up in the discourse, and what impact the new meatways might have on 
how the Ns are used. Subsequently, I will explore other coping strategies, discussed in 
Chapter 3, as regards cognitive dissonance and strategic ignorance to do with eating animals. 
These strategies may not be as obvious, but nonetheless do exist, and seeing them vis-à-vis 
the new meatways may be useful, especially considering the potential of the new meatways 
to create discursive consciousness and allow for more ambivalence to be acknowledged. I 
will also explore in this section certain morality related questions as one clear example of 
the new meatways making a difference, especially in terms of issues to do with 
vegetarianism or veganism, on the one hand, and flexitarianism, on the other.  
Before concluding the chapter in Section 5.5 with a look at my research question, I will 
discuss two more issues in Section 5.4 as reflected in the data, namely labels and labelling, 
                                                          
340
 Occasionally, this way causes the same data examples being used in different parts of the chapter, in order 
to demonstrate different issues, or the same issues, but from another angle. 
341
 “Document” refers to a Guardian article and the posts that follow it as one entity. 
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and the potential of narratives to normalize a future with new meatways, or without meat. 
Both topics may have some relevance for change.  
I will still reflect upon my research question in the concluding Chapter 6, together with the 
related research task set for Chapter 3. 
5.1. Descriptions, themes and dimensions of the data 
The following sections contain description of the four online newspaper articles, including 
some comments about the posts following them, as well as depictions of themes and their 
dimensions found in the data (including both articles and posts), relevant to the old and new 
meatways, and in particular to my research question.342 I will discuss some topics, such as 
the relationship of the new meatways to vegetarianism and veganism, and the related issue 
of morality, however, mostly separately.  
5.1.1. Cell-based meat343 
The CBM (cell-based meat) article344 “Could lab-grown fish and meat feed the world – 
without killing a single animal?” (written by Amy Fleming, published on 20 September 2017 
in the online Guardian) is written in a narrative form, with the overarching story being the 
journalist visiting a San Francisco prototype tasting event of cell-based carp croquettes made 
by Finless Foods, a start-up. This is by far the longest of the four articles.345 
Similar to the PBM (plant-based meat) article discussed later, there are several references in 
the CBM article to the buzz in the new food high-tech start-ups,346 and with a similar 
                                                          
342
 See Chapter 4 for more on themes and dimensions. Note also that I have not determined in detail the 
themes I looked for in the data prior to the analysis. The only requirement has been that they are related to my 
research themes and/or my research question.  
343
 I mostly refer to cell-based, plant-based and animal-based (conventional) meat in my thesis. However, the 
data usually refers to cultured meat, instead of cell-based meat, as “cultured meat” is a slightly older and more 
established term than “cell-based meat”. In fact, the term “cell-based meat” did not yet exist in 2017, the year 
for the latest data. See Chapter 3 for some more discussion on these terms. 
344
 I have used codenames CBM, PBM, INS and FLEX in the data analysis itself, and for brevity, I also use them in 
this chapter when referring to the different articles, or their posts, as well as to the individual posts quoted 
(e.g. “CBM20” would be the 20
th
 included post for the CBM article). The poster usernames are kept confidential 
in line with the policy of the Guardian newspaper. 
345
 Although the articles vary somewhat in length and style, the posts are all restricted to the first around 150 
relevant posts within topic conversations (see Chapter 4 for more explanation). For the INS article, the first 
around 150 topic conversation posts include all relevant posts that exist for this article. 
346
 Examples of this include: “start-ups racing”, “wonder food”, “ideas to change the world”, “dedicates every 
waking hour to their vocation”, “exude confidence”. 
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personal touch from the journalist. There are also references to interviews with new food 
innovators and researchers, and overall, the article is quite detailed, and combines personal 
stories with facts. Although the article focuses almost entirely on the new alternative 
industry (mainly cell-based meat and fish, but also mentioning the new plant-based meat), it 
frames the conventional meat industry and the new alternative meat industry in a fairly 
balanced way in terms of attributes such as "natural/not natural" and "disgusting", in 
relation to the process of producing conventional animal-based meat (or farmed fish) on the 
one hand, or cell-based meat or fish on the other. The journalist also does not frame 
conventional animal-based meat as much other than a clear problem, except for the organic 
meat industry, whereas she frames the action in the article (visiting Finless Foods and tasting 
their cell-based fish croquettes) as mainly a positive experience. However, a message given 
in the article seems to be that humans’ eating animal flesh in general is something that 
cannot really be changed as such, even if conventional animal-based meat could be replaced 
with cell-based meat. As regards the posts to the CBM article, there is a rather clear future 
orientation in the posts, imagining the future often in a positive way in relation to cell-based 
meat and fish.347 Other than that, many different themes are touched upon, among them 
vegetarianism and veganism. 
Table 5.1 shows some themes and dimensions – related to my main themes and my research 
question - from the CBM document, with examples from the data. 
Table 5.1. Themes and dimensions in the CBM document 
Theme Dimensions Data extracts
348
 
Adequacy as meat 
replacement 
Works [could be] “utterly convincing simulacrum of meat”; “cultured meat will 
one day be commonly eaten the world over” 
Does not work “try marketing this dribble to a lion”; “if I can’t shoot it myself, I’m not 
interested in eating it” 
Impacts on 
environment, animal 
welfare, human health, 
and culinary impact 
Better  “potential solution to vile […] cruelty”; “absolutely necessary before all 
our seas are dead and forests burned”; “no human contamination with 
disease, antibiotics, pesticides”; “subtle carp flavour” 
Worse “where will sheep and cows go?”; “disaster for the planet” [enabling 
even more population]; “new threats to health”; “not appetising” 
                                                          
347
 Regarding future orientation, I run the articles through simple corpus linguistics software (Linguistic Inquiry 
and Word Count, LIWC) which pointed to a future orientation in the CBM and PBM articles, something also 
observable from reading them. I used the software more for experimental purposes. See also Chapter 4. 
348
 Since the examples from the posts in Tables 5.1 to 5.5 are not referenced to individual posts, they are also 
not entirely verbatim in that spelling mistakes have been corrected. Elsewhere in this chapter, when a 
particular post is referred to directly, the quotes may include spelling mistakes. 
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Attitude towards CBM Positive  “guilt-free”; “benchmark of scientific progress” 
Negative “hip Californian fakemeat”; [close to] “reanimated dead corpse” 
Process of take-up Fast [processed food companies could] “be lining up”; “start-ups racing to 
markets”; “for those knowing real hunger and little choice” 
Slow “we have time to open our horizons before we have to open our 
wallets”; “still a long way to go” 
Process of 
normalization 
Cell-based meat as 
normal 
[included in] “takeaways, ready meals, burgers”; “cultured meat is […] 
straightforward” 
Cell-based meat as not 
normal 
“renewable protein source for space travel”; “lovely pink beakers of 
human flesh” 
Cellular agriculture 
start-ups
349
 
Making things better for 
people/planet 
“hurry and commercialize this” 
Making things worse for 
people/planet 
“overpromising, under delivering” 
 
5.1.2. New plant-based meat 
Similar to the CBM article, the PBM article “It looks like a burger, tastes like a burger – but 
it's a plant” (written by Nellie Bowles, published on 2 June 2016 in the online Guardian) is 
also written in a narrative form, with the main story being another California tasting event, 
this time of the plant-based Impossible Burgers by Impossible Meat, also a start-up. 
The article presents the new plant-based meat as technology not that far from processes 
involved in other, even basic foods like bread. The history of food is "nature combined with 
human ingenuity". This time, "through a deep, molecular investigation" into what makes 
meat meat, human ingenuity has managed to make a product that is plant-based, but so 
similar to meat that the company aims to "satiate a beef-hungry American population” with 
something so realistic that "even an 'uncompromising' meat eater" cannot tell the 
difference. After tasting Impossible Burgers at a special tasting event, the verdicts of the 
Guardian journalist and others are positive, and the burgers are "pretty good", or "as good 
as a bad [conventional meat] burger". 
The posts to the article include some positive future orientation, somewhat less than in the 
CBM posts, but more than in the INS (insect article) or FLEX (flexitarianism article) posts. 
There is a significant amount of discussion about vegetarianism in the comments, although 
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 Cellular agriculture is a relatively new term preferred by the new industry. It refers to making animal-based 
products, such as meat, fish, eggs, etc. by culturing cells. 
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the topic of the article is a meat replacement product intended for meat eaters. This may be 
partly because of some confusion regarding the main target group for the Impossible Burger 
(i.e. it is mainly aimed for meat eaters, not vegetarians), but vegetarianism and veganism 
come up in as significant themes in all the data. In the PBM posts, it seems that especially 
people who do not seem to want to change their own meat eating habits bring this topic up. 
Eating a plant-based burger as meat could feel like "giving in". 
A number of themes and their dimensions are shown in Table 5.2 with examples from the 
data. 
Table 5.2. Themes and dimensions in the PBM document 
Theme Dimensions Data extracts 
Adequacy of new 
PBM as meat 
replacement 
Works “uncannily beef-like, oozing […] fat”; [aiming to be a product that] “satisfies 
as only meat does” 
Does not work “makes no sense”; “we don't reconstitute chicken to look like broccoli” [so 
why would we do the opposite] 
Impacts on 
environment, animal 
welfare, human 
health 
Better  “way better” [for the environment]; “clear aims” [to reduce damage]; 
“slightly better” [for health than meat]; “help reduce total number of 
animals tortured and murdered” 
Not better/worse [what effect] “would growing these plants on a massive, global scale [have 
on] soil, fertiliser use and run off”; “doesn't have the nutrients of meat” 
Attitude towards old 
PBM
350
 
Positive “surprised at how good [Quorn] is getting nowadays”; “pleasant non-meat 
like texture”;  “awesome” [when not trying to be like meat] 
Negative “none taste like meat”; “texture could use a little work”; “horrid” [when 
trying to be like meat] 
Attitude towards 
new PBM 
Positive [involves a] “deep molecular investigation into desirable properties” [of 
meat]; [aims to] “annihilate meat industry” [positive in the context] 
Negative “turn off for many vegetarians and vegans”; “will never have mass appeal”; 
“fake meat for the rich” 
Process of take-up Fast “huge market”; “the person who achieves [a successful plant-based meat 
product] will make shitloads of money” 
Slow [in the] “evolution of things like this […] the price will come down with time 
and popularity” 
Process of 
normalization – 
What is a burger? 
New PBM burger as 
normal 
“you can call anything a burger”; “what’s in a burger anyway?” 
New PBM burger as not 
normal 
“does not look like a burger”; “a burger with God knows what in it” 
Target group of Vegetarians and vegans “why do vegetarians like to pretend they are eating meat?” 
                                                          
350
 Attitudes towards old and new PBM here refer to what can be called old plant-based meats, such as 
tempeh, Quorn etc., and the new generation of plant-based meats, i.e. the Impossible Burger, Beyond Meat 
products and other such recent products from the last about five to seven years, aiming to be completely 
meat-like (I count the time back to the first products from Beyond Meat which came out in the US in 2012). 
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consumers for the 
new PBM 
Meat eaters [new PBM is for] “non-vegetarians who refuse to eat something that doesn’t 
appear to be meat”; [new PBM is meant to] “reduce the damage done by 
cows” 
5.1.3. Insects 
Unlike the CBM and PBM articles, the INS article “Insects should be part of a sustainable diet 
in future, says report” (written by Emma Howard, published on 5 November 2015 in the 
online Guardian) includes no personal angle of the journalist, nor does it contain any 
interviews with a personal angle as in the FLEX article. 
The key point of this article is about using insects as a partial solution for finding sustainable 
protein for the near future, focusing on both the United Kingdom and the world at large. It 
also mentions seaweed and cell-based meat as other potential options. Although little 
emotion is present in the writing (even regarding the yuck-factor), the message is urgent: by 
2020, land "may be pushed to its limits". Similarly, "reining in the world's appetite for meat 
is essential to tackle climate change", and therefore, "insects should become a staple of 
people's diets around the world". At the same time, and in a contradictory way, insects are 
presented as a particularly important option as feed for meat animals. This may be because 
"the yuck-factor" is seen as a challenge as regards insects for human consumption, and 
because supposedly, "fears of consumer backlash are preventing change" in reducing or 
changing meat eating itself. 
The INS article relies broadly on the UK Waste and Resources Action Programme report 
(WRAP, 2015) on food challenges in the next ten years. Having adequate sustainable protein 
for the UK population will be "one of the defining challenges of the coming decades", 
according to the WRAP report. The Guardian article stays quite fact-based, picking up 
arguments from both the WRAP report itself, from a representative of WRAP, and from 
older Guardian articles and another earlier report on meat consumption. 
The posts to this article include a lot of humour. This is a specific feature of the posts in this 
document, as compared to the posts in the other three documents. The humour is more 
likely to come from the theme than the article itself, and is probably typical for the theme of 
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insects more generally in current, especially online discourse.351 There is also a much smaller 
"imagining the future" orientation in the comments, as compared to the CBM article. 
Together with examples from the data, themes and dimensions in the INS document are 
shown in Table 5.3. The humour theme is, however, not included in the table. 
Table 5.3. Themes and dimensions in the INS document 
Theme Dimensions Data extracts 
Significance Big “could be an excellent source of nourishment for humans”; “once you have 
the choice of worms or nothing you will LOVE worms” [in reference to a 
food collapse] 
Small “fine as a snack (e.g. replacing crisps)”; “only the most adventurous eaters 
[…] will add insects to their diet” 
Impacts on 
environment, 
animal welfare, 
human health 
Better  “there'd be a lot less cruelty”; “healthier with less saturated fats”; “your 
liver and intestines will be cleaner” 
Worse “the environmental case for eating insects [is] dubious”; “how well 
adapted the human digestion is to eating […] insects”  
Attitude towards 
insect eating 
Positive  “a good idea”; “gourmet grubs in the foodie section” 
Negative [food for] “poor people”; “revolting”  
Method of 
introduction in the 
Global North 
In processed form [when] “presented in an unrecognisable form” [insects can be acceptable] 
As whole animals “let’s see them have [insects] on the menu during the Paris environment 
conferences”; “gourmet grubs” 
Normality as food 
in the Global North 
Insects as normal “a lot of insects taste like pork”; “wouldn't taste any different to the 
mashed up miscellaneous protein you get in nuggets, burgers and other 
processed crap”; “If you eat shrimp you are pretty much already eating 
insects” 
Insects as not normal “for most people the 'Yuck' factor would prevent [insects] becoming 
acceptable” 
Insects as normal for meat 
animals and farmed fish 
“the adoption of insects as a protein in animal diets will be ‘more 
straightforward’” 
Relationship 
between Global 
North and South in 
terms of eating 
insects 
Influence North -> South “newly-affluent people in emerging countries are also ditching their insect 
diets as they aspire to eat a meat-heavy Western diet […] so we in the 
West basically need to start eating more insect-based proteins pretty 
sharpish...” 
Influence South -> 
South/North 
“looks like Mexico's finding a new appetite for the little blighters, 
especially in their posh restaurants” 
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 More generally speaking, comments to articles in the online Guardian do contain such humour. However, 
the comments in the other three documents in the data mainly do not. 
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5.1.4. Flexitarianism 
The main content of the FLEX article “Vegans, vegetarians and now… reducetarians” (written 
by Nell Frizzell, published on 25 June 2017 in online Guardian) consists of an interview of 
Brian Kateman, the co-founder of the “Reducetarian movement”.352  
The article is rather positive about flexitarianism, although the journalist questions the 
ethicalness of eating some meat when one tries to be ethical about meat eating in the first 
place. Indeed, the journalist focuses on ethics regarding meat animals, and does not discuss 
the environment to the same extent, although Kateman in the included direct quotes talks 
about eating less meat for environmental or health reasons, and not actually so much for the 
sake of the animals. According to him, the motivation, in fact, does not matter, the end 
result is what matters, whereas it seems that the journalist is more concerned with animal 
ethics, and the consistency of behaviour. The positivity from Kateman and the doubt from 
the journalist hold opposite ends of this dimension, with the positivity seemingly winning at 
the end of the article. 
There is some double talk in the article about what flexitarianism actually is. On the one 
hand, even a small cut in meat eating is a "huge win", but on the other hand, the article (and 
Kateman in particular) talks about eating meat only occasionally as the flexitarian way. These 
two ways of eating are actually very different, in practice, and in terms of their impacts, 
something that the article does not discuss. Most likely for Kateman, flexitarianism denotes 
the second, more radical way, but he tries to present it as easy, and therefore, as the first 
way (i.e. where every small step counts). However, and as will be discussed later in Section 
5.2.3, the first way can be a route into the second way, although Kateman does not talk 
about this. Again, it is an easier sell, when someone just has to think about a 10% reduction, 
and not the further implications of a more profound change. 
The posts that follow the FLEX article reflect the article well in that they are quite focused on 
ethics, and vegetarianism vs. flexitarianism. However, there is a lot of criticism regarding 
labelling the act of "eating less meat" as something in particular, i.e. reducetarianism, or 
flexitarianism. The posts are also overall less enthusiastic about flexitarianism as part of an 
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 “Reducetarianism” is another name for flexitarianism. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this thesis will usually 
refer to flexitarianism. It is the most commonly used term. 
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identity, many of those who are in principle positive about the idea of eating less meat see it 
just as a sensible way of eating, not anything to fuss about. But others do see a point in the 
labelling itself. There is less positive future orientation in the posts than in CBM or PBM 
posts, similar to the INS posts in that respect. 
With data examples, Table 5.4 presents some of the many themes and dimensions in the 
FLEX article. The morality theme will be discussed in more detail separately, as will labels, 
and the transformation process. 
Table 5.4. Themes and dimensions in the FLEX document 
Theme Dimensions Data extracts 
Voluntariness of 
flexitarianism 
Voluntary “doing what they can”; “I’m a convert”; “privileged choice”; “eating veggie more 
than not”; [for the] “meaningful impact”; “movement”; “a group committed” 
Involuntary [eating meat as a] “vegetarian relapse”; [eating meat when] “the veggie-only 
choices are […] limited”; [eating small amounts of meat] “at dinner parties just to 
keep people off his case” 
Impacts on 
environment, 
animal welfare, 
human health 
Better  “huge win”; “harms our planet a little less”; “just smart”; “healthier and happier” 
[with less meat]; [animal] “suffering reduced”; “meaningful impact” 
Worse/not better “even a small amount [of meat] is still going too far”; “while we're at it, let’s have 
a bit less slavery too. Just the odd one every so often” 
Attitude towards 
eating meat only 
occasionally 
Positive “pragmatic”; “25% of people in Britain have cut back”; “good idea”; “occasional 
indulgence in the pleasures of flesh”; “foods that are good for the body and the 
planet” 
Negative [have your] “cake and eat it”; “vegans without the willpower”; “backsliding” 
Attitude towards 
labelling eating 
meat only 
occasionally 
Label as positive [having a label is] “convenient and it ensures that more people stop eating 
meat”; “motivating others” [to follow example]; “movement can be formed” 
Label as negative “coming up with ridiculous terms”; [no need for label when not a] “hard and fast 
rule”; “reflects the narcissism of our age” 
Transformation 
(motivation) 
Convenience “as the sole meat-eater in a vegetarian family I've [cut down] myself” 
Emotional “feels really good” [to eat only a little meat] 
Rational “rebalancing proportions of different foods”; “eating less meat at my age is just 
smart” 
Social support “as a family we started to cut right back on meat consumption when my son 
turned to a vegan diet” 
Financial “just leaving [meat] out of a couple meals a week can save you a fortune”; “the 
good stuff is expensive” 
Moral “the more meat you eat, the more damage” [and vice versa] 
Transformation 
(process) 
Slow “it makes sense that some people introduce [not eating meat] gradually into 
their lives”; “just phasing things out”; “I’m on the same path” [of cutting down 
meat] 
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Fast “I stopped eating all meats save fish around 3 years ago”; “my son switched to 
veganism”;
353
 “when I became a vegetarian […] my parents kept serving me 
meat” 
Morality Positive “increasing expected utility” [with more people cutting down being better than a 
few people turning vegan] 
Negative “robbing one bank makes you a criminal as much as robbing ten”; “fundamental 
wrong” [of eating animals]; [flexitarianism is] “giving your weak will a misleading 
name” 
5.1.5. Vegetarianism and veganism 
Despite vegetarianism or veganism not being significant themes in any of the four articles 
contained in the data, all the documents do include some discussion, and the posts have 
often extensive and rather rich discussion on vegetarianism or veganism. This is therefore an 
important context, or a counter theme for all the other main themes, namely, cell-based 
meat, new plant-based meat, insects and flexitarianism. More specifically, in the CBM 
document there is considerable amount of criticism of, and defence for vegetarianism and 
veganism. In the PBM document, there is extensive discussion on vegetarians or vegans as 
regards meat replacements, and also on whether the new plant-based meat products are 
meant for vegetarians and vegans, or for meat eaters. Further, in the INS article, there is 
somewhat less discussion on vegetarianism and veganism, but there are still two themes 
around it: eating a vegetarian or vegan diet being better than eating insects (if the two were 
the actual available choices), and the idea of vegetarians and vegans supplementing their 
diet with insects. Finally, the FLEX document includes extensive discussion of vegetarianism 
and veganism, from a moral point of view, and from a practical point of view. There is also 
discussion on the process of becoming a vegetarian or vegan, and similarly to the CBM 
document, there is both criticism and defence towards vegetarian or vegan diets. 
Many of the themes and dimensions related to the discussion on vegetarianism and 
veganism are presented in Table 5.5 (covering all four documents, as indicated), together 
with some examples from the data. 
 
 
                                                          
353
 Veganism is included here as the end point of the continuum discussed later in Section 5.2.3. 
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Table 5.5. Themes and dimensions regarding vegetarianism and veganism in the data 
Theme Dimensions Data extracts 
Origin Voluntary “conscious lifestyle choice” (CBM); “I'm an omnivore (digestive options) by 
evolution, but I choose (brain function) to eat only plant foods” (CBM) 
Involuntary “a vegetarian diet most days simply because it's all they can afford” (FLEX) 
Impacts on 
environment, 
animal welfare, 
human health, 
and culinary 
impact 
Better  “you’ll never look back” [as regards health] (FLEX); [cook in a plant-based 
restaurant as a] “masseur of vegetables” (CBM); [as a meat eater] “you are 
asking someone to respect your choice of contributing to damaging the planet 
and promoting the mistreatment of animals” (CBM) 
Worse [vegetarian/vegan food] “doesn't have the nutrients of meat” (PBM); “anyone 
who tells themselves they are vegetarian for environmental reasons is kidding 
only themselves” (FLEX); “furry bunnies and rodents and fluffy feathered friends 
are slaughtered in huge quantities to grow, store and transport grains and 
pulses” (CBM) 
Importance Big “what we eat has a huge impact on” [climate change] (FLEX) 
Small “fooling around with veganism and vegetarianism is nothing more than fiddling 
while Rome burns” (CBM) 
Attitude towards 
vegetarianism or 
veganism 
Positive “being vegetarian or vegan has become fashionable” (FLEX); “three and a half 
times as many vegans [in the UK] in 2016 as 10 years earlier” (FLEX) 
Negative [vegetarians in their] “sad little no fun caves” (PBM); “giving up” [meat] (INS, 
PBM, FLEX); “restrictive and hypocritical rules” [of vegans] (FLEX); “your 
proclivities” [of eating a vegetarian diet] (FLEX) 
Character of 
vegetarianism or 
veganism 
Dichotomous (black 
and white) 
“being vegetarian is seen as a black-and-white deal” (FLEX); “when the choice for 
a certain kind of nutrition is turning into a religion” (FLEX); “Single-Issue Fanatics” 
(CBM); “you can't be a vegetarian and eat meat” (FLEX) 
Not dichotomous (not 
black and white) 
“the free range stuff, I like it too much to be totally veggie” (CBM); “I'm simply 
eating a vegetarian diet more days than not” (FLEX) 
Managing Easy “quite happy already being a vegetarian” (CBM) 
Difficult “vegetarian relapse” (CBM) 
Relationship to 
meat (defined by 
vegetarians and 
vegans 
themselves) 
Liking meat “as a vegetarian I would love there to be a guilt-free, environmentally friendly, 
and utterly convincing simulacrum of meat, in all its glory” (CBM); “people who 
ethically avoid meat-eating still miss what is for them […] a lovely form of food” 
(CBM);  
Not liking meat “I have never loved meat and gave it up when I was about 11” (CBM); “never 
been keen on meat substitutes - no need!” (CBM); “As a vegetarian I don't look 
for veggie alternatives that look/taste like meat” (PBM) 
Relationship to 
meat (defined by 
others) 
Liking meat “why do so many vegetarians like to pretend they're eating meat?” (PBM) 
Not liking meat “who gets distressed by seeing a raw hamburger patty? (besides a very militant 
vegan)” (PBM) 
Relationship to 
meat eaters 
Open “Q: How do you know someone is vegan? A: They'll tell you.” (CBM); “any thread 
about [vegetarianism] here is overwhelmed with [vegetarians] banging the drum 
while the other 98% […] ignore the issue completely” (FLEX); “I am […] perfectly 
willing to make my dietary choices a subject of discussion, but [meat eaters] 
don't really like that either because I stand up to them and I've thought the 
philosophy through more than they have” (FLEX) 
Closed “you chose to be vegan. That is your business” (CBM); “if you'd ever been 
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vegetarian, you would know that many people […] accuse you of being a 
hypocrite […] even though you have no wish to discuss your choice with them” 
(FLEX); “the excuse I use” [for being vegetarian] (FLEX) 
Morality about 
meat 
Positive “guilt-free” [cell-based meat for vegetarians] (CBM); “people who ethically avoid 
meat-eating” (CBM) 
Negative “resolution-snapping burden of guilt” [when a vegetarian eats meat] (PBM); 
“restrictive and hypocritical rules” [of vegans] (FLEX) 
 
This introduction has demonstrated the rich discussion in the four documents, pointing out 
many of the specific themes and dimensions relevant to the new (and old) meatways, and to 
my research question. In the next sections, I will move to the main analysis. 
5.2. Framing 
This section will draw more heavily from Chapter 3, in terms of how framing works, and the 
connection to values. In Section 5.2.1, I will first discuss some conclusions of analysing 
frames in the data. Subsequently, Section 5.2.2 will continue with the frame theme, focusing 
on sustainability facilitating values potentially being more related to certain frames than to 
others. I will also discuss what this may mean for discourses around the new meatways. 
Finally on the focus on frames, in Section 5.2.3, I will present two topics arising from the 
data that are related to conceptual metaphors as framing tools: the demand-supply dilemma 
discussed in Chapter 2, which shows up in the data, and the idea of seeing daily meat eating, 
flexitarianism, vegetarianism and veganism on the same continuum, as “stops” on a road on 
which one may travel, in whichever direction. 
Firstly, however, I will briefly go over the most relevant principles and conclusions from 
Chapter 3 before moving on to the frames found in the data. Frames are often an important 
focus in analysing discourse due to their power of defining what is discussed, or not 
discussed, and how something is discussed. Discourses create and change cognitive frames, 
and frames impact on discourses in return. Through different frames, discourses also create 
and change meanings, activate certain values (and emotions), and vice versa, certain values 
can impact on the kinds of frames and discourses that exist or dominate. Similarly, there is 
also a two-way connection between discourses, frames and knowledge. When discourses 
change or new discourses are born, new, but frequently present cognitive frames may not 
only have an impact on value priorities or dispositions, but through general understandings 
they can also discursively open the relevant social practices, as long as any potential new 
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practice elements are in congruence with each other. Further on reviewing Chapter 3, the 
potential of prioritizing sustainability facilitating values through certain frames could be 
crucial for realizing sustainable practices - both at individual and at societal level - as 
prioritizing certain values may connect to (acceptance of) action towards sustainability, as 
long as these values are salient enough, and different values regarding practices are in 
alignment, rather than in conflict with each other.354  
As discussed in Chapter 3, I use the analytical concepts in Strydom (2000, drawing from Klaus 
Eder and William A. Gamson) whereby three specific cognitive framing devices help 
construct various frames in a discourse. These three framing devices appearing in different 
proportions, and with different emphasis, to build frames in public discourses are “factual”, 
“normative” and “emotive”. As illustrated with the example in Chapter 3, framing devices 
build frames, and a larger discourse can be seen to be built up from a number of different 
but generally compatible frames. The division to three distinct framing devices simplifies 
matters to some extent, as there can be overlaps between them, especially as regards the 
normative framing device. Despite such overlaps, I keep the framing devices mostly separate 
in the analysis, and name them based on what is most apparent.355  
5.2.1. Frames in the data 
In general, the data consists of what can be seen as either crisis discourses - crisis of meat 
production with its disastrous impacts, and crisis of sustainably feeding a growing world 
population - or solution discourses, i.e. the ways the crises can be resolved. Obviously, 
choosing between these two is also about framing. 
All three framing devices can be recognised in the data, although the emotive framing device 
shows up to a lesser extent than the other two. The titles and leads of any newspaper 
articles have an influence on the initial frame taken in by the readers, and this frame is often 
reflected also in the article itself as well as the posts that follow. Therefore, Table 5.6 shows 
the titles and leads for each article, together with the strongest framing devices present.356 
                                                          
354
 Action towards sustainability need not involve only altruistic values, it can also, for example, be about 
responsibility towards one’s own health and wellbeing, which in the context of meat is a relevant connection. 
355
 See Chapter 4 for more on this issue. 
356
 I also briefly considered multimodality in terms of frame analysis, in particular the visual effects such as 
photos in the online articles. The conclusion is that the photos in these articles seem to be largely supporting 
the generally fairly positive frames about the topics. In the end, I did not include photos in my analysis. 
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Table 5.6. Titles and leads of the articles - Framing devices 
Title Lead Framing devices 
Could lab-grown fish and 
meat feed the world – 
without killing a single 
animal?  
Critics dismiss it as unnatural ‘Frankenmeat’, but the San Francisco 
startups racing to take animal-free meat and fish to market think it’s 
wonder food. So how were the carp croquettes at the world’s first 
cultured fish tasting? 
Normative, emotive 
It looks like a burger, tastes 
like a burger – but it's a plant  
Impossible Foods is on a mission to make a burger so similar to beef 
that even the most ardent meat lovers can’t tell the difference. Have 
they succeeded? 
Factual, emotive 
Insects should be part of a 
sustainable diet in future, 
says report  
Alternative protein sources will be needed for humans and livestock to 
reduce land and energy use, says UK government’s waste agency 
Factual, normative 
Vegans, vegetarians and 
now… reducetarians  
For anyone who has tried to cut out meat entirely and failed, there’s a 
new movement which tries to take a more pragmatic approach 
Normative, emotive 
The titles, leads and article texts do seem to influence the discourse that takes place in the 
posts. This can be seen, for example, from the way moral aspects are emphasized or not 
emphasized in the titles, leads and article texts and how this is reflected in the posts. For the 
PBM and INS articles, moral aspects are mostly not explicitly present,357 and so it is also 
largely for the posts, especially for INS posts. For the CBM article, moral aspects are 
somewhat, although not very present, and the posts follow this line. The only article that 
does reflect extensively on moral aspects is the FLEX article where flexitarianism is seen as 
an at least partial solution to the moral dilemmas around meat (more on this topic in Section 
5.3.2). The posts that follow this article also reflect extensively on various moral aspects. 
Further, Table 5.7 shows some examples from the different documents - including the 
articles, but mostly from the posts - for the different framing devices present. These are not 
meant to be inclusive of all different ways these framing devices are used, but only include 
some of the typical uses. Section 5.2.3 concentrates separately on two frames defined by 
two different conceptual metaphors. 
Table 5.7. Typical framing devices in the data 
Framing 
device 
Context in which 
applied 
Data extracts 
Factual Challenges “the problem of supplying the UK’s population with a nutritional and sustainable protein 
supply will be ‘one of the defining challenges of the coming decades’, says the report” (INS 
article); “the road to public acceptance of cultured meat is paved with ‘gnarly problems, 
communication issues, regulatory issues’” (CBM article); “the company in the article are trying 
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 Although here could be an example of two different framing devices overlapping: the new meats are seen as 
better for the environment (factual), and therefore something worth pursuing (normative). 
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to provide an alternative to that which satisfies as only meat does” (PBM posts) 
Environmental 
impact (cell-
based / new 
plant-based 
meat) 
“how a clean-meat revolution could affect the landscape and environment is riddled with ifs 
and buts” (CBM article); “the other potential problem that is not addressed in the article is 
how much carbon emissions is generated in the processing vegetables to creating [the 
Impossible Burger]” (PBM posts) 
Motivations for 
eating food 
“the more likely scenario isn't that you would have people eating insects instead of meat but 
as well as meat. We don't eat only the nutrients we need and nothing else” (INS posts); “one 
of the best reasons for cutting back on meat is financial; the good stuff is expensive - either in 
terms of its asking price - or the amount of energy required to cook it” (FLEX posts) 
Historical scale “during the Second World War, people accepted significant changes to their lives” (FLEX posts) 
“the meat industry is the biggest source of human-caused suffering in history. […] Factory 
farming in particular will be a thing of the past one day” (FLEX posts); “[mock meat] started 
with the Buddhists creating [it] for non-harm festivals that get the greater part of the meat-
eating population abstaining for meat for the duration of the festival” (PBM posts) 
Marketplace 
approach 
“the only way you’re going to do [replace meat] is a marketplace approach and that entails 
creating a food that outperforms this market” (PBM article); “ultimately it's going to come 
down to cost. If these companies can get the cost of their animal protein below the cost of 
farming the real thing then all the companies who make processed foods will be lining up for it 
and finding a way of selling it to consumers (probably also based around cost)” (CBM posts) 
Competition “Selden, Post and the other cultured meat startups exude confidence about solving the serum 
puzzle: with venture capitalists to keep sweet, and stiff competition, a certain swagger must 
be displayed at all times” (CBM article); “and you're right. Nobody will ever compete - these 
guys will own this market as a monopoly forever. After all, Google tried but couldn't buy them 
out, so obviously Google will now lose all interest in the field after that setback. And it is 
incredibly unlikely that anybody else is thinking ‘gee, if Google wanted in that badly, I want in 
even worse!’” (PBM posts) 
New innovations 
over time and 
economies of 
scale 
“the costs will come down (and as the article says, are doing so). Think of the difference 
between the powerful computer in your phone today, and room-sized computers fifty years 
ago” (CBM posts); “it's a pity that when things get popular and mass produced the price 
doesn't fall. Like people ten years ago saying PV would fall to a couple of bucks a watt. Bet 
they are feeling dumb now huh? Oh, hang on...” (PBM posts) 
Consumer power “but fears of a consumer backlash are preventing change [in policies about meat], according to 
a leading think tank [Chatham House] (INS article) 
Efficiency “If [the Impossible Burger] takes off it will likely become a consumer product eventually […] 
Animal Flesh is an expensive product to make, it requires an intense amount of water, crops, 
and land to produce. Through in the cost of the machines and electricity used to slaughter and 
cut the livestock into meat to consume and [the Impossible Burger] might end up being 
cheaper than beef under the right circumstances” (PBM posts); “eating insects is still higher up 
the food chain than a vegetarian diet and the insects would have to be bred on something. So 
we are more talking about insect farms. While you could get some recycling we already are 
doing food waste to energy” (INS posts) 
Meeting the 
demand 
“the interest in meatless meat has to do with finding an economically viable substitute for a 
growing population of meat eaters” (PBM posts); “[another poster:] ‘an industry that is 
shovelling 10 billion pounds of ground mince into Americans' mouths every year’ In response 
to consumer demand, you should note. They aren't being force-fed in detention” (PBM posts); 
“which product can satisfy the craving of the population for meat?” posits [Mark] Post (CBM 
article) 
Normative Co-responsibility “everything we do has an impact, veganism has an impact. […] No-one is perfect, or innocent, 
so let’s just all do what we can” (FLEX posts); “I think we all do our bit, it'll at least help. I've 
not the crusading temperament, but I'm willing to pitch in” (FLEX posts); “look, if you don't 
want to eat meat, that's absolutely fine and dandy, but that doesn't absolve you from the 
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responsibility of doing your part in the much more important and urgent need to reduce 
emissions in all other areas” (PBM posts) 
Meat is a choice “there are enough plants with enough protein to eat, so you'd need to insist a lot in eating 
some animal to prefer worms and bugs over lentils” (INS posts); “I'm an omnivore (digestive 
options) by evolution, but I choose (brain function) to eat only plant foods” (CBM posts) 
Hypocrisy “not sure why meat eaters tie themselves in knots trying to point out relatively minor 
contradictions in other people's behaviour instead of facing their own shortcomings” (FLEX 
posts); “let’s see them have insects on the menu during the Paris environment conferences. It 
would be nice if they could provide the lead on this.....” (INS posts); “the 'holier than thou' 
brigade” [vegetarians/vegans] (CBM posts); “what gets my goat is finger-wagging vegetarian 
hypocrites who have multiple offspring but still get on their stupid box and lecture others 
about the unsustainability of eating meat” (PBM posts); “I love how meat eaters blame 
sanctimonious vegans for their refusal to consider being vegetarian. Nothing like missing the 
point entirely. ‘I'd be all for women's rights, but those damn feminists are so annoying!’” (CBM 
posts) 
Sacrificing for 
common good 
“the Vegan Society’s formal definition may be that ‘veganism is a way of living which seeks to 
exclude, as far as is possible and practicable, all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, 
animals for food, clothing or any other purpose,’ but what we hear is ‘veganism is a way of life 
that ruthlessly excludes anyone who enjoys milk in their tea and will joylessly judge every 
element of your life until you give in and start wearing hemp’” (FLEX article); “during the 
Second World War, people accepted significant changes to their lives - rationing was the 
norm, and recycling went through the roof. We can do this” (FLEX posts) 
Freedom to 
choose 
“I don't think I should be told whether or not to eat meat” (FLEX posts); “telling people you 
need to eat less meat is never going to work, especially uneducated, red neck, libertarian 
Americans” (PBM posts); “are you scared you might eat a vegetable burger by mistake one 
day?” (PBM posts) 
Responsibility 
lies with 
policymakers 
“the problem of supplying the UK’s population with a nutritional and sustainable protein 
supply will be ‘one of the defining challenges of the coming decades’, says the report” (INS 
article); “here's an idea - ban intensive farming” (CBM posts) 
Only 
vegetarianism 
/veganism as 
moral 
(flexitarianism as 
not moral) 
“I'm sure the infrequency of your meat consumption is a great comfort to the animal you do 
eat, which had a crap life/death because you, however infrequently, are the market for its 
flesh” (FLEX posts); [have your] “cake and eat it! Basically ‘reduce your guilt over contributing 
to animal suffering, by giving your weak will a misleading name’” (FLEX posts); “robbing one 
bank makes you a criminal as much as robbing 10. And many people have that moral basis for 
their vegetarianism or veganism” (FLEX posts) 
Cell-based meat 
solving the moral 
question about 
eating animals 
“clean meat, clean conscience” (CBM article); [cell-based meat can be a] “guilt-free, 
environmentally friendly, and utterly convincing simulacrum of meat” (CBM posts); “if it tasted 
good I would much rather eat cultured meat than a real animal or fish” (CUL posts); “I would 
feel much happier about myself if I knew no animals were being bred and the environment 
destroyed to suit my appetites” (CBM posts) 
Eating insects as 
immoral 
“even though I deem it unlikely that insects can feel pain or suffer, the fact that we would be 
farming millions upon millions of them would still be negative on the ethical scales, 
considering that there is a non-zero probability that they can actually feel pain and suffer” (INS 
posts) 
Emotive Joy “afterwards, Selden and Wyrwas [from Finless Foods] are flushed with the raw elation of 
having given birth to something important” (CUL article); “love the idea of eating kill-free 
meat” (CBM posts); “we celebrate anyone who decides to reduce the number of animal 
products they eat” (FLEX article) 
Ambivalence “I used to think I'd eat [my chickens in the backyard] but I've got soft-hearted” (FLEX posts); 
“the Impossible Burger is targeted to meat eaters who are uneasily aware of the high 
environmental costs of the cattle industry” (PBM posts); “have you ever thought that killing 
those animals [you eat] might contribute to making you unhappy?” (CUL posts) 
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Fear “millions - if not billions - of people are going to die from [climate change] impacts before this 
century is through and what we eat has a huge impact on that” (FLEX posts); “please God they 
hurry and commercialise [cell-based meat] before all our seas are dead and all the forests 
burnt” (CBM posts) 
Being part of 
community 
“as a family we started to cut right back on meat consumption when my son turned to a vegan 
diet. Everyone is healthier and happier with their diet and we're all trying different things” 
(FLEX posts) 
Positive/negative 
connection to 
nature 
“the animal world is being fucked up by technology, modern farming and overpopulation” 
(CBM posts); “more farmers would become custodians of nature, rather breeders of animals” 
[if people did not eat so many animals] (CBM posts) 
Positivity of 
something 
special 
“eat more plant-based meals, save a packet and occasionally indulge in the pleasures of a 
special piece of flesh” (FLEX posts) 
The framing devices in Table 5.7 point to some common frames contained in the articles. For 
example, for the CBM and PBM articles as well as posts, typical frames include what can be 
called the Market frame,358 the Innovation frame, the Efficiency frame and the Competition 
frame which all emphasize the factual framing device, and can be seen exemplified in Table 
5.7 under “factual”.359 On the other hand, the Responsibility frame, introduced in Chapter 3 
as a historical master frame (for the present times, according to Strydom, 1999; 2000), and 
emphasizing the normative framing device, is more typical of the FLEX document, although it 
also shows up in the other documents to an extent. Especially in the FLEX document, we can 
speak of a Co-responsibility frame (Strydom, 1999), as there is a sense of society and 
collective human behaviour being able to transform itself, if “everyone does their bit”, even 
if not all posters agree with such a sentiment, or the need to touch meat eating related 
practices in the first place. In the other three documents, co-responsibility is visible as well, 
although to a much lesser extent. Remarkably, these documents also include more focus on 
blame and reasons for inaction, as well as giving responsibility for change more to 
policymakers. 
As I mentioned in Chapter 3, some frames built from the framing devices tend to reflect 
ideologies, which in turn also colour the emphasis with which the three framing devices are 
applied (Strydom, 2000).  
                                                          
358
 Frames are often written with an initial capital letter. 
359
 However, to build a whole frame from framing devices, often more than one framing device would be 
employed. So, for example, for an Innovation frame, one of the factual framing devices, e.g. related to costs of 
cell-based meat coming down, could be combined with a normative framing device whereby, when cell-based 
meat is cheap enough, the moral question related to eating animals can be solved. In other words, innovation 
will solve the issue. 
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The dominant ideology as regards meat eating is carnism (Joy, 2010).360 However, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, dominant ideologies have a tendency to not be visible: “the most 
common is the most obscure” (Lehtonen, 2000:7), or as van Dijk (2006) puts it, when an 
ideology becomes part of the “common ground” accepted by all, it is no longer a 
recognizable ideology. However, perhaps since carnism has historically had counter 
ideologies in vegetarianism and veganism, it can be a recognizable ideology, although not 
easily so. In the data, many of the frames do reflect carnism, in other words, the Carnism 
frame is rather present, as so much of the discussion circles around the necessity, 
naturalness, normalness, or niceness of meat, the four Ns that are used as common 
justifications for eating meat. However, not everyone calling meat Nice, or Normal, for 
example, is an (individual) carnist.361 Especially societal carnism is, however, present also in 
other ways. First, in the following data extracts, the underlying carnism is used for justifying 
cell-based meat as a necessary product, as opposed to the new plant-based meats: 
 
So why isn’t [Josh Tetrick, CEO of Hampton Creek] making plant-based meat alternatives? “I 
can’t imagine the people I was raised with in Birmingham Alabama under any scenario 
choosing a plant-based hamburger ... it’s an identity thing.” 
CBM article 
 
“The question is, which product can satisfy the craving of the population for meat?” posits 
[Mark] Post. “At the moment it’s there and it’s increasing ... culturing is going to cover the 
entire gamut of meats that are out there. It will be much more difficult to achieve that goal 
with vegetable-based proteins.” 
CBM article 
 
And, the underlying carnism is also used to justify the need for the new generation of plant-
based meats: 
 
The goal [of Impossible Foods] is to offset some of the damage done by cows and to satiate a 
beef-hungry American population that consumes 10bn pounds of ground beef every year. 
Doing this requires science. 
PBM article 
Secondly, implied criticism of carnism is also present in the data: 
 
Like you have no other choices [than to eat meat]. Free yourself from the indoctrination of 
what is 'normal' food. Humans can live healthily without the brainwashing of needing meat 
and dairy in their diet. 
CBM12, 20 Sep 2017 
 
                                                          
360
 Joy (2011) argues that neocarnism is another, more recent dominant ideology as regards meat. 
361
 Section 5.3.1 will discuss the four Ns further. 
 
 
228 
 
What a bizarre observation [that vegetarians would prefer eating meat to a plant-based 
burger]. That's like saying every non-smoker secretly wants to neck down a whole pack in an 
hour. 
PBM46, 3 Jun 2016 
The more commonly recognizable frames mentioned above, i.e. Market frame, Efficiency 
frame, Competition frame, Innovation frame, but also Consumer power frame and Meeting 
the demand frame found in the data and included in Table 5.7, can actually be grouped 
together to a frame reflecting capitalism (Capitalism frame), as they all rely one way or 
another in capitalism’s take on how markets, economies and societies work. In other words, 
such frames indicate that markets, new innovations and competition and efficiency will solve 
problems (such as meeting the unsustainable and growing demand for meat) by making 
tasty, efficiently produced, innovative products cheap enough so that as many people as 
possible can buy them, e.g. cell-based meat or the new generation plant-based meats. 
Additionally, because of the supposed consumer power to both create demand (whether for 
meat, or for meat replacements), and reject unpleasant policies (such as a meat tax or other 
restrictions on meat consumption), the hands of policymakers are often tied, and the 
markets will deliver better solutions than policymakers could. 
Rather central to the discourses around meat, the Meeting the demand frame is in fact 
connected to the Carnism frame. Meeting the demand is a topic for Section 5.2.3.  
The Capitalism and Carnism frames can be seen as dominant frames in most current 
societies, defining much of the discourse around meat, as well as meat replacements, to the 
extent that the replacements feature in the discourses in the first place. Both of these 
frames can also be seen as part of the dominant social paradigm, introduced in Chapter 3, 
and seen by some as incompatible with sustainability (e.g. Berzonsky & Moser, 2017; 
Peattie, 2011).  
Another dominant frame existing in the data could be thought of as the Absolute morality 
frame which is evident in the discourse around vegetarianism and veganism, in that nothing 
short of absolute abstention from meat can be defined as vegetarianism or veganism, and 
additionally, vegetarians and vegans should behave consistently in all areas of life, for 
example, so that vegans do not use any leather. Flexitarianism as an ideology counters the 
Absolute morality frame. 
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Defining what are dominant ideologies and what are counter ideologies may not always be 
straightforward, but it can safely be said that emerging ideologies are likely to be counter 
ideologies (at first at least), and flexitarianism can certainly be seen as an emerging ideology. 
Another emerging ideological frame, regarding the larger sustainability discourse, could be 
called the Sufficiency frame, and flexitarianism would certainly fit under that as well. The 
other new meatways, eating cell-based meat, new plant-based meats and insects are 
alternatives that may fit with both capitalism and carnism, as well as, to some extent, with 
the idea of a sustainability transformation. This is a relevant distinction to make between 
these new meatways. The probable conflict between strong sustainability and capitalism (as 
part of the dominant social paradigm) is increasingly recognized in literature (see e.g. Peet et 
al., 2011; Schmelzer & Eversberg, 2017), and also between truly sustainable future food 
systems and growth-based economies (Hadjikakou & Wiedmann, 2017), and more 
specifically between meat eating and capitalism (e.g. Nibert, 2013; Twine, 2014).362 In the 
context of the new meatways, it can also be said that those frames may be competing with 
each other as regards possible aims for a transformation.363 The different frames most 
closely associated with the different new meatways may suggest somewhat different 
futures, although they may also possibly combine and benefit from each other. These topics 
will be returned to in Chapter 6.  
The individual behaviour change policy frame364 (or the “ABC model”, Shove, 2010) or 
Individual responsibility frame, still rather present in policy discourses regarding more 
general sustainability issues, such as energy use or transportation, is not directly present in 
the data, but could be said to be implicitly so, as it is in opposition to the Co-responsibility 
frame. In the data, there are people who resist changing their own meatways, or the 
meatways of the world, and there are people who consider change necessary, also at the 
individual level, and many posters seem to have already changed their own meatways. To 
the extent that it is present in this implicit way, the Individual responsibility frame is likely to 
be either reflected here from discourses around, for example, energy use or transportation, 
or it may be a product of civil society discourses around meat. The missing discussion as 
                                                          
362
 However, synergistic frameworks between capitalism and strong sustainability are also explored (see Geels 
et al., 2015). 
363
 See Strydom (2000) and Eder (1996) for frame competition. 
364
The Individual behaviour change policy frame refers to policymakers giving the main responsibility for 
sustainable society to consumers rather than to the policymakers themselves, or to other societal actors. This is 
not about co-responsibility which implies that all societal actors are partially responsible for making change. 
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regards policies or policymakers and meat eating is likely to do with the fact that 
policymakers have until now indeed barely touched the topic, as discussed in Chapter 2.  
5.2.2. Frames and  sustainability facilitating values 
As discussed in Chapter 3, sustainability facilitating values (see Figure 3.5) – including co-
responsibility, concern for, and unity with nature, social justice and equality - are linked to 
concern for and action on environmental and social causes, as well as general higher well-
being (for the body of literature, see Chapter 3). Also eating less meat is linked to such 
values being prioritized (de Boer et al., 2007). Importantly, according to Schwartz value 
theory, people’s value systems universally include these values, even though they may not 
be prioritized in daily lives or expressed in behaviour. Further, these values are higher in 
terms of value hierarchies, as they are related to the successful functioning of human groups 
(Schwartz, 2012). 
Reviewing Chapter 3 further, values can be better engaged by certain discourse frames than 
by others (Lakoff, 2010). Moreover, and significantly, pro-social, or pro-environmental 
policies can activate the related values in the larger society, rather than (just) the other way 
around, with societal value priorities producing certain kinds of policies (Hoff-Elimari et al., 
2014). However, value conflicts are common within not only societies, but also within 
individuals, and they may prevent the engagement of these sustainability facilitating values 
(e.g. Maio, 2011) at both societal and individual levels. In short, value frames related to 
sustainability, such as co-responsibility or concern for nature, present in discourses can help 
prioritize such values. Depending on what value conflicts may or may not be present, 
prioritizing sustainability facilitating values can motivate people for action, for demanding 
change, or for accepting otherwise tough sustainability related policies (e.g. Crompton, 
2016). The frames that do not prioritize such values may be less likely to motivate for 
persistent environmentally beneficial action. For example, discourse frames related to 
money tend to link to values that can hinder sustainability, such as the cultural or societal 
level values of hierarchy and mastery (Kasser, 2011). 
In this brief section, I will have a look at how and if, sustainability facilitating values are 
present in the frames the data contains. There is, in fact, a similar division between the 
articles for this than there is regarding the Co-responsibility frame. In other words, although 
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frames related to sustainability values are present for the CBM, PBM and INS articles, they 
are less present there than they are in the FLEX article. For example, the PBM article focuses 
largely on the new plant-based meat products and their qualities. However, on the 
sustainability facilitating value side, a partial motivation for these new products is given as 
“to offset some of the damage done by cows”. Further, a particularly powerful statement in 
the PBM article is that “the biggest threat to the global environment right now [is] the use of 
animals for food” (discussed later in the posts that follow the article). Similarly, the INS 
article frames using insects as food or feed as a partial solution to the problem of “supplying 
the UK’s population with a nutritional and sustainable protein supply” in the near future, 
and “reining in the world’s appetite for meat is essential to tackle climate change”. Although 
the need to protect the environment is clearly present, both of these articles have a rather 
human-centered view. The CBM article also has a human-centered approach as regards the 
importance of protecting the environment, but it also celebrates the idea that with cell-
based meat, it may be possible to not cause cruelty to animals while still continuing to eat 
meat. In other words, caring for nature – as far as farm animals can be seen as part of nature 
- matters in and of itself.  
On the other hand, the FLEX article is to a significant extent built around sustainability 
facilitating values. Protecting the environment, or nature, for humans, but also for its own 
sake, is more present than in the other articles. In addition, these values are touched upon 
with the specific features of flexitarianism. It is constructed as responsible, honest, yet 
broad-minded (in that it is not a strict way of eating), incorporating some freedom, and 
providing for inner harmony (in that cognitive dissonance need not be involved). Similarly, 
flexitarianism is framed as not being about public image or social recognition.365 For 
example:  
 
For anyone who has tried to cut out meat entirely and failed, there’s a new movement which 
tries to take a more pragmatic approach. 
FLEX article 
 
We celebrate anyone who decides to reduce the number of animal products they eat – and 
the motivation doesn’t matter. 
FLEX article 
 
                                                          
365
 Preserving public image and gaining social recognition are related to self-enhancing values which less often 
coincide with self-transcending values. See Chapter 3. 
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The reason people eat less meat isn’t for some badge, some public status, it’s because it has a 
meaningful impact on the world. 
FLEX article 
The posts that follow the four articles largely reflect the value presence in the articles. 
Therefore, the FLEX posts contain the most discussion that can be linked to sustainability 
facilitating values, as already reflected in the data extracts earlier in this Section 5.2 in the 
discussion regarding frames. However, some of the points that are brought up in the FLEX 
article as essential to flexitarianism, are criticised in the posts. To some, flexitarianism seems 
to be, in fact, about irresponsibility and dishonesty:  
 
Basically "reduce your guilt over contributing to animal suffering, by giving your weak will a 
misleading name" […] There is no negotiation with dead animals, either they're suffering and 
dead or they're not, this is just excusing inability to "stick to it". 
FLEX134, 25 Jun 2017 
Or, to others, it is indeed about public image: 
 
This simply reflects the narcissism of our age where everyone has to have a label attached to 
them as if to say "look at me, this is what makes me different." 
FLEX129, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Yet, most of the posters seem to embrace the idea of flexitarianism, and one can theorize 
that for these people, sustainability facilitating values are being activated, perhaps more so 
than from reading the other articles or posts, in particular since these values can be seen as 
more relevant to the concept of especially strong flexitarianism. 
Following the discussion in the previous section, those frames that tend to be fairly 
dominant in the discourse about the new meatways – new, more sustainable products - tend 
to also not have as strong links to sustainability facilitating values, whereas the still 
somewhat less dominant frames about the new meatways – e.g. flexitarianism - do tend to 
have stronger links to such values.  
As discussed earlier, conflicts between values are often preventing sustainability facilitating 
values from influencing action. However, all the new meatways may have, in principle, a 
benefit linked to value expression in behaviour, as opposed to vegetarianism or veganism. 
The new meatways may, at least in some contexts, be better in line with values such as 
providing for family, convenience, tradition, freedom, politeness, and pleasure, than 
vegetarianism or veganism alone have traditionally been able to be. To note, the above 
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values do mostly not belong to the self-transcending values (considered facilitating 
sustainability), and so, importantly, the new meatways can better align sustainability values 
with other values prioritized by people more generally. 
5.2.3. Two conceptual metaphors as framing tools 
Conceptual metaphors were discussed in Chapter 4. In short, a conceptual metaphor 
(originally from Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) is "a way of knowing the world" (Foss, 2009:270), 
where one idea (target domain, e.g. time) is understood in terms of another (source domain, 
e.g. money), and the knowledge people tend to have of the source domain (e.g. that money 
is valuable, not to be wasted) carries over to explain the target domain.366 A conceptual 
metaphor can make a point more efficiently and comprehensively than typical 
argumentative structures often can. Further, metaphors play a key role in framing 
perceptions, and therefore also in framing action. Foss argues further that change in society 
or, change at an individual level, can be generated by changing metaphors. 
The two conceptual metaphors in the following two subsections can in part be traced back 
to the Metaphorlist (Lakoff et al., 1991), a compilation and analysis of conceptual metaphors 
found in (mostly) academic literature. 
Journey on a continuum 
Smil’s (2002) suggestion for a global shift in replacing a significant amount of meat in 
processed meat products with plant-based proteins is seen by Jallinoja et al. (2016) not only 
as a practical way to go about a somewhat involuntary transformation to using more plant-
based proteins instead of meat, but also, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, as a way into 
seeing meat eating, and plant-based proteins and vegetarianism, as different points on the 
same continuum, rather than as opposites. Much of that continuum is then in fact comprised 
of different versions of flexitarianism (from weak to strong), and its end points are 
comprised of veganism at one end, and individual carnism367 at the other end. 
                                                          
366
 So, in the traditional format of writing out conceptual metaphors in statements and in capital letters, TIME 
IS MONEY. 
367
 See Chapter 3. 
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The conceptual metaphors of a continuum, as well as a journey368 might be helpful in several 
distinct ways, all of which can be found in the data. As a counter point, the more relaxed 
attitude in flexitarianism (the term coming from “flexible vegetarianism”) causes some 
tension between those (vegetarians or vegans) who call for a more black-and-white 
moralism – referred to in this chapter as an all-or-nothing approach369 - about meat eating 
and those who accept the imperfection of their own vegetarianism, or that of others. The all-
or-nothing approach refers to two ways of reacting in this case, either justifying no action, or 
defining one’s own action in a strict way. For an example of the first reaction: why cut car 
driving, if one still flies? Why mess with diet (to decrease its impact), if one still drives? Also, 
why eat a vegetarian diet when even with that diet some animals will die? These kinds of 
arguments are present in the data likely as coping strategies for cognitive dissonance. They 
will be returned to in Section 5.3.  
The second reaction, relating to defining foodways strictly, is more relevant to flexitarianism 
and the continuum idea: 
That's fine if your basis for not eating meat is environmental or health-based. In that case a 
reduction rather than elimination is still a positive thing. If the basis is that it's simply morally 
wrong to eat other living creatures then even a small amount is still going too far. Robbing one 
bank makes you a criminal as much as robbing 10. And many people have that moral basis for 
their vegetarianism or veganism. I'm not disagreeing with his general concept that it's good to 
cut down. As the sole meat-eater in a vegetarian family I've done that myself. Just not sure the 
justification would fly with a lot of people. 
FLEX68, 25 Jun 2017 
Here, on the other hand, is an example of a counter point to the above, i.e. accepting that 
flexitarianism, although imperfect, may be a good way to go about reducing harm: 
 As a utilitarian, morality is about increasing expected utility: it's not an all-or-nothing thing. 
Black-and-white deontological morality is outdated. If more suffering is reduced by many 
people reducing their meat consumption, as opposed to a few people becoming vegan and the 
rest not wanting to go that far, then I support reducetarianism. As it happens, I don't know 
which approach is the best, but I suspect reducetarianism is part of the solution. I'm a vegan 
myself, and I do encourage people to go as far as they possibly can, but if reducetarianism 
really is the only way to get certain people to reduce their meat consumption, then I support 
it. 
FLEX75, 25 Jun 2017 
                                                          
368
 In the traditional format of conceptual metaphors, we could say, for example, that DIET CHANGE IS A 
JOURNEY, or more generally LONGTERM PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A JOURNEY. The latter metaphor can be 
found in the Metaphorlist (Lakoff et al., 1991).  
369
 In psychology literature, all-or-nothing thinking is referred to as splitting. 
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The second of the two above examples points to flexitarianism possibly helping people to 
start a journey towards less meat, and for them “to go as far as they possibly can”, on a 
road, so to speak.  Moving along - back or forth - on that continuum is also acceptable for 
the more relaxed attitude inherent to flexitarianism (e.g. de Boer et al., 2014), and so, 
speaking of a “vegetarian relapse” (CBM34, 20 Sep 2017) becomes unnecessary.370 As 
Jallinoja et al. (2016) argue, the continuum idea may make replacing (some, or an increasing 
amount of) meat with plant-proteins a more relaxed affair, and therefore also more easily a 
routinized and embodied practice.  
Even though e.g. Verain et al. (2015) note that flexitarianism can just be a food style among 
many others, rather than a step on the road towards vegetarianism, it could also be that the 
different clusters of eaters (such as those identified by Verain and colleagues) are indeed on 
the same continuum from avid meat lovers to vegans, but they are just at different points on 
that journey. Importantly, some might never move forward, while others walk all the way. 
Even if flexitarianism was “only” another food style, promoting it (Jallinoja et al., 2016) 
becomes easier when it (the road) has a name: 
 
Giving it a label means that a movement can be formed. It's a bit like a political party. You 
could say "we believe that policies x, y and z should be implemented" or you could say "I'm a 
member of the Labour Party" or "I'm left-wing". 
FLEX133, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The relaxed attitude around flexitarianism as a food style also makes trying a partly 
vegetarian diet possible for more people, some of which will make a permanent change: “[A 
label] ensures that more people stop eating meat” (FLEX 133, 25 Jun 2017).371 
Another benefit to thinking of reducing meat eating as a journey is that generally a slower 
change in individual eating habits may be better than a fast switch. For example, Zaraska 
(2016a) argues that a fast change tends to be resisted more than a slower change. Similarly, 
a considerable number of people (also represented in my data) are ex-vegetarians or vegans, 
also called lapsed vegetarians or vegans (see Asher et al., 2016) due to the, often especially 
                                                          
370
 Conceptualizing the journey as nonlinear, and not unidirectional, may be quite central in fact: “If progress is 
movement in a forward direction then stopping, slowing down, or stepping off the path altogether may seem 
like failure, even though that could be a counter movement to achieve a sense of balance” (Andrews, 
2017a:274). 
371
 Labels will be explored more in Section 5.4.1. 
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social, difficulties of maintaining the diet. When seen as a journey on which one can go back 
and forth, there is no need to think of oneself being an “ex-veggie”. 
People do tend to think of “going veggie” as a switch (rather than a journey), sometimes in a 
positive sense, especially when referring to a personal or family change that has taken part 
in the past:  
Go vegetarian or vegan. You'll never look back in terms of health. 
FLEX46, 25 Jun 2017 
The kids have gone vegan and vegetarian and we've supported them in that (which has been a 
hassle but they have ended up eating much healthier […] food I think) - and we have gone 
almost fully vegetarian partly for simplicity, but mainly due to an acceptance of the arguments 
for, such as health, environmental concerns and animal welfare. 
FLEX103, 25 Jun 2017 
 
When I first went veggie I used to use meat substitutes, but the[n] I learned to cook. 
PBM25, 3 Jun 2016 
However, even in these examples a journey is referred to in “you’ll never look back”, and 
“going veggie” could actually be seeing as going somewhere, i.e. being on a journey, 
although most often this phrase seems to be understood as referring to quicker change. 
However, a “switch” is also seen in a negative sense, especially when talking about a larger 
group of people and potential change in the future: 
The switch to a vegetarian diet just isn't feasible for many. 
CBM5, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Here the idea of a switch is seen concretely, hypothetically positive, if it existed: 
I do not think human beings are to blame for our evolutionary proclivity for delicious meat. If 
only that were a switch we could turn off. 
PBM131, 3 Jun 2016 
Seeing the process of change as a slow journey, at least on a scale of individual human lives, 
is specifically present in some posts:  
I think not eating meat is now one of the solutions to our species's survival, and as such it 
makes sense that some people introduce it [not eating meat] gradually into their lives. 
FLEX123, 25 Jun 2017 
 
I'm on the same path. I stopped eating mammals some time ago, recently stopped eating 
chicken. 
FLEX87, 25 Jun 2017 
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There is a considerable amount of discussion in the data (mostly outside the FLEX document) 
regarding vegetarians and vegans either liking meat (but not eating it) or vegetarians and 
vegans actually disliking meat.372 The idea of a journey would seem particularly crucial for 
those who continue to desire eating meat, even though they also try to follow a low/no 
meat diet. For example, cell-based meat can be seen as “a great halfway house” on a more 
general journey from meat eating to vegetarianism or veganism for those who do not find 
following a vegetarian or vegan diet (yet) “feasible” (both quotes are from CBM5, 20 Sep 
2017). Similarly, “mock meat” (plant-based meat) is referred to as “transitional food” (by 
PBM39, 3 Jun 2016), when on transit, i.e. on a journey from meat eating to veganism. 
In the posts following the FLEX article, eating animals is compared to slavery. The topic is 
introduced by someone making an argument against flexitarianism (“lets have a bit less 
slavery too”, FLEX118, 25 Jun 2017), but then as a counter point, this comparison is made to 
support the idea of flexitarianism:  
Slavery didn't just end instantly either. There were incrementalists and people who wanted 
reform of the system to "reduce" its severity, too. If people were so resistant to abandoning 
slavery, then a kind of reducetarianism for slavery would have been justified too. 
FLEX121, 25 Jun 2017 
The FLEX document is indeed the one that is mainly concerned with the metaphor of a 
continuum and a journey. The posts to the FLEX article itself certainly reflect on the article 
referring to meat reduction as a point on a continuum (or spectrum):  
“The central premise of reducetarians is that vegans and vegetarians – who have reduced their 
animal intake so successfully that they’re not eating any at all – are part of the same spectrum 
as people who are dissatisfied with factory farming and so have decided to, say, only eat meat 
once in a while,” says Kateman. 
The article also sees flexitarianism as a more relaxed way than all-or-nothing vegetarianism 
or veganism. Right from the beginning, the article lead frames this: “For anyone who has 
tried to cut out meat entirely and failed, there’s a new movement which tries to take a more 
pragmatic approach”. 
Even just calling flexitarianism a movement, can actually be seen as “moving” along a path. 
However, and as mentioned in Section 5.1, the FLEX article somewhat fails to emphasize the 
idea of a journey, and instead conceptualizes flexitarianism, conflictingly, either as a small 
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 Table 5.5 reflects some of this discussion. 
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and easy switch: “if people were to cut back by just 10% that would be a huge win” (quoting 
Brian Kateman), or as a more radical change, in that reducetarians would “only eat meat 
once in a while” as in the above longer quote from Kateman. 
However, as shown above, the posts to the FLEX article certainly help one see meat 
reduction as a journey. Figure 5.1 visualises these ideas in two-dimensional space. 
Figure 5.1. Meat reduction process, and flexitarian journey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Figure by author. 
To explain the diagonal, meat reduction and flexitarian line in Figure 5.1, the closer the 
intended change is to a quick switch (from daily meat to much less, or no meat), the more 
difficult it is likely to be, and the more likely one is to stay close to a daily meat eater. On the 
opposite end of the meat reduction and flexitarian line, the slower the journey of change is, 
the easier it is, and the more likely one is to eventually be able to eat even a vegetarian or 
vegan diet, if desired. However, the reason why the diagonal line is also the flexitarian line 
(and not only about meat reduction) is that flexitarianism can usefully be seen as a journey, 
on which one may move more freely. 
The hungry beast 
Chapter 2 discussed the meat demand paradigm, or frame, according to which the world will 
need 75% more meat production by 2050, due to population and income increases as well as 
rapid further urbanization, and importantly, it is this demand that the meat industry tries to 
Reducing meat eating, flexitarians 
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adjust to. Further, this frame also largely excludes other ways to supply the majority of the 
world population with adequate protein. According to this frame, intensive meat production 
needs to intensify further in order to cut greenhouse gas production, and less intensive, or 
extensive production (in the Global South) needs to either transform into intensive 
production, or use other ways to make meat production more efficient. This frame is still 
strongly present in policy discourses. However, very lately, mainly following the increasing 
awareness of the contributions from meat production to climate change and biodiversity 
loss, has some discussion on reducing meat eating in the Global North entered certain policy 
documents, for example some documents published by the IPCC (e.g. IPCC, 2015; 2018; 
2019). The topic has, however, been present in academic discourses, as well as in some civil 
society discourses for a considerably longer time.  
As regards my discourse data, there are a number of expressions that I interpret as 
corresponding to a conceptual metaphor related to the Meeting the demand frame, namely, 
what I call the hungry beast. To explain, the articles, especially the PBM article, but also the 
CBM and INS articles, and a number of posts (especially to the PBM article) refer to different 
groups of people, in the Global North (especially in the United States) or in the South, as if 
they were one singular entity with certain beast like qualities. Importantly, the beast 
metaphor is not meant to depict actual humans as animal-like or to dehumanize anyone; the 
idea is simply to reveal the metaphorical dimensions of seeing meat demand as something 
natural, unified and something that cannot be argued with. The qualities of unpredictability, 
large size and power are also linked to the idea of the demand for meat in this metaphor. 
The beast also has some powerful own will (and great hunger), whereby the industries just 
have to comply with the demands (of the beast).  
In the examples that follow, this beast must be fed, and in particular, fed with meat, in order 
for it to be satisfied: 373,374, 375  
                                                          
373
 The expressions that refer to the hungry beast are in bold in the examples that follow. 
374
 This analysis combines extracts from different articles and different posts to build the metaphor, via 
showing different aspects of a narrative of a “hungry, uncontrollable, meat-eating beast” present in the 
discourse. Although the purpose is not to claim that any one article or post would have all these aspects within 
it, the PBM document as a whole does actually contain all the elements. 
375
 In the traditional format of writing out conceptual metaphors, we can use, for example, a statement such as 
HUNGRY POPULATION IS A BEAST or POPULATION IS A HUNGRY BEAST. Similar, even stronger statements, 
PEOPLE ARE ANIMALS or LUSTFUL PERSON IS AN ANIMAL (“lust” does not (need to) refer to sexual desire here, 
but other desires such as a strong appetite), can be found in the Metaphorlist (Lakoff et al., 1991). 
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US may be among the world’s most carnivorous nations, but as China’s economy swells, the 
planet’s most populous country is catching up. 
CBM article 
 
The promise from Impossible Foods […] is they will be making burgers so realistic that even an 
“uncompromising” meat eater won’t be able to tell the difference. The goal is to offset some 
of the damage done by cows and to satiate a beef-hungry American population that 
consumes 10bn pounds of ground beef every year. Doing this requires science. 
PBM article 
 
Yes, apparently if [a domestic animal is] not a dog or a cat it is just an object to be abused, 
terrified and murdered to satisfy the obese masses. 
PBM92, 3 Jun 2016 
 
 
As the article says, they're a company trying to diminish the negative impact of the beef 
industry - an industry that is shovelling 10 billion pounds of ground mince into Americans' 
mouths every year. They're trying to produce a viable substitute. 
PBM126, 3 Jun 2016 
 
Here is an answer to the above post (PBM126), emphasizing the demand factor: 
 
[PBM126:] “an industry that is shovelling 10 billion pounds of ground mince into Americans' 
mouths every year” 
In response to consumer demand, you should note. They aren't being force-fed in detention. 
PBM128, 3 Jun 2016 
 
An uncontrollable desire makes humans more like animals. Sometimes it is the appetite itself 
that is a beast that needs to be controlled, rather than simply fed: 
 
Reining in the world’s appetite for meat is essential to tackle climate change, according to a 
report published last year by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. 
INS article
376
 
 
The wild animal is also growing bigger, even in an uncontrollable way: 
 
 
The biggest threat is undoubtedly the out-of-control human population growth. All these 
sticking plasters aren't going to change that (and just wait till the Chinese demand for beef 
catches up to the Americans'.) Fewer meat-hungry people means fewer methane-emanating 
cows, it really isn't that hard to understand. Yet many governments are subsidising childbirth. 
Insanity. 
PBM75, 3 Jun 2016 
 
The interest in meatless meat has to do with finding an economically viable substitute for a 
growing population of meat eaters. 
PBM22, 2 Jun 2016 
 
                                                          
376
 “Reining in” refers to controlling something, including controlling a large animal by using “reins”, straps. 
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It's simple maths. The world has a steadily increasing population. As the middle classes of 
poorer countries grow, so does their appetite for meat. 
PBM23, 2 Jun 2016 
 
In other instances, the beast that needs to be fought is the Western food culture: 
The target market for these products is people who wouldn't have eaten those veggies 
anyway. They would just keep eating beef burgers, which is an unsustainable practice long-
term. It would be nice to encourage people to come back to eating healthy foods properly, but 
this would take a long time (if it was even possible). You would be battling against an entire 
culture of fast food and instant gratification. 
PBM7, 3 Jun 2016 
And in other instances, the beast is actually more addicted to meat than just hungry (a 
carnivorous animal does need meat): 
 
But in the eyes of the cultured meat trailblazers, fancy vegetarian food will never have mass 
appeal. Demand for meat, and fish, is only going one way. “The question is, which product can 
satisfy the craving of the population for meat?” posits Post. 
CBM article 
 
There isn't enough farm land on the planet to raise the livestock and grow the crops to feed 
the livestock to supply the global meat habit. 
PBM23, 2 Jun 2016 
 
There is also some criticism for the existence of the hungry beast:377 
 
You don't counter propaganda by providing fakes. The key problem is induced desires and 
resultant massive over-consumption. It's not about substitution for reasonable levels of food 
intake, or about nutrition, or about taste. The fake meat is not the solution to a problem, it 
perpetuates the primary problem. 
PBM130, 3 Jun 2016 
 
Like you have no other choices [than to eat meat]. Free yourself from the indoctrination of 
what is 'normal' food. Humans can live healthily without the brainwashing of needing meat 
and dairy in their diet. 
 
Parallels to this metaphor could also be drawn from Edward Bernays’ (a nephew of Sigmund 
Freud) theories, applied to the public relations industry he created in the United States in 
the 1930’s, of how advertising can tap into people’s unconscious needs to create desires. So, 
in fact, the beast, or the uncontrollable wild animal, would then be the Freudian unconscious 
human mind (Nadine Andrews, personal communication, 10 May 2018).  
                                                          
377
 In these two extracts, the bold text refers to the idea of “induced desires”, or of the beast actually being a 
creation of the meat industry and the current global discourse around meat. 
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The hungry beast metaphor connects my data well with the more general discourse (see 
Chapter 2) about the near future of humanity, as regards food and population growth, and 
as regards the future of eating meat. Metaphors activate certain frames, and in the case of 
the hungry beast (in this context) the frame being rather naturally activated is the Meeting 
the demand frame. In fact, this metaphor can also be seen to combine the Capitalist frame 
with the Carnism frame in connection with the new meats, as the proponents of new meat 
products aim to satisfy the (societal and/or individual) carnists world over.  
The new meats, i.e. cell-based meat, the new plant-based meats, and even insects to an 
extent, are functioning in the same Hungry beast (Meeting the demand) frame. In particular, 
the ambition of the start-ups is to create huge worldwide markets for these new meats, in 
order to replace (much of) conventional animal-based meat. The beast has to be fed with 
meat, or with something like meat. The underlining notion that such a product (old meat or 
new meat) is absolutely necessary is usually not touched upon in the dominant discourses, 
often reflecting capitalism or carnism. 
Finally, the hungry beast metaphor also intriguingly links to a dog metaphor that Zaraska 
(2016a:102) uses when discussing our current meat eating practices: “we love eating meat 
because it is well sold to us”, and the meat industry “wag[s] the dog of demand as hard as it 
can”. The dog metaphor links to both the hungry beast metaphor and the demand-supply 
dilemma of whether it is the industry largely creating the demand, or whether the industry is 
just responding to an urgent need. There seem to generally be two main interpretations for 
the tail wagging the dog metaphor. The first is that the action of the tail wagging the dog 
takes place, for example, when followers control their leader.378 In Zaraska’s sense above, 
the demand is the leader (the dog), but the meat industry (the tail, a follower) controls it. 
The second interpretation is that to “wag the dog” means to “purposely divert attention 
from what would otherwise be of greater importance, to something else of lesser 
significance”.379 So, in this interpretation, the discourse of meat demand may be distracting 
from the meat industry’s strategy to actually create the demand. Neatly combining to this, 
the “dog of demand” itself (from Zaraska, above) can be seen as a meat eating beast which 
needs to be fed (by the meat industry). 
                                                          
378
 Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 1978. 
379
 From UsingEnglish.com, viewed on 23 May 2018. Also similar definitions can be found in 
Urbandictionary.com and Dictionary.com. This interpretation of the metaphor seems to be a more recent one. 
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Metaphors and the policy context 
One of the crucial consequences of the dominance of the Meeting the demand frame in 
mainstream discourses regarding how to handle meeting the food and/or protein demand 
by 2050 is that research into behaviour change in meat is still lacking far behind research on 
technological emission reduction from meat production, due to the low priority among 
policymakers (Garnett, 2011). Remarkably, flexitarianism runs counter to the Meeting the 
demand (with meat) frame. Noting from the data, the counter discourses around 
flexitarianism imply a different way of meeting the challenges as regards food futures.  
Metaphors themselves have a connection to policy (Spencer, 2010) in that, by activating 
certain frames, metaphors contribute to the discursive construction of an issue (e.g. meat as 
a problem or not), and therefore they contribute to the policies seen as relevant for that 
issue. Both of the conceptual metaphors discussed above call for certain – although 
potentially different – kinds of policies, with the first (the journey) more likely to activate a 
counter frame which encourages flexitarianism, and the second (the hungry beast) a 
currently dominant frame which encourages more meat production, whether old or new 
meat. It will be seen whether a struggle (Strydom, 2000) between these two different and 
somewhat opposing frames will take place in the context of meat,380 or whether the frames 
could somehow combine, in particular, so that the demand for the new meats would be 
balanced with the principle of strong flexitarianism. Being aware of the frames expressed 
through these two metaphors can, in any case, be very useful, and contribute to change as 
such. For example, the “beast” may be hungry, but it need not necessarily be fed with meat. 
Instead, it can be also fed with a combination of new meats and pulses, in the spirit of strong 
flexitarianism, for example.  
Finally, in addition to the individual level journey towards less or no meat, the societal 
transformation away from the old meatways into new meatways can also be seen as the 
grand journey of transformation of the meat system,381 involving experimentation (going 
                                                          
380
 Magneson-Chiles (2013) refers to a discursive struggle, in connection with cell-based meat and various 
future expectations regarding it. Similar discursive struggles could be fought between different new meatways. 
381
 Calling the societal level transformation of the meat system as a journey is from van der Weele (personal 
communication, 25 January 2019). 
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back and forth) with different alternatives. This journey is then also part of the larger 
sustainability transformation journey. As regards the new meatways and the discourses 
around them, and the increasing problematization of the current meat system, this journey 
has already started. 
5.3. Meat eating related challenges 
5.3.1. Coping strategies and the new meatways 
In Chapter 3, I discussed the different strategies used by many meat eaters to cope with 
cognitive dissonance, a common phenomenon arising from the conflict between eating 
animals, yet not wanting to hurt animals - a conflict in values. Similarly, cognitive dissonance 
can be said to arise from not wanting to harm the environment, or even one’s own health, 
and yet engaging in activities that do harm them. Changing actual behaviour is also a coping 
strategy, with vegetarianism or veganism being the traditional ways to do this, and the new 
meatways adding important options to these.  
By all means, not everyone who eats meat uses coping strategies. In Chapters 2 and 3, I 
discussed the idea of a continuum to cover all meatways. The previous section in this 
chapter also explored the data as regards the impact of thinking of different meatways as on 
a continuum. This continuum covers everyone from an avid (individual) carnist to a strict 
vegan. At the individual carnist end, it may well be that coping strategies are not required, if 
no prioritized values are in conflict, whereas someone at the vegan end of the continuum is 
likely to have used the coping strategy of changing his or her actual behaviour, i.e. by ceasing 
to use animal products, at least for food and drink. A good part of the continuum consists of 
flexitarians, from weak to strong, and most flexitarians do use either their flexitarianism as a 
coping strategy, or they use some other strategy, as do what I call societal carnists, i.e. 
people who prefer to eat meat on a regular (usually daily) basis, out of a habit, a social 
convention, or because meat is Nice. At the same time, these people may be somewhat 
uneasy about their diet. A societal carnist has normalized regular meat eating (usually as a 
small child), but carnistic values (see Chapter 3) are likely to not all be prioritized by societal 
carnists. 
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In the literature (discussed also in Chapter 3), coping strategies include the four Ns382 - meat 
being Normal, Natural, Necessary and Nice - as justifying meat eating, in addition to a group 
of other coping strategies identified especially by Rothgerber (2014) and also by Onwezen 
and van der Weele (2016). Together with some of the other coping strategies, the four Ns 
can be seen as more direct justifications, whereas indirect justifications include some of the 
other strategies for coping with cognitive dissonance. These justifications, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, are often part of strategic ignorance of the value and emotion conflicts, and also 
of knowledge regarding what eating animals actually entails. Importantly, the (on- or offline) 
presence of vegetarians or vegans makes meat eaters particularly prone to using coping 
behaviours (Rothgerber, 2014). 
As regards the data, there is a range of coping strategies present, many of which are 
identified in literature. However some of the strategies identified in literature are not really 
present, or if they are, they are only present concerning a discussion of the behaviour of 
others. In terms of the four Ns, the data also has somewhat different takes on the concepts. 
Below, I have attempted to include all the ways that the four Ns are used either for justifying 
meat eating or for justifying the new meatways. I also include the Not Ns, i.e. expressing 
something as Not Normal, Not Natural, and so forth.  
First, although the traditional sense of meat being Normal is indeed expressed: “more than 
half of the animal kingdom eats the other half. Hence I think it's normal” (CBM43, 21 Sep 
2017), much of the use for Normal in the data is for normalizing the new meatways. The 
articles do this: 
 
People are already coming around to the idea of produce grown in factories rather than fields. 
Marks and Spencer has introduced microherbs cultivated free from pesticides in air-raid 
shelters […] And perhaps knowing that cultured meat isn’t a new idea might help normalise it. 
Winston Churchill was banging on about it in 1932. “We shall escape the absurdity of growing 
a whole chicken in order to eat the breast or wing, by growing these parts separately under a 
suitable medium,’’ he wrote, presciently. 
CBM article 
 
Comparing the process of culturing meat cells to […] brewing beer. That hallowed, ancient 
process tends to happen in giant, sterile, sealed fermenters, which are not unlike the 
bioreactors that will be used for culturing meat in industrial quantities. 
CBM article 
 
                                                          
382
 Joy (2010) discusses the first three Ns, Normal, Natural and Necessary in her theory regarding carnism. The 
fourth N has been added later by Piazza et al. (2015). 
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Ground cricket flour is already being used as a protein source in North America, [Swannell] 
said. The adoption of insects as a protein in animal diets will be “more straightforward”, added 
Swannell. 
INS article 
 
For Brown, all food manufacturing relies on technology to some extent. “The entire history of 
food has been nature combined with human ingenuity,” he said. “Bread isn’t something that 
falls off a plant.” 
PBM article 
 
At the tasting, the crowd lined up for sliders. The general consensus was a lot of shrugging. 
“Burger,” one tester described it as between bites. “Pretty good.” 
PBM article 
Also the posts are using Normal in a way that can be seen as working towards normalising 
the new meatways: 
 
Mock meat is created for meat-eaters, an attempt to get meat-eaters to eat less meat. Not 
many vegans eat this - it's considered a transitional food. It started with the Buddhists creating 
fake meat for non-harm festivals that get the greater part of the meat-eating population 
abstaining for meat for the duration of the festival. 
PBM39, 3 Jun 2016 
 
And time, I feel, will also produce more willing consumers, people not yet born who will grow 
up with this as an entirely normal idea. I feel absolutely certain that cultured meat will one day 
be commonly eaten the world over. 
CBM143, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Yes, yes [the Impossible Burger] is [a burger]. Burger these days refers to the form. It isn't a 
hamburger, but nor are chicken burgers, fish burgers, etc. 
PBM2, 3 Jun 2016 
 
I just eat food too. But I only eat meat two or three days a week. I now eat more fruit and veg 
than ever in my life. 
FLEX16, 25 Jun 2017 
 
In particular, many of the INS posts are about normalising insects as food: 
 
A lot of insects taste like pork, particularly in the larval stage and you'd eat the ones that are 
palatable and we have history digesting. 
INS16, 5 Nov 2015 
 
The Aztecs and Maya ate -- and still do -- insects for their protein. Fried worms are tasty and 
crunchy with a texture like cheeze puffs. Grasshoppers are something like popcorn vinaigrette.  
INS73, 5 Nov 2015 
 
Do you eat prawns, crab or lobster? I know they're not the same as insects, but they certainly 
share a number of traits and it turns out they're probably more cloesly related to insects than 
previously thought. Lobsters really are cockroaches of the sea. 
INS4, 5 Nov 2015 
Normalising the new meatways will be returned to in Section 5.4.2. In opposition to Normal, 
Not Normal is used occasionally for the new meatways or for vegetarianism or veganism, but 
it is also used for conventional meat eating, as in “free yourself from the indoctrination of 
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what is 'normal' food” (CBM12, 20 Sep 2017) or in “meat from animals will become a 
premium product and with time may become socially unacceptable in many societies” 
(CBM132, 20 Sep 2017). 
Second, and different from Normal, Natural is used mainly to justify meat eating, this being a 
typical example: “whilst I hate the term natural there can be little debate; we evolved from 
an omnivore diet so clearly eating meat was natural” (CBM65, 20 Sep 2017). However, there 
are also attempts to make the new meats more Natural: “she describes the raw paste of 
harvested cells within them as having a delicate flavour of the sea, a little like the water in an 
oyster shell” (CBM article). There is also criticism for the importance of Natural as an 
argument, for example in the CBM article: “Naturalness is perhaps one of the most slippery 
concepts ever to have been massaged by advertising copywriters”. Also the posts reflect 
this: “What's so good about things being 'natural', whatever that means? Smallpox is 
natural, mosquitoes are natural” (CBM67, 20 Sep 2017). The opposite, Not Natural, is used 
more variably, often for cell-based meat: “Frankenstein's creation was a reanimated dead 
corpse. Are cells grown invitro far removed?” (CBM140, 20 Sep 2017), but also for eating 
conventional animal-based meat:  
 
We are only omnivores in the sense that we do eat meat, not because our biology is adapted 
to meat consumption. Eating meat is as ‘natural’ as eating a deep-fried Mars bar; we can do it, 
but if we do it everyday there are health consequences. 
CBM75, 21 Sep 2017 
 
Additionally, and as could be expected, Not Natural is often used for the way 
conventional animal-based meat is produced: 
 
 
No one can argue that intensive farming is natural. Eating insects is arguably more natural, and 
yet westerners turn their noses up at the idea. 
CBM article 
 
The critics who dismiss [cell-based meat] as unnatural are going to be very upset when they 
find out where their meat currently comes from. 
CBM121, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Animal Flesh is a[n] expensive product to make, it requires an intense amount of water, crops, 
and land to produce. 
PBM68, 3 Jun 2016 
 
Third, Necessary is used in equally varied ways. There are some, although not many 
references to people personally finding meat eating Necessary, however, it is more common 
to say that farming animals is Necessary: 
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Here we go again. If we didn't eat cows, we wouldn't breed them. Therefore they wouldn't 
even exist in the first place. 
PBM95, 3 Jun 2016 
 
We do need our grasslands for biodiversity. 
CBM21, 21 Sep 2017 
 
Total rubbish [to say that if you care about the environment, you should not eat meat]. Wait 
till you have to denude all the forests to plant your silly soya bean and other crops to sustain 
the population of the planet on only vegetable matter. Let's see how the world is then..... 
PBM139, 3 Jun 2016 
 
 
However, a common use for Necessary is also to justify the new meatways: 
 
Alternative protein sources will be needed for humans and livestock 
INS article 
 
I decided that without question the biggest threat to the global environment right now was 
the use of animals for food,” Brown said. “But the only way you’re going to [replace meat] is a 
marketplace approach and that entails creating a food that outperforms this market.” 
PBM article 
 
We're already at the stage where we need to start eating less meat in order to not completely 
destroy the planet. But telling people you need to eat less meat is never going to work, 
especially uneducated, red neck, libertarian americans. But imagine if you can make a burger 
that tastes like meat, costs a 5th of the price, is actually healthy, and doesn't decimate the 
environment. The person who achieves that will make sh*t loads of money! 
PBM23, 2 Jun 2016 
 
[Cell-based meat] will get there because it has to. too many humans on this rock. 
CBM3, 20 Sep 2017 
 
More worrying is the fact that because us Westerners don't have much tradition of eating 
insects, newly-affluent people in emerging countries are also ditching their insect diets as they 
aspire to eat a meat-heavy Western diet. And the last thing the planet needs is the whole of 
China and India getting hooked on meat, with all its disastrous environmental impacts. So we 
in the West basically need to start eating more insect-based proteins pretty sharpish... 
INS46, 5 Nov 2015 
 
I think not eating meat is now one of the solutions to our species's survival, and as such it 
makes sense that some people introduce it [not eating meat] gradually into their lives, and 
should not be made to feel like advocates for rape/slavery for doing so. 
FLEX123, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The opposite justification, Not Necessary, is also used in varied ways, to either justify that 
the new meatways are Not Necessary, or that meat as such is Not Necessary. Sometimes 
criticism of the new meatways is to defend the status quo:  
 
Insects are fine as a snack (eg replacing crisps) but they just don't do the job of a steak. So we 
either need genetically modified, cow-sized insects (the stuff of horror) or to stop listening to 
these ridiculous think tanks. (INS93, 5 Nov 2015)  
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However, in fact most of these justifications seem to be used to support discontinuing meat 
eating, as even when the new meatways are considered Not Necessary, it is to say that 
vegetarianism or veganism is all that is needed: 
 
I don't even see the point of cultured meat at all on this basis, it would be easier and better to 
turn farming around the world to vegetables, nuts and grains used to feed people. 
CBM2, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Anyone would think getting more than adequate protein from plant sources was difficult (it 
isn't). There are many vegan bodybuilders and athletes who do well without any animal form 
of protein. So why bother with insects. 
INS66, 5 Nov 2015 
 
The key problem is induced desires and resultant massive over-consumption […] the fake meat 
[such as the Impossible Burger] is not the solution to a problem, it perpetuates the primary 
problem. 
PBM130, 3 Jun 2016 
 
Given that we don't live in [a hunter-gatherer] society however, meat eating results in animals 
being imprisoned and oppressed all their lives which makes eating meat under these 
circumstances all the more wrong, and as it is arguably no longer necessary for survival it is 
even less defendable. 
FLEX126, 26 Jun 2017 
 
Fourth and last, when Nice is used to describe meat, it is often with short and confident 
appeals to senses: “a lovely form of food”, “delicious”, “yummy”, “meat, in all its glory”. 
Especially the CBM article focuses however, on similar sensory aspects of cell-based meat 
and fish: “a succulent beef meatball”, “sushi or sashimi softer and better than the best sushi 
you have tasted”, but also of the new plant-based proteins, with the Impossible Burger being 
“uncannily beef-like, oozing cholesterol-free fat and pink through the middle”. The PBM 
article also describes the Impossible Burger as “very tasty”. As regards the posts in general, 
the only new meat (in the sense of this thesis) the posters in the data have had an 
opportunity to taste are insects, and this personal experience is shared by many, for 
example: 
 
I've tried several types [of insects]. Some were quite delicous. 
INS10, 5 Nov 2015 
 
I remember the excitement of handing over the cash for a tin of Za-Za insects at the deli in 
Broomhill, Sheffield, back in 1964. […] What were they like? Chewy and the main flavour I 
remember was salty - possibly soy sauce. […] Still wish that I'd tried the neighbouring can of 
chocolate coated ants. 
INS65, 5 Nov 2015 
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Not Nice is applied less frequently than Nice. The first 2013 cell-based burger is described in 
the CBM article as “dry and anaemic”, insects are claimed by a couple of INS posters to be 
“tasteless”, and a PBM poster guesses that the Impossible Burger would taste “gross”. There 
are some posters identifying as vegetarians or vegans who refer to meat as Not Nice: “never 
loved meat”, “not pleasant”, and “repellent”, but many of the posters identifying as 
vegetarians or vegans talk about meat as Nice.383  
As regards the other coping strategies expressed in the data, as said, many, but not all of 
those discussed in literature (and mentioned in Chapter 3) can be found also in the data. In 
addition, there are some that I consider to work as coping strategies, but to my knowledge, 
they are not discussed as such in the literature.384 Table 5.8 lists a variety of the strategies 
together with examples from the data.  In some cases, the data contains criticism of certain 
coping strategies, rather than expressions of the actual strategies.385  I will discuss the most 
interesting issues from the point of view of the new meatways after the table. 
Table 5.8. Further coping strategies in the data in addition to the four Ns 
Coping strategy Description Data extracts 
All or nothing Unless one tries to 
eliminate all harmful 
impacts, it is not 
worth just doing some 
(e.g. Rothgerber, 
2014) 
“what gets my goat is finger-wagging vegetarian hypocrites who have multiple 
offspring but still get on their stupid box and lecture others about the unsustainability 
of eating meat” (PBM posts); “it’s impossible to be vegetarian. If you eat bread, 
vegetables or fruits you are complicit in the death of thousands of rodents and other 
pests from pest control (which is arguably the death of more animal life per calorie 
than meat)” (PBM posts); “why is the life of an animal more important than the life of 
a plant?” (FLEX posts); “if you'd ever been vegetarian, you would know that many 
people take it as a personal insult, and accuse you of being a hypocrite in some way” 
(criticism, FLEX posts) 
Disassociation The animal is separate 
from the food product 
(e.g. Rothgerber, 
2014) 
“frankly, the vast majority of people who eat meat would never be able to slaughter 
their own meat and will only buy, cook and eat it so long it's no longer recognisable as 
the animal it once was” (criticsm, CBM posts); “it would be great to see a move to 
sustainable agriculture (and meat raising is/should be a big part of that)” (PBM posts, 
note “meat raising”); “how many billions of cows, calfs per year are chopped up and 
their dead bodies eaten? Most folks can't make the connection” (criticism, PBM posts) 
Avoidance One actively avoids 
situations and 
information that 
would likely increase 
cognitive dissonance 
“have you ever thought that killing those animals might contribute to making you 
unhappy? It will make more sense if you see where your food comes from” [link to 
Earthlings video about cruelty to farm animals] (criticism, CBM posts); “you have no 
qualms [about the way meat is currently produced]? Factory farmed chickens???” 
(criticism, CBM posts); “[the Impossible Burger is] not a burger then. We don't 
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 A strict vegetarian or vegan referring to meat as nice, is probably less about a coping strategy, and more 
about stating one’s opinion about meat. If however, someone identifying as a vegetarian or a vegan still eats 
meat, Nice may be a coping strategy. Further, a vegetarian or vegan referring to meat as Not Nice, may indeed 
be using a coping strategy. 
384
 It may be that the discourses around meat currently develop, diversify and change fairly rapidly, and 
academic literature may not be able to keep up with them in all cases. 
385
 In Table 5.8 these cases are indicated with the word “criticism” in brackets after the quotes. 
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(e.g. Rothgerber, 
2014) 
reconstitute chicken to look like broccoli. I don't get this” (PBM posts, note equating 
making vegetables like meat and making meat like vegetables) 
Devaluing 
vegetarians 
Criticising vegetarians 
and vegans makes one 
less inclined to feel 
uncomfortable about 
meat eating (e.g. 
Rothgerber, 2014); do-
gooder derogation 
(Minson and Monin, 
2012) 
“there you go, virtue signalling, holier than thou attitude and all. Man I am sick of this 
behavior. Respect others. [referring to another poster saying that he/she found it 
easy to become a vegetarian]” (CBM posts); “many of these Single-Issue Fanatics hate 
fellow humans, more than their love of animals” (CBM posts); “go peddle your Gaia 
guilt trip somewhere else. I'm not interested in your vegan horse shit. Meat is 
delicious!” (PBM posts); “Plus the vegans will be up in arms due to us finding another 
of gods ‘wonderful creatures’ [insects] to abuse and kill mercilessly” (INS posts) 
Environmental 
melancholia  
One’s personal (food) 
choices do not matter, 
we are all doomed 
anyway (concept from 
Lertzman, 2015, but 
not in connection with 
meat) 
“fooling around with veganism and vegetarianism is nothing more than fiddling while 
Rome burns” (CBM posts); “the biggest threat is undoubtedly the out-of-control 
human population growth. All these sticking plasters [such as new plant-based meats] 
aren't going to change that” (PBM posts); “unless fossil fuel use is scaled back 
drastically soon, all talk of burger choices - ham, fish, chicken, or lentil - is just 
ineffectual tinkering on the edges” (PBM posts) 
Disgust One feels disgust 
towards meat 
alternatives (no need 
to eat), or towards 
meat (not possible to 
eat)(not yet in 
literature as a coping 
strategy for meat) 
“Try marketing this dribble [cell-based meat] to a lion ...” (CBM posts); “clear, pink 
liquid resembling the run-off from defrosting pork” (CBM article); “I know it is a good 
idea I am just not sure I can stomach it” (INS posts); “the difference is that [if you] eat 
some invertebrates they can leave eggs and end up eating you. When you [hear] 
stories of tapeworms in the brain it really doesn't make someone feel hungry for 
eating live insects” (INS posts); “I've been a vegetarian for over forty years & for the 
record I've never missed meat - if they got that close to the taste & texture of a 
burger made from an animal it would be repellent to me” (PBM posts) 
Freedom of 
choice 
One should be free to 
choose what to eat 
(not yet in literature 
as a coping strategy 
for meat) 
“I care about the environment but only a wanker will tell me ‘I shouldn't be eating 
meat’” (PBM posts); “I care more about ignoring what sanctimonious people tell me 
to do [when they tell me to not eat meat]” (PBM posts); “I try not to mess with people 
about what they're eating as a rule. I eat what I want, they eat what they want” (FLEX 
posts) 
Blaming vegans It is the fault of 
annoying vegans that 
more people are not 
trying to not eat meat 
(not yet in literature 
as a coping strategy 
for meat) 
“we're omnivores; it's not unnatural [to eat meat]. That's the sort of hyperbolic 
bullshit that turns people off vegetarianism” (CBM posts); “it's attitudes like yours 
which actually encourages people to not try the alternative” [referring to another 
poster saying that eating some meat is morally just as bad as eating a lot of it] (FLEX 
posts) 
As mentioned in Section 5.1, one observation from the data is that vegetarianism and 
veganism seem to hold such power in the discourse that even when they are not the topics 
of the articles in question, a considerable amount of the discussion revolves around them, 
and various coping strategies are employed. For some posters, the new plant-based meats 
seem to hold similar agentive power than vegetarians and vegans in terms of causing 
resentment. But here it may be because the new plant-based meats are (supposed to be) 
just as good as meat, so there would be no reason not to eat them instead of meat. This 
brings out the value conflict (in those employing coping strategies), and restricts freedom of 
choice, and in fact, makes it more obvious that meat eating is a choice, not a necessity. One 
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should therefore, in principle, switch from eating meat to eating the new plant-based (or 
cell-based) meat products as soon as they are widely available. 
Many of the traditional coping strategies (as discussed in literature) are not used extensively 
in this particular data. For example, the four Ns are often used in ways that justify the new 
meatways, rather than just the status quo, i.e. the old meatways. In fact, it can be said that 
the meanings of the four Ns are particularly varied, as discussed above. The main 
conclusions are that Normal focuses often on a new normal, e.g. eating the alternatives, or 
not eating conventional animal-based meat, or at least not eating industrial meat in the 
future; Necessary focuses on urgent change required; and Nice is often also applied to the 
new meatways, in addition to the old meatways. Only Natural is most often used in the 
traditional sense of eating animals being innate to humans. The varied ways of using the four 
Ns may have some significance for opening up meat eating related practices discursively. 
Combining and comparing Nice and Necessary, a noteworthy observation can be made 
between those posters who identify as meat eaters and those who identify as vegetarians or 
vegans. Meat eaters employ both Nice and Necessary (regarding meat), and many 
vegetarians or vegans employ Nice and Not Necessary (and some combine Not Nice and Not 
Necessary). There may be two linked explanations to this. Either the realization that meat is 
Not Necessary makes it indefensible for some people to continue eating it, despite it being 
Nice, or, those who do not want to give meat up justify their practice by it being Necessary. 
Also, the posters who identify as vegetarians or vegans tend to be criticised for claiming that 
some old plant-based meats would have the same qualities as meat, or be just as Nice as 
meat: “these claims of 'taste like meat' usually come from people who rarely eat meat and 
who seem to not remember what it actually tastes like” (PBM55, 3 Jun 2016). Whether meat 
is addictive to humans (Zaraska, 2016a) or not, it might at least be possible to move away 
from that addiction. However, dislike, or disgust towards meat can also be seen as a coping 
strategy in terms of coping with vegetarianism or veganism which are often difficult to 
maintain, especially socially. 
Several of the coping strategies identified in the literature - such as denial of animal mind, or 
denial of animal pain - are not employed in this data. And, in some cases, important coping 
strategies are more criticized, rather than employed, in particular so with disassociation and 
 
 
253 
 
avoidance (see Table 5.8) which have been considered perhaps the most fundamental 
coping strategies in general as regards meat eating. It could be that the new meats “create a 
kind of safe space in which there is room for ambivalence that in daily life [would normally 
lead] to strategic ignorance” (van der Weele, personal communication, 25 January 2019). 
Therefore, these basic coping strategies need not be employed as much in this context. It 
may also be that some people are more aware of these strategies due to the discourses from 
the last years, thus employing discursive consciousness. 
Criticism of vegetarians and vegans – especially in the general devaluing sense – is however 
fairly common in the data. This discourse has historic roots, as mentioned in Chapter 3, and 
much recent and current media discourse around vegetarianism and veganism is also 
negative (see Cole & Morgan, 2011; Nørregård Vørre, 2011). Minson and Monin (2012) call 
the putting down of vegetarians and vegans by meat eaters do-gooder derogation. The all-
or-nothing criticism, focusing largely on the idea of hypocrisy and inconsistent behaviour, is 
also a widely used coping strategy. The all-or-nothing issue is actually a larger point that 
connects to the issue of morality, a topic for the next section. 
The three coping strategies identified above as “not yet in literature as a coping strategy for 
meat” need some further mention. Firstly, disgust need not be a coping strategy, but from 
the data it seems that it can be used as such. As mentioned in Table 5.8, disgust can be used 
to justify both continuing to eat meat – when expressed towards alternatives such as cell-
based meat or insects - and not eating meat when the disgust is expressed towards meat, as 
in the case of some vegetarians or vegans. Secondly, employing the need for freedom of 
choice – linked to individualism and the current dominant social paradigm - is likely to be 
one of the reasons policymakers have not really touched meat eating as a practice. At least it 
is one of the reasons used as a justification in the data for continuing with meat eating. 
Lastly, blaming “militant veganism” for one’s own inaction may be a rather new and perhaps 
still rarer coping strategy, and although it is related to the more general criticism of 
vegetarianism and veganism, it is still worth a separate mention. 
Environmental melancholia is not discussed by Lertzman (2015) as a coping strategy in 
connection with eating animals, but it certainly seems to also fit in this context. 
Environmental melancholia tends to prevent action, and therefore, it can also be used as a 
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coping strategy for continuing with the status quo, in this case continuing with meat eating, 
even when the awareness of the many negative environmental impacts is there. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, strategic ignorance helps to keep certain problematic practices 
from changing in a deliberate manner towards being less problematic. The wider, more 
varied and in-depth the discourses about these practices are, however, the less convenient 
strategic ignorance may be to maintain, the more likely discursive consciousness about the 
practices is, and the easier a certain amount of ambivalence about the practices may be to 
acknowledge by recognizing the conflicting values and related emotions (see also van der 
Weele, 2013). Acknowledging the ambivalence may on its own lessen denial and strategic 
ignorance, and reveal similarities between meat eaters and vegetarians and vegans. The new 
meatways therefore offer a way to expand the discourse, away from the conventional 
animal-based meat vs. no meat dichotomy whereby the vast majority of people in the Global 
North reject the no meat option. There is also a possibility that the new meatways may 
eventually lessen the negative (coping strategy) type discourses around vegetarianism and 
veganism, and even help normalize these diets further by bringing them to the wider 
discourses. The fact that vegetarianism and veganism appear to be so strongly present in the 
discourses around the new meatways, at least in my data, can be a sign of such a process. 
5.3.2. Morality and the new meatways 
Questions of morality are about right and wrong. While moral questions related to eating 
have been more or less ignored by most, eating animals in particular has been a significant 
moral question to a small minority of people for millennia, generally solved by abstaining 
from meat or other animal products. In the last decades, questions of morality as regards 
industrial animal farming and eating intensively farmed animals have become an additional 
moral issue for a growing number of people, as discussed in Chapter 2. Even so, this has 
been reflected largely only at the level of discourse, and the amount of animal flesh eaten 
has seemingly not been substantially affected by these moral concerns. It is one thing to be 
concerned, even in a moral sense, and quite another to act upon on the concerns in terms of 
practices so central to human lives as eating. Adopting a consistent vegetarian or vegan diet 
has been beyond most people’s realm of everyday possibilities in locations of the world 
where meat is widely available. Therefore, strategic ignorance and the related coping 
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strategies, discussed in Chapter 3 and in the previous section, have been a relevant, yet 
unacknowledged part of life for many, but by no means all meat eaters. As will be seen from 
the below discussion, strong flexitarianism, while breaking some moral codes, stands out 
from the new meatways as being, however, able to offer a workable solution to the morality 
of meat. 
As regards the data, moral aspects are variably reflected on in the articles and posts. In the 
PBM and INS articles, moral issues are not really present, at least not explicitly, and so it is 
also largely for the posts, especially for INS posts.386 For the CBM article, moral aspects are 
somewhat more present, and the posts follow this line. The only article that does reflect 
extensively and explicitly on morality is the FLEX article. The posts that follow this article also 
reflect widely on various moral aspects, and also challenge the position taken in the article 
itself. In the case of all the four documents, the posts reflect on morality more than the 
articles do, which could indicate the importance of such issues to people. Section 5.2.1 
looked at framing devices and frames, and in connection with this, Table 5.7 also included 
some of the moral arguments included in the data. Therefore, I will not repeat this exercise, 
but concentrate on a few key points where the new meatways make a difference to the 
discourse, and could also possibly help transform meat eating related practices. 
First, Section 5.2.1 mentioned the Absolute morality frame, evident in the discourses around 
vegetarianism and veganism in the data, in that nothing short of absolute abstention from 
meat can be defined as vegetarianism or veganism in this frame, and additionally, 
vegetarians and vegans should behave consistently in all areas of life. This morality can also 
be thought of as an all-or-nothing approach which can in fact be understood in two distinct 
ways, as mentioned earlier. First, unless one does everything (to avoid harm, for example) it 
is not worth doing just something, and since doing everything would be impossible, one 
needs not do anything. Second, only absolutely clean behaviour is good enough, therefore 
one must be strict about one’s own behaviour. Meat eaters (see also Table 5.8) tend to 
justify their behaviour with the first understanding: “[quote from another post, PBM136:] 
’the bottom line is this, if you care about the environment, you shouldn't be eating meat’; Or 
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 The relative absence of explicit moral statements in the articles may be accidental, or it may be intentional. 
Further, as in the frame analysis, I focus mainly on explicit expressions of morality. However, morality may also 
be hidden, e.g. in factual statements such as “meat is bad for the environment” (“therefore it should not be 
eaten”). 
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driving, or flying, or travelling anywhere unless by bike or foot, etc.” (PBM145, 3 Jun 2016). 
Meat eaters can also blame vegetarians and vegans for hypocrisy using the second 
understanding: “finger-wagging vegetarian hypocrites” (PBM14, 3 Jun 2016).387 Finally, 
vegetarians and vegans in the data are using the second understanding to blame 
flexitarianism for immorality: “robbing one bank makes you a criminal as much as robbing 
ten” (FLEX6, 25 Jun 2017). Posters themselves refer to this as “black-and-white morality”.388 
As also seen in the data, flexitarianism counters the Absolute morality frame as an ideology, 
and in both senses of the all-or-nothing approach: flexitarianism is about less harm being 
better than more harm which makes it, on the one hand, difficult for meat eaters to deny on 
moral grounds as a viable strategy, and makes the argument about vegetarian or vegan 
hypocrisy also lose ground. On the other hand, it may be easy for strict vegetarians or 
vegans to deny flexitarianism on moral grounds. Being that the meat eaters currently vastly 
outnumber strict vegetarians and vegans, it may matter more for societal change how 
flexitarianism is received among meat eaters.  
Additionally, however, many vegetarians and vegans are in reality strong flexitarians, even if 
they would not call themselves that. Flexitarians (who do call themselves that) are similar to 
out-of-choice vegetarians or vegans in the sense that all three groups are likely to have 
acknowledged some degree of their ambivalence about meat and have decided to change 
their own practices, but the key differing characteristics of flexitarianism are flexibility and 
absence of absolutism. Being that vegetarians and vegans often cease to follow their diets 
due to absolute morality being very difficult to follow in practice and especially socially, 
flexitarianism – in particular, the strong version – can be an attractive option to them.  
Ideally, flexitarians would be satisfied with long-standing, cheap, much less resource 
intensive protein alternatives, such as pulses, in addition to the occasional meat. In my 
discourse data, nobody is really combining flexitarianism as a diet with the new meats, cell-
based or new plant-based meats, or insects, as the discourses around the different themes 
are not yet properly merging. However, it would be hard to claim that using the new meats 
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 See also Section 5.4 on meat eaters acting as guardians of morality in social situations with vegetarians or 
vegans present. This is also about using the second understanding of the all-or-nothing approach. 
388
 This second understanding can also be seen as a conceptual metaphor: GOODNESS IS WHITE/BADNESS IS 
BLACK, whereby only “white” i.e. “completely pure” is good and acceptable. This metaphor can also be found 
in the Metaphorlist (Lakoff et al., 1991). 
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(as much as they exist as real products) as part of a flexitarian diet would be wrong (arguing 
this would also be against the flexibility principle), and the new meats could indeed work as 
an enrichment of a flexitarian diet, as long as the principle of absolute strong reductions in 
impacts is also followed. Further, using the new meats as part of a strong flexitarian diet 
replacing conventional animal-based meat, rather than in addition to conventional animal-
based meat would be very relevant in terms of impacts. 
As argued in Section 5.2.3 following frame analysis of the data, flexitarianism goes against 
the Meeting the demand frame, whereas the new meats would likely support the Meeting 
the demand frame. Vegetarianism and veganism also run counter to the Meeting the 
demand frame. However, due to the difficulty of realising the Absolute morality frame, 
vegetarianism and veganism, in fact, paradoxically support the Meeting the demand frame. 
To explain, strict vegetarianism and veganism often end up as unsuccessful projects - there 
are five times as many lapsed vegetarians and vegans in the United States, as there are 
current vegetarians and vegans (Asher et al., 2016) - and since conventional meat eating has 
been the only identified fall-back option, the unsuccessful vegetarians and vegans have 
ended up as, somewhat involuntarily, supporting conventional meat eating as the only 
realistic option.389 
Remarkably in the data, vegetarians and vegans are blamed for being hypocritical, but 
flexitarians are generally not blamed for being hypocritical.390 Generally, if flexitarians are 
blamed for something, they are blamed for being immoral, as they are still involved in eating 
animals. Considering which accusation is worse from a moral point of view is instructive: 
pretending not to harm at all (but still harming), or knowingly and admittedly harming, but 
harming significantly less that would be possible. Hypocrisy can be seen as a form of lying 
(about good behaviour), and lying about good behaviour could be expected to be seen as 
worse than honest bad behaviour.391  
A further relevant point as regards morality and the new meatways, as opposed to the old 
meatways, is related to guilt. This moral emotion has two basic links to meat eating. Firstly, 
meat eaters may feel guilty about eating animals (or causing serious environmental harm 
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 However, many of the lapsed vegetarians and vegans end up eating less meat than an average American 
(Asher et al., 2016). 
390
 Except in the “calling weak will [vegetarianism as] flexitarianism” (FLEX posts). 
391
 The post-truth era may of course change that perception. 
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with their diet) whether or not this shows up in their behaviour, hence the need for coping 
strategies, and the strong reactions to the presence of vegetarians and vegans (Adams, 
2001; Rothgerber, 2014). Secondly, vegetarians and vegans often feel guilty when “falling off 
the wagon”, i.e. when failing to follow their diets strictly. Here is one instance for each from 
the data: 
 
Reduce your guilt over contributing to animal suffering [when not being able to follow 
vegetarianism/veganism], by giving your weak will a misleading name [flexitarianism] 
FLEX134, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Sadly though I shell out for the free range stuff, I like it too much to be totally veggie. 
CBM1, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Presumably, the new meatways could cause less guilt, as neither cell-based meat nor new 
plant-based meats are supposed to involve purposeful killing sentient animals, and they are 
supposed to be environmentally considerably less harmful. Further, insects may not be 
categorized as sentient animals either (although the science is not yet clear on this), and it 
has been calculated that growing insects on an industrial scale could also be environmentally 
advantageous, as compared to conventional animal-based meat. Although even strong 
flexitarianism may still involve killing sentient animals, it is about radical reductions in harm 
– a result that would be likely to cause less guilt as such.392 In the data, there are indeed 
signs of seeing the new meatways positively in this way:  
 
I would feel much happier about myself [eating cell-based meat] if I knew no animals were 
being bred and the environment destroyed to suit my appetites. 
CBM50, 20 Sep 2017 
 
[Cell-based meat could be a] guilt-free, environmentally friendly, and utterly convincing 
simulacrum. 
CBM11, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Are reducetarians just vegans without the willpower? Or, are they simply doing what they can 
do without the resolution-snapping burden of guilt? 
FLEX article 
 
The final point related to morality to make in this section is about the idea of “clean 
meat”.393 The CBM article refers to clean meat as a term that is “catching on: clean meat, 
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 Not following the new meatways, i.e. going back to conventional meat eating would be likely to cause guilt, 
but the likelihood of that happening with flexitarianism might be considered smaller than with vegetarianism 
and veganism. 
393
 The term “clean meat” was created in 2016 for cell-based meat by the Good Food Institute, an organization 
involved in advancing the development of cell-based meat and new plant-based meats. 
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clean conscience”, although no posts in the data pick up on this theme. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, some instances have extended “clean meat” to cover also the new plant-based 
meats. Both are often presented as perfect replacements (from the point of view of the 
eater) for conventional animal-based meat, and both are supposed to be “clean” in a moral 
sense, with plant-based meat perhaps even more “clean” in this sense than cell-based meat, 
not purposefully using animals at all. Adopting “clean meat”, or another similar term – such 
as “new meats” - as a larger category consisting of cell-based and plant-based meats could 
further erase the strict definition of meat, and facilitate a transformation away from 
conventional meat eating. The current competition between the start-ups working towards 
each alternative, cell-based on the one hand, and plant-based on the other, could deter the 
companies from using the same umbrella term, if each group would prefer to see 
themselves as the only real solution to the meat crisis.  
Finally, the other two new meatways, eating insects and eating a flexitarian diet, are morally 
not as clean, as one is about eating large amounts of tiny animals, and the other one is 
usually about continuing with eating conventional animal-based meat, although radically less 
of it. 
5.4. Additional tools for change 
5.4.1. About labelling 
A relevant topic rising from the data, and worthy of a separate discussion, is the issue of 
labelling, i.e. the function and usefulness of labels, in this case in relation to meat eating.394 
The topic is mainly found in the FLEX document, but it also comes up in the INS posts.  
The title for the FLEX article - “Vegans, vegetarians and now…reducetarians” – suggests that 
there are lot of different labels related to (not) eating meat. However, the article is not going 
into a discussion about labels, and it mainly seems to consider “reducetarianism” as a fitting 
name for a new movement. The posts that follow FLEX article reflect the article’s focus on 
ethics, and vegetarianism vs. flexitarianism. They are, however, overall less enthusiastic 
about flexitarianism (or reducetarianism) as part of an identity. Many of the posters in 
principle positive about the idea of eating only a little meat see it more as just a sensible way 
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 As mentioned in Chapter 3, this discussion is not about eco-labelling which is related to products, but about 
the labelling of behaviour. 
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of eating, rather than anything to fuss about. There is, therefore, a significant amount of 
criticism regarding labelling "eating less meat" as something in the first place 
(reducetarianism, flexitarianism, etc.). Some posters consider such labels unnecessary for 
themselves or for others: 
 
Yeah, the name is silly. See also flexitarian or sustainetarian for equally silly names for about 
the same thing. It doesn't really need a label of its own when it's not a hard and fast rule imho. 
Personally I'm simply eating a vegetarian diet more days than not. 
FLEX4, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The above post is arguing that labels are necessary for describing strict diets, not for flexible 
ones. There is no need for labels for something that does not involve hard rules as such. By 
definition, flexitarianism is flexible, so it automatically makes its own label unnecessary.  
Other posters go further, up to the point of considering labels ridiculous: “where I draw the 
line is coming up with ridiculous terms for someone who just cuts down on meat 
consumption” (FLEX3, 25 Jun 2017), embarrassing: “it seems I'm one of these, I agree with 
some of the other commenters here that the new label isn't really necessary, I'd feel a bit of 
a nob referring to myself as a reducetarian” (FLEX103, 25 Jun 2017) or narcissistic: “this 
simply reflects the narcissism of our age where everyone has to have a label attached to 
them as if to say ‘look at me, this is what makes me different” (FLEX129, 25 Jun 2017). It 
could be of course that new labels tend to be embarrassing in the beginning when they are 
new (to an individual, or to society). 
Other posters consider the informative function of labels, even though still criticising it: 
 
I call myself vegetarian, but I hate the expression, simply because it creates this false 
dichotomy, and sounds as if I'm trying to stand on moral high ground. I use the expression, 
though, because otherwise I'm forced into eating obscene quantities of meat whenever I 
socialise or attend anything with food. 
FLEX144, 25 Jun 2017 
 
In the above post, the label for vegetarianism is used in an informative function, in order to 
simplify the social situation, to make it clearer to a host what is wished for in terms of food, 
and to help the vegetarian guest to enjoy him/herself. It is used out of necessity, however, 
and to this poster using a (vegetarian) label brings with it a false image of standing on “moral 
high ground" (a topic for the previous section). Indeed, the difference between labels 
“vegetarian” or “vegan”, on the one hand, and “flexitarian”, on the other, is quite clear. 
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When observed vegetarianism is flexible, and so, in practice actually flexitarianism, insisting 
on still calling it vegetarianism tends to create conflict: 
 
Actually, I'm vegetarian, except when other people are cooking, in which case I think it a bit 
rude to make them do something different for me - a position which actually seems to irritate 
some vegetarians more than simply carnivorism... 
FLEX7, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Well it probably is a bit rude to impose on someone's hospitality in that way and expect them 
to cater for your proclivities, but at the same time, you can't be a vegetarian and eat meat. So, 
a dilemma. 
FLEX8, 25 Jun 2017 
 
These appear to be typical problems for vegetarians to encounter. If they are flexible about 
their meat eating (and eat some meat when offered), they are good guests, but get blamed 
by guardians of moral vegetarianism, i.e. meat eaters who guard the moral behaviour of 
others, and if they are not flexible, they get a label(!) as difficult guests. Eventually these 
problems can turn a vegetarian into an ex-vegetarian, as social reasons seem to be among 
the most significant for this reverse process (see Asher et al., 2016). However, when there is 
a label for it, you can be a flexible vegetarian (flexitarian) and eat some meat. Among meat 
related food labels, a flexitarian label may be likely to create a less strong reaction than a 
vegetarian or vegan label, even though vegetarians and vegans might still feel uneasy about 
flexitarianism. 
Other posters do see a point in labelling as such, beyond the informative function, and 
consider labels as potentially powerful. For them, labels make things exist, and they make 
patterns of behaviour easier to adopt:  
 
You see, these ‘ridiculous terms’ [such as ‘flexitarianism’] often motivate others to reduce 
their own meat consumption. 
FLEX17, 25 Jun 2017  
 
Giving it a label means that a movement can be formed. It's a bit like a political party. You 
could say "we believe that policies x, y and z should be implemented" or you could say "I'm a 
member of the Labour Party" or "I'm left-wing". It's convenient and it ensures that more 
people stop eating meat, which is only a good thing. 
FLEX133, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Flexitarianism "ensures that more people stop eating meat" because of the power of a 
movement tends to lead to more recruits, but perhaps also because flexitarianism may be 
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appealing to more people than vegetarianism or veganism, and when it is labelled, adopting 
it becomes easier. 
Also the INS posts consider the potential of positive labels helping people to overcome initial 
negative feeling or reactions: "do you think if [insects] were referred to as land shrimp it 
could help get over typical Western reactions?" (INS4, 5 Nov 2015). 
Individual words – and therefore also labels – can have a lot of agentive power.395 In addition 
to the above examples of flexitarianism and insects, the label “clean meat”, or even “new 
meat” could potentially be a powerful way to get more people interested in trying the new 
plant-based and cell-based meat products.  
It seems obvious that labelling can help with behaviour that requires particular effort. 
Labelling creates identity, and identity helps to keep the behaviour. However, as discussed in 
the previous section, in the case of strict labels, such as vegetarianism or veganism, labelling 
can also create guilt when one does not follow it to the letter. A label for flexible behaviour 
can therefore be seen as ideal from this point of view. The label helps to keep the behaviour, 
and at the same time, there is less reason for guilt. Additionally, a label about flexible 
behaviour may also be seen as a positive label more often than not.  
From the data arises also a theme of “watching (or not watching) other people’s behaviour”, 
in particular in the FLEX posts. Some posters claim this not to be an issue: 
  
To grow up is to realise that no one is watching you; to mature is to realise no one cares 
enough to watch you. Just live your life.  
FLEX25, 25 Jun 2017 
 
I try not to mess with people about what they're eating as a rule. I eat what I want, they eat 
what they want. 
FLEX36, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Such obliviousness might seem to go against certain theory, including social labelling theory. 
Indeed there are several posts arguing the opposite position: 
 
Not sure why meat eaters tie themselves in knots trying to point out relatively minor 
contradictions in other people's behaviour instead of facing their own shortcomings. 
                                                          
395
 See e.g. a study by Chung et al. (2016) for the difference in people’s reactions to “pink slime”, in contrast 
with “finely textured beef” - different words / labels for the same “meat” used for certain processed meat 
products. 
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FLEX96, 25 Jun 2017 
 
I take the mickey [out] of vegetarians. My best [mate] is one of them. Here's the thing though, 
I don't hate them. I don't dislike them. I take the mickey because I don't care and it's their 
choice to take the mickey out of me back. I don't understand why people don't get this. 
FLEX28, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Although if you'd ever been vegetarian, you would know that many people take it as a 
personal insult, and accuse you of being a hypocrite in some way, even though you have no 
wish to discuss your choice with them. 
FLEX26, 25 Jun 2017 
 
People _are_ watching me. […] if people observe vegetarian behavior, they take it as a 
personal insult. It's quite odd. One person I know who normally avoids meat eats small 
amounts of it at dinner parties just to keep people off his case. I am more truculent and 
perfectly willing to make my dietary choices a subject of discussion, but the believers don't 
really like that either because I stand up to them and I've thought the philosophy through 
more than they have. 
FLEX34, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Who is watching whom is, however, up for debate: 
 
You really think non-vegetarian spend more time badgering vegetarians than vice versa? 2% of 
the UK population (mostly kids waiting to grow up) and any thread about it here is 
overwhelmed with them banging the drum while the other 98% (OK, besides me now) ignore 
the issue completely. 
FLEX35, 25 Jun 2017 
  
If someone has a label, it seems to be calling for other people to somehow evaluate it, and 
the more controversial the label is, the more social evaluations. There tend to be certain 
values attached to labels, and these values may make other people feel threatened, if they 
feel they should also prioritize these particular values, but they do not. This links to Section 
5.3.1 and the coping strategies of meat eaters. A vegetarian often arouses negative 
emotions in meat eaters, thereby the label is viewed negatively, especially if the 
vegetarianism is ethically based on environmentalism, or the right of animals to not be 
harmed or killed for human pleasure. Health vegetarianism seems to be viewed more 
positively, as it is associated with values that tend to be easier to acknowledge, or prioritize, 
than the values associated with vegetarianism based on environmentalism or animal rights. 
Therefore, there are vegetarians who publicly often justify their vegetarianism on health 
reasons, even though their actual motivation would be related to animal ethics (Wilson et 
al., 2004), as they do not want to be labelled as “PETA people”. The data has an example of 
this: 
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I'm pretty much vegetarian. The excuse I use is that I have IBS and that digesting meat is 
difficult. Indigestion is an excuse anyone can use; it's true that humans don't digest meat as 
efficiently as carnivores. 
FLEX33, 25 Jun 2017 
 
Labelling and social labelling (Cornelissen et al., 2007; Lacasse, 2016) have certain benefits 
from the point of view of the new meatways, especially flexitarianism: labelling itself helps 
to keep the behaviour, as long as it is seen by others as positive, and additionally; social 
labelling can eventually help shift motivations, e.g. a behaviour that is environmentally more 
sustainable may start from health or social reasons, but end up being about sustainability. 
This further enables people to persist with the diet. In the data, this can be observed for the 
families who initially turn “flexitarian” (by purposefully eating less meat) in order to support 
their vegan or vegetarian children, but eventually start preferring the flexitarian diet for its 
own sake, as a kinder way towards oneself, the animals and the environment, as in the 
following:396 
 
As a family we started to cut right back on meat consumption when my son turned to a vegan 
diet. Everyone is healthier and happier with their diet and we're all trying different things. 
FLEX53, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The kids have gone vegan and vegetarian and we've supported them in that […] and we have 
gone almost fully vegetarian partly for simplicity, but mainly due to an acceptance of the 
arguments for, such as health, environmental concerns and animal welfare. […] It feels really 
good and I think we'll stick to it. 
FLEX103, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The positivity of the label is a crucial factor, as when the label is viewed negatively, such 
shifts in motivation can actually go the other way, as is the case for lapsed vegetarians 
mentioned earlier (and in Asher et al., 2016). As a potentially more positive label, 
flexitarianism may have power over labels such as vegetarianism or veganism. Promoting 
flexitarianism as a more feasible meatway than total abstention from meat would indeed 
seem useful (see also Jallinoja et al., 2016). However, from the point of view of 
sustainability, it is crucial to focus on strong flexitarianism, and radical absolute reductions in 
impacts. 
 
                                                          
396
 However, these posters have likely not recognized themselves as flexitarians, merely as people eating less 
meat. Of course “eating less meat” can also be seen as a distinct meatway, although not as recognizable as 
flexitarianism. 
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5.4.2. Normalizing futures with the new meatways 
As discussed in Section 5.3.1, some of the discourse reflected in the data involves attempts 
to normalize the new meatways. On the one hand, through this, the meaning of Normal (as 
one of the four Ns) is therefore extended by some towards covering cell-based meat, insects 
and even the new plant-based meats. Even “occasional meat eating” is presented as normal 
by some, i.e. nothing to make a fuss about (nor use a label for). On the other hand, the 
normalness of meat as such is questioned by some posters. Although the meaning of Normal 
requires constant reproduction in any case (Shove, 2010), such a purposive process of 
normalization within discourses is an important way of how something unfamiliar can have a 
chance of becoming part of everyday practices.  
Extending the meaning of Normal meat is semantic broadening in the use of words or 
expressions; in fact it is about extending the meaning of meat to cover previous non-meats 
that may or may not have been food in general.397 A sign of the power of such semantic 
broadening is the fight over the meaning of meat or milk that is currently going on in courts 
in the United States and Europe. Donaldson (2016a) defends the trend of calling new plant-
based protein products meat (or milk or eggs) with the idea that such repurposing of 
narratives of meat (or milk or eggs) away from what the industries have done until now 
(happy cows in the field) may also change the connotations towards plant-based foods in 
general into more positive ones. Jallinoja et al. (2016) also calls for new meanings and 
associations for plant-based foods, including pulses, to enable them to be normalized as 
meat replacements. 
There is also a possibility that the new meatways could help normalize vegetarianism and 
veganism further as realistic options for the future, by lessening the need for negative 
discourses around vegetarianism and veganism - currently often used as a coping 
mechanism in connection with cognitive dissonance - and by bringing them further to the 
wider discourses, as can be seen to an extent in the data discussing the new meatways. 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, creating new narratives can be an important part of normalizing 
something new. It can also be about imagining a future where this “something” is a positive 
                                                          
397
 In many languages, e.g. in English, the original meaning for “meat” was actually “food”, as discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
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part of life (Stibbe, 2015). Not being able to imagine such a future, makes this “something” 
much less likely to become reality. An increasing amount of calls are indeed made for 
positive frames and narratives about sustainable futures, both in the academic literature and 
in the media. On similar lines, there are calls for new stories about a future where animals 
are no longer farmed for food, as currently we have difficulties imagining a world without 
meat animals.398 To some extent, the data does include such stories, including stories of the 
future involving the new meatways.  
The CBM article in particular is imagining positive futures when talking about “doing 
something new” with cell-based meat and fish; them having “taste of the future”, with their 
inventors exploring “new culinary possibilities” and “extraordinary dishes” with “structural 
wonders”, and the plant-based protein innovators’ “life mission” being to “transform the 
food industry”. The CBM posters focus less on the future food products themselves - apart 
from reassuring doubters that cell-based meat will become feasible in terms of price in the 
not so far future, and this will make it sellable to consumers - and more on imagining a world 
where cell-based meat is widely eaten instead of conventional animal-based meat: 
 
Meat from animals will become a premium product and with time may become socially 
unacceptable in many societies. It's easily possible to imagine a world where eating animals is 
viewed as little better than cannibalism is viewed now. 
CBM132, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Even more farmers would become custodians of nature, rather breeders of animals [in 
response to a question by another poster as to what will happen to all the animal farmers of 
today]. 
CBM133, 20 Sep 2017 
 
Time, I feel, will also produce more willing consumers, people not yet born who will grow up 
with this as an entirely normal idea. I feel absolutely certain that cultured meat will one day be 
commonly eaten the world over. 
CBM143, 20 Sep 2017 
 
It will take a sufficiently long time, and grow sufficiently gradually, that all livestock alive today 
will have been and gone. Fewer sheep and cows will be bred. Although we'll still presumably 
want wool and milk, at least until someone grows a wool or milk culture. 
CBM150, 20 Sep 2017 
 
The FLEX article imagines how a small reduction in meat eating (10%), feasible for everyone, 
would be “a huge win” for lessening the negative impacts from meat, in addition to being 
positively less than “perfect”, while one would eat “as many foods as possible that [are] 
                                                          
398
 See e.g. the 2017 film End of Meat by Marc Pierschell. 
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good for [one’s] body and good for the planet”. In this narrative, the negativity associated 
with vegetarianism and veganism is wiped away with flexitarianism, since “you cannot ‘fail’ 
at trying to eat better; and you’re not a hypocrite if you do your best”. Although such a 10% 
reduction may be unrealistic in terms of creating “a huge win”, and the idea behind the kind 
of flexitarianism that the FLEX article is promoting is actually about much larger reductions, 
the positivity of the narrative could no doubt help start a change at some level at least.  The 
FLEX posts include stories of positive change in the present, but equally applicable for the 
future:  
 
As a family we started to cut right back on meat consumption when my son turned to a vegan 
diet. Everyone is healthier and happier with their diet and we're all trying different things. 
FLEX53, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The kids have gone vegan and vegetarian and we've supported them in that […] and we have 
gone almost fully vegetarian partly for simplicity, but mainly due to an acceptance of the 
arguments for, such as health, environmental concerns and animal welfare. […] It feels really 
good and I think we'll stick to it. 
FLEX103, 25 Jun 2017 
 
 
And the FLEX posts also include a narrative of a future without meat: 
 
 
The meat industry is the biggest source of human-caused suffering in history. But 
reducetarianism is surely part of the solution. The meat industry and factory farming in 
particular will be a thing of the [past] one day. 
FLEX121, 25 Jun 2017 
 
The PBM article is more modest in using emotive framing, but nonetheless, the positive 
future promise of plant-based meat start-ups is to make “burgers so realistic that even an 
‘uncompromising’ meat eater won’t be able to tell the difference” while offsetting “some of 
the damage done by cows and [satiating] a beef-hungry American population”. On similar 
lines, the PBM posts focus on the future products, with some posters imagining “a burger 
that tastes like meat, costs a 5th of the price, is actually healthy, and doesn't decimate the 
environment” being a winner for both its inventor and the world, while “having a part in 
annihilating the meat industry”. The making of the future products would be relatively 
straightforward as:  
 
Plants grow almost everywhere on earth. Breaking crops down to their molecular structures 
and rebuilding them into a 'meat' alternative would not necessarily require a specific crop. 
Local production facilities would reduce the issue of transportation. 
PBM119, 3 Jun 2016 
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As regards how to manage future agriculture with the new plant-based proteins providing 
food for everyone: 
  
They could use the land that is currently used to grow food for cattle. Then they can 
rehabilitate the land the cows currently use into forest. Or whatever it was before the cows 
got there. 
PBM118, 3 Jun 2016 
The INS article is the least enthusiastic about positive future with new meatways, and merely 
asserts that “novel foods in Western diets will incorporate insects to some degree, in a 
similar way to the spread of sushi from Japan in 2000s”. Some of the posts that follow the 
INS article take a similarly pragmatic view to the future of eating insects as the PBM posts do 
with new plant-based meats, in imagining insects simply incorporated in existing processed 
foods:  
 
If it looks the same or better, tastes the same or better, is healthier with less saturated fats, 
and is safer for the reasons above, plus all the other reasons, least of all price, why not? 
INS13, 5 Nov 2015 
 
Similarly, farming insects in the future will be straightforward: 
 
Sometimes the improved in new and improved isn't a lie. And you could farm insects the way 
we currently farm free range chickens or grow tomatoes in greenhouses, except there'd be a 
lot less cruelty, and they'd be easier to harvest at the end. 
INS16, 5 Nov 2015 
 
Frames that work together can build a narrative (Olsen, 2014). Viewed together as groups of 
frames, the above narratives about the future with new meatways incorporate all three 
framing devices, factual, normative and emotive, focusing on practical aspects, how things 
ought to be, and how positive such new meatways can be. Incorporating all three elements 
in single narratives would likely be important for impactful, positive stories about future. 
5.5. Conclusion 
My two research goals set in Chapter 1 are firstly, about exploring social practice theories 
and the connections between discourses and social practices, in order to create a framework 
that could help enable purposive change in unsustainable social practices, and secondly, and 
more specifically, how the new meatways and discourses around them could enable a 
purposive transformation in meat eating related practices. Chapter 6 will present more 
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specific findings from this Chapter 5 related to my research question, while also reflecting in 
detail on the first more general research task.  
As regards this chapter, in employing critical discourse analysis to study my research 
question, I have taken a kind of wait-and-see attitude (Tonkiss, 2004) to the data. As a result, 
I have found a number of potential ways discourses around the new meats can make a 
difference for transforming unsustainable meat eating related practices. Some of these are 
based on concepts discussed and developed earlier in the thesis, and reflected in the data, 
and some are arising from the data itself.  
Based on the conceptual developments in Chapter 3, I argue that the discourses around the 
new meatways can enable purposive transformation in meat eating related practices 
through their agentive power to increase discursive consciousness of current, unsustainable 
practices, and the related conflicting values and emotions. In the process, strategic 
ignorance may be diminished, discursive consciousness increased, and value priorities and 
dispositions better acknowledged. The practices may open up discursively, which can be 
seen as a prerequisite for purposive change. 
Each of the sections to this Chapter 5, apart from the introductory Section 5.1, includes one 
or more answers to my research question. Cognitive framing is relevant throughout. More 
specific discussion will follow in Chapter 6, but to go over the sections briefly, Sections 5.2.1 
and 5.2.2 examined frames and their connection to values. Section 5.2.3 studied the two 
conceptual metaphors of the journey/continuum and the hungry beast in relation to how 
they can explicitly and implicitly impact on the stability and instability of meat eating related 
practices. Section 5.3.1 focused on strategic ignorance and the related coping strategies, 
while Section 5.3.2 examined the relationship between the new meatways and 
vegetarianism and veganism. Finally, Section 5.4.1 centered on labels and labelling, and 
Section 5.4.2 examined processes of normalization of the new meatways, as reflected in the 
discourses. 
In Chapter 6, I will elaborate further on the results from the data, while connecting them 
also more with the conceptual developments in Chapter 3. I will also make connections from 
the discourse level back to the level of social practices. 
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6. Conclusions and discussion 
As scientists from the Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future in the United States write: 
Demand-side food system solutions such as shifting diets and reducing wasted 
food have vast potential for helping to achieve the Paris Agreement goals and 
keep global warming within 1.5°C. Without recognizing this and taking action, 
there is virtually zero chance we as a global community can meet our climate 
goals. Without recognizing and implementing this critical solution, the global 
community will also miss out on opportunities for supporting health and 
environmental co-benefits. 
Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future (2018:7) 
Part of the larger journey towards societal sustainability, the grand journey of 
transformation of the current meat system has arguably already started, even though meat 
consumption statistics still indicate otherwise. Increasingly, the production and consumption 
of meat is problematized, and simultaneously, new meatways are created. Discourses 
around these new meatways create potential leverage points for purposive change, as 
established practices and frames are questioned and reflected on within discursive 
consciousness, new meanings created, and value conflicts around meat acknowledged. 
These discourses also link to the larger sustainability questions, and the meat system could 
even function as a test case for our collective agencies and capacities to transform.  
Apart from focusing on the issue of meat, I have also explored social practice theories in this 
thesis, and specifically, drawn a bridge between social practices and discourses. Until 
recently, this connection has received less attention in the social practice theory literature of 
the new millennium. As I will discuss later, discourses are, in fact, rather essential for 
purposive change towards sustainability in the mesh of an infinite number of social practices 
that constitute our current societies. 
In this last chapter, I will first revisit, in Section 6.1, my two research goals, the research task 
for Chapter 3 and the research question for Chapter 5, and the purpose of the work itself. 
Subsequently, I will present conclusions from both the conceptual work and the empirical 
analysis and make some further comments on those. In Section 6.2, I will recapture my 
thoughts on what specifically to do with the problem of meat, in light of the explorations in 
this thesis. I will also briefly bring up some issues related to research on transforming the 
meat system. Section 6.3 will conclude the chapter by including a brief discussion on 
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limitations as regards the empirical part, by discussing the contribution that this work could 
make, and finally, by reflecting on the work as a whole. 
6.1. Conclusions from the analyses 
The purpose of this thesis has been two-fold. My general research task set in Chapter 1 was 
to explore social practice theories and the connections between discourses and social 
practices, in order to create a conceptual framework that could help enable purposive 
change in unsustainable social practices both at individual and societal levels. As regards my 
empirical focus, my more specific research question explored how the new meatways and, in 
particular, discourses around them could enable a purposive transformation in meat eating 
related practices, an urgent issue, as discussed in Chapter 2. For both analyses, I have 
focused on discourses, and their connections – through cognitive frames (on the side of 
discourses) and general understandings (on the side of practices) – to values, emotions and 
knowledge, as well as on strategic ignorance of knowledge and of conflicts between values 
and emotions.  
My foremost ambition in this work has been to obtain new insights to social practice 
theories, potentially useful for policymaking. As Shove et al. (2012) argue, the main benefit 
of social practice theories for policymaking processes is in it redefining policy focus, and in 
particular, in emphasizing the need to address all main elements of practices, rather than 
(only) consumer behaviour. An example from past policymaking is the Japanese Cool 
Biz/Warm Biz campaign which in effect reconfigured elements (meanings, technologies, 
competencies) of the practices of office clothing in Japan with a successful outcome. Taking 
a practice theory view on general healthy eating as another example, such policy could 
address comprehensively the obesogenic environment, the availability and pricing of foods 
in shops, schools and other public catering (e.g. through taxes, regulations, guidelines, etc.), 
offer free cooking classes, and work on the meaning of healthy/unhealthy foods, rather than 
merely produce nutrition guidelines for education, and place responsibility for following 
those on individuals.399 To the above I would add, together with Mont and Power (2013), 
                                                          
399
 The Cool Biz/Warm Biz campaign was not intentionally a social practice theory based policy project. Further, 
as Shove et al. (2012) remind their readers, large-scale policy projects need a support network of non-policy 
actors, and “transition-style policy is not about delivering plans and advancing on ready-made goals, but about 
moving towards always-moving targets” (idem:162). 
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that policymakers need to take the issue of strategic ignorance seriously, as it tends to 
prevent action at different levels.  
My objective for the empirical part in Chapter 5 has been to examine some of the 
conceptual framework developed in Chapter 3 through real life discourse data. As regards 
my ultimate goal in this work, I have tried to produce something that could, in a small way, 
contribute to helping societies move away from environmentally destructive ways, in 
particular including those related to intensive animal agriculture. 
Among other things, qualitative research seeks to generate new hypotheses, rather than 
prove existing ones (Curry et al., 2009). My conclusions, as discussed in the following 
sections, can be seen as such hypotheses, some of them to be investigated further. 
6.1.1. Theory on transforming social practices towards sustainability 
In this section I will explain, via a sketch in Figure 6.1, how a purposive transformation of 
social practices can take place via their connections to discourses.400 These pathways would 
apply particularly to those unsustainable practices which are more complex and deeply 
embedded in societies, and people’s lives, and therefore particularly challenging to 
transform. Change may be partly technological and material, or involve challenging and 
transforming various powerful industries. However, it also involves changing value priorities 
and worldviews at individual and at societal levels, addressing emotions and strategic 
ignorance, as well as tackling the habitualness of practices. 
According to social practice theories, the world we live in largely consists of an innumerable, 
and often interconnected social practices as a nexus, or rather, multiple nexuses. With the 
broad aim of sustainability, many of these practices need to transform in smaller or greater 
ways. Since practices are largely interconnected, in order to be effective, the transformative 
changes often need to apply to not just individual practices, but to societies in general. The 
concept of distributed agentive power, however, and the different old, and importantly, new 
elements of practices, as well as the connected discourses, having such agentive power, 
mean that practices can transform from within, rather than from the outside, especially 
since there really is no true “outside” in a world of interconnected practices. 
                                                          
400
 Some of the connections are from literature discussed in Chapter 3, others are original ideas. 
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The process in Figure 6.1 originates from, for example, a sustainability-related societal 
problem seen as new, due to more societal focus on it, and especially due to emerging new 
solutions (such as, new meatways), often involving changing elements of the social 
practice(s) in question. A previously common path towards either indifference or strategic 
ignorance becomes somewhat less universal in such a new situation. The issue of strategic 
ignorance – of knowledge, and of conflicting values and emotions - is critical, and helps to 
keep practices discursively closed (something that is ignored, is not discussed), which in turn 
benefits some of the societal vested interests that wish to keep the status quo.  Related 
unsustainable practices would also tend to persist together. However, the difference 
between actual indifference – where no conflict between values, for example, exists – is that 
strategic ignorance includes a sense of responsibility (Onwezen & van der Weele, 2016). 
Figure 6.1. How social practices can transform 
 
Source: Figure by author. 
Although practice theories maintain that the everyday lives of people are not spent in 
discursive consciousness, but rather in practical consciousness and routine, autonomous 
action, discourses do encompass the rare instances of deliberation about social practices. As 
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through cognitive frames (on the side of discourses) and general understandings, an element 
of social practices, as depicted in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3, and in Figure 3.3. 
Discourses can therefore be seen as essentially connected to social practices. Further, the 
connections from both cognitive frames and general understandings to values, emotions and 
knowledge, and the power of cognitive frames to produce, maintain or transform meanings, 
are also essential to the framework.  
Importantly, conflicts between values, between emotions or between knowledges are 
common to both practices - partially determining what we actually do - and discourses - 
partially determining how we talk (or do not talk) about what we do or might do. Where 
doing and talking about doing are not in line with each other, it is exactly these conflicts that 
cause the discrepancy. However, when there are no conflicts (e.g. with individual carnists), 
what we do and what we say may be more in line with each other. The critical point to note 
about this is that when necessary change is restricted at some levels of societies or 
individuals, these conflicts and their strategic ignorance need to be addressed first, and 
addressing them through discourse is a realistic way to do this. 
Further on Figure 6.1, the related new discourses create new discursive consciousness of the 
practices, and possibly also awareness of conflicting values and emotions. Strategic 
ignorance and discursive consciousness work in opposite directions. Although somewhat 
uncomfortably (due to emotional conflicts), strategic ignorance helps to maintain the status 
quo, while discursive consciousness may offer opportunities for change. Therefore, the more 
public discourses there are about, not only problematic practices, but the related values (or 
emotions), the better – and values facilitating or hindering sustainability are of particular 
relevance here. An important distinction is that between more stable societal value 
priorities, and individual value systems which, on the one hand, also include more stable 
value dispositions (adopted largely from both family and societal environments), and on the 
other hand, are formed and reformed by ever changing value priorities.  
Moreover, discursive consciousness connects to the discursive (cognitive) framing of the 
problematic practices, as well as to framing of potential solutions, together with the related 
values, worldviews and paradigms. Awareness of these frames as not something inevitable, 
but challengeable, is also important.  
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Still further on Figure 6.1, discursive consciousness as such creates discursively open 
practices which, combined with the new potential solutions, can lead to purposive change. 
New practice elements (such as new material products) tend to lead to changing practices in 
any case; however, such changes may not be compatible with a transformation towards 
sustainability. Therefore, discursive consciousness can be seen as important for change that 
has larger implications to more sustainable practices. Discursive consciousness and 
awareness of value and emotion conflicts can also create agency, and if combined with a 
principle of co-responsibility (the ought implies can –principle in Figure 6.1), it can further 
help create purposive change. However, it is also important to keep in mind that simply 
doing something new can also change frames and values, in other words, these may change 
during or after a particular practice transforms. The positive feedback loop mentioned 
earlier in this chapter can apply here too. 
Regarding responsibility and social practice theories, seeing social practices collectively as a 
mesh or a nexus of many interconnecting practices, and framing them (individually) as 
icebergs - whereby the invisible main part of the iceberg (see Figure 3.2) is the difficult-to-
change practice as an entity, also involving societal power imbalances - largely invalidate 
individual consumer responsibility for change. However, distributed agentive power - found 
in especially new practice elements, and in new discourses, but also expanded to cover 
societal actors involved in the practices - makes co-responsibility for change more realizable.  
Although the common social practice theory view on change is that purposive change should 
mainly be led by policy, and/or should be collective rather than individual based (e.g. Welch, 
2016), and although the dominative power of interconnected practices often inhibits 
purposive change at the level of individuals, some practices are more susceptible than 
others to individual agency. In particular, changing how and whether we eat meat, as 
individuals and as collectives of individuals, in particular in connection with the new 
meatways, such as flexitarianism, is seen possible by many.401 Individual action as such may 
be a prerequisite for political change, especially in the most challenging issues, and meat 
eating related practices seems to belong to those. In return, political change can further 
change individual attitudes and values, enabling a positive feedback loop.  
                                                          
401
 See e.g. Goodland (2014), Raphaely and Marinova (2014), or the Guardian column by George Monbiot, The 
best way to save the planet? Drop meat and dairy, from 8 June 2018. 
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As mentioned in Chapter 3, Voget-Kleschin et al. (2015) see changing one’s lifestyle, in order 
to contribute one’s fair share, as a core duty for individuals as regards sustainability. 
Importantly, however, this assumes that changing lifestyle does not overburden individuals, 
in other words “ought implies can”. Some lifestyle changes may be considered 
overburdening individuals, and others not. Giving up, or radically reducing, conventional 
animal-based meat in one’s diet could be seen as unlikely to overburden anyone, as long as 
other sufficient protein sources were available. It could in principle, therefore, be seen as an 
individual duty to do this. However, it seems that strategic ignorance, in addition to other 
challenges, can be a considerable additional difficulty for individuals. New discursive 
consciousness can, however, greatly aid in this regard. 
As Shove et al. (2012) argue, a practice-oriented approach to public policy could eventually 
help transform the current dominant social paradigm. Changing worldviews and societal 
value priorities is, however, particularly challenging when the dominant social paradigm is 
largely invisible (as it is taken for granted), yet strongly connected to unsustainable social 
practices, and societal value priorities. Nonetheless, at the individual level, value conflicts 
are connected to emotional conflicts which cannot always be ignored due to the tensions 
and uncomfortableness they generate. Moreover, as noted above, more stable value 
dispositions can change also after the fact, in other words, after concrete action towards 
more sustainable practices, at either individual or societal levels, potentially creating a 
positive feedback loop for change.  
One more immediate cause for optimism is likely to lie in widened discourses and increased 
discursive consciousness of unsustainable practices, and increased awareness of 
ambivalence and strategic ignorance of the value and emotion conflicts, and knowledge. 
Talking about and better appreciating the difference between more stable value dispositions 
at the individual level, and value priorities at individual and societal levels, and 
understanding that in most everyday situations some values are in conflict, could help us 
better question, explore and challenge societal value priorities and certain unsustainable 
practices.402 Understanding for example that it is not one’s “fault” to want to eat meat on a 
                                                          
402
 To have more of an impact, such wide and open discussions could be carried out in schools, in the media, in 
communities, in public or other non-profit campaigns, in citizen committees, in public service, etc., and be 
initiated by local and national governments, as well as many other organizations. 
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regular basis could be morally liberating. Nonetheless, that want may have to simply be 
sacrificed so that a future for human societies can better be realized. 
A recent case of a purposive attempt to do many of the things discussed above can be seen 
in what Extinction Rebellion (XR) – a new movement for societal change – is doing. By 
demanding that governments “tell the truth” about climate change XR groups are likely to 
increase discursive consciousness and possibly manage to challenge paradigms. By 
demanding citizens’ assemblies on climate change they are also in effect asking for 
discourses to be more inclusive of all of society, something that can enable otherwise 
difficult policy action.403 By setting up so called XR cafes, the movement is offering safe 
spaces for value and emotion expression and discussion. And finally, the way XR refer to the 
“right and duty to act” in terms of ordinary citizens pushing for policymakers to act implies 
agency and co-responsibility.404 
Regarding changing practices from within, meat eating related practices are a particularly 
good example of such potential, and the empirical analysis in Chapter 5 indicates that many 
potential elements of change can be found in discourses around the new meatways, as 
noted in the following section. Meat eating related practices are also linked in various ways 
to many other practices (within food provisioning, within economies, and within communal 
and individual lives), and the meat system is an essential part of the current dominant social 
paradigm, and capitalist market system. Confronting this to the extent necessary will likely 
indeed be extremely challenging, yet arguably important and urgent for sustainability. 
Transforming the meat system could also, however, act as a test case for how humanity can 
transform itself.  
As I argued in Chapter 3, meat eating related practices can have particularly strong 
distributed agentive power, in terms of the new meats themselves, in terms of the 
discourses around the new meatways changing meanings, lessening strategic ignorance of 
                                                          
403
 The work of a citizens’ assembly on abortion rights enabled policy action and led to a successful referendum 
expanding abortion rights in Ireland in 2018. This is referred to by Extinction Rebellion as an example of how 
citizens’ assemblies can bring change. Citizens’ assembly as such is a fairly established form of deliberation 
(relating to the concept of deliberative democracy) used in certain nationally important issues in a number of 
countries. 
404
 The primary way in which Extinction Rebellion tries to actively create change is with non-violent civil 
disobedience. However, it can be argued that the means discussed in the text here may be equally important, 
and importantly also less divisive. For more on Extinction Rebellion, see for example, their own website at 
https://rebellion.earth/. 
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knowledge and of value and emotion conflicts (or lessening the need for other strategies for 
coping with cognitive dissonance) and increasing the acknowledgement of ambivalence. 
Further, both individual agency and collective emotional agency can be deployed by 
individuals or by communities for changing meat eating related practices from within. The 
example of conscious flexitarians (Verain et al., 2015) acknowledging co-responsibility, and 
using their political agency (Halkier & Holm, 2008) indicates that there are possibilities 
reflecting and applying the ought implies can -principle.  
As social practice theories argue, change as such is constant in social practices. However, 
humans can “change the change” (O'Brien, 2012:590), although this requires both agency 
and responsibility, and addressing the “conscious and unconscious assumptions, beliefs, 
values, identities, and emotions of individuals and groups that influence perceptions, 
interpretations, and actions” (idem:589). Using social practice theories for analysing the 
challenges, as well as the solutions, may be valuable.405 This may be especially so, when the 
theory is adapted to include discourses, and strong connections to values and emotions, and 
when allowing for some emphasis on distributed agentive power. 
6.1.2. Empirical data on discourses 
In this section, I will recontextualize my findings from Chapter 5, taking into consideration 
the conceptual framework in Chapter 3. The data consists of four online articles on the new 
meatways from the Guardian newspaper (between 2015 and 2017) and discussions by 
posters following the articles. In short, my main claim is that discourses around the new 
meatways can help open meat eating related practices up discursively, reveal somewhat 
hidden frames that have supported existing practices in the last decades, and subject these 
practices to purposive change. Two conceptual metaphors present in the data nail down well 
two main issues regarding transforming the meat system towards radically less, non-
intensive production with radically lower negative impacts. I will discuss them first in the 
following paragraphs. After that, I will go over several other issues related to the new 
meatways that the data analysis has brought up. 
                                                          
405
 Until now, policymakers have on occasion used social practice theories for problem analysis, but have then 
usually gone back to older, individual behaviour change related policy methods in their search for solutions 
(Welch, 2017a). 
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The first metaphor, the hungry beast406 addresses the still very present meat demand 
paradigm which needs critical reassessment. The issue of whether feeding the future world 
with conventional animal-based meat is more about demand (actual need among 
populations), or supply (further expansion of the meat industry and its dominative power), 
can be seen through the hungry beast metaphor in the data. The beast is a singular entity 
consisting of (various groups of) meat-hungry humans in the world. Alternatively, it is the 
demand for meat itself, as suggested with certain expressions in the data. The beast 
metaphor is not meant to depict actual humans as animal-like, nor to deny that there might 
be populations, in the Global South, for whom eating some more meat could significantly 
increase food security; it is simply a tool to reveal the metaphorical dimensions of seeing 
meat demand as a natural force, and something that cannot be argued with.407  
The new meats, i.e. cell-based meat, the new plant-based meats, and even insects to an 
extent, are partially functioning in the same Hungry beast (Meeting the demand) frame with 
the underlining notion that these new food products are absolutely necessary to satisfy the 
starkly increasing demand for meat. One of the consequences of the dominance of the 
Meeting the demand frame in policy documents, research reports, and mainstream 
discourses regarding how to handle meeting the global food and/or protein demand by 2050 
is that until recently, policies have not supported meat reduction, or a transformation 
towards plant-based proteins, anywhere in the world.408  
The second metaphor of a journey illustrates how sustainable ways of eating protein, 
including some meat, can be realized. This metaphor is present in the data, and in literature 
(Jallinoja et al., 2016). When framing meat eating and its transformation using this 
metaphor, different meatways are seen as points on a continuum, where many possible 
journeys along that continuum can be made (see Figure 6.2).409 Seeing the different 
meatways as points along a continuum can facilitate even more radical changes.  
                                                          
406
 To my knowledge, this is not an established conceptual metaphor, although similar expressions can be 
found in the Metaphorlist (Lakoff et al., 1991). 
407
 In fact, the hungry beast could even be seen as the big and powerful meat industry, hungry for growth and 
more profits. 
408
 A significant sign for change are the new 2019 Canadian food guidelines that seemingly encourage people to 
eat more plant-based proteins than meat. They are also very comprehensive in offering food, nutrition, and 
eating related advice. See https://food-guide.canada.ca/en/. 
409
 Figures 3.8 and 6.2 are identical. Figure 6.2 is provided only for convenience. 
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There are three specific benefits to using a frame that employs this metaphor. Firstly, when 
all meatways (including veganism) are seen as stops on the same road, they are not as 
different from each other, and people at different points of their journey may have more 
understanding and tolerance towards each other. Coping strategies to deal with cognitive 
dissonance may also be less present. Secondly, a benefit to thinking of reducing meat eating 
as a journey is that for many, a slower change in individual eating habits may be better – 
easier to work through, and more durable in the longer term - than a quicker switch (also 
argued by Zaraska, 2016a).410 Thirdly, when moving from one meatway to another is seen as 
a journey, one can also go back and forth on this journey, and there is less need to identify 
oneself, for example, as a lapsed or failed vegetarian when currently eating some meat. 
Moving away from strict to more relaxed thinking can, in fact, help change (de Boer et al., 
2014; Jallinoja et al., 2016). Important from the sustainability point of view would of course 
be to keep moving, at least collectively, as much as possible, towards less resource intensive 
and destructive meatways.  
Figure 6.2. The continuum and journey of different meatways 
 
Source: Figure by author. The idea of such a continuum is, however, present in literature (see Jallinoja et al., 2016). 
Notes: The vertical lines offer an estimate of the closeness of the meatways, also from an ideological point of view.
411
  
As regards the relationship between the new meatways and the above frames, as portrayed 
by the two metaphors, the new meats – cell-based and plant-based meat and insects – can 
                                                          
410
 The discourse data also includes some indications that this could be the case at least for some people. 
411
 Carnism is the ideological background to eating meat. The socially shared beliefs of this particular ideology 
would include meat being Normal, Natural, Necessary and Nice (Joy, 2010; Piazza et al., 2015). I argue in 
Chapter 3 that an individual carnist tends to express carnistic dominance, for example, supporting the killing of 
animals for meat, or being indifferent to the fate of animals (Monteiro et al., 2017), and a societal carnist tends 
to express carnistic defence, i.e. defending the practice of eating animals, while also not wanting to harm 
animals as such (idem). As non-dominant meatways, vegetarianism and veganism may seem to have strong 
ideology behind them, but this is not necessarily so, or at least the ideology need not be stronger than that 
behind carnism. Generally in this thesis, I refer to vegetarianism and veganism to describe certain meatways. 
However, some people make a clear distinction between a vegetarian or vegan diet and the ideology itself. I do 
not see that the distinctions are clear and strong enough to necessarily differentiate between the two. Firstly, 
there is no single definition for vegetarianism or veganism as an ideology to separate it from a diet that is in no 
way ideological. Secondly, as meat eating is usually not seen as an ideology, although it can arguably often be 
such (as carnism), one can see vegetarianism and veganism in a similar light. 
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in principle work in both frames. However, whether the new meats can be truly sustainable, 
if they simply replace animal-based meat (satisfying the hungry beast) without the principle 
of meat reduction, i.e. flexitarianism, is by no means clear. This depends on whether the 
scale of impact reduction would be large enough, and whether or not new, similarly 
problematic issues would be created with such new massive-scale industries. Such a 
replacement is however, more or less the stated future aim of the emerging industries that 
are forming around the new meats. On the other hand, the new meats can work well when 
replacing meat along the journey of meat reduction, within the principle of flexitarianism, 
especially its stronger forms whereby “meat” is only eaten occasionally. Whichever paths are 
explored and taken – or parallel paths may be taken simultaneously - the ultimate goal has 
to be about radical absolute reductions in negative impacts. 
The empirical analysis also looked for specific values connected to frames, with the idea 
from literature that a stronger presence (or prioritization) of certain values, at individual and 
at societal or cultural levels, can facilitate sustainability, while a stronger presence of certain 
other values can hinder it. Seen through the Schwartz value theory (Schwartz, 2006b; 2012), 
the values potentially facilitating sustainability include values such as co-responsibility, 
concern for, and unity with nature, social justice and equality, while the values that can 
hinder sustainability include values especially related to power and achievement, also seen 
as materialistic values at the cultural level (Schwartz, 2006b). The frames that tend to be 
fairly dominant in the discourse data about the new meatways – exploring new, seemingly 
better products for the market – may not have strong links to the sustainability facilitating 
values. On the other hand, the still somewhat less dominant frames about the new 
meatways – especially to do with sufficiency – may have stronger links to these values. 
Although value conflicts may prevent sustainability facilitating values as such from 
influencing action (see e.g. Maio, 2011), all the new meatways have, in principle, a benefit 
from the point of view of sustainability. This is because, compared to the old meatways 
(eating animal-based meat daily, or following a vegetarian or vegan diet), the new meatways 
can better align values related to sustainability with values often being prioritized in daily 
food related practices, such as providing for family, convenience, tradition, freedom, 
politeness, and pleasure. This is a clear benefit for the new meatways, as value conflicts, and 
strategic ignorance of them, are a significant issue hindering change.  
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Further, regarding frames, ideologies and paradigms present in societies, and especially 
present in discourses around sustainability, the emergent frame of flexitarianism, at least in 
the way it is constructed in my data, supports the concept of sufficiency, important for those 
seeing strong sustainability as a necessary societal goal.412 On the other hand, the new 
meats are alternatives that can also function well in the current dominant social paradigm, 
represented, for example, by capitalism and carnism. I will still return to this distinction later 
in this chapter. 
Specific value related issues to do with meat eating related practices include also various 
coping strategies. The new meatways, and the discourses around them, can have an impact 
on these. Firstly, strategic ignorance of value and emotion conflicts, and of related 
knowledge, is a less discussed, but rather present phenomenon that helps to keep certain 
problematic practices, such as those related to meat eating, from being purposively 
changed. It also prevents the sense of emotional agency, necessary for change (Weenink & 
Spaargaren, 2016). The wider, more varied and in-depth the discourses about problematic 
practices are, however, the less convenient strategic ignorance is to maintain, the more 
discursive consciousness there is likely to be, and the easier ambivalence – regarding the 
conflicting values or emotions - about the practices may be to acknowledge.  
The new meatways therefore offer a way to expand the discourse, away from the 
conventional animal-based meat vs. no meat dichotomy. Although the data also includes 
resistance to the new meatways, they might also eventually be less threatening than strict 
vegetarianism or veganism, and they might lessen the negative, coping strategy inducing 
discourses around vegetarianism and veganism, and even help normalize these diets further 
by bringing them to the wider discourses, as in my data. However, for some posters, the new 
plant-based meats, in particular, seem to cause similar resentment than vegetarians and 
vegans often do. In this case, however, it is likely to be because the new plant-based meats 
are presented as just as good as meat (in taste, texture, and so on), and that being so, there 
would be no reason not to eat them instead of meat. This brings out the value conflict (in 
those employing coping strategies), and restricts freedom of choice (for the indifferent), and 
in fact, the new meats make it more obvious that meat eating is a choice, not a necessity.  
                                                          
412
 For a brief discussion on weak and strong sustainability, see Chapter 2. 
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Meat is also a moral question that the new meatways address in different ways. Firstly, by 
directing discourses away from all-or-nothing (black-and-white) dichotomous thinking, the 
new meatways can release some of the moral burden and guilt related to meat eating via 
the recognition that daily meat eating and vegetarianism or veganism are not the only 
choices. As seen in the data, flexitarianism in particular runs counter to the all-or-nothing 
approach: it is about less harm being better than more harm. This makes it, on the one hand, 
difficult for meat eaters to deny on moral grounds as a viable strategy, and makes the 
argument about vegetarian or vegan hypocrisy413 also lose ground. On the other hand, it 
may also be easy for strict vegetarians or vegans to disapprove of flexitarianism on moral 
grounds. However, many of those identifying as vegetarians are in reality strong flexitarians, 
i.e. occasionally still eating meat. Given that vegetarians and vegans may cease to follow 
their diets due to the all-or-nothing principle being difficult and impractical, especially 
socially, strong flexitarianism may be an identity that would be easier to maintain in longer 
term.  
There are two more issues to be discussed here, as regards ways in which meat eating 
related practices could open up discursively. The first of these relates to labels, and the 
second to the issue of normalization. 
Although the data includes resistance to labels such as flexitarianism, it also contains 
support for them. Labels can assist change in several ways. Positive labels may help people 
overcome initial negative reactions, such as towards some of the new meats. Further, when 
flexitarianism is labelled as a movement, it can help more people reduce meat eating, as the 
collective agency of a movement tends to lead to more recruits, and perhaps also because 
flexitarianism may be appealing to more people than vegetarianism or veganism. Moreover, 
once something is labelled, adopting it becomes easier, and labelling can help with 
behaviour that requires particular effort through creating identity which helps to keep the 
behaviour. Additionally, social labelling can eventually help shift motivations, e.g. a 
behaviour that is environmentally more sustainable may start from health or social reasons, 
but end up being about sustainability (Cornelissen et al., 2007). This shifting motivation 
further enables people to persist with the diet, as indicated by some of the data. The 
                                                          
413
 This argument about hypocrisy is about vegetarians and vegans supposedly pretending to be morally clean. 
Making such claims can be seen as one of the coping strategies for meat eaters. 
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positivity of the label is important, however, as when the label is viewed negatively, 
motivation can be lost more easily. This is often the case for lapsed vegetarians who far 
outnumber current vegetarians, at least in the United States (Asher et al., 2016). Although 
the data also includes criticism, the label of flexitarianism may have potential to be seen 
positively, and it may, therefore, have power over labels such as vegetarianism or veganism. 
Promoting strong flexitarianism as a more feasible meatway than total abstention from meat 
would indeed seem beneficial.   
Lastly, my data consists of many attempts to normalize the new meatways, partly through 
personal experiences (in the case of insects), through playing with concepts (e.g. insects as 
land shrimp) and also through attempts at extending the meaning of “normal” to cover cell-
based meat or the new plant-based meats, or flexitarianism, and to present conventional 
animal-based meat as not normal. Such processes may also change the connotations 
towards plant-based foods, and vegetarianism and veganism in general, into more positive 
ones (Donaldson, 2016a). Discourses around the new meatways could also help normalize 
vegetarianism and veganism further as more realistic options for the future, by lessening the 
need for negative discourses around vegetarianism and veganism, and by bringing them 
further to the wider discourses. Imagining positive futures around sustainability is necessary, 
as it can help these become reality (Stibbe, 2015). To some extent, my data does include 
narratives of the future involving the new meatways. Viewed together from all the data, 
these narratives can be seen to incorporate the three framing devices, factual (practical 
aspects), normative (how things ought to be) and emotive (how positive such new meatways 
could be), constructing discursive frames more generally (Strydom, 2000).414 Incorporating 
all three elements into single narratives could be relevant for impactful, positive stories 
about the future, making further transformation seem more feasible. 
6.2. Final words on transforming meat eating related practices 
Since my primary focus in Chapters 2 and 5, and partial focus in Chapter 3, has been on a 
transformation of meat eating related practices, as opposed to more general sustainability 
transformation, I will still include in this last chapter a brief discussion on how specifically the 
conceptual framework in this thesis can contribute to such a transformation. I see this 
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 See Chapter 3 for more on framing devices. 
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transformation of the meat system as an urgent task for societies, for many reasons, but 
especially from the point of view of both the biodiversity and climate crises. The section will 
end with a brief word on potential for more research on the issue. 
Even at this moment, in 2019, the vast majority of policymakers still seemingly ignore the 
issue of meat,415 while an increasing number of scientists point to it as a central issue. The 
discrepancy is also clear between the IPCC reports, with the 2018 SR1.5 report and the 2019 
land use report both considering GHG mitigation through diet shift an important option,416 
and the climate conferences (COPs), such as in Katowice in 2018, which are more political 
and where the issue of meat has still mainly been dealt with in the side events, mostly 
involving NGOs.417 The issue may be gradually moving closer to the center, however, 
possibly indicated, for example, by the critical calls from some of the Katowice participants 
and presentations for policymakers to take it seriously.418 The 2019 IPCC land use report may 
also help push the issue onto the agendas for the next round of negotiations. 
Generally, one argument against radical changes in animal agriculture is that many 
economies in the world are dependent on it. However, changing the way protein foods are 
produced does not mean that they would cease to be produced. The world obviously needs 
protein food production, but it needs different kind of production systems in order for both 
the natural system and humans to cope in the future. Imagining the specifics of an actual 
animal free agricultural future for the largest economy in the world, the United States, 
Emery and Almy (2018)419 argue that such a system could be well functioning, while offering 
                                                          
415
 For the denial of the problem among policymakers, see, for example, a 2018 column 'Denial' - is meat the 
new climate change? by the EU Observer. 
416
 IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5° C states, for example, that “1.5°C pathways that include low 
energy demand […], low material consumption, and low GHG-intensive food consumption have the most 
pronounced synergies and the lowest number of trade-offs with respect to sustainable development and the 
SDGs” (IPCC, 2018:21). 
417
 The meat and GHG -heavy menu of the COP24 Katowice meeting itself illustrates how difficult it is for 
policymakers to take the meat issue seriously, see e.g. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-12-
03/un-climate-conference-features-meat-and-emissions-heavy-menu. 
418
 Some reports produced for the Talanoa Dialogue, designed to help countries contribute to the UNFCCC 
dialogue between COP23 and COP24, also argue for the necessity of radically reducing meat consumption. See 
e.g. Johns Hopkins Center for a Livable Future (2018). 
419
 This short report produced for the Good Food Institute is in reaction to a journal article by White and Hall 
(2017) whereby it is argued that such a transformation away from animal agriculture would leave the US 
economy and population worse off. Emery and Almy offer proof of a bias in favour of the livestock industry in 
the White and Hall article, while pointing out their flawed modelling and erroneous assumptions. 
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benefits that the current system lacks, for example, in terms of healthier diets, more biofuel 
production and areas for rewilding and improved habitats for endangered species. 
6.2.1. Some suggestions 
Chapter 2, and in particular Box 2.3 include recommendations from literature on how to 
transform meat eating related practices towards radically lower meat consumption 
wherever consumption is currently high, or even medium high. In connection with this 
discussion, and based on relevant literature from Chapter 2 and my work in Chapters 3 and 
5, I would emphasize the following, as regards the connections between practices and 
discourses supporting other (policy) action for change: 
1 – There needs to be a further increase in discussions around the issue of meat, spreading 
to as many parts of society as possible, and encouraged by policymakers. The main focus 
should be on the multiple benefits of eating less or no meat, so that most people could 
agree with some part of the message.420 Further focus should be on positive narratives 
about a future with little or no intensive animal agriculture, on questioning assumptions 
such as the Meeting the demand frame (the conceptual metaphor of the hungry beast), and 
on talking about value priorities and value and emotion conflicts, strategic ignorance of the 
issue at different levels of society, and co-responsibility for solving the problem. Importantly, 
wide discourses may help gain support for new, transformative policies, and moreover, the 
wider, more varied and in-depth the discourses are, the less the issues may be ignored. The 
case of Extinction Rebellion discussed earlier in this chapter indicates that the pathways in 
Figure 6.1 may not be theoretical only. 
2 – The main focus of the transformation needs to be on the radical reduction of 
environmental impacts.421 Options having the largest positive impacts while still being 
pragmatic, flexible, and maintaining some cultural diversity should be promoted by 
policymakers, change agents, and other societal actors, and enforced by regulation, while, to 
the extent necessary, working with especially farmers, but also the rest of the relevant 
industries. Most likely such options would entail strong flexitarianism, i.e. consuming pulses, 
                                                          
420
 Indeed, many recent reviews of the issue combine benefits from reduced meat consumption to both 
sustainability and human health. See, for example, IAP (2018). 
421
 For discussion regarding the critical relevance of a focus on impacts of sustainability transformations, see 
e.g. Geiger et al. (2018) and Gjerris et al. (2016). 
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with some new meats and occasional conventional animal-based meat. While flexitarianism 
can also be used as a concept within weak sustainability, implying smaller reductions in meat 
eating together with efficiency gains in meat production, when focusing on the idea of 
sufficiency, flexitarianism can also function as a way of possibly getting people used to the 
idea of strong sustainability in other areas of life and society as well.422 The idea of the 
journey of meat eating along the continuum (the conceptual metaphor discussed earlier) can 
be very helpful in enabling change. 
3 – The good news regarding change is that meanings and value priorities (or individual 
value dispositions) can, and probably will change during and after such processes or journeys 
of transformation, if not already beforehand. This is a point that does not invalidate a focus 
on values, but gives some optimism, as regards the generally slower societal change in value 
priorities and cultural meanings. 
6.2.2. Note on future research on transforming the meat system 
Many mainstream recommendations call for research on making production of meat more 
efficient and intensive (e.g. Gerber et al., 2013, an FAO report), in line with the demand 
paradigm. However, there are also recommendations focusing more on transforming the 
system, and on reducing especially consumption and demand for meat. A consequence of 
the meat demand paradigm is, however, that research into behaviour change in meatways 
has still been lacking far behind research on technological emission reduction from meat 
production (Garnett, 2011). Among others, Wellesley et al. (2015), Hartmann and Siegrist 
(2017) and IAP (2018) all call for more research on how to encourage or motivate individual 
behaviour change in terms of eating less meat. More comprehensively, Garnett (2011) sees a 
need for more research on how to shift food consumption in the Global South so that the 
rich world problems with diet - for example, to do with overconsumption of meat - could be 
better avoided.423 
                                                          
422
 Verain et al. (2015) argue that the contrast between weak flexitarianism and strong flexitarianism can 
indeed be seen in terms of an efficiency approach (or product-related consumption, consuming differently and 
more efficiently in terms of resources), and a sufficiency approach (or act-related consumption, consuming 
less). 
423
 This in a similar way that some locations in the Global South have managed to shift from having few, if any 
electricity supplies, to using renewable energy, without having to go through a phase of getting electricity from 
fossil fuels. 
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Notably, there are few if any research recommendations, however, on how to tackle the 
perhaps most challenging issues: to decrease (from sustainability point of view) negative 
industry influence on meat related policy,424 to decrease individual or societal strategic 
ignorance, and to widen the range of research being funded, so that research on changing 
the production of meat includes research on a fundamental transformation of the system.  
On the theme of what to research, Elliott (2013:329) argues that selective ignorance (a kind 
of strategic ignorance as well) affects what is researched and what is not researched, for 
example, via "decisions about what questions to ask, what metrics or standards to employ, 
what concepts to use, what research strategies to pursue, what technological applications to 
develop, and what information to disseminate”. Therefore, discussing, for example, the 
values behind certain research could be more important than trying to obtain as much 
knowledge as possible, as with the obtaining of that knowledge we have already made some 
choices (about what to obtain) based on values. However, these influential values are 
normally barely discussed, if at all (Sarewitz, 2004). Elliott (2013:342) sees this issue applying 
in particular to agriculture related research, as the research choices in this area affect 
"society's awareness of the environmental and social problems associated with current 
agricultural practices" and "whether specific alternatives to current agriculture appear 
feasible and important". 
6.3. Discussion 
In this last section, I will first make some reflections on working on this project, and go 
briefly over the limitations and alternative paths to the empirical part. Following this, I will 
discuss the potential contribution that this work could make, before concluding with a 
broader reflection on both the conceptual and empirical work. 
 
 
                                                          
424
 The meat industry power and influence is discussed in Chapter 2, and power is also discussed in Chapter 3. 
More generally, and as discussed earlier, a social practice theory approach, especially in the stronger versions 
of the theories, takes dominative power in society, often inhibiting change, to largely reside in practices 
themselves (practices as entities), i.e. in the invisible iceberg (see Figure 3.2), as well as in the 
interconnectedness of practices. I consider discourses to be connected but separate from social practices, and 
power in discourses is another issue discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
 
289 
 
6.3.1. Autobiographical reflections 
During this project, I have dealt with my own strategic ignorance as regards meat to a 
considerable extent (as compared to before), and nowadays identify as a strong flexitarian, 
eating a good amount of pulses, but being curious about the new meats, as well as 
experimenting with some old plant-based meat replacements. Similarly, I have ended up in 
some way dealing with my strategic ignorance as regards ecological threats such as climate 
change or biodiversity loss. In 2016, my emotions finally fully caught up with my long-time 
awareness of the issues, and after some discussions and self-reflection, I realized that the 
best way to deal with the related negative emotions was to acknowledge them. I felt that, in 
addition to being less stressful, this could lead to positive actions at personal level, such as 
completing this thesis. 
Further on the work itself, I have learned to find some balance in my writing, somewhere 
between detached and passive, and emotional and involved. As is often the case in 
qualitative research projects (Bazeley, 2013), building up this thesis has been a question of 
going back and forth between the potential research questions, the (potential and final) 
data, and the conceptual framework. Each of these elements has been shaped and reshaped 
by the other elements several times during the process. This all has also helped me build 
some more confidence in my abilities to develop and link ideas, and express them in a more 
comprehensible manner. One event particularly helped me forward in the conceptual part, 
and is therefore worth mentioning. The research task I set for Chapter 3 was born at a 
workshop in Helsinki in 2017,425 from discussions regarding potential connections between 
social practices and discourses. Senior colleagues there suggested that making this link as 
strong as possible could be challenging, but it could also be a theoretical contribution in this 
thesis. In the end, this connection did turn out to be central to the conceptual framework. 
While working on this project, I have read and learned a lot, and widened my understanding 
of human behaviour, as individuals, as collectives, and as carriers of social practices, 
implicitly or explicitly embracing or rejecting the linked paradigms, worldviews and values. 
Peattie (2011) argues that sustainability researchers need to be paradigm breakers and 
paradigm makers, instead of paradigm takers. I believe that a paradigm shift lies in the near 
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 See also Acknowledgements. 
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future of humanity, and making sense of the kinds of futures that may be possible through a 
transformation is vital. 
6.3.2. Limitations of the empirical analysis and alternative paths 
Perhaps the most significant limitation of online data such as the data I used is its 
anonymity. Not only because of the negative issues that anonymity can bring about, as 
discussed in Chapter 4 (although anonymity has its positive sides too), but because there are 
usually few or no demographic data elements attached to data. However, seeing the 
discussions as entities - rather than as a group of individual comments from posters the 
analyst would wish to know more about - and as reflections of particular discourses, makes 
the demographics somewhat less important. Nonetheless, seeing differences or similarities 
between locations (e.g. posters living in the United Kingdom or the United States) or gender, 
for example, would be interesting. Similarly, being able to identify comments that originate 
from organized attempts to influence the discourses would be useful in terms of discussion 
on power.426 
Another limitation of the empirical study in this thesis may be that I restricted the data to 
one newspaper, and four documents.427 A larger amount of data would perhaps have 
allowed for more confidence in the findings, and some possibilities for comparisons. 
However, had I included significantly more data, the level of detail would have necessarily 
been less intensive, or the analysis itself would have had to be different, perhaps including 
some quantitative elements. The richness of the discourse did become evident already from 
this smaller amount of data.  
The way that I used the discourse data in this thesis was intended firstly, to explore some of 
the concepts discussed in Chapter 3 (such as coping strategies in connection with the meat 
paradox), and secondly, to actually study the discourses with a more open mind. A smaller 
amount of data has seemed to fulfil these two purposes, although having the time to analyse 
a larger amount of data in the same manner would have been useful as well. In a way, the 
empirical part of this thesis can also be seen as a case study, being somewhat limited in 
scale. 
                                                          
426
 Assuming that such attempts at least occasionally might exist in this kind of data. See a brief discussion in 
Chapter 4. 
427
 A “document” refers to a newspaper article together with its reader comments. 
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Finally, it might have been interesting or useful to include a variety of different data, in 
addition to the particular discourse data; for example, expert interviews or focus groups, to 
test some of the elements in the conceptual framework, or to discuss the results of the 
analysis of the online data. Given that the conceptual work is at least as important for this 
thesis as the empirical analysis, and that completing the conceptual work was equally or 
more time-consuming than the empirical part, expanding to different kinds of data would 
not have been practicable. However, such research might be an avenue to pursue in the 
future. 
6.3.3. Potential contribution of the work 
As regards the conceptual framework in this thesis, scholars writing on social practice 
theories in this millennium, and especially in the last 5-10 years or so have developed the 
theories extensively, even if there still exists more of a multiplicity of theories, rather than 
one single social practice theory. However, they have mostly not engaged in examining in 
detail the relationship between discourses and social practices. This is likely to be so at least 
in part because scholars usually originate from either tradition, and do not tend to cross over 
(Nicolini, personal communication, 26 February 2018). Examining this relationship is one of 
the main focuses in Chapter 3, and I believe this work to be an original contribution to 
theory on this issue.428  
Analysing societal discourses may also partly address the concern of Welch and Warde 
(2015) as regards the focus of social practice theoretical research largely staying at the 
micro-level of practice performances, and therefore it not being able to offer more 
persuasive conceptual answers to policymakers on how to make societal change. Focused on 
the links between discourses and social practices, my work aspires to offer some help in 
finding such answers. 
Furthermore, in an interdisciplinary manner, the conceptual framework includes concepts 
from outside social practice theories in order to expand on the connections from practice 
elements to values, emotions and knowledge. Especially the connection to values has often 
had a minor, or near non-existent role in social practice theoretical writings. However, as Bai 
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 The critical discourse analysis in Chapter 5 can be seen theoretically compatible with social practice theories 
(Daniel Welch, personal communication, 18 December 2018), also for example through the work of Norman 
Fairclough. This link further sets the connections between discourses and social practices. 
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et al. (2016) argue, a future in the Anthropocene requires an emphasis on underlying values. 
Since values, emotions and knowledge are closely connected (as also discussed in Chapter 
3), I see all of these connections as vital, especially when focusing on transforming 
unsustainable social practices towards something the natural and human world can 
sustainably cope with. On a more practical level, my work could contribute to ideas on how 
to purposively transform unsustainable social practices into more sustainable ones.  
Meat eating related practices are one such bundle of largely unsustainable practices that 
need transforming, and together with the empirical work in Chapter 5, this thesis suggests 
different pathways that could be further explored. Findings from discourse analysis can 
provide new insights, deconstruct dominant assumptions and challenge practices (Georgaca 
& Avdi, 2011), such as those involved in producing animals for human use, as well as in 
eating such animals. 
6.3.4. Reflections on both the conceptual and empirical work 
In earlier sections in this chapter, I have covered in some detail conclusions from the 
conceptual and empirical work done in this thesis. However, in this last section I will still 
reflect on working on these parts as a whole, especially as regards what has been 
unexpected, or particularly notable issues, viewing both parts together.  
Firstly, getting into the detail of how value systems work, in individuals and at the societal 
level, has been a very informative experience. The value-action, or knowledge-action gaps 
no longer seem to be the main issues inhibiting change, but indeed understanding the 
functioning of the value systems, and everything related to them (practices, worldviews and 
ideologies, emotions, and discursive framing) seems to offer more opportunity to make 
progress towards societal transformation.  
Secondly, it has been useful to recognize that although social practice theories tend to 
traditionally omit the significance of the individual, and importantly, stand in opposition to 
behaviour change based policymaking, there are ways to bring the individual back, so to 
speak, conceptually, but also in actuality, in terms of collective change, and even in terms of 
an empowerment of the individual. I appreciate the recent metaphors of seeing the social 
world as an infinite mesh of interlinked practices, and individual practices as icebergs where 
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what lies under water is the main, difficult to change part of the practices. I also appreciate 
the contradiction whereby behaviour change policies at the same time treat people in a way 
as objects to be changed, and as subjects capable of taking responsibility for change. It is 
easy to consider policymakers as necessarily first movers for change. At the same time, I see 
including the individual as a subject with agency, and co-responsibility, as essential for a 
sustainability transformation.429 The positive feedback loop between individual and 
collective citizen action and policy action enabling and facilitating each other can work. 
However, it needs to start from somewhere. The meat system is one area where action at 
the citizen level may have potential to break the cycle of inertia. And certainly the case of 
Extinction Rebellion discussed earlier in this chapter shows that there can be ways to tackle 
inertia even on a world-wide scale.430 
Thirdly, it has been a satisfying realization to see how social practices and discourses indeed 
can conceptually connect through the corresponding notions of general understandings (as 
one of the main social practice elements) and cognitive frames (as part of discourses), both 
neatly also connecting onto values, emotions and knowledge. Additionally, the three framing 
devices from Strydom (2000)431 correspond neatly to these connections. The connection 
between social practices and discourses also links to the above point about agency, as I 
believe that only through discursive consciousness of practices (rare, but still occurring 
condition) can agency be realised. Further, understanding how conflicts between values, 
emotions or knowledges function as the glue between difficult-to-change practices and the 
way they are discussed, or not discussed, has been enlightening. 
Fourthly, and more specific to the empirical part, recognising and distinguishing between the 
different frames linked to meat eating related practices has been illuminating. 
Flexitarianism, as an acknowledged unique meatway and as an ideology, is something at 
least partly new to modern societies (while at the same time, without its label, being a very 
old and common meatway), while the new meats are also innovative and have some 
considerable potential for change. However, how these new meats and meatways turn out 
to be employed is to be seen. Flexitarianism can also be used as yet another food style 
                                                          
429
 See also O’Brien (2018) for a discussion on this. 
430
 However, what the Fridays for Future movement has done since 2018 has certainly increased discursive 
consciousness as well. 
431
 The three framing devices from are factual, normative and emotive. 
 
 
294 
 
whereby one sometimes skips conventional animal-based meat in a “flexitarian style”. 
Further, the new meats can be mainly utilized for profits by various industries, possibly just 
added to conventional meat eating on the side of individual eaters, in a system which will 
aim to only integrate weak sustainability. Such a system would be susceptible to an eventual 
collapse due to the related ecological crises.  
Fifthly, while working on this thesis, it has been thought-provoking to see how closely the 
transformation called for in the meat system relates to the journey of a larger sustainability 
transformation, also called by some the great transformation.432 More specifically, there are 
at least two ways that the new meatways discussed in this thesis are related to such a 
transformation, as explained below. 
On the first of these connections, together with many other consumption related practices, 
eating radically less meat, in line with strong flexitarianism, connects to the idea of strong 
sustainability and sufficiency, and further, it links well with the concept of consumption 
corridors (Di Giulio & Fuchs, 2014:184), whereby a particular consumption corridor is defined 
by certain minimum and maximum standards, “allowing every individual to have a good life” 
while ensuring limits on the use of natural and social resources, so that access to a 
“sufficient level of resources […] for others in the present and in the future” can be 
guaranteed. The relationship between strong flexitarianism and the idea of consumption 
corridors could be worth paying attention to.   
On the second of these connections, there are arguments in the literature (e.g. Díaz & 
Merino, 2018; Twine, 2014) that it would be essential for those critical of the capitalistic 
market system, such as the degrowth movement, to reconsider human-animal relations and 
their connections to capitalism. Further, Nibert (2013) explores the link between capitalism 
and intensive animal agriculture, and believes that we can only transform away from 
intensive animal agriculture in a system that does not embrace capitalism. In Chapter 5, I 
also argued that in my data reflecting the discourses around the new meats, the Capitalism 
and Demand frames seemingly connect to each other. Specifically on the connection 
between cell-based meat, capitalism and human-animal relations, Miller (2012) sees that 
                                                          
432
 The concept of a great transformation in terms of ecological, economic and social concerns is originally from 
Polanyi (1944). In this thesis, the main focus has been on ecological sustainability, with the argument that it is a 
prerequisite for social and economic sustainability. For discussion of the great transformation, see e.g. Beling et 
al. (2018) and Spangenberg (2016). 
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cell-based meat succeeds in hiding the reality of both capitalism and animal exploitation, as 
its (future) existence maintains the importance of meat, while furthering the separation 
between meat and its animal origin. On the other hand, van der Weele and Driessen (2013) 
believe that it would be important to approach cell-based meat openly, allowing it to have 
potential for different futures, including one where humans could continue with animal 
protein consumption while having meaningful relationships with domesticated animals.433 
Finally, the link between the meat system crisis and the wider ecological and unsustainability 
crises also relate to the two conceptual metaphors discussed above in connection with the 
conclusions from the empirical data. More specifically, the hungry beast is the mainstream 
discursive frame justifying continuing increased, further intensified, and more efficient meat 
production, while also being employed by the emerging alternative meat industry to justify 
replacing conventional animal-based meat with the new meats. On the other hand, seeing 
different meatways, and especially both individual and societal transformation towards less 
meat as a positive journey, offers an alternative frame for the future. Whether these frames 
could successfully coexist, or whether a discursive struggle would ensue, remains to be seen. 
  
                                                          
433
 Further, cell-based meat could actually mean that the production of meat is once again brought out into the 
open (e.g. in a brewery-style production), instead of being increasingly hidden in the huge closed intensive 
industrial production units with actual animals. 
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Annex 1 - Coding system used in MAXQDA 
 
Main code Sub code Explanation 
Threads   Marks each thread (i.e. chain of posts) 
Posts  Marks each post 
Interesting   Marks instances where I thought I might use the data later, but there was no existing suitable code yet, 
neither was there any need for creating a new code at that point 
Old meatways  I did not code data with this main code 
 Vegetarianism/veganism Marks instances where vegetarianism or veganism is discussed or referred to (code included prior to 
analysis) 
 Conventional meat system Marks instances where any positive or negative (or neutral) aspect of some type of conventional 
(intensive, extensive, organic etc.) animal agriculture is discussed or referred to (code included prior to 
analysis) 
New meatways  I did not code data with this main code 
 Insects and insect protein as 
food 
Marks instances where insects as potential or existing food for humans are discussed or referred to (code 
included prior to analysis) 
 Flexitarianism Marks instances where flexitarianism is discussed, implied or referred to, including instances where 
infrequent or occasional meat eating is discussed without calling it flexitarianism (code included prior to 
analysis) 
 Plant-based meat Marks instances where either new or old plant-based meat is discussed or referred to, including also 
other plant-based “animal protein”; note that when the topic is “old” plant-based meat replacements, 
this is included in a note attached to the data (code included prior to analysis) 
 Cell-based meat Marks instances where cell-based meat is discussed or referred to, including also other cell-based animal 
protein (code included prior to analysis) 
Making positive future with 
meat alts 
  Marks instances where various meat alternatives are discussed as positive in/for the future (code from 
data) 
Business/technology - meat and 
meat alts 
 Marks instances where businesses or technologies are discussed in connection with, also conventional 
animal-based meat, but mostly meat alternatives (code from data) 
Labels  Marks instances where labelling meat eatieng related behaviour is discussed or referred to; this mostly 
relates to flexitarianism (code from data) 
Story  Marks instances where a “story” of some sort is contained in the post (code from literature) 
Knowledge  Marks instances where knowledge regarding "where meat comes from" and the impacts from meat 
production or consumption are discussed or referred to; it is about ethical aspects about animals, but 
also about other impacts of meat production, as well as similar impacts of meat alternatives (code from 
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data) 
Conflict  Marks instances of either a personal conflict between two posters (when it is related to the topic), or a 
conflict between ideas (related to the topic); in many cases, a conflict between two posters is also a 
conflict between ideas (code from literature) 
Cognitive frames about meat   Includes all cognitive frames that were first coded generally as “frames” in MAXQDA, and then analyzed 
in more detail outside MAXQDA (using mainly Excel for organization); the frames are discussed in 
Chapter 5 (code from theory building and literature) 
Carnism  Marks direct references to something more or less ideological as regards eating meat; note that this code 
does not mark instances where carnism is not obvious, e.g. it is not meant for instances when someone 
says that they love meat, or use one of the four Ns, or other coping strategies (code from literature) 
Metaphor   Marks certain conceptual metaphors that were repeated in the data, and I considered potentially 
relevant for the research questions (code from data, but in relation to literature) 
Values and morals  I did not code data with this main code 
 Values and morals general Marks instances with any (implied or direct) reference to morals or values in connection with eating or 
not eating animals (code from theory building and literature) 
 Watching/not watching 
others and their choices 
Marks instances of discussion regarding whether people care (or do not care) about what other people 
are doing somehow in connection with eating or not eating meat (code from data) 
Modality   Marks instances where the use of a modal verb (in particular “should”) is ambiguous, i.e. the modal verb 
can refer at the same time to something probably happening (epistemic modality) and something being 
“morally right” to do (“root” modality) (code from literature) 
Agency or lack of agency  Marks instances where feeling of agency or lack of agency to change one’s own meat eating related 
practices is discussed or referred to (code from theory building and literature) 
Emotions  I did not code data with this main code 
 Emotions general Marks instances where a positive or negative emotion (related to the topic of meat) is expressed or 
discussed (code included prior to analysis) 
 Catastrophizing Marks instances where it seems that a poster is catastrophizing, i.e. when a situation (somehow in 
relation to impacts from the meat system) is viewed or presented as extreme; this is placed under 
“emotions”, as catastrophizing is related to anxiety (code from data) 
Disgust   Marks instances where disgust, either towards meat, or towards meat alternatives is expressed or 
discussed; disgust is also an emotion, but since it is both an emotion and (possibly) a coping strategy, it is 
not under either of those, and is listed as a main code (code included prior to analysis) 
Environmental melancholia   Marks instances which can be seen to relate to environmental melancholia (and disempowerment) as 
regards meat eating; environmental melancholia can be seen as an emotion, but also a coping strategy, 
so it is listed as a main code (code from literature) 
The 4 N justifications  I did not code data with this main code; the 4 N justifications coded here include instances where the 4 
Ns are used as coping strategies, or related to carnism (all these codes are from literature and theory 
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building) 
 Not normal Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives, or very occasionally processes related to 
the production of meat or meat alternatives, are referred to as not normal 
 Normal Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives, or very occasionally processes related to 
the production of meat or meat alternatives, are referred to as normal 
 Not natural Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives, or often in this case, processes related to 
the production of meat or meat alternatives are referred to as not natural 
 Natural Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives, or often in this case, processes related to 
the production of meat or meat alternatives are referred to as natural 
 Not necessary Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives are referred to as not necessary; note 
that this code is restricted to the food products, not processes of production 
 Necessary Marks instances where eating meat or eating meat alternatives are referred to as necessary; note that 
this code is restricted to the food products, not processes of production 
 Not nice Marks instances where (eating) meat or (eating) meat alternatives are referred to as not nice; note that 
this code is restricted to the food products, not processes of production 
 Nice Marks instances where (eating) meat or (eating) meat alternatives are referred to as nice; note that this 
code is restricted to the food products, not processes of production 
Acknowledging ambivalence   Marks instances where ambivalence related to meat eating is in some form implied or discussed; this 
code is not used for instances where a poster may have acknowledged his/her ambivalence and changed 
behaviour (i.e. by becoming a vegetarian) (code from literature and theory building) 
Indifference   Marks instances where no justification for meat eating seems necessary for a poster, also when related 
negative issues are acknowledged; also discussion of such behaviour is included; the code also marks 
instances where one or more of the four Ns are used, but seemingly for social reasons only, i.e. no 
personal values or emotions appear to be in conflict (code from data) 
Actual behaviour change  Marks instances where the process of eating less meat, or organic meat, or becoming vegetarian or 
vegan is discussed; this is in fact a coping strategy in literature, but listed as a main code here 
Other coping strategies  I did not code data with this main code; these coping strategies are instead of, or in addition to the 4 N 
justifications, and are generally related to strategic ignorance 
 All or nothing Marks instances where it is implied that unless one can do everything to eliminate harm it is not worth 
doing just some of it; also instances where such an attitude is discussed or criticized are included; 
further, instances of “shooting the messenger” are included, i.e. criticism for someone discussing a moral 
behaviour, but not following it him/herself; also included are those posts, usually from posters 
identifying as vegetarians or vegans, where less harm is considered no better than a lot of harm, and only 
no harm is good enough (i.e. a “black and white” attitude); as regards meat eaters, this "all or nothing" 
coping strategy may actually be related to the "freedom to choose", as any restrictions by definition 
impact on freedom to choose, however, it is a somewhat different argument, therefore I have separated 
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these two codes (code from literature) 
 Animal death is unavoidable A version of the "all or nothing" coping strategy, but marked separately due to its popularity; in short: 
even a vegetarian diet causes a lot of animal death (on the fields themselves, or because of agricultural 
expansion); humans cannot live without animals dying; animal death is inevitable, and the more humans, 
the more animals die; in other words, meat eaters are not any more principally responsible than those 
not eating meat (code from data) 
 Devaluing vegetarians Marks instances where deficiencies and inconsistencies among vegetarians or vegans are specifically 
discussed; also includes instances where such discussion is criticized and vegetarians and vegans are 
defended; this code is also linked to the “all or nothing” code, but considered separately, as it is not only 
about excuses for not changing one’s own behaviour (by eating less or no meat), but also about putting 
others down (code from literature) 
 Freedom to choose Marks instances where freedom to choose what kind of food to eat is considered more important than 
any negative issues related to eating meat; also relates to people seemingly being afraid of being fooled 
or forced to eat “fake meat”, i.e. unidentifiable meat replacements; also included are instances where 
any ambivalence about eating meat is ridiculed, and eating meat is presented as a simple choice, either 
eat it or don’t (code from data) 
 Blaming vegans Marks instances where vegans are being blamed for why the poster him/herself is not trying 
veganism/vegetarianism, i.e. due to the hypocrisy and bad behaviour of vegans (code from data) 
 Denial of animal mind Marks instances where meat animals are considered less intelligent than other animals, such as pets 
(code from literature) 
 Denial of animal pain Marks instances where meat animals are considered to not feel pain when mistreated or killed (code 
from literature) 
 Neocarnism Marks instances of discussion of behaviour change, e.g. eating only organic or “humane” meat, however, 
without being strict with the choices, or without finding out how the animals have actually been raised, 
i.e. relying on the images and promises; a strong need to use justifications is linked to this (code from 
literature) 
 Perceived behavioural 
change 
Marks instances of discussion of behaviour where a person perceives to not eat (much) meat, although in 
reality doing so (code from literature) 
 Disassociation Marks instances of discussion, or expression of behaviour where the animal is separated from the food 
product (code from literature) 
 Avoidance Marks instances of discussion, or expression of behaviour where situations and information that would 
likely increase cognitive dissonance are actively avoided (code from literature) 
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